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PREFACE
This is not a typical book. It was not written all at once—it contains
articles, forecasts, and studies made over the past 30 years. Life
passes so quickly one can hardly remember how old one is; having
just written that phrase, I remembered my age.
I did not know how many pages in this book I should dedicate to
those individuals who have helped me. So I decided to thank, first,
those who inspired me with the idea to prepare this collection. Secondly, I need to thank those people who helped me with the actual
preparation of the book.
Before all else, however, I am indebted to my mother for her unconditional support in all my life’s endeavors and to my father for,
during my childhood, introducing me to business. I am grateful to
my older brother, Pavel, a talented engineer who, instead of dating
girls, often stayed home to explain to me the fundamentals of modern technology. I am thankful to my daughters, Liza and Valeria, for
forcing me, after a long day’s work, to sit down behind my desk and
write many of the articles that are collected here. I also thank my
Dina, who provided a warm environment during the preparation of
this book.
I will never forget my first arrival in the United States when I was
met at JFK airport by Charlie Powleske and Peter Tichansky, leaders
of the Business Council for International Understanding, who have
been and continue to be my friends and colleagues throughout all
my years in the United States. We all have different periods in our
lives, but my American period was particularly difficult because I
came here without any knowledge of the English language. I’m reminded of my cat, Benji, who understands everything, but can say
nothing. It was under these circumstances that I came to Forbes
magazine and tried to explain the ‘‘strange’’ concept that the Soviet
Union would soon disappear. They ended up publishing this as a
cover story. This was the beginning of my writing career in the
United States. Consequently, there is no limit to my gratitude to
Steve Forbes and Forbes’s editors James Michaels and Lawrence Minard, my friend who in 2001 left forever to the mountains.
Throughout my 30 years in the academic structures of various
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countries, I have never met a man with greater academic tact than
the head of the Management Systems Department at Fordham University, Professor Robert Wharton. Robert and Dean Sharon Smith
created an encouraging environment that allowed me time to write
and study. These are the people who, in my business and academic
life, helped me to prepare this book.
Of course, I am grateful to Ann and Ken Bialkin, Jacqueline Gallus, Theresa King, Evelyn Kenvin and Arthur Rosenbloom, Arthur
and Kathryn Taylor, and Vicki and Ron Weiner, whose support was
invaluable in helping me to understand American business, life, and
culture.
I am appreciative to Lawrence Weinbach, Donald Hanson, and
Peter Berger, who were my leaders—my guiding forces—during my
years at Arthur Andersen. It is always crucial to have the support of
close friends, and so I would like to express my warm feelings to my
friends Dr. James Hatt from Great Britain and Dr. Arben Malaj and
Dritan Celaj from Albania, who helped me immensely during my
Fulbright time in their country. I am very happy that I have my dear
friends from Russia, Dr. Alexander Granberg, Dr. Eugene Ardemasov, Dr. Valeriy Korotkov, an outstanding hockey player and now a
minister of sport in Russia, Slava Fetisov, President of the Russian
Bar Association Dr. Gasan Mirzoyev, President of NEP Bank Boris
Sokalsky, professor at Moscow State University, Dr. Zeidulah Yuzbekov, and the Gamzatov family. I am thankful as well to my American
friend, Alik Yanovsky, who gave me a clear understanding of how our
years bring us to friendships with people who are younger than us.
Finally, I thank Fordham University Press, who encouraged my
enthusiasm in putting this book together. Executive Editor Mary
Beatrice Schulte and Production Manager Loomis Mayer were instrumental in bringing this project to completion.
Of course, all potential success and any interest in this book will
be shared with my relatives and friends, but should any dissatisfaction with its contents arise, all conclusions drawn here are solely my
responsibility.
Vladimir Kvint

BECOMING A STRATEGIST:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
SECOND EDITION
As a boy of 16, I was a simple metalworker whose main responsibility
was to make hammers. One late evening, my boss, the team leader,
called me and said, ‘‘Vladimir, in any case, you are not a good metal
worker; better you should give me your advice and figure out how we
can beat this latest steel shortage and get more orders.’’ Shortage is
a key word for understanding Soviet everyday life and business. People were constantly struggling to obtain one thing or another (from
laundry detergent to cars), be it through barter, graft, or standing in
long lines for hours in the middle of winter. ‘‘If you will give me good
advice,’’ my boss continued, ‘‘you will not cut metal anymore. You
will be responsible for the next advice.’’ That team leader who, most
of the time, was either totally or partially drunk, changed me and my
life forever.
In my 30-year career, I have worked extensively with strategy and
strategic advice. At the beginning of my professional life, I wasn’t at
all surprised when I did not find, in the USSR, a single book about
business strategy. The shortage was not accidental. The communist
command economy had no need for such books. During the short
period of Nikita Khrushchev’s thawing out, a few American ‘‘imperialistic’’ economic and prognostic books were translated into Russian,
but nothing pertaining strictly to business strategy or policy really
surfaced. However, ironically enough, businesses, companies, ministries, regional communist leaders, and even Politburo members (the
main dictatorial body of the Communist Party), unbeknownst to
them, were in desperate need of sound business strategies.
My first experience as a strategist came when I was the chief economist of a huge Siberian scientific-technological conglomerate with
thousands of employees. I was also an adviser to the bosses of the
Krasnoyarsk territory, a Siberian region with an area bigger than that
of Great Britain, France, and Germany combined, which consisted,
in fact, of 11% of the Soviet Union’s land. At that time I was desper-
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ate to know who was developing the ‘‘strategy’’ of the USSR, a country that occupied a quarter of the land on our planet. To satisfy my
thirst to understand, I came to a romantic conclusion: that in Krasnoyarsk, the people who surrounded me lacked any deep vision of
the future, but that somewhere on top of the Soviet bureaucratic
pyramid, there were leaders who knew where they were leading our
ship and how we would come to a better economic future amid the
total poverty and the absence of freedom in which we lived. All of
that was ruined one day somewhere at the end of the 1970s.
A regional boss invited me to his office and informed me that in a
few days, a Politburo member who was responsible for all the industrial development of the Soviet Union would be coming to the region
and that I would be afforded a special opportunity to brief him about
productive forces and the economic situation of the region. (The
Politburo was the main executive body of the Soviet Union. To explain their function, one can look to the ruling body of the Ayatollahs
in Iran as the closest example. Not a single word in the Soviet constitution referred to the Politburo, yet all the constitutional bodies
were merely its pawns). In the following days, at the headquarters of
the regional government, three of us sat in the office: the Politburo
member, the regional leader, and I. By request of the regional leader,
I began to speak about potential scenarios of the economic development of the region. Speaking passionately and uninterrupted, I
showed different points on the map, which was placed on the table,
for about five minutes. The Politburo member, an old man, then
turned and asked the regional leader, a man whom he himself had
appointed to his position, to identify himself. For the regional boss
and myself, it was a very awkward situation and we both understood
that this Politburo member was obviously suffering from senility.
The regional boss went on to explain to the man from the Kremlin
about himself. The Politburo member thought for a moment, and I
started to speak again. Then he broke in once more and asked what
city he was in. Apparently satisfied with the answer, he told me to
continue. At this point, the situation was clear to me, and without
enthusiasm I spoke for another five minutes. The regional boss, sensing my disappointment, let me know that it would probably be better
for me to leave them alone. At around 11 in the evening, he called
me (for the first time without the secretary’s help), and asked me to
come to the same office where we were earlier (in general, bosses
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in Russia work long hours). I was told, first, that our meeting was
confidential and second, that not everybody in the Politburo was like
that. Despite the regional boss’s efforts, I formed my own conclusion
that almost everybody was, in fact, like that. But I kept that little
joke, along with the serious economic information we had discussed
that night, confidential for 25 years, as promised.
Later, after my Siberian years, I worked at the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow, the most prestigious and influential think tank of the Soviet Union. While there,
I was surrounded by people whose everyday job was to make analyses
for the main executive bodies of the Soviet Empire, the Cabinet of
Ministers, and the Politburo members. After some time, I realized
that the ‘‘strategy’’ that they were trying to present to the Soviet
leaders was actually not strategy at all. It was the primitive thinking
of the Politburo members concealed in pseudo-scholar forms and
slogans. Hardly being visionaries, Politburo members produced
‘‘ideas’’ that were nothing more than the same old ‘‘ideas’’ recycled
and covered again in a new fancy wrapping. To illustrate this situation for you, I can offer one example:
At the Institute, my direct boss was Dr. Lev Gatovsky, the former
head of the Institute during the most dangerous time of Stalin’s
reign. Among his many stories, I will share one with you that involves
the brutal dictator himself.
At the beginning of the 1950s, after he had already ‘‘proved’’ that
he was a great linguist, Stalin decided to ‘‘prove’’ that he was one of
the great economists of all time as well. In order to prepare a strategic theory of socialist economic value, Stalin, on several occasions,
invited about 20 economists to sequential meetings. He started each
meeting with an explanation of his strategic understanding of economic value in socialist conditions. At the final meeting each economist would give a definition of socialist economic value. (It might
be helpful to keep in mind that when Stalin didn’t like somebody,
that person typically disappeared—permanently. A cruel joke, of
which he was particularly fond, was that if there is a person, there is
a problem; if there is no person, there is no problem). The dictator
asked for the best definition of more than half of the economists
who participated at the meeting. Not liking any of the definitions
offered, he sharply criticized the economists. Gatovsky listened to
these comments very carefully. Stalin then said, ‘‘Comrade Gatov-
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sky, what is your definition?’’ Gatovsky took a piece of paper out of
his pocket and handed it to Stalin. Stalin read it for what must have
been the longest five minutes of poor Dr. Gatovsky’s life, and finally
Stalin declared that this definition was the one with which he agreed.
(Later, this definition was published as an original thought of Stalin’s in his famous strategic book Economic Problems of Socialism).
When Gatovsky, a short, slight man, finished telling me this story,
he stood tall and proud and asked me if I would like to know the
secret of his success with Stalin. Hardly able to wait for my answer,
he told me how it was done.
When preparing for that meeting, Gatovsky wrote 13 completely
different definitions of the law of socialist economic value, according
to the previous comments of Stalin, on 13 different pieces of paper.
He then put all 13 pieces of paper in different pockets of his clothing.
Finally, during the meeting, when Gatovsky got a good idea of what
Stalin was looking for, he knew which piece of paper to pull out. The
final problem was remembering which pocket the correct answer was
hiding in.
This is an example of the way strategies are produced in dictatorships. But it holds not only for Russia. This pitiful country just happened to be the most refined example of the process of strategic
development in a dictatorship. But it does not matter if a dictatorship is a military one, such as those that formerly existed in Argentina, Greece, or Turkey; a personal dictatorship as in Indonesia, the
Philippines, or Iraq; simply a communist dictatorship as those in
Eastern Europe, Vietnam, China, or Cuba; or an absolute monarchy
as in many Arab nations. Aside from the objective characteristics of
these regimes (absence of economic freedom, command economies,
lack of motivation, callous disregard for human life), these kinds of
strategies sped up the inevitable placement of the majority of these
regimes into the garbage can of history.
The results of my political, economic, and business strategical
analyses brought me to the conclusion that the Soviet Union did not
have an economic future. As you can see, I was right on target with
my strategic forecast, as proved in the book I published, in a cover
story in Forbes magazine, and in a New York Times article with the
exact day of the event. In response to my article in the New York
Times, where I said that ‘‘by 1992 there will be no country called
the Soviet Union,’’ great Sovietologists (something which naturally
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cannot exist, like sweet salt) started to laugh about my forecast, but
later turned their heads when it became a reality. The great Sovietologists were not able to reach the same conclusions as I because they,
like Politburo members and dictators, didn’t understand how to develop strategic ideas for practical needs. Don’t get me wrong. Although the Soviet Union’s leadership was indeed primitive, wild, and
cunning, there were quite a few good economists as well. Two of
them received Nobel Prizes in Economics: Wassily W. Leontief, a
soviet émigré who became a U.S citizen and got a Nobel Prize in
1973, and Leonid V. Kantorovich, a member of the Soviet Academy,
who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1975. However,
in spite of these and other talented minds, the system of soviet leadership could not, and would not, accept their recommendations because the system was not built to rely on objective analyses and the
motivations of people, but only on terror, oppression, and mythological perspectives on the state of the economy.
In 1989, when I arrived in New York to give lectures and consultations, the first stop of my U.S. tour was organized by Peter Tichansky
of the BCIU, who took me straight to Brighton Beach to enjoy the
sights and sounds of Russian nightlife. After 20 hours without sleep,
and being excited to finally see American skyscrapers and Broadway,
the last thing I wanted was to watch Russians eating Borscht. Only
later did I realize that it seems to be the favorite custom among
Americans to immediately take their newly arrived Russian friends
to Little Russia. But in spite of this, Peter and I became fast friends
to this day. As for Brighton, I was so happy to see the place that I
didn’t set foot there again for the next seven years.
My life in the United States gave me opportunities to meet with
several great strategists and leaders. But despite their reputations,
only a few of them understood that with the birth of the Global
Emerging Market in the 1980s, the business world had come to a
new stage of development. Even fewer made practical steps on the
basis of this strategic understanding. One of the believers, Jack
Welsh, who at that time was Chairman and CEO of General Electric, decided to make a serious investment in Hungary. It was a signal
to all other cautious U.S. business leaders that Eastern Europe was a
new emerging market. The head of American International Group,
Maurice (Hank) Greenberg, was the first leader of the insurance in-
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dustry to invest heavily in political risk insurance for investors going
overseas to emerging market countries. Today AIG is the undisputed
leader in this kind of service. Larry Weinbach, at that time the Executive Partner of Andersen Worldwide, developed a tremendous
auditing, accounting, and consulting service in more than 40 emerging market countries during the 1990s. He also, by the way, saw the
potential problems of Arthur Andersen and had preventive solutions
to these problems concerning conflicts of interest between auditing
and consulting services. It’s a pity that the majority of the partners
did not buy into his strategic view. Now he is a successful leader of
the Unisys Corporation, a company that invests heavily in emerging
market countries. Several young investors who believed in the new
opportunities and stability of emerging market countries built their
fortunes and careers from these forecasts, despite the cold waters of
these markets.
When a strategist reaches the point where everybody understands
the opportunities in the business world of the future, to which he
had previously pointed, new dangers appear. Take, for example, what
happened with the idea of heavy and highly profitable investment in
emerging market countries. The majority of those who ventured into
these markets did so without understanding that the investment capacities of these countries have limits. This is when crises happen.
We witnessed such a financial crisis in 1997 and 1998, which started
in Asia (Thailand and Malaysia) and then went through the territory
of Russia with the tremendous default of the ruble and ended with
a very negative impact on the economies of Argentina and Brazil. It
was a great example of how any successful strategy must be continuously reevaluated and revised. This crisis was another strong signal
that in our real global business marketplace, it is not enough to rely
solely on the self-regulation of the market. It is important to reestablish the new regulating role of national governments and even some
multilateral institutions. It is also very important to understand that
the Bretton Woods institutions—especially the International Monetary Fund, which was established during World War II—has lagged
behind the economic times and must now redesign their role in the
global community. The IMF should reevaluate some serious mistakes that brought many emerging markets to crisis. Even, perhaps,
the very existence of this institution should be questioned, and why
this institution should be separate from the World Bank, which, un-
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like the IMF, works a lot with private sectors of the economy, not
only with governmental bureaucrats.
To be a real strategist, one must understand a few basic rules that
will probably make your life more difficult, but will undoubtedly give
your predictions greater accuracy. Rule 噜1: Never rely on common
sense alone. Common sense will often lead you to the very opposite
side of an accurate forecast. Common sense is what anybody can
find on the surface of a very deep and complicated process. The
German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Hegel said that the quintessential—that is, the pure, highly concentrated—essence of a phenomenon is not what lies on the surface. Any economic or business
strategy must be the result of the serious and interdisciplinary analysis of political, economic, business, and technological systems that
determine the future. None of these analyses are governed solely by
common sense.
This leads us to Rule 噜2: The majority is very often wrong. This
might seem counterintuitive, but in reality, the conclusions of deep
analysis almost always defy common sense and the popular opinion
of society. After all, the majority of society has not worked long days
and nights, combining knowledge with deep thinking to get the right
answer to a particular question that a scholar dedicates his life to
answering. Together, the majority has a collective knowledge, but
lacks any method of extracting the ‘‘diamonds’’ of truthful strategies
for the future from this mountain of empty ore. When a strategist
finds these ‘‘diamonds’’ he has to hold onto them and believe in
them steadfastly, because he, alone, must convince skeptical decision-makers and the nonbelieving majority that his decision is the
only right scenario of the future. When your strategy finally becomes
a reality, the majority will, inevitably, forget about you. They again
will be looking for new strategies and forecasts and again will be wary
of accepting unusual predictions. The right or correct strategy almost
always induces a reaction of shock and disbelief from the majority of
society. What would have happened if Moses had listened to the
voice of the majority? Moses was a great leader because he deeply
believed in very unusual Advice and he was committed to this Advice. He brought his people through the wilderness and we remember him for thousands of years. Only, we will never have as reliable
an Adviser as he had (at least, not that we know of).
Rule 噜3: For strategists, the year of developing your strategy is
already the past. A strategist is always working in the past, not in the
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present, because for strategists the present is always history. The
time of your intellectual life must be five years ahead of others. Otherwise, your forecast will merely be a post-facto report.
New scenarios of the future developed by strategists are their service to society. Business strategy and its vision of the future are compasses which have to give the correct direction to businesses in order
to unite owners and employees of businesses with society. The right
business strategy is a roadmap to the future. The book which you
hold in your hands, through articles and studies, shows the difficult
processes one must go through in order to find the correct destination.
Inertia is a major obstacle on the way to finding new revolutionary
strategies, as it is a common custom of operational management in
the day-to-day life of a company. This is why a COO, very often, is
opposed to changing strategies, especially if he is a successful COO.
He is running his business very well; he built relationships with suppliers and buyers and he created a great inventory. New strategic
ideas about the production of totally new goods or services can ruin
his success.
The strategist, in most cases, is like an astronomer. An astronomer
does not create new stars; for the benefit of mankind, he explores
the cosmos and finds unknown stars that have existed for millions of
years. So too, a strategist has to be first to find new global trends and
then evaluate their real influence on the company’s future. He must
see this influence as a threat and, at the same time, as an opportunity. This is the start of the scanning of the external environment of
a company.
High-quality labor processes need high levels of professionalism,
vigilance, and intensity. This, of course, brings us to the necessity of
high compensation, which translates into high motivation. Employees have to be motivated differently, one from another, according to
their individual quality of labor and quality and quantity of production. This is exactly what was missing in communist Russia as well
as all other dictatorships and command economies. All emerging
market countries try to create a high quality of life for their citizens.
In other words, freedom of choice and business strategy has to be
oriented for this kind of freedom. In existential terms, I can say that
the quality of goods and services of any business answers to the freedom of choice of the individual. When a strategist is positioning a
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company in the market, he has to evaluate all current competitors
or new entrants and find ways to improve company standing and
development.
My colleagues and I decided to include in this book only those
articles and studies of mine that will help potential readers—
business leaders, politicians, students—understand strategy as a
process. For each strategy, my strategic process went through the
following stages:
• strategic analysis
• strategic forecasting
global
international
national
regional
functional
corporate
business unit
• formulation of mission statement
why this strategy has a right to exist
how this strategy is different from all others
what kind of message to society and community this mission
statement contains
how my strategy will benefit society
• philosophical vision of the strategy inside and outside of corporate
business or national economy interests
• enrichment of objectives
• quantitative and qualitative formulation of goals
• strategic planning
• strategic organizational and managerial decisions which require the
success of the business policy
• strategic control

Some of the stages of strategy development that I have suggested
contain elements that are generally agreed upon by all strategists and
some that may not be very well received. As always with management
systems, there are no absolute rules, but any exceptions to the suggestions I made would not change the general algorithm of strategy
formulation and implementation but would rather most likely support it.
Rule 噜4: In addition to well-developed and detailed strategies,
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always bring to the clients or the board of directors a short overview
of the major ideas of a new strategy and the results of its implementation. I remember a bad experience at the beginning of my career
at Arthur Andersen. I had brought a business strategy to the head of
a multi-national corporation for his new ventures in the country to
which he was flying the next day. He thanked me, but did not take
the 700-page volume of this strategy with him. Since that day, I
always develop a short digest of my work, because top-level executives do not have the time to read huge documents if they do not
have a particular interest. A good digest saves their time and gets
them excited about the strategy. If the digest interests them, they
can read the full document at their leisure.
Rule 噜5: Any mathematical formulas used in a new strategy, especially in the digest of a new strategy, should be used only to convince decision-makers of what they cannot do and what the limits
of their decisions are. Never try to use mathematical formulas to tell
them what they should do. The overwhelming influence of common
sense can create resistance toward any mathematical formulas found
in the new strategies.
In general, though, this book is not about rules; it is about
trends—global, regional, and sectoral. Analyses of these kinds of
trends are always the initial stage of new strategy development.
I have come to the realization that it is not a lack of knowledge on
the part of the people who are trying to develop strategies that is
problematic; what is a problem is the system of their thinking. I am
sure that all the readers of this book are knowledgeable people with
different levels of experience; what I am trying to do in my approach
is to provide a system of knowledge that can make my readers more
powerful as strategists. I present my system of developing forecasts
and strategies for your scrutiny.

INTRODUCTION: THE FUTURE
BEGINS TODAY
The business world of the 21st century and the new millennium will
not arise out of nowhere; it will inherit the characteristics, from the
last 15 years of the 20th century, of the world’s business map. Specifically, there is no one event in the history of business at the end
of 20th century that better predicts the business world of the next
century than the birth of the Global Emerging Market.
Today, when only days remain before the new millennium, anyone
who writes about the future will find it very difficult to convince his
readers that his forecasts and predictions will materialize for the
quite simple reason that everyone with access to a computer is a
potential fortune teller, and even individuals unfamiliar with statistical and mathematical methods can draw their own reliable conclusions. At the same time, it is still very important to grasp the point
of view of other experts and professionals in the field.
Before I proceed to offer ideas about the future, I would like to
tell my readers that my past principal forecasts have become reality
with almost total accuracy. I remember that sometime, in the period
between 1979 and 1982, I concluded that the Soviet Union had no
economic future, and, as early as 1988, I began to publish forecasts
that the Soviet Union would disappear from the world political map
in 1991–92. These forecasts were published in several major European and American newspapers and magazines.
Today, at the beginning of 1999, although many people are thinking about the future, very few try to get an understanding of it by
looking backward. Despite the new methods that economists and
mathematicians have developed, a true understanding of the past
remains essential for any analysis of the future. When we properly
apply the past’s coefficients, we foster our analysis for a better understanding of the future. Thus, the articles I have chosen to include
here reflect the results of forecasts I have made in the past. I hope
that readers can accept these forecasts as feasible as well as useful
and, as a result, can reach similar conclusions on their own.
At the same time, in analyzing business opportunities, it is not
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enough to think of the present as an indicator of the future, because
in business the present is always the past. Just imagine a businessman who is involved in an international trade transaction trying to
make business plans based on his information about the current
business world. The Global Business World today is completely different from what it was just 10 to 15 years ago. Fifteen years ago the
world was divided into 17 developed countries and 125 developing
countries. Today, of those 125 developing countries, approximately
45 have become rapidly growing emerging markets, representing 25
percent of the global GDP (the U.S., for example, represents only 21
percent). Thus, it should be clear that without an understanding of
changes this businessman could miss many major profitable opportunities.
In the next 10 years, the Global Emerging Market will continue to
evolve along two vectors of growth. On the one hand, emerging markets will continue to grow from 80 developing and underdeveloped
countries, and, on the other, the top emerging market countries will
acquire characteristics of developed ones. Of course, such major
global trends as political disintegration, economic re-integration, regional decentralization, privatization, demilitarization and the conversion of military economies to civilian, and globalization will
continue to affect the business world in the 21st century.

Rationale for Article Selection
This volume contains articles, chapters from various books, and
other types of research that can help the reader understand three
major requirements of the future Global Business World. The pieces
focus on development trends in the Global Market and several of
its major emerging regions, primarily the former Soviet Union,
processes of privatization, dynamics of management systems, and
technological progress. Several articles that describe different characteristics of international joint ventures representing major business
and legal successes in the forum of cross-border transactions are also
included.
I believe that this selection of articles will provide readers with a
better understanding of the past and, therefore, a better vision of
the future. International politics during the 1980s was marked by
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the collapse of communism, the end of the Cold War, the breakdown of dictatorships in Latin America, Pacific Asia, and the Indian
subcontinent, and the end of apartheid in South Africa. These
changes, together with the technological revolution of our era—
telecommunications, in particular—have enhanced the globalization
of business. The increase in the gross domestic product (GDP) of
leading countries during the 1970s and 1980s was largely the result
of the globalization of business. More than 50% of the industrial
products in the developed countries are the result of the cooperation
among developed countries with one another and with the emerging
market countries in particular.
Articles describing international business and political processes
and economic policies cannot be separated effectively, because these
subjects are inherently interrelated. Given the influence of modern
political, social, and economic processes in a particular region, international business may also affect the foreign policy of a particular
country, and vice versa. As a result, this book accents political and
economic factors, because these factors almost always determine the
risk involved in international investments. Any entrepreneur or executive will confront the problem of determining whether the country
in which he or she is considering investing is in fact an emerging
market. The answer to this question is more difficult than it appears,
simply because currently no agreeable definition of what is meant by
an emerging market currently exists.

Structure of the Volume
The book’s structure will help readers understand the implementation of the practical decision-making process with respect to global
trends. In general, the book’s structure is in a chronologically reverse
order in each of the Parts; although my first publications appeared
in 1967, the earliest included here were written in 1974. This book
excludes not only the first seven years of my research, but of my
approximately 300 articles and 18 books, I have included only those
I found to be useful for understanding future business with or within
emerging markets. Nonetheless, for the convenience of the readers,
I have added a partial bibliography, listing not only my own publications but also interviews I have given, as well as opinions and reviews
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of my publications, including personal critiques by journalists who,
as one may imagine, offered ‘‘thorned roses’’ in evaluating the different aspects of my life and studies.
Part I: Understanding the Global Emerging Market
Developing and implementing practical strategy and tactics toward
emerging markets is a practical, day-to-day responsibility and goal of
any executive, whether in a multinational company or a small and/
or family business, or in multilateral institutions and research centers. Thus this book starts with explanations and definitions of global
trends, classifications of different perspectives of emerging markets,
and a general understanding of the nature of the modern Global
Emerging Market.
In Part I, Section A, I offer several tables where I have combined
the opinions of five major publications covering the economic and
business issues of emerging markets. These are The Emerging Markets Monitor, J. P. Morgan Emerging Markets Economic Indicators,
Standard & Poor’s Emerging Markets, and Emerging Market Investor.
The Economist, as well, was included, because the final pages of each
issue of the magazine exhibit special emerging market indicators.
In this section, I placed the opinions of these magazines regarding
nine European countries, ten Latin American countries, six African
countries, and four Middle Eastern countries. Though these publications agree that three European countries, four Latin American
countries, and eight Asia Pacific countries are Emerging Markets, no
single common opinion exists on African or Middle Eastern countries. This suggests that each executive must rely totally on his own
judgment as to whether whether a country has emerged with regard
to a particular business that relates to his company. To arrive at this
decision, he must evaluate the risk of his investment in a particular
market.
Fifteen years ago, in the mid-1980s, when an international decision-maker heard about the possibility of risk, he immediately tried
to avoid the deal in its entirety. Today the situation is totally different. Every multinational company, even middle-size companies and
small-size manufacturing and financial service firms, have either an
Emerging Markets or a Risk Management division. A risk management system typically inolves identification of risk aversion, develop-
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ment of risk management strategy, method of managing risk, means of
measuring risk levels, evaluation of system and ability to make adjustments. All these issues are covered in Part 1, Section A.
This section will allow readers to understand how to incorporate
global risk management in their practical activities. The achievements and problems of the modern world have changed the goals of
existing multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). New demands are placed and new
approaches are required in the decision-making processes of national
and regional governments as well as of companies and their branches.
This new situation in the investing process is illustrated by my articles published in the Harvard Business Review and in those describing the initial stages of the transitional period in Russia. This first
part of the book highlights the processes of creation, registration,
and functioning of international joint ventures. International joint
ventures are the main legal and economic form of cross-border functions.
An international joint venture (IJV) is one of the major forms for
implementation of internationalization and globalization of business. A joint venture (JV) may take the form either of a partnership
or some other type of business cooperation. Regardless of the type
chosen, the resulting entity is a joint venture if it represents the
collaborative effort of two or more existing companies united for
short- or long-term economic purposes. A JV is an IJV when the
parties are from different countries.
The underlying nature of IJVs is the mutual interest of domestic
and foreign companies in cooperating in business deals. Typically,
foreigners contribute know-how, brand names, and managerial skills.
Locals contribute production facilities, established marketing networks, cheap natural resources, and efficient labor resources.
Project financing, which is an increasing financial trend in the
1990s, allows companies with limited resources to participate in
deals through the use of mutual resources. IJVs also present opportunities to receive project assistance from multilateral and national
agencies. Companies from different countries involved in project financing, focusing on managing risk and profits, are likely to create
an IJV. Because of this, new forms of IJVs (accommodative and conventional) have appeared. An accommodative IJV helps partners reallocate risks associated with the project and establish more efficient
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ties between suppliers and consumers. A conventional IJV usually has
limited contract support between partners, who share full market
risk. This form may cause the IJV to be less leveraged.
Other contributors to the establishment of IJVs have been multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, and others. The globalization of business and involvement of
multilateral institutions (e.g., setting regulations on economic and
business activities, offering financial services and loans) creates a favorable climate for establishing and operating IJVs. As an example,
the objective of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is to eliminate trade barriers. By bringing down those barriers, the WTO enhances expansion of international business and the creation of IJVs
capable of producing goods and services abroad for import-export
purposes. Product standards set by the WTO make products more
desirable for other organizations.
In this volume, IJVs are described in several articles, two of which
were originally published by the Harvard Business Review. In these
articles, there are explanations of the business and legal natures of
international joint ventures and strategy for the creation and location of international joint ventures. You will gain an understanding
of how to choose the right partner and how to negotiate the establishment of a joint-venture, as well as some operational issues of
setting up IJVs. For the successful creation of an IJV it is necessary
to have one non-binding document—letter of intent—and three official legal documents: the joint-venture agreement, joint venture
bylaw (statute), and a document of approval from the countries participating in the venture. All these issues are covered in Part I, section B: Investing in the Emerging Markets.
Part II: The Top Emerging Markets of Europe, Central Asia, and
Latin America
The second Part of the book is dedicated to the emerging markets
in Europe, Central Asia, and Latin America. From the European
countries, I have chosen the top six Emerging Markets. This Part
describes business conditions in the leading European emerging
markets—the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal,
and Turkey—as well as in some of the outsiders, such as Bulgaria and
Ukraine. A parallel can be drawn with the business conditions of the
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Central Asian and Latin American emerging markets and those in
Kazakstan and Brazil. Additionally, on the regional level, I have focused specifically on the Balkan region, which, though relatively new
and one of the last European Emerging Markets, has yet to attract a
strong interest of the international business community. I zero in
on the Balkan country of Bulgaria. Among the former Soviet-bloc
countries it is the most interesting one, with unique geopolitical
characteristics—on the coast of the Black Sea and on the route from
the Balkans to the rest of Europe. On the one hand, this country is
already an associate member of the European Union and is credited
with adhering to the Currency Board of the IMF; on the other, it is
still rarely viewed as on par with the European Emerging Markets in
many respects.
The birth of the initial emerging markets occurred in the ‘‘old
world’’ of Europe. The timing of their appearance determined the
differences among them and created broad gaps in their development trends. Though some of these countries, such as Portugal and
Greece, are today full members of the European Union and NATO,
by several indicators they are still classified as emerging market countries. Some may be pre-emerging markets, such as Albania. Some,
like Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine, are on the cusp of being emerging markets.
Because of the strong interest many investors have shown in highgrowth European emerging markets, in 1996 I completed a study of
Europe’s Top Six emerging markets. I classified them not only according to the opportunities they present, but also by their level of
development. Some of these include the Czech Republic, Greece,
Hungary, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey. In this I also tried to describe
the Ukrainian market. Ukraine is the largest European country in
territory, with the exception of the European part of Russia and Turkey with its Asian part. Home to 53 million inhabitants, it is also one
of the most populated European countries. Ukraine was always in
Russia’s shadow, but now it has great economic potential and plays
a key political role between Russia and NATO member-countries.
The Central Asian countries—which contain approximately 60
million people, largely Muslim—will substantially influence the future of Russia in particular and Eurasia overall. Moreover, the Muslim-populated Russian regions like the Tatar Republic, Bashkirtastan,
and republics in the Caucasus mountains like Dagestan, contribute
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to the significant role Islam is playing in the emerging markets in
this part of the world.
In this book I highlight two specific areas: the largest Central
Asian country both by territory and population, Kazakstan, and one
of the most beautiful autonomous republics in the Caucasus mountains, Dagestan. Several of the articles I wrote in cooperation with
Dr. Z. Uzbekov, Dagestan’s Minister of Privatization from the early
years of that country’s privatization process, are included here.
Part III: The Emerging Market of Russia
Part III covers the largest emerging market in the global business
world—Russia. No executive can overlook this country, regardless of
whether or not he plans to be directly involved in this market, because it directly or indirectly influences the political, social, cultural,
economic, and business life of the entire planet. Peace and prosperity
in Russia enable all other countries to reduce their military expansion and advance the notion that the territory of this country, the
largest in the world, does not divide East and West, North and
South, but brings them closer to one another. Peace and prosperity
in Russia provide a new market of raw materials and an enormous
consumption capacity. The most important part of this section is
the account of Russia’s transition from a communist dictatorship to
a free-market economy. Russia’s privatization and the internationalization trends of its economy are granted particular attention.
After the Soviet Union crumbled in December 1991, Russia, without the other 14 former Soviet republics, became the largest country
in the world by territory. Siberia alone, while a part of Russia, is
larger than the world’s second largest country, Canada. By the way, I
have quite often been surprised to discover that in spite of the fact
that Canada is the U.S.’s next-door neighbor, few Americans have
an understanding of the vastness of Canada’s territory and the real
population. Among the world’s first five largest countries by territory
are the U.S., China, and Brazil. Siberia, only a part of Russia, is
slightly larger than Canada, but Siberia and Canada are also almost
equal in population—both have around 30 million people.
Though Russia’s participation in the Global Market began just
before the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, it
will take at least another 20 years for it to become a full player in the
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global business community. In 1989 a very difficult transitional period in Russia began. At that time the direction of Russia’s advances
were assumed to be obvious: it was a transition to a market-oriented
economy. Those who considered capitalism to be perfect spoke not
of a ‘‘market economy,’’ but rather of a bright, instantaneous capitalist future for Russia. I was one of these naı̈ve people. As a result,
one of my articles, published in Vienna, in January 1990, was called
‘‘Capitalism Immediately.’’
We in the Soviet Union were so accustomed to the pressures of
the communist propaganda machine that we fell into the habit of
interpreting every piece of official information with an exactly opposite meaning. Every article on capitalism described its evils, yet I was
convinced capitalism was perfect. When I was finally allowed to
travel abroad in December 1988, and, in particular, on my first trip
to the United States, to New York City, in May 1989, I gained a more
realistic perspective. I was surprised to see homeless people and lots
of uncollected garbage in the street, and the wastefulness, in my
opinion, of streetlights in operation in broad daylight.
Everyone understood that Russia must move to a market economy, yet few understood the economic abyss from which Russia
must rise. Because all information was either simply wrong or was
deliberate ‘‘misinformation’’ the so-called Sovietologists and Western experts had little idea of how damaged and imbalanced the Russian economy was. They knew that the military expenses exceeded
official figures, but few were aware that in reality more than 50% of
the USSR budget was oriented toward the military-industrial complex.
Even today, many Western businessmen don’t seem to grasp the
realities of the Russian economy. In 1990 I began to publish articles
in Forbes and The New York Times and in publications in Austria,
Great Britain, Belgium, Germany, and Italy about political and economic crises in the USSR and possible scenarios of transitional outcomes. These articles are concentrated in the first section of Part III:
Transition to a Free Market. They began by covering Gorbachev’s
experiments of perestroika and glastnost. My major goal, as an insider at that time, was to deliver the main point to Western political,
economic, and business leaders: regardless who holds the office of
‘‘dictator’’ of the Soviet Union, whether it is former KGB Head Yuri
Andropov, brainless Konstantin Chernenko or Mikhail Gorbachev,
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this country had no future as a market economy. Major elements of
perestroika were developed in the early 1980s by Andropov’s and
Chernenko’s economic advisers, but the health of these dictators did
not give them the opportunity to implement these programs. They
were in office less than two years. When the two years of extravagant
funerals and fanfare were over, Gorbachev had no choice but to proceed to introduce these programs. At that time, I published several
articles intended to give a portrait of the real Gorbachev. The names
of the articles speak for themselves. For example, I wrote in Forbes
that ‘‘The Best Way to Help Gorbachev Is to Make Life Difficult for
Him’’ (June 1990), in which I mentioned that the stronger the pressure from the West, the higher the military expansion, the sooner
the Soviet Union would collapse and disintegrate. The real success
of glastnost in Russia was not only Gorbachev’s desert, but more so
that of the tough policy of its true authors—Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl.
When Gorbachev received the Nobel Peace Prize, I had no choice
but to publish in Forbes ‘‘The Myth of Good Czar Gorbachev’’ (February 1991). Here I emphasized that it was he who instituted the
repressions in the Baltics, in Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. He behaved like a master manipulator of Western opinion, a
despot like any other, who blamed his ‘‘wicked’’ ministers for the
evils around him. When he took office, the country was already on
the brink of disaster. Responding to the force of popular anger he
moved toward democracy. To his credit, he did so in a positive manner. Nonetheless, to his last day in office he objected to removing
the provision that makes the Communist Party the leading policymaking fixture in the country. This is not to say that Gorbachev
was not an admirable figure—he was; but he was a follower, not the
initiator, as many Westerners wrongly believe.
Other political factors of the transitional period were described in
several of my articles. Special attention was given to the failed coup
d’état in August 1991, and prior to that many times my readers heard
my predictions of the impending complete and irretractable disintegration of the Soviet Union. I recall my Forbes cover story ‘‘A Soviet
Economist’s Revolutionary Proposal: Russia Should Quit the Soviet
Union’’ (February 1990). At that time it was indeed a revolutionary
proposal. Vivid in my mind even today is my meeting with Henry
Kissinger in early January 1990 in his New York office. I told him the
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Soviet Union had only months, not years, left to exist. He disagreed,
convinced that the Communist Party, the Red Army, and the KGB
would keep the country together and strong. The same happened
during a panel discussion in Basel, Switzerland, in March 1990 with
Zbigniew Brzezinski. He didn’t share my opinion either. My forecast
was published also in The New York Times, where I predicted the
exact date of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In ‘‘Opportunities in Soviet Disintegration’’ (October 1990) I mentioned explicitly
that ‘‘By 1992, there will be no country called the Soviet Union.’’
At approximately the same time I published several articles in
Forbes, The New York Times, and The Chicago Tribune with a straight
prediction that Yeltsin, not Gorbachev, would be the key political
figure. Remember, this was while Gorbachev was still president of
the USSR and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. This was one year before Yeltsin was elected president
of the Russian Federation, at that time only one of the republics of
the Soviet Union.
I must to mention one of my current forecasts, still in progress—
the probability of the restoration of the monarchy. I believe that in
some countries undergoing transition the restoration of a monarchy
can be a very positive step. It is of particular importance in those
countries with a small middle class where society is polarized. A
monarch traditionally represents neither communists nor anti-communists, neither the rich nor the poor. The monarch represents the
nation as a whole, and this concept of unity is very important for a
nation in transition. Particularly this has possible applicability, in
such countries as Bulgaria, Albania, Russia, Romania, and Serbia.
Greece might be added to the list, but Greece does not need a monarchy (see my articles ‘‘Restoring the Romanovs’’ [Forbes, December
1994] and ‘‘Bulgaria is the Last Klondike in Eastern Europe [The
Kvint Newsletter: February 1995). Finally, I would like readers to understand that ‘‘The Last Days of President Yeltsin’’ I wrote when the
crisis of 1998 had not yet happened in Russia. Nevertheless I had a
strong feeling that, without change in the political leadership of Russia and the retirement of Yeltsin, the political and economic collapse
which started in August 1998, would continue.
It is not as important for my readers to read my forecasts that have
become reality as to be given the opportunity to make their own
correct forecast. And each of you is capable of doing this. For the
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last eight years I have been teaching both graduate and undergraduate courses in the School of Business at Fordham University on how
to make correct political and economic forecasts in emerging markets. I have also given courses of lectures on these matters at New
York University’s Stern School of Business, at UCLA’s Anderson
Graduate School of Business, at Babson College in Massachusetts,
and individual lectures at universities in Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria,
Germany, Great Britain, and Poland, among others.
So, then, how does one make correct political and economic forecasts? Any of you who will be involved in the decision-making process, whether initiating or ceasing business ventures in the ‘‘new
emerging market countries,’’ must begin your analysis with basic
economic factors and major economic indicators. You cannot begin
to make a decision to participate in processes of privatization in any
country worldwide without a quick, but sharp, analysis of these factors. This is covered thoroughly in the sections on Processes of Privatization, Regionalization, and Industrial Analysis.
We definitely live in the Information Age. One tap of a computer
button will access the Internet, Lexis-Nexis, Reuters, Dun & Bradstreet, where volumes of pages of information on any country are
readily available. But for your decision-making methods you need
only several clear and concise pieces of information on the country
in question. To do so, your analysis need consist of only five basic
economic factors:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

natural resources, including land
labor resources
domestic and foreign capital
existing production facilities and infrastructure, such as like telecommunication and transportation, and, finally,
(5) the factor that influences the previous four factors: scientific and
technological advances.

Among major economic indicators that must be analyzed are
GDP, GDP per capita, and rate of GDP growth over the last 20 years
in the country. One must focus closely on the statistics of industrial
development, standard of living, and consumption capacity, dynamics of foreign direct and portfolio investment in the country, and
other economic indicators. No single indicator will offer the right
answer; only a combination of information pieces will point in the
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right direction, though including more of them than necessary
should be avoided.
Since information on emerging markets is often either flat wrong
or deliberately flawed, conclusions should never be based on only
one a single source. The best way to obtain information is, first, from
the country of your potential investment itself, that is, secondly from
the central government of the country, secondly, from the regional
authorities, and, finally, from the companies of your potential partners or companies you would like or intend to privatize. Only when
you identify the differences in the sources and in the information
you have obtained and are able to account for the existence of these
differences will you be ready to make a decision.
The vast majority of the emerging market countries are not homogeneous in their geographic, economic, and political characteristics.
As a result, regionalization is one of the most important contemporary trends. Part III offers a description of several regions of Russia
and a thorough analyses of their industry.
Part IV: Management Systems and Scientific Technological
Progress
To be successful in any emerging market, the ability to evaluate the
management systems is no less important than the ability to understand the economic development of each region. In order to take
advantage of the privatization process or the creation of IJVs, when
one negotiates trade transactions or weighs investment opportunities, one must first understand the management systems on federal,
regional, and corporate levels. My studies show that. in the initial
stages of internationalization of any emerging market, 16% of all
the failures by foreign executives are the result of bureaucracy. An
increased understanding of Emerging Markets in general does not
necessary imply that the management system directly corresponds
to the knowledge of the specific markets. One will eventually realize
that the role of this factor declines in importance gradually, not immediately, as some might expect, because even experienced foreigners fail to evaluate fully all the elements the management systems of
the Emerging Markets comprise.
Any analysis of the management system of a country must be assessed via five critical elements present in the country’s system: orga-
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nizational structure of the management system; qualifications of
executives, managers, and staff of the management system (excluding
engineers and blue-collar workers); specifics of the decision-making
process; management system technology, computerization and office
supplies; and finally a thorough evaluation of information.
In Part III of the book, I also speak of information, but not as it
pertains to the management system. In this case, one should understand information from a different perspective—as only a ‘‘raw material’’ of the decision-making process and as the only by-product of
this process. All these issues are covered in Part IV. Specific attention
is given to the compensation of executives and the board of directors; the bureaucratic problems; management system functioning
processes; forecast development strategy and tactics; long-term preparation, current operational plans; and employee motivation. Control of the decisions’ implementation is illustrated in this part of the
book mostly from the aspect of scientific and technological development, though regional programs and technological improvements on
the corporate level are also described.
The Global Emerging Market is not homogeneous. The main differences among emerging markets are in their technological and industrial levels of development. We can discuss instances, such as
some northern African and Latin American countries, that technologically are far behind developed countries in North America and
Western Europe. At the same time, countries like Russia, Hungary,
the Czech Republic, and even Bulgaria possess technological levels
that are not greatly inferior to those in the Western countries. In
particular, Russia has had some very well-known scientific and technological achievements: the first artificial satellite of the earth—
Sputnik; the first human being in space—Yuri Gagarin; the first
nuclear power station; and, what may be a surprise for many, in 1965
the first two Nobel Prize winners for laser technology—Basov and
Prokhorov. The Soviet Union had no modern economy as we understand it today, but it was a Soviet economist who received the Nobel
Prize in Economics in 1975—Leonid Kantorovich.
Practically all Russia’s achievements were reached within its military-industrial complex. Today, the trend of converting military industries to civilian purposes is widespread in Russia. This affords
foreigners the optimal opportunity to understand both Russian scientific technological progress and the regional and federal programs

introduction

15

that helped Russia achieve its success in many areas of technology
and science.
In Part IV I have selected articles describing scientific and technical policies. Part IV contains two chapters of my main research book
The Management of Scientific-Technical Progress: A Regional Aspect,’’
which outlines the primary methods Russians employed to accelerate the country’s technological development. I selected only two
chapters of this book to include here: ‘‘Economic Entity of Regional
Scientific Technical Policy’’ and ‘‘Process of Formation of This Policy.’’ In my opinion, one of the most important building blocks of
Russia’s technological success was a system for technological preparation of production. This system was initially developed in the early
1970s and I was one of those who developed the economic aspects
of this system.
Finally, automatization and robotization techniques in the Soviet
Union and Russia were far behind those of the U.S. and Western
Europe. Nonetheless, the automatization of mining and nonferrous
metals industries in Russia proved to be successful. I participated in
the development of economic preparation of many of these systems
and you can find my articles about this in Part IV. These articles will
help readers understand how to conduct economic analyses of some
Russian technologies. My research from the early 1970s until the
present has focused on management systems of technological development. I believe that Part IV of this book will be functionally useful
for my readers.
Overall, all the articles in this volume represent the last 25 years of
my research and studies. It is always difficult for people to combine
two seemingly uncombinable abstractions—space and time. When I
was putting this volume together, I came to understand that time
serves as the space of human growth and change. It is clear that the
last quarter-century was not a time of evolution, but revolution in
mankind’s history. In retrospect, as if I were glancing at these 25
years in the rearview mirror, it became apparent to me that, as a
result of all the political and economic difficulties we have witnessed,
future generations will have a chance to live in a more perfect world.
Throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s we have created solid
grounds for the future of our descendants. I hope that the readers of
this book will turn its last page with the same conclusion of optimism and feeling of confidence.

Part I
UNDERSTANDING
THE GLOBAL
EMERGING MARKET

Classification of
Emerging Markets

INCORPORATING GLOBAL
RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE
STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING
PROCESS
Introduction
Ten years ago, the global business world was totally different from
what it is today. While this is not surprising, the scope of the
changes is virtually unprecedented. In 1986, the world was divided
into 18 Developed Countries and 125 Developing Countries; 98% of
all international transactions were between the 18 developed countries, while only 2% were with the 125 developing countries.
Since 1987, approximately 40 of the developing countries have
become Emerging Market Countries. Currently, these Emerging
Market Countries account for approximately 70% of the world population, 15% of all international transactions, and 25% of the global
GDP, which is more than the U.S.’s 21% contribution to global
GDP. These Emerging Markets Countries exert a strong influence
on the remaining 85 developing countries, for whom they serve as a
beacon, and on the developed countries as well, as new markets and
competitors.

Investing in Emerging Market Countries
During the last ten years, the annual growth rate of foreign and domestic investment in emerging markets increased from 15% to 25%.
In 1987, only one-half of one percent of the total assets of western
pension funds, hedge funds, and mutual funds were invested in
Emerging Markets. In 1994, the percentage of these funds invested
In Executive Summaries, an official publication of the World Economic Development Congress, September 25–26, 1996, Published by the World Markets Research
Center, February 1997.
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in emerging markets increased to 16%, and in 1995 to around 21%.
The growth rate of private American investments in Emerging Market Countries was 37% in 1993, 41% in 1994, and 47% in 1995.
Between 1995 and 2005, multilateral institutions will invest over
$300 billion in Emerging Market Countries. Naturally, the surge in
investment has also had an enormous influence on employment,
with the growth in the number of new jobs in emerging markets at
20% per annum—ten times greater than in developed countries.
Emerging Market Countries have also become major markets for
exports from developed countries. Japan, one of the first Emerging
Market Countries during the 1960s, ships 50% of its exports to
Emerging Market Countries. Likewise, 40% of U.S. exports and 32%
of EU exports are shipped to Emerging Market Countries (1995).

Global Trends
Global business today is influenced by 5 major trends—political disintegration, economic re-integration, regional decentralization, privatization, and internationalization of global and national business.
Because of the rapid increase in the number of Emerging Market
Countries, especially during the last six years, two more trends have
developed which affect global business—deficit of investment and
shortage of capital. These new trends have forced Emerging Market
Countries and even regions within the same country to compete for
foreign investment.

Emerging Market Classification
There is no common approach to using specific economic indicators
in classifying countries as pre-emerging or emerging markets. Nor is
there agreement on criteria used for this classification among major
publications specifically covering emerging markets.
Tables 1 through 4 contain the results of a study of major worldwide publications specifically covering emerging markets (The
Emerging Markets Monitor, J. P. Morgan Emerging Markets Economic
Outlook, Standard & Poor’s Emerging Markets, Emerging Markets Investor, and The Economist). The study summarizes the classifications
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designated by the publications for a total of 43 countries on five
continents. Of the 43 countries considered, only 15 are designated
as emerging markets by all the publications, and 12 of the 43 are
designated as emerging markets by only one of the publications.
These discrepancies exist because each publication has its own approach for classifying emerging markets. The only significant similarity in the approaches used by each of the publications is the use of
fundamental economic and financial indicators.
Kvint’s Emerging Market Classification
Table 5 includes the results of a recent evaluation I conducted to
determine a list of Emerging Market Countries. It is important to
note the differences between my evaluation and the above study.
There are many countries that my analysis determines to be emerging markets, which are not considered to be emerging markets by the
publications listed in Tables 1 through 4. These include the following
countries:
Europe
• the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. These countries
have stable, developed democracies, all with higher GDPs per capita
than several countries in Tables 1 through 4
• Slovenia, which is the most economically stable country among all
of the former Soviet-bloc countries
Asia/Pacific Region
•
•
•
•

four out of five Central Asian Republics (all but Tajikistan)
Kazakstan, which has much lower country risk than Bangladesh
Pakistan
Vietnam

South America
• Guatemala
Africa
• Tunisia and Zimbabwe.

In addition, the J. P. Morgan Emerging Market Outlook and Emerging Market Investor consider Iran and the Ivory Coast, respectively,
as Emerging Market Countries, while my analysis does not.
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Table 1: Emerging Market Classification, European Countries
c

d

e

Total

a

b

Bulgaria

x

x

Czech Republic

x

x

x

x

x

5

x

x

x

x

4

x

x

x

5

x

x

4

x

4

x

x

4

x

x

5

Greece
Hungary

x

x

Poland

x

x

Portugal

x

x

Russia

x

x

Turkey

x

x

Romania

x

Slovakia

x

Copyright Vladimir Kvint

2

x

x

a

The Emerging Markets
Monitor

b

J.P. Morgan Emerging
Markets Economic Outlook

c

Standard & Poor’s
Emerging Markets

d

Emerging Markets Investor

e

The Economist

1
x

2
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Europe

Table 2: Emerging Market Classification, Latin American Countries
Latin America

b

c

d

e

Total

Argentina

x

x

x

x

x

5

Brazil

x

x

x

x

4

Chile

x

x

x

x

x

5

Colombia

x

x

x

x

4

x

2

Equador

x

Mexico

x

x

Peru

x

x

x

x

x

5

x

1

Uruguay

x

1

x

x

x

x

The Emerging Markets
Monitor

b

J.P. Morgan Emerging
Markets Economic Outlook

c

Standard & Poor’s
Emerging Markets

d

Emerging Markets Investor

e

The Economist

3

x

Panama

Venezuala

a

x

5
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Table 3: Emerging Market Classification, Asia/Pacific Countries
Asia/Pacific

a

b

c

x

x

Hong Kong

x

x

India

x

x

Indonesia

x

Korea
Malaysia

Total
1

x

China

x

x

5

x

x

4

x

x

x

5

x

x

x

x

5

x

x

x

x

x

5

x

x

x

x

x

5

x

Pakistan
x

x

Singapore

x

x

Taiwan

x

x

Thailand

x

x

Vietnam

x

x

x

5

x

x

4

x

x

x

5

x

x

x

5

x

a

The Emerging Markets
Monitor

b

J.P. Morgan Emerging
Markets Economic Outlook

c

Standard & Poor’s
Emerging Markets

d

Emerging Markets Investor

e

The Economist

1

x

Philippines
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Bangladesh

d

Table 4: Emerging Market Classification, African and Middle Eastern Countries
Africa

a

b

c

d

Algeria

Egypt

Total

x

1
1

x

x

x

2

Nigeria

x

x

2

x

x

Middle East
Israel

x

a

b

c

d

x

x

4

e

Total

x

2

b

J.P. Morgan Emerging
Markets Economic Outlook

c

Standard & Poor’s
Emerging Markets

d

Emerging Markets Investor

e

The Economist

x

1

Kuwait

x

1

Iran

x

1
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Saudi Arabia
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The Emerging Markets
Monitor

1

x

Morocco

South Africa

a
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Cote d’Ivoire

e
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Evaluation of National Credit Risk
There are also evident differences in analytical methods used to determine national credit risk by emerging market professionals. The
significance of these differences is amplified when institutional and
even public investors use this information to make investment decisions. Publishing the results of these analyses can mislead members
of the business community who are not very knowledgeable about
emerging markets. In addition, for professionals working with the
emerging markets, the results of different analyses often lead to more
questions than answers.
For example, the results of my national credit risk analysis of
emerging markets are very different from The Economist Intelligence
Unit’s credit risk ratings, which are based on economic and political
factors. The EIU’s results are questionable for several reasons. The
following paragraphs cite some examples where my evaluation of national credit risk differs from EIU’s.
Colombia vs. Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela
EIU considers Colombia to be the safest country in Latin American.
This is difficult to understand when its president is persona non grata
because of allegations of business dealings with drug cartels. EIU
considers Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela as riskier countries than
Colombia, although there is greater political and economic stability
and numerous economic reforms are taking place in both Argentina
and Brazil. My analysis concludes that primarily because of political
issues the national credit risk associated with Colombia is higher
than the risks associated with Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela.
Turkey vs. China and Indonesia
EIU considers Turkey to be riskier than both China and Indonesia
(currently governed by a form of dictatorship). Primarily because of
Turkey’s strong orientation toward democracy, my analysis considers
Turkey to be less risky than either China or Indonesia. Turkey is a
member of NATO, and an associate member of the EU with a special
customs agreement, not to mention a stable democracy and economic system.

Table 5: Kvint’s Emerging Market Classification

North America
Mexico
Panama

South America
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Guatemala
Uruguay
Venezuela

Africa
Algeria
Egypt
Morocco
Nigeria
South Africa
Tunesia
Zimbabwe
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Asia/Pacific
Bangladesh
India
Indonesia
Kazakstan
Kyrgyzstan
Malaysia
Pakistan
Philippines
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Sri Lanka
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Europe
Albania
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Estonia
Hungary
Greece
Latvia
Lithuania
Moldova
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Turkey
Ukraine
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Greece and Hungary vs. Poland and South Africa
EIU considers Greece to be riskier than both Poland and South Africa. Greece is a country with a stable democracy that has an unquestionable orientation toward capitalism, is a member of the EU and
NATO, and has a much higher GDP per capita than either Poland
or South Africa. In addition, EIU considers Hungary to be riskier
than Poland. This is questionable when one considers that Hungary
is slightly ahead of Poland in terms of market reforms, and has a
higher GDP per capita and standard of living than Poland.
Malaysia vs. Taiwan, Poland, and Chile
EIU considers Malaysia to be riskier than Taiwan, which currently
has many political problems. In addition, Malaysia is considered by
this publication to be riskier than both Poland and Chile, both of
which are in the middle of economic reforms (which are successful
even though the country still has a difficult business environment).

Global Risk Management
During the 1990s, global business risk management has become an
important aspect of strategic and tactical business practices. In the
past, risk was something to be avoided. However, the explosion of
Emerging Market Countries during the 1990s has resulted in a fundamental change in the way that international business considers
risk. Emerging Markets have become one of the most important
parts of global business. Today, risk is, to some degree, inherent in
every emerging market. But rather than avoiding it, investors are
looking closely, measuring, and taking steps to adjust and cover risk.
A very important step in risk evaluation is the selection of indicators of political, economic, and technological risks of investment. In
order to manage risk, one must understand the modern meaning of
global business risk. Global refers to ‘‘worldwide,’’ but also to ‘‘thorough or entire’’; thus, global business risk refers to the risks associated with conducting all areas of business, from production to
finance to post-sales service worldwide. During the last three years,
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all leading investment companies, commercial banks, insurance
companies, mutual and pension funds, and accounting firms have
created risk management departments.
Global risk is broken down into two components, systematic risk
and unsystematic risk.
Unsystematic risk includes: product risk (raw materials/parts risk,
human resource risk, credit risk, operating risk, regulatory risk, legal
risk, after-sales liability risk) and financial risk (currency risk, interest
rate risk, liquidity risk, settlement risk, derivative risk, fraud risk).
National (OPIC), regional (MERCOSUR), and multilateral (MIGA)
institutions and organizations play an important role in global risk
management. These organizations are critical in helping companies
to manage unsystematic risk.
While investors feel that they can evaluate, manage, and adjust
for unsystematic risk, such as product and financial risk, systematic
(market) risk is outside their control. Market risk, however, can be
managed on a limited basis by those who have influence in the market—the central, regional, and city governments. Now is the time for
governments to create risk management systems to identify, evaluate, and adjust for various types of risk. During the process of developing a government risk management system, it is important to
consider the requirements of worldwide investors. To attract international investors, regional and central governments from emerging
markets need to meet the demands of international investors. This
includes reducing political, economic, and business risk to a level
acceptable to investors.
In addition to considering the risks involved with a particular
emerging market as a whole, it is important to consider separately
the risks associated with various economic sectors of the emerging
market. For example, by my evaluation, there is a low level of economic risk associated with investing in Argentina. However, in Argentina there are high levels of risk associated with investing in the
mining and pharmaceutical industries. Another good example is Liberia. Many investors are afraid of the high level of risk associated
with this country. However, it is easy to obtain financing for Liberian
shipping companies that are backed by Panamanian assets and operated by third-world countries.
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The Risk Management System
‘‘Global risk’’ for any country must take into account a comprehensive evaluation of political, economic, business, and technological
risks. This is true for countries that are pre-emerging or emerging,
developing or developed, for any global regional organization such as
the EU, MERCOSUR, ANDEAN Pact, ASEAN, APEC, etc., or for
any rural or metropolitan area or economic region within a country.
Of course, these risks are not separate; they overlap. However, for
the purpose of analysis, it is necessary to consider these risks separately and then identify any correlation or areas of mutual influence.
Based on these interactions, it is possible to determine the overall
risk level associated with a specific country, region, or investment
project.
After analyzing many risk management systems, I tried to pinpoint
the major elements of the systems agreed on by the majority of industry. The elements included in my analysis are equally important
for industrial, financial, and consulting firms. A global risk management system should include the following major elements:
Identification of risks
Determination of risk aversion
Development of risk management strategy
Method of managing risk
Means of measuring risk levels
Evaluation of system
Ability to make adjustments.

Risk management is truly a dynamic field. At the Fifth Annual
World Economic Development Congress I served as the chairman of
the Global Risk Management Summit. After discussing the definition of risk and methods of risk management with politicians, economists, and business leaders at the Congress, I concluded that there is
no single, agreed-upon definition of risk with respect to international
business. Without an agreed definition of risk, it is difficult to agree
on a single method for managing risk. The general view is that global
risk management systems are formed as a result of combining the
expanding focus of technical specialists with firm executives, managers, and political leaders.
The reliability of all risk management systems currently in use is
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still questionable. The following characteristics are commonly associated with reliable risk management systems: top-down structure,
formal policy setting, flexibility, frequent review/evaluation, accountability in the system, i.e., the importance of addressing risk
exposure. Practically all experts agree on the following fundamental
steps in the development of risk management systems: (1) identification of risk, (2) determination of appropriate system for managing
risk, and (3) continued measurement of risk.
There is also not one generally accepted statistical or optimization
method for managing and measuring risk that has proven better than
any other. However, credit was given to several companies’ risk management practices including those at ABB, Canadian Imperial Bank
of Commerce, Arthur Andersen, Walt Disney Co., Stanley Works,
Inc., and Walmart. These companies were noted for their use of
extensive modeling and sensitivity analysis in the practice of risk
management.
During the 1990s, under the influence of new political and economic trends, and especially with the appearance of the global
emerging markets, risk management has become a natural, yet critical element of the strategic decision-making process.

EMERGING OR DEVELOPED,
WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?
Securities Operations Letter: You have developed three approaches
to identifying emerging markets. Why did you develop these approaches, and what are they?
Vladimir Kvint: They were needed because there is no general agreement on the definition of an emerging market among market participants, academics, and economists. The three approaches to
developing a definition are the financial approach, the political approach, and the business approach. The financial approach was actually created by IFC, the International Finance Corporation.
Q: What is the financial approach?
Kvint: It says that countries with average per capita income of $8,625
are considered developed countries. Countries below this figure are
considered as emerging market countries.
Q: Does the $8,625 per capita income level place several countries
of the European Union in the emerging country category?
Kvint: Yes, several emerging EU countries have not reached that
level. Many financial companies go strictly by the $8,625 level. They
would consider Greece or Portugal as an emerging market country
because neither has now reached this level, but I consider Greece
and Portugal as developed countries.
Q: What about the political approach?
Kvint: The political approach involves the newly achieved political
stability and orientation of government in some countries. Russia,
for example, is an emerging market because for the first time they
are enforcing a constitution, elections are scheduled, and they have
moved toward a democratic form of government.
Securities Operations Letter, International Edition, August 2, 1998, pp. 1, 3, and
8.
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Q: What about the business approach?
Kvint: The business approach considers the level of development of
capitalist institutions, such as insurance companies, commercial and
investment banks, and accounting firms.
Q: What has caused emerging markets to grow so rapidly?
Kvint: Back in 1985, there were almost no emerging markets. But
after dictatorships failed in Latin America, as well as military dictatorships in Southern Europe and Southeast and Pacific Asia, and the
collapse of communism in the former Soviet Union, emerging markets began to appear. They have totally changed the nature of global
finance.
Q: How so?
Kvint: They created a shortage of capital, for one thing. Prior to
1984–85, the number of emerging markets was minimal. Countries
like Japan had excess capital, and they did not know where to invest.
Now 70 countries have reached the level of emerging markets, and
they are competing with each other for capital.
Q: Would you consider a country that limits foreign investment to
be an emerging market?
Kvint: If a country does not allow foreign investors to operate, it is
not an emerging country. In Bulgaria or Ukraine, for example, insurance firms cannot operate independently. They can only create joint
ventures in which they own no more than 39% of the business.
Q: You’ve written that emerging countries should allow third-party
auditors to be used. What is the impact of not using auditors?
Kvint: If a Big Six firm cannot issue a valuation opinion, investors
will not invest on a large scale. The firms cannot issue a valuation
without a third-party auditor.
Q: Let’s talk about the Soviet Union. Have the Soviets priced their
companies on the basis of market value or book value?
Kvint: Unfortunately, privatization in the Soviet Union has been
based not on market value, but on book value. It means companies
are sold for about 10% of their market price. Anyone will pay 10% of
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the value of a company, and they will pay substantially more under
the table. This is the relationship between corruption and privatization.
Q: What percentage of the Russian economy was in private hands?
Kvint: In 1990, only 4% of the economy was in private hands; today
70% is in private hands.
Q: How many stock exchanges does Russian have?
Kvint: During 1992–93, they created five stock exchanges, but there
is not one settlement and trust organization, so you have to deliver
all certificates physically. As a result, many trades never settle, and
people have turned to the Mafia to settle and clear trades.
Q: What’s being done about this problem?
Kvint: In November 1994, Yeltsin signed legislation covering the exchanges and the creation of settlement organizations. Several international companies are improving the markets, but it will take at
least three years.
Q: What is the state of the South American markets?
Kvint: The South American countries have not been homogeneous
in their development of capitalistic institutions. Chile is the most
advanced, followed by Argentina and Brazil.
Q: What are the major problems in Ukraine?
Kvint: Ukraine started its economic reform without understanding
what to do first. They started with the liberation of price, prior to
privatization. The result was a dramatic increase in inflation. Ninetyfive percent of the people fell below the poverty line and a crisis
occurred. Instead of a nationalized currency, ‘‘dollarization’’ occurred. Then they realized which steps they needed to take. Inflation
is now less than 3% a month as opposed to the 200% a month before.
Private banks and all the Big Six accounting firms have opened offices, and three stock exchanges have been opened.
Q: Can foreigners buy shares in these markets?
Kvint: Through March of this year there was no legal procedure for
trading shares. As a result, foreigners were not allowed to purchase
shares on the primary market. They could not buy shares directly.
Foreigners could buy only through a secondary market.

A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON
EMERGING MARKETS
The Investment Appeal of Emerging Markets
It is no surprise that the Fourth World Economic Development
Congress, which took place in October in Washington, D.C., had
‘‘emerging markets’’ at the top of its agenda. It is the single most
important issue for the world business community. As an investment
class, its status is on the agenda of international business executives
and entrepreneurs alike. Emerging markets play an integral role in
the international financial markets, in particular derivative instruments, pension reform, pension, mutual funds, and currency markets.
A new world order is emerging. The collapse of communism is
almost complete, and with it a whole global economy has been set
into motion. More than 25 new emerging markets have appeared
since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, bringing the
total to 60. The newly independent countries that are opening up
their borders both politically and economically are creating numerous opportunities for both the world and themselves. The question
is how quickly the rest of the world will be able to follow. It is only
natural that available investment dollars will be spread thin. In addition, there is the inherent uncertainty and risk involved in plunging
capital in a volatile environment—as most emerging market countries are.
The key is for these countries to show a positive commitment
toward establishing and sustaining a continuous and growing GNP,
fueled by an increasing stream of net exports. This will help their
financial markets develop, make the markets less volatile, and attract
into these markets more investors with highly sophisticated investments and financial instruments.
The term ‘‘emerging markets’’ has become a buzzword popular
In The Fourth Annual World Economic Development Congress, Addendum: A Special Summit Briefing of Some of the Speakers’ Addresses, October 1995, pp. 50–54.
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with the press and first appeared in relation to the stock market in
the early 1970s. It did not refer to markets in newly democratic or
semi-democratic countries like those in the Middle East, Latin
America, and the Pacific Rim. Instead, it was purely a financial term
that focused on emerging equities, debt securities, and stock markets
in developing countries. The term has evolved substantially from
those days. Today, when viewing emerging markets, it is necessary to
consider the social, political, and business perspectives as well as the
purely financial ones.
It is clear, however, that there is a big difference in what people
mean when they refer to emerging markets. The lack of one agreedupon definition stems from the fact that there are several approaches
to identifying and analyzing emerging markets that do not necessarily correlate to one another. This makes it difficult to assess the risk
of investment. In this article I analyze the various approaches used
and then make my recommendations.

IFC Sets the Standard
The first institution to become vocal on emerging markets was the
International Finance Corporation (IFC), a multilateral subsidiary
of the World Bank, created in 1956. Its approach to identifying
emerging markets relies heavily on GDP per capita: once a country’s
GDP per capita is $8,625, the figure as of 1993, it is considered a
developed country. Below that it could be an emerging market. But
since the IFC did not establish a minimum GDP per capita, by this
approach it is impossible to differentiate between an emerging and
a developing country.
Therefore, relying on this approach too much can be misleading.
Some countries, such as South Korea and Israel, which are considered developed, have a GDP per capita lower than the IFC figure.
Thus, someone might mistake these for emerging markets. Even
Greece, a member of the European Union, is sometimes categorized
as an emerging market because of these standards.
Institutions that follow and invest in emerging markets have
adopted a variety of their own standards. This further complicates
the matter. Several institutions continue to categorize Portugal as an
emerging market, yet it is a member of the European Union. These
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contradictory classifications would never occur if a multi-pronged
approach was used to evaluate the countries for emerging market
status.

A Diversified View to Emerging Markets
The current method by the IFC does not recognize the different
standards of living in each country. For example, in North America
and Russia, climate and transportation costs increase the amount of
income necessary to live, compared with a smaller country of mild
temperature like Israel.
If a country has a strong and stable democratic government but
lacks market economy, such as Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovenia,
should it be an emerging market? At the same time even if Mainland
China reaches the required level of income per capita, it will not be
an emerging market in my estimation because it is not a democratic
country. Countries like China must remain classified as developing
countries because the political risk for business is very high. The
same is true for countries such as Colombia and Ecuador where
democratically elected governments are in place but the political situation is nevertheless very unstable.
Equally, countries with a stable regime, but no democracy are not
emerging markets as yet. Their structure is not good for the entrepreneurial spirit or for foreign investment. Most modern international
businesses are sophisticated enough to recognize that the handshake
of a dictator is not a guarantee against political risk. I believe people
have already learned this from the former president of the USSR
and the last General Secretary of the Communist party, Comrade
Gorbachev.

Capitalist Institutions Are Key
In deciding on what an emerging market country is, it is not sufficient to appraise the country strictly from a financial or political
point of view. Nor is a combined approach enough. It is also critically
important to evaluate the level of development of capitalist institutions and business activity. The capitalist institutions to which I
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refer are insurance companies (to guard against political and regular
business risks), commercial and investment banks (especially international banks that appear in countries with new markets), internationally recognized law firms, and, of course, capital market
institutions themselves (currency commissions, stock markets and
commodities exchanges, and settlement and depository organizations). Finally, a country needs a well-developed telecommunications and transportation infrastructure that will allow international
corporations to do business with fewer obstacles.

The Kvint Approach
My approach to identifying emerging markets is based on an integrated point of view, so my list differs substantially from those of the
major publications. As I mentioned, China is a country that I feel
cannot be considered an emerging market.
Of course, one can say that China is industrialized enough to be
considered an emerging market. To me this is definitely the wrong
approach. Using that standard, the USSR and all the former Sovietbloc countries would have been classified as emerging markets due
to the high-technology, military-industrial complex that existed.
Though highly industrialized, clearly those were not countries where
one should have invested money. The political risk was substantial,
with no protection for international investment.
From a political point of view, Bulgaria and Romania have created
important links with the rest of the industrialized world. Both are
associate members of the European Union and have signed free
trade agreements. Financially, they are also improving. Both solved
their problems with the London and Paris Clubs, and have a strong
orientation toward a market economy. That, in turn, has resulted in
a GDP higher than that of Chile or Argentina. Also in these countries, the necessary major capital institutions are on the track to becoming fully developed.
The final illustration of my point is Albania. Until 1991, Albania
was one of the most isolated countries in the world. For many years
it had no connections with the communist and capitalist countries
alike. Before the 1980s, Albania had connections with China, but cut
those off as well when China started to implement some market
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economic reforms. Then, in 1991, Albania had its first legal democratic election, won by the Democrats. After a short period of a declining economy, in 1994, it became the most rapidly growing
economy on a market-oriented platform. At the moment, Albania
has the lowest rate of foreign debt in relation to GDP among all
emerging markets worldwide. Inflation has declined to 4.5% this
year, and production is growing by approximately 15% annually. Albania became a member of the Council of Europe, and has developed a legal system to protect foreign and domestic private
investment. Still, the GDP per capita is only $700.
It seems to me that Albania is still not an emerging market but
rather what I would term a pre-emerging one. From this point of
view, I would classify many countries as such markets: Algeria, Egypt,
Vietnam, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Chile, and Ukraine.

It Is Time to Refocus
For those who are still weighing the business, economic, and political
risks in Russia and the former Soviet republics, it is a diverse picture.
The social and political climate in Russia is definitely receptive to a
market economy with all the necessary capitalist institutions.
Even GDP per capita is closer to the IFC requirement for a developed country, and 75% of the economy has been privatized. Russia,
therefore, is an emerging market. So, too, are the Baltic states.
Ukraine probably will become an emerging market in the next year.
Pre-emerging republics include Moldova, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
For international businesses, the various classifications of what
constitutes an emerging market may be a moot issue. Most of the
major corporations and financial players are already well established
in those countries. What their new goal should be is to look for those
countries that are in the pre-emerging market phase. Given the right
circumstances (political, social, and economic), they should look for
opportunities to begin to tap the potential of these markets. There
are plenty of such countries that fall into this category. The most
noted are Egypt, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Vietnam, Albania,
FYRO Macedonia, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the repub-
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lics of the former Soviet Union, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Uruguay, and Jordan.

Investment Interest Is Rapidly Rising
The emerging marketplace is already succeeding in drawing investors. The ‘‘developed’’ markets are fairly well tapped and as such
offer few major growth opportunities. Why invest in the U.S. which
grows at a rate of 2%–3% a year when you can invest in China which
is growing at a rate of 15%–25%?
The International Monetary Fund estimates that major Western
pension, mutual, and hedge funds invested 16% of their assets in
emerging markets in 1994, compared with 0.5% in 1987. With the
dissemination of technology and the consolidation of financial assets
in these funds, investing has become less speculative. Without globalization, derivatives might never have assumed the importance they
have today. They initially originated as instruments to hedge against
currency and interest-rate fluctuations, but with globalization they
literally took off. We also saw, in 1994, how risky they can be.
The following statistics will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the potential of emerging markets: more than 50% of
Japanese exports, more than 40% of U.S. exports, and more than 30%
of European Union exports were earmarked for emerging markets in
1994. To put the phrase ‘‘emerging markets’’ in context, it is important to remember that 75% of the world’s population lives in emerging markets, and this market produces 21% of the world’s GNP. Over
the next ten years, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Asian and African Multidevelopment Banks will give a combined total of over $300 billion to
emerging markets.
In 1993, foreign direct investment in emerging markets grew by
37%. U.S. companies, in 1994 alone, exported more than $2.7 billion
of U.S. products through the multilateral development banks, serving Asia, Latin America, Africa, and former Soviet-bloc countries.
These numbers are only the direct effect of multilateral institutions.
According to the Bretton Woods Committee, the indirect effects
are even greater: ‘‘U.S. exports are on the order of $5 billion higher
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each year because developing countries, with multi-development
banks, have been opening their markets and expanding their capacity
to import goods.’’

Templeton Russia Fund on the New York Stock Exchange
Direct investment by developed countries in the commercial and
industrial activities of emerging market countries during the last five
years reached $2.50 billion. The resulting development of capitalist
institutions in this part of the world creates new possibilities for the
international investment community. This new stage was marked by
a milestone event on September 15, 1995. On that day, the first
publicly trade Russian fund on the New York Stock Exchange was
created, the Templeton Russia Fund, Inc. During 1993–94, I was a
consultant for the Russian State Investment Corporation in its deal
with PaineWebber to create the first Russian closed-end fund for
$105 million. Ultimately, $135 million was raised in 1994. The PaineWebber fund became the first closed-end venture capital Russia
fund. The Templeton Russia Fund is classified as a non-diversified
closed-end publicly traded fund.
The fund’s objective is long-term capital appreciation. The managers will mainly invest in equity securities of Russian companies.
They plan to sell a total of 4,600,000 shares at $15 per share, making
the maximum $619 million. This fund was made possible by the
leadership of Dr. J. Mark Mobius, president of Templeton Emerging
Markets Fund. He lives in Singapore and has two experts in Moscow.
Of course, this staff is not enough to understand the trends and
changes in the huge emerging market in Russia. I hope he will increase the number of experts there.
The underwriters that participated in the Templeton Russia Fund
include Merrill Lynch, A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., C. J. Lawrence/
Deutsche Bank, Nomura Securities International, Inc., and Prudential Securities, Inc. As part of the fund’s policy, the managers will
invest at least 65% of the total assets in the securities of Russian
issues. The fund wants to have the option of investing the remaining
35% in other countries should the investment climate in Russia become volatile. The fund will primarily invest in Russia’s most visible
businesses and companies. The risk with this strategy is lessened,
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but so will the gains be. As they begin to know the Russian landscape
better, the fund will invest in debt securities of less visible companies
so that higher returns can be achieved.
Another of the fund’s restriction is not to invest more than 25%
of its assets in any one industry, and no more than 10% in more than
one issuer. In addition, the fund is limiting its investment in debt
securities to no more than 20% of its total assets.
The Templeton Fund is the next important step for Russia. A
series of events have occurred, each one making Russia more and
more attractive as an investment in the emerging marketplace: first
came the Moscow International Currency Exchange in 1992. Next,
in February 1993, was the creation of the first publicly traded company on NASDAQ, the telecommunications company Petersburg
Long Distance, Inc.; then came the PaineWebber Russian country
venture capital fund, followed by the introduction of derivative instruments in the Russian market. The Templeton Fund is the latest
milestone. It is paving the way for more funds if its kind.
Emerging markets have become a global market where major financial instruments can be used. The creation of all major capitalist
institutions is a stamp of approval for any emerging market as a stable capitalist market.

HOW EMERGING IS EMERGING?
One question to consider in preparation for what lies ahead is how
to define what an emerging market really is? How many institutional
investment funds use a written policy to determine which countries
qualify as emerging markets? How familiar are plan sponsors with
their managers’ definition of the term? The World Bank’s International Finance Corporation defines emerging markets to be those
with a GDP per capita below $8,625, but it does not indicate a minimum GDP per capita, points out Vladimir L. Kvint, Director,
Emerging Markets, at Arthur Andersen Economic Consulting, New
York, and Professor of Management Systems and International Business at Fordham University’s Graduate School of Business.
Kvint’s approach to the issue, which he outlines in a recent edition
of his newsletter, Inside Russia, includes considering the level of development of capitalist institutions, meaning insurance companies,
commercial and investment banks, international law firms, and such
institutions as exchanges, depositories, and clearing facilities. Additionally, a market needs a transportation and telecommunications
infrastructure that can support the business activities of international corporations. ‘‘If these factors are in place, then it does not
matter what the GDP per capita is,’’ asserts Kvint. ‘‘If the capitalistic
institutions appear, it means there is a business interest in these
markets.’’
Some of Kvint’s classifications might take some seasoned global
investors by surprise, among them: Chile, long considered a Latin
American success story, is better as a pre-emerging market, due to a
lack of ‘‘major, recognized international business institutions there,
and it is very difficult to obtain insurance against political risk,’’ not
to mention ‘‘under-developed telecommunications and transportation services. You cannot go anywhere—the framework is not yet
ready.’’ But it is very close to emerging market status, Kvint adds, as
is Albania, which in 1994, he points out, became the most rapidly
growing economy on a market-oriented platform. Inflation in Albania is just 4.5%, and production is growing about 15% annually.
Global Investment, 2, No. 1 (December 1995), 43–44.
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Other ‘‘pre-emerging markets’’ on Kvint’s list include India, Pakistan, Egypt, and several Newly Independent States in Central Asia.
China, by the way, doesn’t even make the pre-emerging market list.
‘‘For me, it is a very simple issue,’’ says Kvint. ‘‘Would a businessman
or entrepreneur want to go or not to go? The major issues for him
are the business approach, not the financial approach.’’
However one defines emerging markets, the characteristics that
they share—higher economic growth rates, evolving legal and physical infrastructures, and a desire for foreign investment—are reason
enough to be optimistic about their prudent inclusion in future asset
allocation strategies. Throwing good money after bad doesn’t
achieve satisfactory returns in any asset class, and emerging markets
are no different. The provision of keen global market insights will,
therefore, be the basis of investment success stories even more in
the year ahead than they are today.

Investing in the
Emerging Markets

GAUGING THE RISK: FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
EMERGING MARKET COUNTRIES
In the last two decades of the twentieth century, watershed political
changes rocked five continents and, as a result, broke open scores of
countries that never before had been an integral part of the global
market. The historic demise of the Soviet Union, the collapse of
apartheid in South Africa, and the dismantling of military and personal dictatorships in Latin America, Pacific Asia, and the Indian
subcontinent meant that the global business world was five times
what it had been prior to the 1980s.
This is the second time in the last 500 years that geopolitical
events had remapped so dramatically the global commercial landscape. The first time was when Christopher Columbus and the other
great explorers introduced the riches of the new world to Europe’s
most powerful nation states. Prior to the changes that swept the
business climate in the last two decades of the twentieth century,
about 90 percent of all legitimate cross-border commercial transactions took place among the developed world—the United States,
Canada, Europe, Japan, and Australia.
Before the 1980s, the rest of the world was divided into two
parts—the so-called developing nations and various countries under
different forms of dictatorship. While embryonic free markets took
the place of command economics in Europe, military dictatorships
in Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, and Greece also fell apart, as did personal dictatorships in the Philippines, Indonesia, Paraguay, and numerous countries in the Middle East. The death of these regimes
prompted an unprecedented demand for foreign direct investment
(FDI), a phenomenon that opened the doors for international business in these countries. Hence the birth of the global emerging
market.
This market is made up of about 50 countries in Latin America,
Pacific Asia, and the Indian subcontinent, the 15 newly independent
countries of the former Soviet Union, and 10 more states in central
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and eastern Europe. This market greatly influences business transactions across the entire globe. In fact, it acted as the trigger for the
most powerful trend to take place on the eve of the new millennium:
globalization. The global emerging market became a partner and a
competitor for well-developed nations and simultaneously a model
for the remaining developing and underdeveloped countries. The
contribution of emerging market countries to global output equals
that of all of Western Europe and slightly less than that of the
United States; this constitutes 30 percent of total global output.
The global emerging market spearheaded certain worldwide trends
and influenced others. For example, we witnessed the death of most
centralized economies and the redistribution of executive federal
power into the hands of regional and local authorities in many countries. We also saw the emergence of an unprecedented scale of privatization as another global trend, as well as the drying up of capital
available for foreign direct investment.
In order to protect their power and privilege during their reign,
dictators had in the past invested significantly in the production of
weapons and military might. With the departure of these dictators
and their regimes, we began to see demilitarization and the conversion of the military-industrial complex to one that focuses on civilian
production. The conversion was another invitation for international
capital to participate in privatization, with respect to these former
military production plants. With the reorganization of national
economies and the redistribution of power, regional governments
inherited economic responsibilities that were previously the eminent
domain of dictators.
Although privatization actually began in well-developed capitalist
nations such as Great Britain, it became globally prominent with the
death of the state-owned companies in centralized economies. The
new, democratically elected federal and regional governments of
these countries knew that they lacked the expertise and capital to
resurrect their state-owned industries to profitability. These governments realized it would be wrong to try to retain managerial control
of these vast, state-owned industrial and commercial holdings. Consequently, they put forth a formal offer to sell stakes in their prized
stated-owned industries, mainly to American, Western European,
and Japanese investors. What happened next was an immediate and

gauging the risk

51

acute shortage of foreign direct investment for those firms that so
badly needed it.
Private western investors who took on unfamiliar risks to move
into these emerging market countries also ran up against massive
social problems—poverty, intense corruption, high unemployment
during uncertain periods of transition, record high emigration rates
to well-developed countries. These problems substantially changed
the nature of private investment that flowed to emerging markets.
Before, private investors who acted in response to the social needs of
people in their investment regions would at best make occasional
monetary donations. But now the game had changed. These investors had a personal interest in solving these problems. Investment
requires stability. Investment requires customers who can afford to
buy products and services. A safe haven for investment cannot exist
when social problems impede sustainable development. It was in the
1990s that private capital began to cooperate with multilateral institutions and national governments to fight poverty, unemployment,
and mass emigration in order to stabilize these economies and bolster their transition into free markets. Private capital began this process, making it peaceful and irreversible in many respects. These
partnerships, which involved local authorities, became a formidable
weapon against poverty. This is a situation that investors never encountered in their home countries.
In these countries, economic stability has led to a higher standard
of living and less disposable political leadership. In emerging market
countries, macroeconomic stability co-exists with high unemployment rates and a majority of the people living below the poverty
line. It’s the reason why in countries like Bulgaria, Albania, Romania,
Ukraine, Uruguay, Indonesia, India, and the Philippines we can identify rapid changes in the political fortunes of different governing parties.
An influx of people from emerging market countries created serious social and welfare budgeting problems in well-developed nations.
Take Germany, France, Italy, Greece, and even the United States,
for example. In all these countries, the number of illegal immigrants
in search of a better standard of living has rocketed in recent years,
a problematic byproduct of globalization. In the United States alone,
there are some 13 million illegal immigrants.
The global emerging market, which welcomes foreign investment,
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provides a different level of real economic freedom from what you
see in well-developed countries. In countries like China, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Egypt, Pakistan, and Bulgaria, foreign
investors still experience strong intervention on the part of the national government in their business ventures. Often, this intervention translates into corruption and nepotism. This is common in
Azerbaijan, Russia, Brazil, and Bulgaria.
Democratization of former communist countries, the failure of
the dictatorships in many other countries, and the low efficiency of
command economics gave birth to another global trend: political
disintegration. The embers of nationalism, fueled by minorities previously suppressed by totalitarian pressures, burned fiercely in the
former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Yugoslavia’s bloody conflict
spawned five newly independent states; the Soviet Union’s disintegration, 15 newly independent states; and Czechoslovakia, the 1989
‘‘Velvet Revolution’’ and 1993 ‘‘Velvet Divorce’’ of the Czech and
Slovak republics. In Indonesia, we witnessed the birth of an independent East Timor. And Eritrea split off from Ethiopia in East Africa.
Far from finished, this global trend of ‘‘balkanization’’ percolates
around the globe in such countries such as Canada, Belgium, and
Spain’s Basque country, as well between the rich northern and poor
southern states of Italy, among many others.
On the flip side, regional economic integration was another trend
that began to influence the process of foreign direct investment. Visible examples include Mercosur (Mercosel), the common market of
Latin America’s southern cone, the ANDEAN pact, ASEAN (the
trade association of 10 Southeast Asian countries), the CIS (the
commonwealth of 12 former Soviet states), the Baltic Union of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation,
the CORECOM; the Caribbean Community and Common Market;
and regional cooperation of West African nations (ECOWAS, the
Economic Community of West African States). These regional economic blocs hatched fresh opportunities for investors but also put
them at a competitive disadvantage. For example, U.S. investors now
did not enjoy the same edge that other nations inside of, say, the
Mercosur did when they trade with Brazil.
The failure of the dictatorships and the ensuing democratization
process brought down not only the Berlin Wall in 1989 but also many
other walls between countries. This made it possible to execute
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cross-border business more efficiently and cheaply. But the elimination of decades-old barriers also brought with it a new threat that
was clearly underestimated until the tragic events that took place in
the United States on September 11, 2001.
The Muslim world at the end of the twentieth century was very
much a divided one, philosophically and economically. Some nations
had opted for democratic change and economic freedom such as
Turkey, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Bahrain,
and even Indonesia, while others are still floundering, undecided as
to which way to develop. They include Egypt, Lebanon, Algeria, Iran,
and Malaysia. In fact, a substantial number of Muslim countries,
such as Syria, Libya, and Sudan, remain in the hands of dictators
who have no interest in democracy and harbor pockets of well-established, well-funded extremists who pose a threat to mankind in general, be it in the developed, developing, or emerging market
countries. The development of private business in Arab nations and
the integration of these businesses in the global market will undoubtedly play an important role in the fight against terrorism.
Any investor or company putting together a strategy for entering
an emerging market must weigh the problems and opportunities
brought on by the various aforementioned global trends that have
become so prominent in recent years. But an even more pressing
problem exists: how does one define an emerging market? The International Finance Corporation, a division of the World Bank, differentiates markets based on gross domestic product per capita (GDP/
capita). In my view, this is impossible, because among emerging
market countries then must be counted nations like India and
China, with GDP barely reaching $450 per capita; even Europe’s
Ukraine, Albania, and Moldova, with less than $800 per capita; and
Singapore with almost $28,000 per capita. Singapore, still deemed
an emerging market by the IFC, has a per capita GDP that is much
higher than the majority of well-developed nations. Democratic societies like Greece, Argentina, Brazil, Romania, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic are also still seen as emerging markets, as well as
communist dictatorships such as China, Vietnam, and Belarus, the
only remaining dictatorship in Europe.
The level of political risk of investment does not necessarily correlate to a country’s level of democracy. When investing, reasonably
democratic countries such as Ukraine, Argentina, and India still pres-
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ent an investor with a significant level of political risk, while countries ruled by dictatorships such as China and Brunei have stable
political climates with acceptable risk levels. This helps to explain
why among all emerging market countries, China attracts the greatest amount of foreign direct investment. Even nations ruled by oppressive regimes, such as Zimbabwe, in 2001 lured more FDI per
capita than the United States or Australia.
Likewise, countries whose governments rarely intervene in business ventures funded by foreign investors, for example, Bahrain, do
not necessarily operate on a democratic system of rule. The Wall
Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation in its Index of Economic
Freedom ranked the top six: Hong Kong, Singapore, New Zealand,
Estonia, Ireland and Luxembourg—not the United States or France.
The countries ranked at the bottom were more obvious: Iran, Laos,
Cuba, Libya, Iraq, North Korea, Burundi, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.
The Economist Intelligence Unit every five years publishes its own
rankings in terms of business environments around the globe.
Among the top 10 were no surprises: the Netherlands, the United
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Switzerland, Ireland, Finland,
and Singapore. But I question some of the choices at the bottom of
the list: Vietnam, which has a more favorable investment climate
than those of Romania or Ukraine.
And UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in its ‘‘2002 World Investment Report,’’ ranked 74th the
largest recipient of foreign investment with its $124 billion: the
United States. In fact, more than two-thirds of FDI flows to welldeveloped nations, the leaders of which are Belgium and Luxembourg on a per capita basis. These few emerging markets were among
the top 10: Hong Kong, Angola, Ireland, and Malta. Even Azerbaijan
and Bolivia make the UNCTAD list. But what this ranking fails to
evaluate is the cumulative amount of foreign investment per capita.
For example, Angola, which actually receives very little foreign investment per capita, in 2000 was ranked 129th on the list, but it
took third place in 2002. And among emerging market countries, the
leaders will be the Czech Republic and Poland, which on the whole
are among the top 40. By my own estimates, the leading countries in
terms of FDI on a cumulative basis are Poland and Hungary, with
more than $1,000 per capita, a level at which FDI becomes a factor
in economic development. If a country’s FDI per capita falls under
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$1,000, it really has no influence on building a national economy. Of
course in absolute terms, China always tops the list.
A key factor to consider when evaluating business risk overseas,
particularly in developing countries, is the development stage of a
nation’s business infrastructure. Though this may seem contradictory to a traditional evaluation of business risk, which typically is a
sum of product and financial risk, incorporating an assessment of the
level of business infrastructure will give us a more realistic picture of
the true business risk inherent in a particular country.
Typically, investors go to emerging market countries with capital
borrowed from investors, commercial banks, and other sources. Experienced creditors would never put up significant amounts of
money for investors without some evidence of insurance against political risk. Such insurance is obtained easily enough through agencies and companies with representatives in countries targeted for
such types of investments. For example, if you approach the U.S.based insurance giant AIG, formally known as the American International Group, you can procure insurance on more favorable terms in
countries where AIG has branch offices, such as Argentina and
Egypt, versus countries with lower political risk such as Albania, but
where there is no local AIG operation. In short, AIG is more willing
to insure investors in regions where it has a presence and some expertise, despite the particular level of political risk in those countries.
You can generally secure financing on more favorable terms if you
work with an investment bank that has a presence in the country
in which you are planning to invest. If targeting Bulgaria, better to
approach ING Barings, which has an office in Sofia. If you are interested in Argentina and Russia, contact Citibank. In the case of the
Czech Republic, the German banks are a good bet, as is JP Morgan
Chase. In regards to insurance and loans, investors need to open
accounts with commercial banks, preferably ones that can be trusted
in the investor’s home country.
The next requirement is an accurate valuation of any property you
may purchase or any state-owned property up on the privatization
sale block. A Big Four auditing firm is critical in such a situation
because you otherwise have to depend on the quality of due diligence work done by unknown local auditors, whom you must investigate yourself. The same goes for the law firms that an investor
employs to file the corporation registration and other key documents
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with the government. Choose firms that have a deep-seated knowledge of the local law and enforcement regimes when looking to build
an international joint venture or execute an acquisition.
The conclusion of this point is that you need the presence in
country of major capitalist institutions that are recognized internationally. I am talking about insurers, investment banks, commercial
banks, accounting firms, and law firms. Only then can you start to
evaluate the product and financial risk in more traditional ways.
The birth of emerging market countries altered in a fundamental
manner the approach of top executives in categorizing and analyzing
political and economic risk. Some 20 years ago, the idea was that
political risk was to be avoided outright, though some firms dared to
invest in areas that were deemed iffy on this front. In traditional
markets, foreign investors gained an edge thanks to lower production
costs and prices, the original impetus that drove American, European, and Japanese firms into developing nations. Participation in
these markets was not only a key success factor, but it was also essential to the continued existence of traditional competitors from highly
developed post-industrial nations. The birth of emerging markets
forced industry leaders to create systems that would pinpoint risk
and develop more sophisticated, multi-faceted risk-management
strategies. Those systems, of course, have to constantly be tinkered
with in order to incorporate adjustments in risk, thanks to changing
geo-political factors.
Due to its complexity, the current business world in terms of risk
and level of development of national economies cannot be broken
down into two categories of developed countries and emerging markets. The world is far too complicated for such simplistic pronouncements. Instead, the following categories work well to illustrate the
myriad stages of economic development in various nations:
I.

Developed Countries
a. Super economies
b. Modern economies
c. Industrialized nations
II. Emerging Markets Countries
a) Economies in transition
b) Oligarchic markets
c) Emerging market dictatorships
d) pre-emerging markets
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III. Developing National Economies
IV. Underdeveloped Economies

The strategy and process that goes along with foreign direct investment in different emerging market countries share mutual characteristics, often regardless of geographical differences. First of all, we are
talking about countries that have high levels of political risk, versus
the stability we witnessed in Western European and North American
countries. We are also talking about nations with inchoate legal
frameworks, but with laws that reflect some general ideas about protection of property rights of foreign investors. These nations generally have undeveloped business infrastructures. For example, there is
very limited activity of reliable commercial banks. There are also a
limited number of services available from reputable, international
investment banks and underwriters. We also see a lack of international insurers involved in these countries, poor-quality legal and
auditing services, and underdeveloped, nontransparent capital markets institutions. The factors jack up the levels of political, economic, and business risk associated with foreign direct investments.
I am not speaking here about the technological risks, because this is
not a homogeneous characteristic throughout the emerging market
countries. Eastern Europe consistently graduates university students
with an extremely high standard of technological education and
practice, so much so that the scores of these students often rival
those of their counterparts in the United States. This is particularly
true in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Russia. Hungary,
for example, has always enjoyed a tradition of producing world-class
scientists and mathematicians. The Czechs are well known for their
high standard of engineering talent. This is not the case, however, in
many Latin American and Southeast Asian countries, where the level
of technological education and practice is quite low.
Regional Economic Unions and Organizations
When any potential investor goes into any emerging-markets country, it is very important first to understand if the country belongs to
any regional organizations, such as Mercosur (Mercosol), the Andean
Pact, ASEAN, APEC, CIS, BSEC. Your potential profitability as foreign director investor is inextricably linked to whether you’ve smartly
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situated yourself within a tariff-free zone. Proximity is not the main
issue, but rather making sure you are setting up an operation tucked
safely inside the tariff-free zone’s borders. For example, if you are
looking for forestry resources to produce lumber and, ultimately, furniture, it doesn’t necessarily make sense to build the plant on the
edge of the forest, but rather on the right side of the border. There
is a massive consumer market in Brazil, a nation of 165 million people, of whom 25 million are members of the middle class and have
enough disposable income to buy reasonably pricey furniture. But in
order to ensure a healthy flow of those furniture sales, it’s not necessary to set up shop in Brazil. Due to the establishment of the Mercosur, you can operate the plant in Paraguay and sustain no punitive
tax and tariff disadvantages. At the same time, if you will build your
business on another side of the same forest in a country outside of
the Mercosur, you will be slapped with massive duties to be able
to sell that furniture in the nations that belong to the Mercosur
federation.
It is also critical that you, the foreign direct investor, work with
executive administrators of these regional economic organizations,
such as Mercosur or ASEAN. You can develop a dynamite business
plan and move forward on making your investment a reality, but you
will find that a much larger company secured some special preferences from one of these organizations. This has happened all too
often to well-meaning investors because they failed to build relationships with regional authorities, including those at the local and provincial levels of these countries. But in emerging market countries,
regional authorities still have much more executive influence on
business than in well-developed nations such as the United States or
those in Western Europe. I found that quite often people successfully built relationships with important regional officials in states like
Nevada or Minnesota, but they failed to apply the same logic in
addressing the social needs of similar authorities in Russia and Indonesia. We are not talking about bribes here. We are talking about
working with the authorities to meet the needs of the local population in solving particular social problems. Although a firm can usually only make a dent in the social problems of communities in which
they base their operations, any attempt to mitigate these problems
such as building schools or helping to fund hospitals will be greatly
appreciated by the local authorities. Participating in social effort to
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better the welfare of the local population makes good business sense.
Kenneth C. Frazier of Merck & Co. reported in a 2001 issue of The
Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, a monthly journal for company lawyers, about how Merck had donated a medicine called Mectizan to
25 million victims of river blindness in Africa and Latin America.
Chemicals giant Dupont reported in an earlier edition about its donation of computers to a school and the establishment of local medical services in India. Although these are the actions of publicly held
corporations accountable to shareholders in the way they manage
their firm’s assets, the executives of these companies realize that
these are wise investments that will yield returns in the form of good
will and positive publicity.
Corruption remains, of course, one of the major obstacles to investing in emerging-market countries. Research shows that the lower
the level of corruption in a particular country, the higher the level of
foreign direct investment per capita in the country. Transparency
International, an agency which operates out of Berlin, Germany,
cites these countries as having the lowest of level of corruption: Singapore, Hong Kong, Chile, Taiwan, and Hungary. The agency cites
these states as ones plagued with the highest levels of corruption:
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Venezuela, Pakistan, India, Russia, and Argentina (The Economist, Feb.1–7, 2003, p. 90). The World Bank
names Azerbaijan as the most corrupt country, an assessment with
which I completely agree. And this is despite the fact that when I
worked in Brazil, the Brazilians would often boast that their country
was indeed the most corrupt on the planet. Turkmenistan, according
to the World Bank, is also high on the list of those nations dogged
by corruption.
Corruption not only dissuades FDI in a lot of instances, but it also
works to keep a country rooted in poverty. There is scant evidence
that the well-meaning programs of multi-lateral institutions such as
those of the United Nations and the World Bank have done much
to improve living conditions of the poor in the developing world.
What economists have instead credited is the creation of jobs associated with FDI. Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neil commented on this issue at a conference in Monterrey, Mexico, where
representatives of 171 developing nations gathered for a United Nations conference on poverty. ‘‘If we are going to have economic development in the world, most of that will come from capital coming
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into those countries to create jobs. We are not going to do it with
welfare,’’ said O’Neil, as was reported in a Wall Street Journal op-ed
piece dated March 26, 2002.
But when an investor goes abroad, particularly into an emerging
market country, this strategic decision always reflects a tough choice
that was made regarding the scale and type of risk that a firm can
manage. Prior to 1980, when business leaders heard about risk, they
would often dismiss a project altogether. But these same leaders
learned the hard way that they would lose out to competitors who
took the risk and set up operations in developing nations, enjoying
much cheaper labor, richer natural resources, a bigger market for
sales, and lower production costs. Companies generated profits in
those developing nations, as well as the money they made from selling those goods back in their home countries. During the 1980s,
large companies from well-developed nations exported their competitive struggle to emerging market countries and began to create riskmanagement systems. Now these firms know how to measure risk
accurately, to evaluate the types of risk they can tolerate and the way
they can adjust their operations to manage the risk they take on. In
emerging market countries, companies deal with many types of risk,
some of them traditional business risks like product risk and financial
risk and some specific to emerging markets: political risks, such as
the expropriation and nationalization of foreign properties and physical damage to property due to political unrest, and the risk of being
unable to convert soft currency back into hard currency. Many firms
built stellar risk-management systems, such as the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), European engineering giant Asea
Brown & Bovari (ABB), The Walt Disney Co., and McDonald’s
Corp., among many others.
Sovereign governments of emerging market countries are the only
ones who can manage the systematic risk in their nations. No one
corporation or foreign investor can do this. When General Electric
Co. came to Hungary in the late 1980s, under the leadership of legendary CEO Jack Welch, the company knew it could not handle the
systematic risk that it faced in this environment. But the Hungarian
government, similar to others in emerging market countries, had created its own risk-management systems designed to attract and protect foreign investment. Other nations that made a similar effort
were Poland, Brazil, China, Taiwan, and, more recently, Croatia.
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Hungary, thanks in part to the approach of its government and
new legislation, has secured the highest level of FDI among all
emerging countries, with more than $2,000 per capita. But in absolute numbers, the largest FDI recipient in the emerging markets of
Europe is Poland. At the start of the year 2002, Poland had so far
attracted $60 billion in total FDI capital, which is approximately
$1,554 per capita.
The leading recipient, globally, among all emerging market countries is China. The reason why some countries attract so much more
foreign direct investment than others is due to a variety of factors.
Take Russia for example. Why would a country with such vast natural resources, a highly educated, hardworking population, a tradition
of great scientific achievements, and a developed infrastructure fail
to attract an enormous amount of FDI? In fact, Russia in the last
decade has attracted less cumulative FDI than Brazil and China have
been able do within the period of only one year.
In order to answer the question about Russia, I want to look at
Slovakia, where the attitude toward foreign investors was until 1999
the same as Russia’s today. Slovakia was, until 1999, the lowest recipient of foreign direct investment in Eastern Europe. A government
practice of political isolation; maintenance of artificial barriers
toward foreign participation in privatization projects; restrictions on
foreign investment over a wide spectrum of corporate sectors, particularly banking and insurance; and voucher privatization schemes
(vouchers were distributed only among Slovak citizens) made it practically impossible for foreign companies. But in 1999, under the leadership of newly elected Prime Minister Mikula Dzurinda, the Slovak
government began to do away with these restrictions and adopted a
more hospitable approach to foreign companies. The country subsequently experienced an influx of foreign direct investment, thanks
to its new outward-reaching policy. In the year 2000 alone, Slovakia
attracted more foreign investors than ever before. Annual inflow of
FDI in 2002 was equal to 10 percent of the nation’s GDP. This
country of 5.4 million people surpassed its neighbors to become the
leader in attracting foreign investment, based on a percentage increase. Behind Slovakia came its neighbor, the Czech Republic, with
an 8-percent annual increase of FDI inflow and then Poland, with a
jump of 3 percent. The problems that had daunted Slovakia prior
to 1999 still discourage foreign direct investment from flowing into
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Russia, Ukraine, and Bulgaria. In these countries, lobbyists of local
moguls who operate on the basis of a seemingly incurably corrupt
system succeed in keeping out foreign corporations. In general, we
can speak about FDI as a factor of economic growth if this investment reaches a level of $1,000 per person in that specific country. If
the amount is lower than that, then FDI as a phenomenon doesn’t
really change the economic landscape of a particular country. Very
few countries in the world, however, can boast of reaching a level of
FDI of $1,000 per capita. It is important to understand that a high
level of FDI does not necessarily correlate with a nation’s natural
resources, general education levels, or national transportation infrastructure. All this is secondary to what outsiders perceive as the political risks of investing in a particular country and the agenda of its
current regime with regard to economic development. This was clear
in the case of Slovakia, but not only Slovakia. Look at what is going
on in the six independent countries that used to make up the Federal
Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. The best example of the cost of the
high political risk of investment is the Republic of Serbia. Serbia
used to be the most economically developed state within the Yugoslav federation and the largest market, with 10 million citizens. But
the isolationist policies of former president Slobodan Milosevic
bankrupted the country and turned it into the lowest recipient. For
example, until 2002, the total, cumulative amount of all FDI in Serbia came to $1.25 billion. That means that Serbia attracted only
$125 of FDI per capita, the lowest in all of Central and Eastern
Europe. But Croatia, its much smaller neighbor to the West and a
far less developed nation economically at the time of the break-up
of socialist Yugoslavia, had by then attracted more than $5.4 billion.
Different industries within emerging market nations attract different levels of foreign money, with the most attractive being the banking and financial services sector. On average, this attracted
approximately 23 percent of FDI in global emerging markets. The
trade and hospitality industry sector trails in second place, with
about 20 percent. Next is the manufacturing sector, followed by the
energy, water supply, and transportation sectors. One of the best
ways to attract foreign direct investment is to set up dedicated economic development zones that give tax breaks and other inducements to investors. Ireland is perhaps the most spectacular case of a
country that has used such an approach so successfully. Ireland has
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done so well recently in its efforts that it has been able to stem the
flow of young talent out of Ireland and woo back those who had gone
in search of high-paying jobs in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.
The managerial decision to move forward with foreign direct investment is always a strategic, long-term move on the part of a company. The decision is always controversial and unprecedented in that
each project carries with it a unique set of circumstances and risks.
Ironically, the decision to plunk down often millions of dollars into a
risky overseas venture runs counter to common sense. Foreign direct
investment, to some degree, requires faith that you will be accurate
in your assessment of the complexities underpinning a particular
country’s political, economic, and social scenario. In employing common sense alone, most intelligent, reasonable people would decide
against making such a move because it is too difficult to know for
sure the outcome. As a result, executives in favor of moving into
emerging markets often grapple with a maelstrom of doubt and opposition within their companies. But the teachings of Plato and
Kierkegaard have long taught us that the majority opinion is often
wrong. And once a daring move into an emerging market has proven
successful, business leaders who follow in the wake of those who
originally took the chance adopt the particular case as an example of
conventional wisdom. Yet that doesn’t make it that much easier for
the next group of hard-charging executives who propose a different,
still unproven strategy with regard to FDI. And so the cycle continues, with successes logged as conventional wisdom and failures as
drastic mistakes to be avoided. Yet those who succeed in setting up
a viable operation in an emerging market should not forget to congratulate themselves on their achievements. Only through such
work, rather than aid programs, can the people in emerging markets
acquire the respect and prosperity that they so crave. I believe that
foreign direct investment will continue to grow at its currently levels
of 20 percent into the next decade, particularly given that the emerging market will only increase in size, as underdeveloped nations move
up the socio-economic ladder into the developing nation category.

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND THE WORLD BANK:
THE ADVANTAGES AND
SHORTCOMINGS
In 1944, the Soviet Union had the opportunity to become a founding
member of the IMF and World Bank. Joseph Stalin sent representatives (including the father of Victor Gerashenko, the current head of
the Central Bank) to several meetings. Stalin ultimately decided that
these institutions were too imperialistic for USSR participation. So,
for the next 48 years, the Soviet Union remained outside the circle
of legal, international, economic, and financial institutions. But
when the Soviet Union was near collapse, the Soviet and then Russian leaders rediscovered the IMF and World Bank. They saw them
as two of the major sources for additional out-of-pocket expense
money, and these institutions began to look more attractive.

Russia Joins International Business Institutions
For Russia, an historic event occurred in 1992: it became a member
of the IMF and World Bank. This membership was important not
only for monetary reasons, but also because it was a major indication
of Russia’s movement toward supporting civilized, modern, international business. In April 1992, leaders of the Western countries, including President George Bush and Prime Minister Helmut Kohl,
initiated action to provide Russia with $24 billion in aid. In July
1992 the IMF met to decide whether to issue this money to Russia.
Although the aid was approved, the bureaucratic mechanisms of
these institutions were not much better than the communist bureaucratic mechanisms, and so a substantial portion of the money,
as of August 1994, has still not been issued.
In The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 1 (August 1994).
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The major problem of any large organization, like this multilateral
institution, is its mechanisms for implementing its programs. As expected, they are oriented toward working only with governments, not
with private companies and entrepreneurial institutions in recipient
countries. As a result, the money often flows to inexperienced governments in which there are few people who understand a capitalist
economy.

Unique Problems, Standard Approach
An important role of the IMF and the World Bank was in developing
an economic and business information system in Russia. For example, these institutions created a system for calculating economic indicators. In addition, membership in the IMF and World Bank gave
Russia access to many advisers who had tremendous influence on
the activity of the Russian government. Unfortunately, these organizations had only a primitive understanding of the way business is
conducted in Russia, especially during the initial transition years,
1991–93. Thus, their recommendations did not provide the desired
results and, in some cases, were counter-productive. One dramatic
example is the policy recommendations the IMF advisers gave to
Acting Prime Minister Gaidar. As expected, the initiatives of Gaidar
and Jeffery Sachs of Harvard ‘‘liberalized’’ prices prematurely, before
the demonopolization of the economy, conversion of the military
industry, and privatization. Prices for all basic needs such as meat,
milk, and clothes jumped sky-high. People lost the ability to feed
their families. IMF ‘‘experts’’ exacerbated the situation by recommending that the Russian treasury not print new ruble bills. As a
result, companies had no currency to pay salaries, and serious deflation occurred. Later the government had to issue, on a monthly
basis, more money than was ever in circulation.
A serious problem with organizations such as the IMF and World
Bank is that they attempt to remedy a country’s specific problems
with a generic set of recommendations and solutions. Ideas that
might work well in Poland, for example, will not necessarily produce
results in Russia. The Poles, in contrast with the Russians, have a
memory of capitalism. Communism was instituted in Poland 45
years ago, compared to 73 years ago in Russia. But the biggest differ-
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ence is that in Russia there was no private economy at all, while in
Poland about 40% of the economy was private. This advantage enables capitalist systems to take root more in Poland than in Russia,
a subtle distinction that has been lost on the IMF and World Bank.

New Solutions Are Needed
Past experience has proved that the world business community
needs a new mechanism to solve large-scale economic and business
problems. This mechanism must be more flexible, and have a shorter
lead time between political decision making and implementation. In
addition, it must be oriented toward private capital and entrepreneurs, and not just toward governments. Global institutions of this
kind are developing, such as the regularly scheduled G-7 meetings of
the leading industrial countries: Canada, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan, the United States, and now Russia. G-7 meeting
members are generally making good political decisions, but not all
of the decisions are being implemented.
Economic decisions are usually made without the input of economists, and are not as sound. It is necessary to convert these meetings
into real institutions and create the mechanism for implementation.
The difference between institutions with 50 years’ experience
such as the IMF and World Bank and new institutions is their emphasis. The older institutions are geared more toward long-term
macroeconomic decisions, while the newer ones address shorterterm tactical goals. In order to be most effective, plans to solve
global-scale problems must be put into practice on a regional level.
Several new regional institutions have appeared, such as EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), which was
opened in April 1992. I participated in the recommendations for the
creation of this institution in 1989 and early 1990. The Soviets finally
realized that, for this institution to be successful, it was necessary
to invest amounts comparable to what other leading countries were
investing. As a result, EBRD became one of the first institutions
where the former Soviet Union, and later Russia, played a role not
only as a recipient but also as a decision maker. Unfortunately, the
EBRD did not focus its activity, and is therefore not visible in postCommunist countries.
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Central Asian Republics Are Neglected
By overlooking the important Central Asian republics, these world
organizations have left that part of the world without a stabilizing
influence. Countries such as Iran and Iraq have not hesitated to increase their business activities in these regions, and, therefore, their
political influence has grown. Likewise, Turkey has become very active in Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. For the first time in history,
Central Asia is established into independent countries. Therefore, it
is vital to create a Central Asian institution to work with these republics. While they do not yet play a geopolitical role, and while they
are not yet a major target of the world business community, both
will occur within the next ten years.
Business people must also understand that multilateral institutions are not world institutions—even the World Bank, despite its
name. Many countries, even with formal participation in this institution, do not receive any money. Of the Eastern European countries,
Poland, Hungary and Romania have the best relationships with multilateral institutions, but Bulgaria is neglected by these groups. As a
result, international business is only slowly focusing on this country.
And Western business people have not recognized that this country
offers wonderful opportunities for business.

Follow the Money Trail
International investors should closely follow the activities of the
major multilateral institutions. If countries are receiving funding
from multilateral organizations, it is a signal that these economies
are worthwhile for investment. Once a government receives money,
private entrepreneurs within the country can revive a flagging economy. This leads to better business opportunities, as well as stabilization. For example, the fact that Russia joined G-7 and the Paris Club
is a positive indication that the economy is stabilizing. Individuals
should read news regarding such international organizations for clues
that could lead them to potential investments. Private entrepreneurs
and investors can obtain guarantees for investment in these countries.

DON’T GIVE UP ON RUSSIA
The Russians love their dictators, I’ve heard American say. I suppose
one could argue the point. But Westerners who think Russians are
hostile to a free economy are just plain wrong. The 25% of the population that voted for the nationalists in the last parliamentary election were not voting against capitalism; they were protesting the
hardship caused by ‘‘shock therapy,’’ the ill-conceived economic policy that resulted in skyrocketing inflation, high unemployment, a
fuel shortage, and a decrease in food consumption, all of which have
left 90% of Russians living below the poverty level. Still, if the 1991
coup plotters—the Communist Party, the KGB, and the army—
couldn’t squelch the beginnings of democracy and a free economy,
neither can the lack of bread.
This is no time for U.S. investors to retreat from Russia. The climate for international joint ventures has never been better. Russians
know that without cooperation with the West, the country cannot
survive, let alone prosper. Not one elected leader has called for government control of foreign property. Russia has become a member
of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and some
18,000 foreign companies have already invested in the country. According to a study I conducted of joint ventures attempted between
1989 and 1993, between 35% and 38% of consummated joint ventures are already profitable or well on the way. That’s the highest
success rate for new businesses in the world.
It’s true that the country still needs modern insurance and banking systems and more firms to handle accounting and auditing. Industry must be fully demonopolized and state property privatized.
Russia also needs more laws governing business; too many Russian
entrepreneurs see the black market as the seat of modern industry.
Nevertheless, the country offers foreigners advantages available nowhere else: a cheap labor force more highly educated than the
United States’s, inexpensive factories and land, and a plethora of
natural resources. Despite the lack of maintenance in the oil fields,
Harvard Business Review, March–April 1994, pp. 62–74.
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Russia produces more oil and gas each day than Saudi Arabia and
more natural gas, steel, and cement than any other country.
Russia is on sale now, and those who arrive late will have to pay
more. The price of land will undoubtedly rise, and the country is
developing protectionist stances as it comes to appreciate the full
value of its resources. Still, many Americans remain reluctant to invest, understandably deterred by the fact that most joint ventures
attempted in Russia never get off the ground. But their failure is less
a function of business conditions in Russia than poor planning on
the part of foreign investors. Western partners of joint ventures in
Russia have usually neglected to scout out the best locations, negotiate fair deals, and verify the information that companies provide.
Potential investors who want to beat the trend can begin by learning from the mistakes of the first wave of joint ventures. My own
history may offer some insight into the beginnings of these ventures,
the mind-set of the Soviet leaders who allowed them, and the emergence of Russian capitalism decades before the Soviet Union’s collapse.
My capitalist education began early. I was born in 1949 in the
city of Krasnoyarsk, the industrial heart of Siberia. Most Westerners
imagine Siberia as a permafrost wasteland with few people and no
businesses. In reality, there are 28 million people living in an area a
little larger than Canada. Krasnoyarsk has warm summers—for two
months, anyway—and beautiful rivers in which I swam as a boy.
At 15, I got my first job as a metal-worker in Krasnoyarsk. Later, I
spent a year mining for nonferrous metals in Norilsk, the northernmost city on earth, with a climate that makes Anchorage seem tropical. Eager to stay warm and above ground, I enrolled in graduate
school to study electrical engineering in the mining department at
the Krasnoyarsk Institute of Nonferrous Metals. During my studies
there, I came across one of the first Russian translations of Paul
Samuelson’s work and became fascinated by the potential of economic theory to shape human behavior. At 23 I competed to earn a
place at the Moscow Institute of National Economy.
Going to this institute after working in Siberia was like moving
from the bottom of society to the top. For the first time, I met the
scholars who had written the textbooks I had been reading. It was
1972, and already the first wave of new management theory was
sweeping the school. We studied organizational structure and man-
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agement systems based on U.S. models and read translations of U.S.,
British, and Japanese texts. Even then, almost everyone knew that
communism was a stupid idea. People didn’t say this in public—it
was much too dangerous—but we talked among ourselves. Anyone
who had ever worked at a company even briefly knew there was absolutely no connection between real life and communism. People
needed incentives to work, and companies needed incentives to produce.
After I earned my Ph.D. in 1975, I took a job as head of organizational management at the Norilsk Mining Metallurgical Concern,
the largest Soviet enterprise, with 150,000 employees in a single location. I introduced a matrix structure to encourage cooperation between divisions the size of companies. For the first time, the bosses,
who ran these divisions like fiefdoms, were forced to share employees
and resources. Productivity increased, and the matrix structure remains to this day. The following year, I accepted a position as chief
economist and deputy chairman of the Siberian Nonferrous Metallurgy Automation Company (SibAuto), a technology company that
automated the nonferrous metals industry and one of the first Soviet
businesses to base its production on actual customer orders rather
than subsidies from the state.
At SibAuto, I learned more about the importance of motivating
workers than I could have in any school. All workers in Soviet companies earned nearly the same salaries, no matter how much or how
efficiently they produced. The state did not allow us to pay our best
workers more than 30% above the average salary; so I had to find
other ways to raise our employees’ standard of living. First, I sent a
portion of our profit to the trade union, which gave money to the
company canteen. The canteen used the money to prepare sumptuous lunches to be sold for just a few kopecks. Our trade union chairman helped out by securing free passes to various spas so that we
could reward our best workers with vacations. People started to pay
more attention to their work because they knew that their managers
would recognize excellence with more than communist medals.
In 1978, I was invited to join the Siberian School of Economists,
part of the Academy of Sciences. The leaders of the Siberian School
included Nobel Prize-winning economist Leonid Kantorovich and
Abel Aganbegian. While I came from the region, most members had
exiled themselves to Siberia to be as far as possible from Moscow’s
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communist bureaucrats. In the subfreezing temperature, we could
discuss our passions: the free market, and new management methods. Members even sent the general secretary of the Communist
Party a letter saying that there was no future in the Soviet economic
system. A risky move, but where could the secretary send people who
were already in Siberia?
During this time, I developed methods of studying natural resources and business opportunities in various regions of Russia. I
organized the first economic expedition through the Arctic Seaway
to evaluate its natural resources and local enterprises. Bundled in
snowsuits, our group of 15 traveled for 63 days by ship, helicopter,
and jeep through the icy terrain, often going for days without meeting anyone. We observed mile after mile of oil and gas fields; plants
that produced nickel, cobalt, copper, and timber; fish factories; and
transportation and construction companies. I knew that with the
development of the right infrastructure for mining and transportation, the economic potential of this region was enormous.
In 1981, when I arrived at the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow to study for a second doctorate in regional management and economics, in some respects it was like
going back in time. The institute was the official consulting arm of
the central government. (Our director would become deputy prime
minister for economic reform under Mikhail Gorbachev.) Using
Marxist analysis, people studied why communism was more productive than other economic systems. I asked my new colleagues, ‘‘If the
Soviet economy is so much better, why are you buying foreign cars
and shoes? Why are Russian companies using so much foreign
equipment?’’ When I asked one scholar when he’d last spent time
inside an industrial company, he said, ‘‘In 1953.’’
The institute, nevertheless, had a fine department of political
economy, and I wanted to improve my understanding of the connection between public policy and economics. We had special access to
government statistics—the ones not available to the public—which
were much more detailed and accurate. Based on these numbers, I
prepared a study in 1988 analyzing the political and economic situation in the Soviet Union. I concluded that the Soviet Union could
not support its military and political apparatus beyond 1991 or 1992
and was headed for a collapse. I was not psychic; the statistics and
political environment had simply swayed me. The economic basis of
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communism had been deteriorating since 1970. From 1970 to 1985,
the gross national product’s rate of growth declined 300%.
The mounting economic crisis forced the communist leadership
to open markets and court foreign investment. I had already begun
to study how international joint ventures in Europe increased the
level of technology and production. Foreign companies could produce the equipment, technology, and management systems Russia
desperately needed as well as the money to develop oil and gas fields
and nonferrous metal and diamond pits. International cooperation,
I believed, was critical to Russia’s survival.
By the mid-1980s, even Gorbachev realized that Russia did not
have enough investment capacity, equipment, and workers to advance Soviet industry. In 1987, he opened the doors to direct cooperation between Soviet and foreign enterprise. The Soviet government
invited other market-oriented economists and me to consult on the
draft of a joint-venture regulation.
Some Russians called Soviet bureaucrats pen pushers; they were
actually more like erasers. They deleted 95% of our draft of progressive legislation from the text. The final agreement limited the rights
of foreign partners to 49% and made it impossible for foreigners to
hold the post of chairman or director general. The doctrinaire bureaucrats were afraid that without these restrictions fat, cigar-smoking capitalists would take control of the motherland. Of course, they
did no such thing. Only 23 joint ventures were created in 1987 under
the poorly formed regulation. But this was good news to me: when
the second joint-venture regulation was drafted in 1988, the bureaucrats no longer feared a mad rush to buy Moscow. They heeded our
calls to abolish restrictions.
The most successful joint-venture partners were German, Finnish,
and Austrian companies, whose members knew the country well and
had good relationships with Soviet bureaucrats. Most Americans
didn’t understand the market, so they weren’t in any rush to invest.
Dialogue, the second U.S.-Soviet joint venture, was an exception. It
began as a modest company that assembled computers from U.S.
parts. Although Soviet companies had little hard currency, they
could usually scrape together enough to buy a couple of Dialogue’s
computers. The venture grew rapidly and was one of the few to see
immediate profits.
Today there are more than 18,000 joint ventures in Russia and
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more than $10 billion in foreign investment. The number of U.S.–
Russian joint ventures has increased from 625 in January 1992 to
2,800 in January 1994. The numbers vary, but, according to my research, around $1 billion in U.S. investments flowed into Russia
from October 1992 through December 1993. Large U.S. industrialists are on the scene, including IBM, General Electric, Ford, HewlettPackard, Eastman Kodak, Playtex, Chevron, and AT&T. In 1993,
PepsiCo signed a $3 billion multiyear trade pact, and in 1989 and
1990, McDonald’s invested $50 million in a food-processing plant
and a restaurant in Moscow. Thousands of small and midsize ventures have also arrived. Most of the joint ventures have been in software, heavy industrial production, tourism, and hotels. There has
also been an explosion in the growth of research and development.
Companies like Bell Labs are working with Russian scientists to
study space, electronics, optics, lasers, and nuclear energy.
I applaud Gorbachev for opening the door enough to let in these
foreign investments. He deserves much credit for glasnost and the
liberalization of daily life. But while he talked about economic reform and political freedom, he never came out against communism.
Gorbachev was not a real revolutionary; he was a reformer who supported small reforms, and he bungled even those. Gorbachev never
came out in favor of private property.
Boris Yeltsin, on the other hand, is the first modern Russian revolutionary and the first true anti-communist. He destroyed the last
Russian empire in front of our eyes. Yeltsin understands the importance of creating a political climate that encourages investment. But
revolutionaries can only destroy old systems; they cannot create new
ones.
Yeltsin does not understand capitalism. He has relied on Russian
advisers who have never lived and worked in capitalist countries and
on Western consultants who do not understand the Russian economy and have recommended standard measures to move the country
toward capitalism. Yeltsin’s decision to liberalize prices in January
1992, before the decentralization of management systems, before
demonopolization, and before the privatization of state property, resulted in a pseudoliberalization of price. Because state monopolies
owned all property, they raised prices. Inflation rose from 15% to
159% per month. This kind of shock therapy was a mistake on the
part of an inexperienced government. The resulting economic hard-
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ship gave Russians the impression that life would be even worse
under capitalism.
Soon Russia will need new leaders who can help the country understand the function of capitalist institutions. These leaders will
have to take steps to prevent hyperinflation, lift restrictions on the
activities of foreign banks and insurance companies in Russia, and
create jobs programs and systems of social protection for elderly veterans, students, and the poor, particularly during the worsening meat
shortage. (There are as many cows now as in 1954, but the human
population has increased since then by 35 million.) I’m not calling
for a return to socialism, but for a dose of compassion as Russia
moves toward capitalism.
Russia desperately needs investment from the West to ease this
difficult transition. Recent regulations allow foreigners to form
wholly owned companies and subsidiaries, but joint ventures are still
the best investment option. Americans can benefit from reliable Russian partners with good connections and access to raw materials and
equipment. Deciding where to invest and how to structure a deal,
however, can be fraught with problems. Americans would do well to
learn from their predecessors’ mistakes.

Choosing the Right Location
The first question I hear from U.S. managers considering joint ventures is, ‘‘How far from the Kremlin can our headquarters be?’’ They
overestimate the power of government bureaucrats, who no longer
make all the decisions, and underestimate the power of regional
leaders—the heads of various political and administrative subdivisions—and executives, who now have much more autonomy. During
the first two years of joint-venture activity, 85% of all foreign joint
ventures were located in Moscow and 10% in St. Petersburg. Only
5% were scattered over the rest of the former Soviet Union. Americans who favor high-risk ventures might consider locating in Moscow, the hot seat of political turmoil. I suggest heading north
instead.
In general, the political risk of investments in Russia decreases
from south to north and west to east, meaning that investments in
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Siberia and along the Pacific Coast are more reliable than those in
the many European regions of the country. Most people in Siberia,
or their ancestors, went there as exiles. They don’t like communism
and stay far away from the centers of power. All political violence has
been in the European parts of Russia, where unemployment is higher
than in Siberia or the Russian Far East. More corruption, especially
bribery, and higher levels of crime exist in Moscow.
I am partial to my home, Siberia. Each of Siberia’s 13 regions has
a university and excellent graduate schools. Most important, Siberia
has abundant resources. According to recent studies undertaken by
geologists at the Academy of Sciences, the oil reserves of eastern
Siberia are larger than those controlled by all OPEC nations combined. Krasnoyarsk produces more platinum, nickel, and timber than
any country in the world—with old machinery and without foreign
investment. Privatization has resulted in the conversion of military
plants to civilian products; a potentially lucrative plant for optical
equipment for submarines, for example, is now manufacturing sewing machines.
Equally attractive to investors is the Russian Far East, a secret
the Japanese have known for years because of their proximity. One
hundred and fifty Japanese companies have already established direct ties to various Russian enterprises in the Russian Far East. The
area is rich in oil and gas, diamonds, gold, nonferrous and rare metals, coal, timber, and fish from Siberian rivers and the Pacific and
Arctic oceans. The Sakhalin, Primorskiy, and Khabarovsk regions
have already developed the infrastructure necessary for industry.
Given that nearly a quarter of the Pacific region’s lumber resources
are in the Russian Far East, the timber industry should attract numerous foreign investors. What the area needs now is foreign technology for furniture, paper, and cardboard manufacturing.
Fortunately, people in this area do not view trees purely for their
lumber potential. After many decades of ecological devastation, environmentalism is a growing force in Russia. The population in the
Russian Far East will welcome any foreign company that can reduce
waste and still make money.
Companies would also benefit by locating in any of Russia’s 15
free economic zones. Four years ago, I was involved in creating Russia’s first FEZs, which offer special privileges, such as tax holidays,
to encourage the investment of foreign capital. Unfortunately, from
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1989 to 1993, the government didn’t draw up plans for developing
these zones; as a result, progress is slow.
When foreign investors consider a specific area, they should get a
copy of the regional program, usually available through the regional
government. Each lists which foreign technologies are considered
vital to the area and the region’s preferences for imports. Regional
programs also indicate the availability of state-owned property that
foreigners may purchase. Consultants or local economists can help
potential investors explore regions, track down programs, determine
transportation options, and calculate the cost of developing infrastructure. Investors must keep in mind that a portion of any investment made in eastern Siberia will need to go into transportation and
basic services.

Choosing the Right Partner
The importance of picking the right partner is obvious, but I’ve lost
count of how many U.S. businesses I’ve watched make disastrous
mistakes. According to my joint-venture study, 28% of potential
joint ventures failed because they lacked a reliable Russian partner.
During the initial negotiations, Americans should gather as much
documentation about a company as possible, including: records of
outstanding obligations to the state, such as loans; recommendations
from banks; and the company’s registration numbers and licenses,
which can be found in regional government offices. Some companies
may have a license to produce a product, for example, but not to
export it. I’ve seen numerous Americans and other Westerners neglect to ask about licensing and even more who fall for the line, ‘‘Our
license will be arriving any day.’’ Too often the next day turns into
the next month, which usually means never.
I came across one U.S. company that signed an agreement with
the Krasnoyarsk Oil and Gas Geological Company without knowing
that the company had the right to do geological research but no
license to develop oil fields. To make matters worse, the U.S. company also failed to consult the Ministry of Geology before signing the
deal. When the company finally approached the ministry to obtain a
license, the ministers were furious that they hadn’t been contacted
prior to the signing. Naturally, they denied the request.
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An Austrian company had a similar experience when the second
largest Soviet publishing house, Molodaya Gvardiya, approached the
Austrians because it needed computer equipment for its publishing
facilities. The Russian publisher had no hard currency, so it agreed
to pay the Austrians in waste paper, which can be sold to newspaper
companies at good prices. The Austrian partner, however, had neglected to check one detail: Had the state supplies committee
granted the publisher permission to sell its waste? (The Austrians
had no idea that the state even regulated waste!) Not only had the
company failed to obtain this license, but also it had neglected to
get permission from the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties to sell
any goods abroad. The deal was over before it had even begun.
Unfortunately, too many U.S. companies spend considerable
money on trips and negotiations only to discover that their Russian
partners have lied. I’ve seen Russian companies claim to earn $100
million in profits when they have absolutely nothing. And I’ve seen
too many Americans neglect to ask for documentation. Foreigners
who are the victims of fraud can take legal action, but the settlement
will probably not justify the expense, and such action could hurt a
company’s reputation in the Russian business community. Consequently, it is essential to verify all information the company supplies,
using an independent auditing company that meets Western standards.
Occasionally, Russian companies hire such auditing firms. In most
cases, both partners need to agree on an auditor and decide who
will pay for the service. Foreigners should also compare and contrast
information from several sources in the company. In general, foreigners are more likely to receive accurate information from lower level
managers than from senior executives. One important fact to keep
in mind when assessing financial information is that the Russian
accounting system—a relic of the communist era—does not allow
for a realistic appraisal of products or assets. Concepts like ‘‘current
market value’’ do not exist.
Foreign businesses should also be skeptical of figures offered by
government officials, who are masters of the ‘‘double lie squared.’’
Any information channeled to them has already been doctored by
the so-called First Department, the group responsible for classified
information, which still operates within almost every state-owned
enterprise as well as in many private ones. The difficulty of obtaining
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accurate figures makes the case for independent auditors much more
compelling.

Understanding Cultural Differences
When Americans go to Japan, most attempt to learn about Japanese
customs. But too many Americans don’t bother to learn about Russians and their extremely diverse cultures. Each region has its own
economic and labor histories and ethnic and religious traditions.
One American accountant wanted to negotiate a contract in Tataria.
Because he had heard that meat was in short supply, he brought
plenty of first-rate bacon as a goodwill gesture. But the Tatars are
Moslem. They don’t eat pork.
The possibilities for miscommunication are endless. If someone
asks two Russians how they met, the Russians will be embarrassed.
Russians are generally secretive, especially with foreigners. This attitude comes from years of living under a repressive regime. In general,
Russians have an inferiority/superiority complex about Americans.
On one hand, they see all Americans as millionaires who look down
on their poor Russian neighbors. One the other, Russians refer to
Americans as burdocks, simpletons who crumble in the face of hardship.
Americans who want to transcend these stereotypes should stress
to their Russian colleagues that their success took years of hard work.
I remember a negotiation in Miami between a Russian and a wealthy
American that was going well until the American began reminiscing
about his first foray into business. At the age of 14, he told us, he
hired ten people to clean the bathrooms along Miami Beach. He
described in detail how he would sit in a beach chair and sun himself
while his workers cleaned the stalls. The story revealed more to the
Russian than the American imagined. It told the Russian that the
American never got his hands dirty; he let other people do his work.
To make a good impression, Americans should spend time socializing with potential Russian partners. Many deals have been hatched
in a sauna between discussions of life, family, and philosophy. But
politics, a sensitive subject that is becoming more sensitive every
day, should be avoided at all cost. Foreigners don’t want to lambaste
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Vladimir Zhirinovsky only to discover that their potential Russian
partners are among the 25% of the population that votes for him.
Americans should not try to be mentors for Russians. Rather than
pontificating, they should rely on stories from their experience to
convey information. Most important, Americans should not assume
they know more than their Russian colleagues. I spoke to a potential
investor who asked if the Russians would understand him when he
talked about laser technology. I reminded him that the Russians
earned a Nobel Prize in laser technology in 1964.

Designing the Deal
Many Americans mistakenly treat the problem of the quasi-convertible ruble as the most important aspect of their negotiations. After
July 15, 1992, when the Russian banks began to hold exchange auctions, inconvertibility became less of a problem. Through banks and
financial companies, Americans can buy dollars with rubles at these
auctions, invest rubles in dollar-producing businesses, or opt for a
barter or collateral deal instead.
The most important point during the negotiations is the share of
initial capital investment each party contributes to the joint venture.
This division and ownership last for the life of the joint venture, and
parties will divide all profits according to the percentages of initial
capital investment. Americans should not underestimate the purchasing power of the ruble during these negotiations, and they must
realize the value of any property. Too often Americans ask Russians
to contribute more than their fair share.

Befriending Local Leaders
Before 1987, befriending Russian bureaucrats meant shaking hands
with the right people or offering bribes. The situation has changed
dramatically; keeping up relationships with despots doesn’t work
anymore. Even state-owned companies have gained more independence from the central government. So have regional leaders, as I
mentioned earlier, many of whom are now more powerful than U.S.
mayors.
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To form strong personal connections with regional leaders, Americans can work with them to solve regional problems. This level of
involvement will help convince these leaders that the company’s intent is not only to take from Russia, but also to improve life in the
community. One U.S. oil company won over regional leaders when
it donated equipment to start a small factory to produce sausage.
Many other companies, however, have neglected to foster goodwill.
Consider the owners of an oil refinery on the West Coast of the
United States. In 1988, the executives managed to meet Gorbachev
and former Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, who gave the company
permission to build a plant in western Siberia. I warned lawyers representing the company that the proposed site was in an ecological
disaster area. I told them to speak with members of the regional
government, who would undoubtedly have reservations, as would the
local people, who could barely breathe because of the pollution. But
the lawyers went ahead with the project without consulting anyone.
Soon the local citizens were holding rallies, and the regional government was doing everything it could to block the refinery. After the
company had invested $17 million, the deal fell through.
To sell ministers and regional leaders on a proposed joint venture,
U.S. and Russian partners should write a strong project summary
that discusses how the venture corresponds to national, regional, and
local goals and concerns. Recommendations from members of institutions like the Academy of Sciences will strengthen the proposal.
Every Russian ministry has from 5 to 50 research institutes that can
supply information and analysis. Foreign businesspeople should also
make themselves available to both the local and the national Russian
press for interviews. Good public relations is more important now
than ever before.

Compensating Employees
Average Russians are better educated than average Americans, and
given the proper conditions, they can be excellent employees. Still,
the average salary of Russian employees in international companies
is only $55 per month. A lot of small foreign businesses have paid
even less, treating Russian workers little better than slaves.
Most Russians subsist on cabbage, bread, and potatoes. They live
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in crowded apartments and share bedrooms and bathrooms with
other families. Thirty percent of Russians still live in communal conditions—generally squalid ones. My work at SibAuto, the company
that automated the nonferrous metal industry, taught me that if you
take care of employees’ social problems, you’ll have the best workers.
Given the high inflation rate, rubles are of little value to Russian
workers. So companies need to pay workers with something besides
money, such as apartments, health care, and medical and food products, which are in short supply. Russia has a strong tradition of bartering. It’s an excellent way to motivate workers and strengthen
relationships between employers and employees.
Anticipating Shortages in Materials
The last point I want to stress is that failure to anticipate shortages
can destroy a business before it gets off the ground. One of the first
and most highly touted joint ventures with the West was a women’s
fashion magazine, Burda Moden Russia. Raı̈ssa Gorbachev supported
the project in 1987 but arranged only hard currency financing, which
left the project undercapitalized. By 1991, a dire paper shortage and
the diminishing influence of the Gorbachev name with suppliers
spelled trouble for the magazine. Paper mills began selling to the
highest bidder, and Burda Moden Russia lacked the capital to compete. In hindsight, one of the partners should have been a paper
supplier, but the venture had too much debt to make this switch.
The magazine folded that year.
McDonald’s, in contrast, prepared for shortages before it opened
the first of three restaurants. The company established its own farm,
where it grew potatoes for french fries and kept livestock for burgers.
By the time the first golden arches went up in Pushkin Square, the
venture was self-sufficient. Companies with this kind of foresight
have the greatest chance of success. By avoiding the common mistakes that plague their predecessors, they position themselves to
enjoy large profits later.
Some experts are counseling U.S. companies to move slowly as
they develop joint ventures in Russia. My advice: Invest early and
move as fast as you can. Companies can minimize the risk of bureaucratic entanglements and benefit from the fire-sale prices in the
largest market in the world.

THE RUSSIAN INVESTMENT
DILEMMA
Do the risks of starting joint ventures in Russia outweigh the benefits?
Some experts are counseling U.S. companies to move slowly as they
develop joint ventures in Russia. In ‘‘Don’t Give Up on Russia,’’
Siberian-born Vladimir Kvint advises Americans to invest early and
move fast. Despite sky-rocketing inflation and other economic hardships, the climate for international joint ventures has never been
better, he argues. Russia has a cheap and highly educated workforce,
inexpensive land, and abundant natural resources. According to a
study Kvint conducted of joint ventures attempted, between 35%
and 38% of those consummated are already profitable or well on the
way. That’s the highest success rate in the world for new businesses.
Still, Americans are deterred by the fact that most of Russia’s joint
ventures never get off the ground. But their failure is less a function
of business conditions in Russia than of poor planning on the part
of foreign investors, Kvint argues. And potential investors can learn
from their predecessors’ mistakes.
Russians know that without cooperation with the West, the country can’t survive, let alone prosper. Russia is on sale how, Kvint
writes, and those who arrive late will miss the bargain-basement
prices in the largest market in the world.
Seven experts consider their pros and cons of investing in Russia.
Marshall I. Goldman, Kathryn W. Davis Professor of Russian Economics, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts; Associate Director, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
Vladimir Kvint’s article is a perfect illustration of the hazards and
uncertainties of dealing with Russia. Kvint wrote the piece before
the dismissal of two of the most outspoken supporters of economic
reform: Yegor Gaidar, the deputy prime minister, and Boris FyoHarvard Business Review, May/June 1994, p. 35.
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dorov, the minister of finance. Their removal from the government is
hardly an encouraging sign for foreign investors because it probably
heralds an increase in inflation and less resistance to the protectionist calls of Russian nationalists and communists. Kvint reassures us
that the 25% of the Russian population who voted for the nationalists (he neglects to mention the 20% who voted for the communists)
did not vote against capitalism. True, but they did not vote for capitalism and reform, either.
No elected leader, Kvint says, has called for government control of
foreign property. That is certainly reassuring, but at the same time
the existing government has become more protectionist. One U.S.
company, for example, spent several months preparing bids on a
project after it had been assured that foreign bids would be considered. When the time came for the authorities to make a decision,
however, they reversed themselves and said that only Russian companies could bid.
Nor does it help that Russia does not yet have a commercial code
that governs in practice as well as in theory. As those involved in
the profitable Radisson-Slavyanskaya Hotel joint venture discovered,
even favored ventures (President Bill Clinton stayed there during the
summit in Moscow) are at risk. The hotel’s account has been frozen,
and it is being sued for several million dollars by two maids because
they were not given permanent employment.
In arguing that there is no better time for international joint ventures, Kvint apparently disagrees with the mayor of St. Petersburg,
who warned that, with ever-increasing crime and corruption, it is
now more difficult to start a joint venture than it was in 1990. In
the past, the Russian Mafia focused on domestic businesses because
attacks on foreigners were certain to provoke a response by the KGB.
But as government authority has weakened, these gangs of thugs and
racketeers have penetrated the previously immune foreign sector.
Thinking themselves beyond the reach of the Mafia, most Western companies, especially the multinational ones, at first refused to
pay them off. In retaliation, the Mafia launched a bazooka attack on
the bottling plant that Coca-Cola was building in Moscow and has
intimidated many of its distributors. Showing its impartiality, another Mafia group regularly hijacks PepsiCo trucks and, as in the
days of Al Capone, sells the soda itself. Fear of the Mafia has made
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it more difficult to recruit new managers, especially those who have
families.
Obviously, paying off the Mafia (which is illegal under the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) or hiring others to provide protection
(sometimes the protectors are the would-be firebombers) adds significantly to the cost of doing business—something Kvint neglects
to discuss. Most Western companies, for example, estimate that it
costs $300,000 to $400,000 a year to maintain an expatriate in Russia. No wonder so few Western ventures are making a profit and so
many are losing money.
Kvint would be much more convincing if he gave us more extended examples of joint ventures that have gone well. While he
does mention a few companies, the bulk of his analysis tells us why
so many joint ventures have lost money—not a very reassuring argument. Nor is it reassuring that the outflow of capital from Russia of
about a billion dollars a month far exceeds the inflow of private capital. It is also noteworthy that Japanese business people, who are very
active in China, have a diminishing presence in Russia. In part that
is because of the political dispute over the Kuril Islands, but it is also
a reaction to the hundreds of millions of dollars that the Russians
owe to Japanese companies. The Japanese are good at taking a long
view toward investment, but they have apparently decided that investing in Russia is too long-term.
Despite the many horror stories, which Kvint seems to regard as
the exception rather than the rule, there are no doubt opportunities
for resourceful investors. However, there is no easy or guaranteed
way to succeed, and usually there are corners to cut and pockets to
pad. Because Russia is so rich in raw material and human capital,
many will want a share of what someday could be a very profitable
market. But that someday will have to bring with it a return to commercial law and order and a willingness to participate in the international business community.
Jean-Pierre von Rooy, President, Otis Elevator Company, Framington, Connecticut
Otis Elevator took Kvint’s advice: we invested early in Russia and
moved as quickly as we could. Based on our experience, I couldn’t
agree more with Kvint’s assessment.

the russian investment dilemma

85

Between 1990 and the end of 1992, Otis Elevator formed four
joint ventures in Russia and one in Ukraine to manufacture, install,
and maintain elevators. Our company has invested $50 million already, and discussions are continuing on possible additional ventures. The first shipments of Otis elevators produced in
Russia—which are manufactured using Western technologies and
are designed for Russian offices and apartment buildings—were
made last September.
We expect strong business growth because of the urgent need for
new housing in Russia. Nearly all of the half million elevators in the
country are in desperate need of refurbishment or replacement.
Although our new Russian employees may lack expertise in sales,
marketing, and accounting, their engineering skills are terrific. For
example, they have already identified mistakes in some of our drawings. The transfer of Western technology into the ventures is going
relatively smoothly for that reason. Of course, we would love to see
better commercial banking facilities and improvements in communication and transportation. And we wouldn’t object if networks of
small supplier businesses were developed and import regulations
simplified. Being realistic, however, we do not expect to make a
quick profit on our investment.
As the former Soviet republics struggle with the transformation to
free-market economies, we will continue to be patient. We fully expect that our strategy in Russia will pay off, and we are confident in
Russia’s long-term future.
Ruth Harkin, President and CEO, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Washington, D.C.
While Kvint is correct in arguing that the Russian investment climate is better than the U.S. press reports and in advising Westerners
to pay closer attention to the particulars of Russia’s culture and
economy, he should have placed the onus on Russia to put its house
in order before it courts further foreign investment.
Although the parliamentary crisis in October and the December
elections have exacerbated Russia’s political instability, a number of
other impediments to international investment have existed for a
much longer time. For example, hyperinflation and the declining
ruble tend to cause capital to flow to ventures that generate hard
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currency—oil, gas, mining, natural-resource production, and the
like—rather than to the production of consumer goods. But because
the Russians consider natural-resource production a strategic area,
they are ambivalent about whether they want foreigners to invest in
it. This presents an economic catch-22: a poor economy in precisely
those areas where the Russians are uncertain they want it.
Other problems continue to discourage investors. Russia’s decision-making structure remains haphazard, without clear legal protection for investments, contracts, or mineral rights. Often there is no
clear delineation of responsibilities between agencies or between
central and regional authorities. Federal and local authorities continually amend old levies and add new ones, leaving Russia’s tax and fee
structure unstable. For some projects, exported oil may be subject to
as many as six or more taxes totaling 60%. For other projects, the
total tax bite may be smaller. Both the size of the levies and their
variations among projects are generally greater in Russia than in
emerging economies outside the former Soviet Union.
International lenders thus see Russia as risky and are unwilling to
make loans without the protection of guarantees and insurance from
Western governments. Further, the Western nations as a whole have
failed to provide much of the funding promised by the G-7 at last
year’s Tokyo summit. Even so, the United States has unilaterally
moved to back much-needed investment.
A significant portion of that backing has been provided by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Clinton administration agency charged with supporting U.S. investment in the developing world and emerging economies. To free up critically needed
capital, the agency is offering U.S. investors $2.5 billion in loan guarantees and political risk insurance for joint ventures in the newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union. That level of support
will leverage an even greater amount of investment—perhaps as
much as $8 billion—for the economies of all the former Soviet republics. It will have the added benefit of generating billions of dollars
in U.S. exports and creating tens of thousands of U.S. jobs.
As Kvint argues, Westerners must do more to understand and
adapt to the Russian way of doing things. The converse is also true.
In the meantime, support from Western governments can be an important catalyst for taking joint ventures from conception to completion.
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Constantine S. Nicandros, President and CEO, Conoco, Inc., Houston, Texas
My advice to companies investing in Russia is different from Kvint’s
Full steam ahead. I urge instead, Proceed with caution. Western investment in Russia does indeed offer great potential both for investors and for Russia. Realizing the potential, however, requires major
steps by the Russian government to improve the investment climate.
As president and CEO of Conoco, an integrated international oil
company and a subsidiary of DuPont, I have seen firsthand both the
potential that exists in Russia and the problems that the country
needs to overcome.
Kvint points out that there are major opportunities for Western
companies to invest in Russia’s petroleum industry. On the one
hand, Russia has the largest oil and gas reserves in the world. On the
other, the country’s oil production is declining in the face of severe
capital constraints and less-than-current technology. Attracted by
those opportunities, Conoco decided in late 1991 to participate in
the first U.S.–Russian joint venture to develop a new oil field. The
field is in the Arkhangel’sk region, north of the Arctic Circle and a
thousand miles northeast of Moscow. Our partner is the Russian
geologic enterprise Arkangelskgeologia, and the joint venture is
called Polar Lights.
We chose to participate in developing this relatively small oil field
with two goals in mind: to use the project as a test case to learn
whether or not we could successfully do business in Russia and, if we
could, to use it as a platform for future investments. As a learning
experience, it has been very successful.
For one thing, we have found the technical capabilities of the
Russian workforce to be superior. Any doubts we might have had
about the Russian’s welding skills, for example, were put to rest when
25 of 26 welders passed American Petroleum Institute after very little
training. Their subsequent performance in building the 37-mile
pipeline required by the project has been outstanding. We also have
discovered that the existing infrastructure can be used effectively
with much less upgrading than once thought necessary. In most instances, the Russian rail system, barges, trucks, and heavy construction equipment such as cranes and bulldozers have performed well.
Because of those two advantages, the project is coming in on
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schedule and very close to the original budget, even though the oil
field is in a remote location. We have, of course, encountered logistical, efficiency, and managerial shortcomings—inevitable considering
the years of neglect under the old communist system and the lack of
market discipline. But those deficiencies do not reflect the capabilities of our Russian colleagues. I am convinced that once they are
given the tools and the opportunity to use them in a rewarding environment, their successes will rapidly rival those found in the OECD
countries.
The most important problem our project continues to face is the
Russian investment climate, which can be characterized only as one
of complete disarray.
First, although current Russian law allows Western joint venture
companies to export oil, actual joint venture exports have been significantly curtailed as a result of the government’s bureaucratic efforts to allocate export rights. The ability to export is a critical one,
given that internal market prices for crude oil are substantially lower
than world prices. Second, Russia has no defined tax code. Various
taxes are being invented by different entities; if actually imposed,
they would exceed the total income that investments would generate.
The Russian government is the only player that can guarantee
export rights and replace the present legislative and tax nightmare
with rational and efficient structures. It must be able to assure investors that their products can be exported and that taxes will be at
levels that allow adequate returns on investments. Until those steps
are taken, Russia will not be able to attract Western investment on
the scale necessary to bring about a real improvement in its
economy.
Karl M. Topp, President and CEO, Die Welt Development Company, Inc., Woodside, New York
Nothing would be more foolish than giving up on Russia, especially
at a time when, as Kvint points out, Russia is on sale.
Simply knowing all the facts about this giant country, however, is
not enough to persuade the average U.S. businessperson to invest
there. Only a few emotionally and financially committed people with
staying power will succeed. Nothing good has ever happened quickly
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in Russia. Likewise, no one has ever built a successful enterprise
there without a great deal of patience.
Die Welt Development Company (DWDC) is one of the few
U.S.–Russian joint ventures in Kaliningrad, a city that is suffering a
severe energy shortage, among other hardships. More than half the
city has no heat in the coldest weather. Stories of global warming
do not help the people living there, but U.S. business creating new
enterprises can.
When I consider the energy problems in Kaliningrad, I think of
the people I know in the city and oblast who were forcibly shipped
there by Stalin after 1945. Until then, Koningsberg, as it was known,
never lacked the organization it takes to supply a million people with
energy to heat their homes and to live. I believe it is up to U.S.
citizens to share their knowledge with the Russians so that they can
help themselves.
In Kaliningrad, DWDC is currently promoting the rebuilding of
four hydroelectric power plants that today do not produce anything
but fish in their lakes. Those plants had their guts dismantled and
used as raw materials. As things stand now, no factories or hotels can
be built in the oblast unless they generate their own power.
Kaliningrad’s transportation system is also on the verge of collapse,
but not one bicycle in the completely flat territory is for sale. DWDC
is trying to change that situation. Why? Bicycles were the vehicles
that helped Germany rebuild after World War II. Many German bicycle shops went on to sell mopeds, then scooters, then motorcycles,
then minicars, and, finally, Volkswagens. As utopian as it may sound,
companies can actually make money in the process of helping the
Russians.
Finally, Kaliningrad boasts 500 kilometers of boatable waterways,
but thanks to Stalin and his successors, no one owns a boat. DWDC
has done research to demonstrate the viability of a boating business
and will proceed with plans to populate the waters of Kaliningrad.
My most recent interest is the insurance business. Here, too, it
will be an uphill battle—not because of the Russian but because of
the U.S. insurance industry. The representatives I spoke with wanted
to know only who was backing the effort and who would insure their
policies. The U.S. insurance industry is apparently no longer in the
risk business. Well, in 1993 the Chinese sold 350 million policies to
someone, but surely not to a timid partner.
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Working with the local people, staying in fourth-class hotels, and
bringing my own food and water, I have witnessed firsthand the great
potential for doing business in Russia. The needs of its huge population are enormous, and those considering investing in Russia have a
good chance of success if they make an emotional commitment and
take the time to build a sound business foundation.
Arthur H. Rosenbloom, Chairman, Patricof & Company Capital
Corporation, New York, New York
I am fully prepared to yield to Kvint’s expertise on the subject of
finding attractive business opportunities in Russia and identifying
local players best positioned to exploit them. However, as an investment banker charged with responsibility for recommending pricing
and negotiating strategies to clients, I believe that his otherwise exemplary piece glides over some of the most intractable issues involved in making deals happen in Russia, Central Europe, or any
other place where legal and financial norms are ill adapted to latetwentieth-century deal transacting. While Kvint allows that ‘‘the
country still needs . . . more firms to handle accounting and auditing’’ and that Russia ‘‘needs more laws governing business,’’ a closer
look at these issues demonstrates their magnitude. I will illustrate
them with examples drawn from my own experience.
Absence of Modern Commercial Law. Last year, Patricof & Company acted for a non–U.S. buyer acquiring control of a large heavyequipment dealer in Central Europe. In the United States, a considerable portion of the purchase price could be financed by a pledge of
the perfectly good equipment to which the target company had clear
title. But how exactly does a lending institution perfect a lien on
those assets in the absence of a Uniform Commercial Code or its
equivalent? Assuming a bonded-warehouse-type solution, in which
the lender essentially advances funds as assets leave the warehouse
under its control, would a claim of title by the lender in the event of
default be enforceable under a local law otherwise silent on the subject? Our client could get no comfort in this issue from local council
and was forced to borrow in the West on its local credit lines (the
Western lender would not lend on Central European assets), thereby
diminishing the credit available for its existing operations.
Lack of Sophistication in Determining Corporate Values. In the fall
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of 1992, I chaired a seminar in Eastern Europe for CEOs and CFOs
of companies slated for privatization. When I asked these otherwise
sophisticated managers how much they believed their businesses
were worth, they invariably directed me to the statement of net
assets on their companies’ balance sheets. It will take a while before
such managers, raised in command economies, fully embrace the
notion of corporate values determined by discounted cash flows or
multiples of revenues or earnings.
Absence of Western-type Accounting. While accepted European accounting standards have reached central and Eastern Europe, historical (and to some degree current) accounting statements are
notoriously unreliable because of volatile price swings, uncertainties
about inflation, translation errors, arbitrary assignments of asset values, and a lack of true independence by former state-run agencies.
None of the problems I have described (to which I could add considerably more) are intended to suggest that companies shouldn’t
undertake transactions in Russia or in Central or Eastern Europe
generally. But it’s important, I believe, to go in with eyes wide open
to some of the stumbling blocks to deals, beyond the obvious ones
of political risk, problems created by time and distance, and the inevitable delays resulting from bureaucratic hassles.
It’s my guess that some of the enterprises likely to show the largest
internal rates of return are start-up investments with modest capital
input, such as the Polish TV Guide-like publication owned by a businessman I know from Pennsylvania, or coin-operated U.S.-made
washer/dryers in high-rise apartment buildings in Hungary. As in the
case in merger-and-acquisition transactions, in which most deals
(many of them extraordinarily successful) are made between small
private companies and pass below Wall Street’s radar screen because
of their size and the absence of public-disclosure requirements, we’ll
never get to hear about many of the best deals that will be made in
Russia.
Daniel Yergin, President, Thane Gustafson; Director, Cambridge
Energy Research Associates, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Russia is trying to make a triple transition: from communist dictatorship to democracy, from centrally planned command economy to
market economy, and from empire to national-state. Any one of
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those moves would be immensely taxing, and no one can know how
it will turn out. The biggest part of economic reform—winding down
the overwhelming military-industrial sector, with the consequent
rise in unemployment—has not yet begun. Because of the uncertainties, we find scenario planning to be very valuable in our work with
companies that are considering investments in Russia.
In light of all the gloomy news from Russia, the scenario that
would seem the most implausible is what, in our new book, Russia
2010 and What It Means for the World, we call chudo—the Russian,
economic miracle. ‘‘Miracle,’’ of course, should be in quotes, as we’re
talking about something that would be hard wrought over a decade
or more. Yet that scenario is no less plausible than the darker ones,
and it is consistent with Kvint’s perspective.
Circumstances are very harsh in Russia today. Yet we see five elements that could converge to create a chudo. The first is the human
material: people in Russia are highly skilled and educated and also
have great technological competence. Under communism they were
unable to convey that competence into commercial innovation,
which was one of the undoings of the Soviet economy. Now technology and the market can be joined.
Second, there is a huge pent-up demand for goods and services.
Whether it is housing, appliances, or services, the Russians have
been enormously deprived. That demand provides incentives for entrepreneurs to fill the need and also for people to work so they can
buy those goods and services. A housing boom has already begun on
the outskirts of Moscow.
Third, a great deal of potential can be achieved from the very fact
of the transition. Previously, the economy was organized to produce
the goods that the leaders wanted. Now the very act of rearranging
those same elements of production to make the goods that the people want will contribute to prosperity. Two of the things that were
repressed under communism were entrepreneurial energy and managerial talent. As they are liberated, they will act as a driving force for
economic growth.
Fourth, Russia has physical resources that can be measured, including immense reserves of oil and gas, which can generate earnings
on the world market.
Fifth, ironically, Russia has the same advantage it had a century
ago, at the time of its last economic miracle. It was a late starter
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then, meaning that it was able to introduce advanced technologies.
Today, being a late starter means that it can skip over copper-wire
phone systems and go right to fiber optics and the latest generation
of radio-based telecommunications. Integration with the world economy will itself be a driver. Enabling technologies like computers and
communicators will spur economic growth. Information, instead of
being rigidly controlled, will be easily available and widely disseminated. Business people in the Urals will plug instantaneously into the
world economy.
But a chudo will require investment. Much of that will have to
come from the Russians themselves. The process of what some Russians call the ‘‘primary accumulation of capital’’ has already begun.
Russians hold perhaps as much as $25 billion in Swiss back accounts
and elsewhere abroad. As the economy starts to grow again, they
will bring that money home and invest it. Currently, foreign direct
investment in Russia is very small. But when the issues that matter
to foreign investors, such as property rights, become clarified, that
will change.
In spite of the awesome challenges that Russia faces in its transition, a decade from now it could be a country of economic growth,
its exports seeking entry into markets of other industrialized nations.
And Russian may be heard in the financial markets, in the business
hotels, and on the ski slopes of the world. By then, we will know
much more about the character of something we see as virtually
inevitable: capitalism, Russian-style.
Vladimir Kvint responds:
There is no question that doing business in Russia is very difficult,
as all the commentators point out. The communications industry is
underdeveloped, the transportation infrastructure is inefficient, and
the railroads are in terrible condition. In addition, although Russia
is the world’s largest producer of oil and gas, the second-largest producer of electrical energy, and the third-largest producer of coal, the
problems of supply and distribution of fuel and energy are enormous.
The Russian business infrastructure presents additional problems.
First, the country does not have a modern banking system. It is almost impossible to expect a Russian buyer to insure a letter of credit.
Currently, the Export-Import Bank of the United States recognizes
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only four Russian banks, and only one of them is private. Second,
foreign investors face many problems even when using their own
insurance companies, because Russian insurance law does not recognize foreign insurers on Russian territory. Third, as Arthur Rosenbloom underlines, accounting systems need to be improved. Fully
80% of the companies open for investment do not have balance
sheets or auditing practices that meet Western standards.
Nevertheless, of the seven commentators on my article, six are
executives in government or industry who see the glass as at least
half full when it comes to investing in Russia, whereas only one,
Marshall Goldman, who works in academia, sees it as half empty.
Although the former know firsthand the difficulties of doing business in Russia, that practical experience has made them realize that
there is nowhere in the world where business is problem-free; the
problems elsewhere are simply different. Moreover, they understand
that because Russia made the switch to capitalism only recently,
some patience is in order.
If one looks at the changes made so far, it is clear that they are all
positive. Business conditions in Russia are indeed developing and
improving rapidly. The telecommunications industry is much better
than it was in 1989. All cities and towns now have airports. Almost
2,000 private banks and 12 foreign banks are operational. All of the
Big Six accounting firms have opened offices. And now, at least some
executives of large industrial companies are able to give more reasonable assessments of how much their businesses are worth.
Goldman is correct in saying that I wrote the article when Yegor
Gaidar and Boris Fyodorov were still in office. But I suggested that
Gaidar’s ill-prepared pseudoforms only caused trouble and oriented
the people against market reforms. Indeed, I would argue that after
the resignations of Gaidar and Fyodorov, the situation has improved.
Gaidar and Fydorov are children of the Soviet system. Gaidar
worked for the main magazine of the Communist Party, and Fyodorov worked on the Central Committee. With the failure of communism, they began to create their own image, which proved
unfortunate for the millions of people whom they brought into poverty and for the thousands of foreigners who tried to work with Russia. They succeeded in convincing the Russian people of their
knowledge and capitalist expertise, but they actually had no experience with capitalism and made all the predictable mistakes. When
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Gaidar came into office, Russia’s inflation rate was 10%–12% per
month. After his primitive pseudoliberalization of prices, it jumped
to 150%–180% per month and even higher.
It is therefore understandable why, in the absence of a strong
moderate candidate at the time of the election, so many people
voted for Vladimir Zhirinovsky. They voted for change and for an
alternative to Boris Yeltsin. Zhirinovsky promised to stop shock therapy with social protection and slow reform. Today several moderate
alternatives to Zhirinovsky have emerged in the Russian political
arena, the two most prominent being current prime minister Victor
Chernomyrdin and Alexander Rutskoi, who was vice president until
October.
Although I agree with Ruth Harkin and Constantine Nicadros that
Russia has no defined tax code, this problem has not discouraged
foreign buyers of oil. I am certain that any large foreign company
would agree to buy crude oil and even to give Russian companies the
additional benefit of refining it in foreign refineries.
Harkin is correct in saying that the Russians are imposing too
many restrictions on foreigners who would like to invest in the natural-resources industry and participate in the process of privatization.
That strategy was a mistake made by Gaidar’s cabinet. And Goldman’s mention of the frozen bank account of the Radisson-Slavyanskaya Hotel is a good example of the absence of a commercial code.
Freezing foreign accounts was one of the Gaidar government’s ways
of stabilizing Russia’s hard currency situation. On the subject of corruption and crime, Goldman has fallen victim to the mass media in
likening today’s Russia to the days of Al Capone. That comparison
is a far cry from reality.
It is true that crime has grown rapidly in Russia since the disintegration of the communist system. Obviously, democratically oriented individuals were not the only people who lived under
communist control; many criminals did too. As a result, the number
of registered crimes increased 52% from 1990 to 1993. And, although
the Mafia lives primarily in newspaper headlines, it is true that protection payments are being made. Extortion from large companies,
however, is limited, and it is mostly small businesses that are preyed
upon.
Fortunately, domestic and foreign investors realize that the crime
rate in Russia is far below that in most large cities worldwide. It
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would probably be a pleasure for a New York City policeman to work
in Russia. Not one foreign nation has decreased investment, not even
the Japanese, as Goldman suggests. In fact, Japanese investment has
increased from $1 million in 1987 to $51 million in 1991 to more
than $100 million in 1993. And, while it is true that previous Japanese governments did not increase their investments significantly
because of the dispute over the Kuril Islands, the only thing that has
decreased is the rate of those investments relative to other foreign
investments, not the actual amount.
Goldman says that my argument would have been more convincing if I had given more examples of joint ventures that have gone
well. There are hundreds. PepsiCo, for example, already has three
joint ventures in Russia and will have four by the end of the year,
with a total investment of about $55 million. The Coca-Cola Company has two joint ventures and continues to implement a $34 million project. And Caterpillar has two joint ventures with sales of $200
million in 1993. Caterpillar is very pleased with the results and has
created a third joint venture, which will start production this July.
The use of the word chudo by Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson
brings to mind the European and Japanese economic miracles after
World War II. They were based not only on the principles of a freemarket economy but also on price controls, nationalization of inefficient industries, and hugh state investments in those industries.
And, like Russia today, neither Japan nor the European nations followed all the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund.
It is clear that now is the time to do business in Russia. No one
can lead Russia astray from the road to market-oriented reforms, for
the simple reason that there is no alternative to that path.

RUSSIA IS CREATING A SYSTEM
TO ENSURE FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: $1.5 BILLION
COLLATERAL FUND
ESTABLISHED TO SAFEGUARD
FOREIGN VENTURES
The recent political fights should be taken in their proper context.
After 70 years of communism, the road to democracy is anything but
straight. What is clear is that there is no longer any turning back;
nothing can strangle democracy in Russia.
As sure as there is political infighting now, there will also be fights
between President Yeltsin and the new parliament a year from now;
it is an unavoidable part of their mentality. In spite of these political
struggles, Russia is moving quickly to a free market economy. The
business climate remains stable.
To pursue this burgeoning marketplace, it is important to stay
well-informed. Using a law firm that is firmly established in Russia,
like Baker & McKenzie or Coudert Brothers, is not enough. One
must also understand the economic mechanisms that impact government decision-making and implementation, along with the power
structure in each industry.
Yeltsin gave an enormous boost to the development of a free-market economy with a decree issued on February 2, 1993, that authorized the formation of the State Investment Corporation (SIC). This
new company insures foreign investments against political risk, and
could act as a guarantor for foreign investment on the basis of collateral operations with foreign banks and companies. The Russian government has allocated over $1 billion liquid state property, plus U.S.
$50 million cash and 200 billion rubles, to establish the initial fund
of this Corporation.
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 1 (October 1991).
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What does this mean to foreign investors? In theory, it means that
if the SIC evaluates a project as viable and potentially profitable, it
can allocate a substantial amount of Russian treasures (precious
metals and stones) as collateral guarantees for these investors.
If nothing bad befalls the foreign investment (from a political
point of view), and the investor is successful and generates enough
revenue to cover the investment and even turn a profit, the SIC will
gradually take back the collateral.

Old Problems and New Possibilities
Previously, the guarantee of the Soviet government, or the handshake of Brezhnev or Gorbachev, would have sufficed. Even in 1990–
91, when such arrangements ceased to provide protection, foreigners
continued to rely on them. Only after losing large sums of money
will they come to understand that in this new situation, it is essential
to act carefully, evaluate all guarantees, letters, and agreements with
Russians.
Of course, one could not sue any Russian company that reneged
on a written agreement, but that isn’t so simple; if the contract is
not written according to Russian law, it is void. And even if it is
written properly, and the litigant wins the suit, what type of compensation or remuneration can be obtained from a company that may
have no hard currency or not enough rubles?
Many professionals know that during the wonderful years of perestroika, Gorbachev spent most of Russia’s gold reserves. According to
my estimate, Russia has no more than 750 tons of gold left. However,
Russia not only produces gold, but is also one of the world’s largest
producers of precious metals like platinum and palladium, and precious stones such as diamonds. Without revealing any state secrets, I
would say (based on my experience with the nonferrous and precious
metals industries) that the current Russian state reserves of these
treasures is the greatest in the world. So, the SIC collateral would
probably take the form of platinum, palladium, and diamonds, and
much smaller amounts of gold. The collateral-building activity of
this Corporation is creating a real system of protection of investments and interests.
The Corporation’s importance to Yeltsin is illustrated not only
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by these indications of financial commitment, but also by personal
commitment. Russian business is conducted on a very personal basis.
If a Russian doesn’t like you, he won’t do business with you, even if
it’s in his best financial interest to do so. Yeltsin appointed Ambassador Yuri Petrov, his personal friend and former chief of his presidential staff (1991–93), as chairman of the SIC.
SIC is not the only institution foreign investors can work with. For
many years, world insurers have known Ingostrach, the state insurer
for foreign activity. It is recognized by many foreign insurers, and
has representatives in several countries, international experience,
and connections.
It appears that this company could be a good insurer for investments of up to $200 million by my estimate, but not more. Since
1993, some foreign insurers have also become active in the Russian
market. I would not be surprised if the American Insurance Group
(AIG) soon creates a joint venture with a reliable Russian company.
In 1991–92, it was almost impossible to believe any letters of guarantee from Russian institutions. Even VnesheconomBank (VNB),
the Russian state bank for foreign debt, frequently did not support
its guarantees in 1992. In 1993, the situation finally came to a head.
VNB began to recognize its obligations, particularly irrevocable letters of credit. It seems to me that VNB, VneshtorgBank (Russian
state bank for foreign trade), and some private banks will work according to banking norms, especially those Russian banks that have
correspondent accounts with foreign banks. For example, Moscowbased Incombank now has 130 correspondent accounts with the
Bank of New York.
Earlier this year, it became possible and legal for foreign banks to
open branches in Russia, or to create joint banks with at least $3
million in foreign investment. At present, however, there are no
American banks with Russian partners who are active in Russia. Most
large American banks have representatives (plus a secretary and
driver), but do not have operational branches. French banks Credit
Lyonnais and BNP, and Germany’s Dresden Bank, are among the
first few to have operational branches in Russia.
By 1994, some American banks will be forced to come to the Russian market, or their clients will work without them and do their
banking elsewhere. These pioneers will have to be tough, sturdy
banks—the government is stingy about giving out licenses, and it’s a
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rigorous process. I believe that one of the first American banks to
become fully operational in Russia will be Chase Manhattan Overseas Corp., as they have opened an office in Prague, and are active
in Eastern Europe.
Now, there is not only the legal climate, but also the business
environment and first capitalist institutions to help foreigners who
wish to discover this new mecca of international activity.

THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL
JOINT VENTURES AND THEIR
ROLE IN GLOBAL BUSINESS
Introduction
International politics during the 1980s were marked by the collapse
of communism; the end of the Cold War; the breakdown of dictatorships in Latin America, Pacific Asia, and the Indian Subcontinent;
and the end of apartheid in South Africa. These changes and those
from the technological revolution, especially in telecommunications,
have enhanced the globalization of business. The increase in the
gross domestic product of leading countries during the 1980s and
1990s was largely the result of the globalization of business (more
than 50 percent of industrial products in developed countries are the
result of international cooperation with each other and especially
with emerging market countries). One of the major forms for implementing the globalization of business is the international joint venture (IJV). As the markets of developed countries have become
saturated, companies have been driven to enter the global marketplace.
Formation of an IJV can decrease risk for both local and foreign
partners. These risks include product risk (raw materials/parts risk,
human resources risk, credit risk, operating risk, regulatory risk, aftermarket risk, and liability risk) and financial risk (currency risk, interest-rate risk, liquidity risk, settlement risk, derivative risk, and fraud
risk). Also, IJVs maximize equity risk transfer.
A joint venture (JV) may take the form of either a partnership or
some other form of business cooperation. Whether a partnership or
a corporate form is chosen, the resulting entity is a joint venture if it
represents the collaborative efforts of two or more existing companies united for short- or long-term economic purposes. A JV is an IJV
when the parties are from different countries.
In International M&A, Joint Ventures and Beyond: Doing the Deal (Second Edition) (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), pp. 331–56.
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The underlying nature of IJVs is the mutual interest of domestic
and foreign companies in cooperating on business deals. Typically,
foreigners contribute know-how, brand names, and managerial skills.
Locals contribute production facilities, established marketing networks, cheap natural resources, and efficient labor resources.
Project financing, which was also an increasing trend in the 1990s,
allows companies with limited resources to participate in deals
through the use of mutual resources. IJVs also have opportunities to
receive project assistance from multilateral and national agencies.
Companies from different countries involved in project financing,
focusing on managing risks and profits, are likely to create an IJV.
Because of that, new forms of IJVs (accommodative and conventional) appeared. An accommodative IJV helps partners to reallocate
risks associated with the project and to build more efficient ties between suppliers and consumers. A conventional IJV usually has limited contract support between partners, who share full market risk.
This form may cause the IJV to be less leveraged.
A study conducted by the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development, covering the years from 1985 to 2000, revealed that three our of four joint ventures between international
and domestic partners in emerging markets and developing countries
are more successful (e.g., Japanese and Swedish car manufacturers
have created successful joint ventures in the United States with leading U.S. car manufacturers, using experienced, less expensive U.S.
labor resources and energy).
Other contributors to the establishment of IJVs have been multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and others (see
the section in this chapter on IJVs and their relationships with financial institutions). Globalization of business and involvement of
multilateral institutions (e.g., setting regulations on economic and
business activities, offering financial aid and loans, etc.), create a
favorable climate for establishing and operating IJVs. As an example,
the objective of the WTO is to eliminate trade barriers. By breaking
down such barriers, the WTO enhances expansion of international
business and the creation of IJVs capable of producing goods and
services abroad for import—export purposes. Product standards set
by the WTO make products more desirable for other organizations.
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Regionalization, another global trend, also enhances the climate
for the formation of IJVs. Regionalization in this context means the
establishment of favorable conditions for countries that are members
of any regional organization or union. For instance, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) creates a favorable climate for
U.S. companies in dealing with Mexican and Canadian companies,
but challenging conditions nonetheless remain for companies outside these regions. Thus, although companies in the European
Union (EU) enjoy the benefits of regionalization, countries that do
not belong to the EU benefit companies outside the region, but such
agreements loosen restrictions on international business activities
and create a favorable climate, and hence a greater opportunity for
international partnerships within the region. Companies in nonmember countries can take advantage of regionalization by forming
IJVs with companies from EU member countries as Japanese countries do in dealing with members of the Association of South and
East Asian Nations (ASEAN). If Japanese companies were simply to
export to the ASEAN member countries, they would confront tariffs
and other barriers that are mitigated by creating IJVs with companies
from ASEAN member countries.
Consequently, foreign companies have increasingly used IJVs as a
vehicle for direct investment in new markets. The formation of IJVs
between U.S. and international companies has increased at an annual rate of 27 percent since 1985. Usually, IJVs are not a form of
full integration of the constituent companies, but rather a form of
partial cooperation for particular activities in a new market. Analysis
has determined that the benefit resulting from joint efforts (net of
the transaction costs arising from the formation and operation of the
IJV) is often greater than the net benefit from separate efforts. The
synergies created by the IJV result in risk reduction, economies of
scale, production rationalization, convergence of technologies, and
better local acceptance.
This chapter provides guidance for companies interested in taking
advantage of the expanding potential of IJVs. Because countries and
regional markets have very different regulations and opportunities,
the chapter attempts to provide the reader with general rather than
specific guidance.
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The Business and Legal Nature of IJVs
Typically, IJVs involve international investment in existing local operations of domestic companies or domestic operations owned by
entities from a third country. IJVs provide a vehicle for decreasing
the investment required by companies when entering new markets
in foreign countries. In emerging and developed countries, IJVs provide an ideal vehicle from business and legal perspectives for doing
business in highly competitive markets. IJVs often provide the best
opportunity for competing in domestic markets within foreign countries.
My studies have shown that nearly 20 percent of all IJVs are created to implement in practice proactive business policy with the primary purpose of gaining share in foreign markets, as U.S. and
Western European companies have done in Latin America, Eastern
Europe, China, and Russia. In places like China and Russia, the IJV
may protect companies where laws and business practices create risk
levels dramatically higher than those in the West. But many companies from well-developed countries take on themselves those risks to
materialize reactive business policy under pressure of their competitors and of newcomers in their original markets.
IJVs as a Business Approach
Before IJVs are formed as legal entities, companies generally enter
business cooperation agreements. These agreements allow companies
to ‘‘test the water’’ before entering into IJV partnerships. During
this phase, the highest priority remains the independence of each
company. These contractual agreements serve as feasibility studies
and are often a critical phase in the development of IJVs. Business
cooperation agreements that do not result in IJVs are also quite common in international trade. In practice, either such agreements develop into IJVs, or cooperation is achieved.
Another legal relationship between companies that does not lead
to the creation of a new legal entity is the formation of a strategic
alliance. Although it is seldom that an IJV in a new market does not
include domestic partners, in theory, the venture could be between
two experienced foreign companies whose only need is to combine
capital resources and technology.
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IJVs as a Legal Form
IJVs are composed of two or more entities from two or more countries. The first step is the choice of legal form. A JV typically will be
either a partnership or an agreement for cooperation, depending on
the desires of the constituent companies. Whether a partnership or
a cooperative relationship is chosen, the resulting form is a JV if it
represents the collaborative efforts of two or more existing entities
united for short- or long-term purposes. The JV partners have two
choices. They can sign an Agreement of Mutual Activity, describing
how they will coordinate their activities and listing their mutual
rights and responsibilities. However, under this scenario each company will separately incur its own expenses. Each can pursue its own
profit, or the JV can share expenses and profits. To decrease expenses, the companies agree not to compete with each other. Often
they share office space and production facilities and combine marketing efforts. They share the costs of purchasing materials to lower
overall costs. Alternatively, they can create a new entity. In many
countries, an entity created in such a manner is referred to as a JV.
Hence, this term refers to a new legal entity, not an Agreement of
Mutual Activity.
As an example of an international joint venture, consider the relationship among McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, Rockwell Corporation,
and Tupolev Construction Bureau, a Russian company. The parties
are engaged in an international joint project to develop a supersonic
passenger aircraft, for which they are using the Russian supersonic
Tupolev 144, with McDonnell Douglas, Boeing, and Rockwell Corporation providing additional technology.
Some countries specifically regulate IJVs. These IJVs may be a in a
legal form for which the country of activity has special regulations,
or they may simply represent a form of business cooperation between
a domestic and a foreign partner in a country where there is no such
regulation. Other than as described in this chapter, most countries
do not have regulations concerning IJVs. Without such regulations,
the laws that apply to the domestic partner apply to the IVJ as a
whole. If a government wishes to encourage IJVs, it will establish
favorable IJV regulations, as was the case in the 1980s with the internalization of Chile, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,
and Hungary.
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Political and Economic Factors
International business, political, and economic strategies are strongly
interrelated. Depending on the influence of modern political processes on the region, international business may influence a country’s
foreign policy, and vice versa. When considering potential IJVs, priority must be given to the evaluation of political and economic factors. Unlike investing in the United States or Western Europe, when
investing in a foreign market, investors must often evaluate and consider political risks separately.
Government instability presents many problems. Among these is
economic risk, as well as the uncertainty of volatile change in government regulation, legal authority, and the potential nationalization of
the IJV’s assets. For example, companies thinking about Russian or
Argentinian IJVs have concerns about government stability. Investing in China, however, is quite different. Companies are not as concerned about potential changes in the dictatorship as they are about
the uncertainty of the Chinese political hierarchy’s attitude toward
foreign investment. Knowledge of the functions and activities of government bodies, state companies, and private companies is critical.
It is also very important to know when, for what reason, and to whom
in the government one must go for information and approval. In
fact, bureaucratic issues are reported to have caused 16 percent of
all IJV failures in emerging market countries between the years 1988
and 1992.
The August 1998 Russian currency turmoil, followed by a payment
crisis, literally forced several IJVs into bankrupcy. The Turkish government’s currency float in 2001 and economic problems in Argentina in the same year dramatically squeezed profit margins of several
IJVs. In the example of Turkey, the decline of the U.S. dollar exchange rate by 30 percent diminished the U.S. dollar-denominated
income of several IJVs, including Bulgarian and Albanian ventures.
In addition to bureaucratic issues, legal issues cause problems for
IJVs. The government of the jurisdiction in which an IJV is located
may continue to change laws in favor of the formation of IJVs. However, the legal issues causing 10 percent of all IJV failures in emerging
markets between 1988 and 1992 were as a result of the form, not the
substance, of legal documents. IJV agreements are often not approved if written in a format other than that embraced by the government. To avoid this problem, local counsel should be consulted.
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Internal political instability or regional conflicts between countries
create uncertainty and increase political risk. Such instability in the
country in which an IJV is located negatively affects international
trade balances in that country. Often, as a result, the government
begins to place restrictions on international transactions and especially on the repatriation of profits and assets. Although some economic risks are inseparable from political risks, there are other
economic risks that are quite independent of such risks. The economic risks that affect foreign investments in general, and especially
emerging markets, relate to the presence or the absence of membership in international economic organizations (World Bank, IMF, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [EBRD] and
WTO, regional trade blocs, etc.).
Currency fluctuation and incovertibility are common risks in IJVs,
because the value of the dollar relative to the currencies of the partners’ countries determines the value of the IJV’s overseas assets and
earnings. An increase in the value of the U.S. dollar reduces the
value of assets and earnings of U.S. multinational companies with
substantial investments abroad. In addition, currency swings can affect competitiveness in global markets because of the impact on the
prices of goods manufactured in different countries. Problems of inconvertibility and currency fluctuations were reported to have been
the cause of 20 percent of the IJV failures between the years 1988
and 1992 in emerging markets.
Inflation rate differences, which are related to currency values, are
yet another economic risk to consider for companies involved in IJVs.
The United States and many Western industrialized countries have
benefited from relatively low inflation rates over the past several
years. However, many countries, including those in South America,
the Pacific Rim, and Eastern Europe, have experienced inflation
rates of several hundred percent.
Democratization of the former communist and military dictatorship countries appeared to offer major business opportunities for
Western companies. But these countries often initiated privatization
before they de-monopolized, demilitarized, and decentralized their
economies. The consequences of failing to de-monopolize were price
increases initiated by those holding monopoliy power, causing the
majority of the population to fall below the poverty line. As a result,
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a lessened desire for privatization and an impetus toward renationalization began to take hold.
Depending on the industry in question, foreign companies involved in IJVs in some former communist countries may face the risk
of tremendous loss. In Russia and Belarus, the defense industry has
been the target of renationalization. A Moscow court canceled the
privatization of several defense aviation plants acquired by a foreign
company, ruling that the foreign company did not have the appropriate government approvals at the time of the auction in 1994, even
though initial approval had been granted by the government. This
ruling suggests that almost any privatization deal made during the
first stage of privatization can subsequently be held to have been
illegal.
If renationalization results from the kind of political changes that
do not recognize prior domestic or international statutory or case
law, the political and economic risks of a potential IJV are increased
to a level that makes its creation economically disadvantagenous.
Strategy for Creation of IJVs
The first step for a foreign investor contemplating an IJV is to make
a series of strategic decisions as to what kind of industry, in which
country, and in what particular region it seeks to invest. During the
past 10 years, reasons for foreign investment have substantially
changed. While traditional reasons, such as lower production costs
and potential new markets, still exist, new and quite important factors have appeared. Today’s consumer demands quality products at
reasonable prices. Thus, companies must produce at high-quality
levels and modest costs or lose their competitive advantage. This
means that it is practically impossible to succeed with a reactive
business strategy for entering an emerging market to produce highquality, low-cost products while substantially reducing operational
costs.
Choosing a Location
Whether the IJV prospers depends in part on the resources available
in the place where it is located. For example, the initiator of an IJV
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may enter a new market with a chemical technology that consumes
large amounts of water, but if the IJV’s location has a water shortage
or a pollution problem, the expenses required to address the problem
will make it extremely difficult to profitably implement the technology. The same holds true with an investor entering a new market
with an energy-consuming technology when there is a significant
shortage of energy or high energy costs. A frequently made mistake
of electro-technical companies or clothing manufacturers is to select
a new market and to simply assume that they can readily acquire a
cheap labor force. In reality, many less developed countries have limited numbers of skilled workers and relatively low unemployment
levels, which cause the required salaries to be much higher than the
investor had assumed.
Rapid changes in emerging markets easily confuse initiators of
IJVs. For example, in the beginning of the 1990s, with the disintegration of the former communist Yugoslavia, one British fashion factory
decided to use cheap labor resources in Slovenia by establishing an
IJV. But soon, living standards and employment compensation substantially increased, and that company was economically forced to
leave Slovenia and to reestablish its production in Ukraine.
There are several important factors to consider when deciding on
the location of a new IJV, such as development of the region, presence or absence of capitalist institutions (commercial and investment banks, insurance companies, and accounting and law firms),
and the availability of these services. Also important are the level of
development of the region’s capital and financial infrastructures, of
the host nation’s trade and distribution systems, and of its telecommunications, transportation, and energy services. A second priority
is the level of development of the social infrastructure in and around
the region of the new IJV. Thus, although China is one of the world’s
richest countries in labor and natural resources, the low cost of such
resources has often been offset by costs resulting from its poor and
unreliable transportation systems, which make it difficult to obtain
such resources. Because most foreign companies are located in free
economic zones in coastal cities, they find it cheaper to import resources from nearby countries than to transport them from inland
China.
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Decision-Making Process
Strategic decisions regarding establishment of new IJVs must be consistent with the internal policy of the company considering an IJV.
It is possible to use computer models to make a decision regarding
the IJV, in a process guided by experience, common sense, and logic.
Modeling allows one to choose from a variety of potential scenarios
and from an infinite number of possible outcomes. An alternative to
an IJV is a wholly owned structure. Sometimes, transactions are best
facilitated by using wholly owned structures rather than IJVs. This is
particularly true when it is anticipated that the goals of IJV partners
may diverge after a time or where a company seeks unadulterated
control to better integrate the subsidiary into the parent company’s
production, sales, and marketing plans.
The establishment of an investment by a new wholly owned susidiary is often a complex and costly process, but the advantages described earlier may make the problems worth addressing. In the
decision-making process, one must consider how difficult or easy it
will be to acquire the knowledge typically supplied by IJV partners
to operate alone in foreign markets.

Choosing a Partner
A major problem for many investors intending to enter a new market
is finding a suitable partner. History demonstrates that a company
less experienced in a new market has a higher risk of failure without
a partner. In emerging market countries, for example, this factor, as
my study shows, has caused 28 percent of the failures during the first
four years (1988 to 1992) of international business activity in the
emerging market; but in the fifth year it caused only 15 percent of
the failures. The major reason for the decline appears to be that
domestic and foreign parties gain experience over time and therefore
learn how to find better partners.
In addition, my study shows that more-experienced foreign entrepreneurs know there is a higher risk of market failure when there
have been unfavorable negotiations, language barriers, and conflicts
of attitudes, cultures, and business approaches. During the first four
years, 10 percent of the IJV failures in the former Soviet Bloc were
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alleged to be due to unfavorable negotiations; in the fifth year the
failure rate increased to 13 percent. One of the explanations for the
3 percent increase is the retention of Western lawyers in the IJV
negotiating process. Hiring a lawyer or an international business consultant sometimes complicates the issue at hand if such a person
lacks specific knowledge of the local market. This lack of knowledge
handicaps the foreign partner and heavily favors the domestic firm.
Without a proper partner or vast experience of its own, a company
is ill-advised to form an IJV, even if the business reasons are solid. It
is necessary for each partner to bring complementary strengths to
the partnership. Moreover, partners must be compatible and willing
to trust one another. It is important that no partner seeks to acquire
another’s strength, for this undermines any mutual trust that has
been developed. For example, Dow Chemical Company, which is
involved in many IJVs, uses the early negotiation process to evalute
the other side’s corporate culture and to assess the likelihood of compatibility and mutual trust.
It is necessary to formulate a business strategy consistent with the
goals of the partners. Each partner must be willing to share strategic
information—an early test of the parties’ trust and commitment.
Operational responsibilities of each party must also be clearly defined up front to reduce role ambiguity. Details regarding objectives
and resource commitments should be clearly stated and documented
in the IJV agreement. Flexibility should be built into the agreement
to allow for restructuring the IJV if the need arises.
Because trust is an essential element for an IJV and cannot be
written into a contract, it may make sense to phase in the relationship between the partners to allow them to get to know each other
better and to develop trust. Philip Benton, Jr., former president of
Ford Motor Company (which has been involved in several IJVs over
the past decade, most notably with Mazda), has said that the first
time two companies work together, many opportunities arise. Working together on relatively small projects initially helps to develop
trust and determine compatability while minimizing economic risk.
Each partner can gauge the skills and the likely contribution of the
other; as trust and confidence build, further investment can be considered. Obviously, the best way to build these vital elements is by
working together in a new marketplace.
The degree of trust relates in part to the question of interdepen-
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dence. The higher the degree of interdependence, the more incentives there are for each party to behave in a trustworthy manner.
Failure to meet expectations of trustworthiness may dry up the resources on which the disappointing party depends. This dynamic
encourages self-policing behavior, which in turn increases trust.
Trust, versus combativeness in resolving disagreements or tendencies
to engage in opportunistic behavior, is partly cultural. In cultures
where contractual trust is high, the contract language of the IJV need
not be very specific. Conflict is avoided rather than encouraged and
is resolved amicably rather than adversarially. In low-trust cultures,
conflict is common and acceptable and is resolved adversarially,
sometimes through litigation. Although cultural tendencies may provide a rough approximation of expected levels of trust between parties from different cultures, variation within these stereotypes must
be accounted for as well. In fact, 10 percent of all IJV failures between 1988 and 1992 in emerging markets were a result of cultural
differences.
The most recent study of IJVs conducted under my supervision
was made in the year 2000, based on the statistical data of 1998.
Ten years of internationalization of the economy and the experience
gained through the creation of IJVs substantially changed the level
of success and the reasons for IJVs’ failures in emerging market countries. In 1992 only 10 percent of inexperienced entrepreneurs and
executives were able to create successful IJVs; in 1998 the level of
success reached 52 percent. The reasons for failure also were substantially transformed. The incidence of ‘‘no partner found’’ being
reported as a reason for failure decreased from 28 percent to 7.5
percent. With the new data it was found that financing problems
became the major reason why the venture was not created. Nine
percent of all failures in 1998 resulted from bureaucratic obstacles, a
quarter of which were related to licensing. A critical role in the creation of IJVs in 1998 was played by taxation. Thirty-eight percent of
all IJV failures were due to unfavorable feasibility and market studies;
this revealed considerable complications resulting from existing tax
structures. Fifteen percent of legal problems were due to taxation. It
is also interesting that 75 percent of the financial disagreements were
related to auditing, due diligence, and tax issues (see Exhibit 1).
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Exhibit 1: Reasons for International Joint Venture Failures (1998)
Unfavorable
negotiations
Legal problems 3%
(35% related to
property law and
intellectual property
rights; 15% due to
taxation)

3%

Unfavorable
feasibility/market study
6% (35% related to
competition; 38% to
taxation)
Other problems 2%

Bureaucratic problems
9% (25% related to
licensing)
Financing problems 19%
(75% related to auditing,
due diligence, and tax
issues)

Established
joint
ventures
52%

No partner found 7.5%
(65% related to
shareholding
disagreement)

Specific Legal and Business Issues in the Creation of IJVs
The Negotiating Process
The IJV negotiating process frequently unravels. Some of the reasons
are: (1) When two parties have equal knowledge of the market, negotiations can become overwhelmed with detail, and the process becomes unreasonably prolonged; (2) the inability to resolve the
question of how much each participant will invest; and (3) lack of
candor between partners. Too often, U.S. companies spend considerable money on trips and negotiations only to discover that their partners have lied to them. Many companies claim to be significantly
profitable when they have earned absolutely nothing. Prospective IJV
partners should request documentation supporting claims of historic
profitability. This documentation should be audited in accordance
with internationally accepted standards. Both partners should agree
on an auditor and should decide which party will pay for the service.
One needs to be aware of the poor quality of some financial information. The accounting systems in emerging markets, for example, do
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not allow for a realistic appraisal of products or assets. Concepts
like ‘‘current market value’’ barely exist. The difficulty of obtaining
accurate financial data makes the case for independent auditors that
much more compelling. On other informational issues, the prospective IJV investor is likely to receive more reliable data from lowerrather than senior-level executives. Such data should, where possible,
be supplemented by data from the central and the regional governments.
While defrauded foreigners can hazard the application of foreign
law and litigate, the amount of the settlement or judgment will probably not justify the costs and the injury to the plaintiff’s reputation
in the foreign business community. A better approach is a rigorous,
up-front due diligence process.
Drafting the Letter of Intent
The principal document resulting from successful initiation of discussions between potential IJV partners is an IJV Agreement. The
best way to create the document is to start with a letter of intent
(LOI) instead of negotiating the IJV Agreement immediately. With
some exceptions, the LOI is a nonbinding, legally unenforceable
document. A useful tactic is to put all the points that have been
discussed from the beginning of the negotiations into memorandum
form and to have the memorandum in hand before creating an LOI.
Points of mutual understanding are the basis of the LOI. The LOI
is an extremely important element in creating a successful IJV.
What kinds of issues should be covered in the LOI? Surely one is
the exact names of the potential partners of the IJV. The company
names of the partners must match the names under which they are
legally registered. One Swiss company signed an LOI with a Russian
counterpart, which later became the basis for an IJV Agreement.
Both documents were signed and the IJV was registered. Before the
IJV started its activity, a U.S. company showed interest in partnering
with the Russian company. The Russian partner was very attracted
to the U.S. company, which offered the Russian company better
terms than the Swiss did. The Russian company, however, was presumably bound by its agreement with the Swiss partner. The U.S.
company showed its U.S. and Russian lawyers the IJV Agreement
between the Russian and Swiss companies. The lawyers discovered
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that at the moment the LOI and the IJV Agreement were signed,
the Swiss company did not exist and, in consequence, was not registered—a process that was completed only after the LOI and IJV
agreements were signed. The applicable law governing the Russian
partner did not permit a company not registered as a legal entity to
be a partner in an IJV. As a result, the agreement between the Russian and Swiss partners was void. The name under which the IJV acts
and its legal address must be exactly as it is registered. Furthermore,
as the preceding example clearly illustrates, the company must be
registered before the deal documents are signed.
A very important part of the LOI is a clear description of the IJV’s
activities. Absent this, should the partners decide to diversify the IJV
later, they will have to reregister the IJV Agreement. Accordingly,
prudence dictates a laundry list of potential IJV activities.
In both the LOI and the IJV Agreement, the role of each party
must be clearly set forth—briefly in the LOI and extensively in the
IJV Agreement. In the LOI, there is a schedule of steps to be taken
in executing the IJV, which is unique to the LOI and not found in
the IJV Agreement. Apart from the requirement to bargain in good
faith, the LOI, in anticipation of an IJV Agreement (as are most such
documents), is not legally binding.
Structure of an International Joint Venture Agreement
An IJV Agreement is a legal document binding parties to specific
obligations and proportionate shares in the venture. As a written
agreement, it clarifies party obligations as well as the purpose of the
venture in order to document the agreements made and to mitigate
conflicts between parties. The following major sections should be
included in the written agreement:
Legal Status, Official Name, and Seat of Activity. Statement of
legal status of contracting parties and the country under whose legislation the combined venture will operate. The legal name of the
venture shall be defined in the languages of all participants in the
venture. The official seat of activity as well as the company seal and
logo are included in this section
• Statement of Purpose. Description of the venture’s purpose of formation and business activities. This shall be a thorough description
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of all venture operations, including descriptions of all establishments required to be formed in order to perform this venture’s activities.
Assets, Funds, and Business Activities of the Venture. Definition of
the venture’s assets, their composition, and the contributions of
which they will be composed are included in this section. It is important that the written agreement clearly state the participants’
contributions and their proportionate shares in the venture. The
amount of assets required to cover obligations shall be included.
The agreement shall also state that the venture is liable for obligations against its assets. However, it is not liable for obligations of
participants, and the participants are not liable for obligations of
the new joint venture.
Management Bodies. Definition of the organizational structure of an
IJV is required. This section names the members of the Joint Venture Board and states their objectives, obligations, and rights in controlling the operations of the venture. The president in charge of
venture operations and his or her obligations and rights must also
be defined. In addition, the creation of other bodies required to
complete the objectives and the functions of the venture must be
clearly stated.
Auditing Commission. Defines the establishment and activities of
an Auditing Commission. The Auditing Commission shall consist
of members appointed by the Board. The term and the number of
members shall also be mentioned in this section.
Accounting Requirements. The venture shall keep business records,
books of account, and statistical records according to the procedures
established by the Board in compliance with the legislation of the
country of IJV registration. Accounting records shall be in the language of the country of the IJV registration. Cost accounting shall
be used in the currency of the country of IJV registration. Typically,
auditing opinion for the IJV has to be issued in two accounting
standards: (I) an international standard and (2) the host country’s
domestic standard, if there is any difference.
Rights and Duties of the Participants. The legal rights and responsibilities of all parties involved in the venture must be clearly stated.
Liquidation and Preemption. Requirements for approval and procedures for liquidation and preemption must be clearly stated. Usually, the venture may be liquidated by mutual agreement between
the participants. The money received from realization of the venture’s property as well as financial funds left after settlement of accounts with creditors shall be distributed among participants in
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proportion to their paid-up shares. The venture shall lose the status
of a legal entity and be considered as terminated from the moment
its liquidation is registered in the established order. A notification
of liquidation shall be published in the press.

Cultural Challenge in IJVs
This chapter has been at pains to emphasize that cultural differences
often spell the difference between success and failure of IJVs. This is
certainly true at the contract stage, where parties should be aware of
cultural differences that affect the outcome. Subject to the limitation of all generalizations, German negotiators tend to approach the
process in a thorough, systematic, but sometimes rigid manner, resulting in the need for a high degree of preparation as well as for
clarity and precision in communications. French and Belgian negotiators are observed to engage in ‘‘lateral’’ negotiations, preferring to
discuss general principles before considering the specifics. The British have been observed to be informal in style, flexible, and open to
suggestions. Potential partners from Russia and Ukraine, during the
initial stages of negotiations, may appear very tough and taciturn.
This may especially be the case if the meeting is early in the morning
and follows a late night spent out with friends. However, do not be
surprised if these negotiations become friendly toward the end of
the negotiations, especially after the first shared dinner. Albanian
negotiators can create considerable mistrust during negotiations by
presenting facts and documents regarding the ownership of potential
assets for investment that do not represent reality. However, Albanians will honor all obligations that they will take upon themselves.
This includes old contracts. One may also become very confused by
negotiations with Bulgarians and Albanians simply through gestural
communication. In these countries nodding the head means no,
while shaking it means yes—the exact inverse of everywhere else. For
representatives of Georgia, any result of negotiation in writing does
not mean much. Georgian friendliness does not necessarily suggest
that they subscribe to the obligations set forth for them, and the most
serious issue is not the written contract but the friendship between
negotiators. Negotiators from Korea, during the majority of negotiations, will assent out of politeness; in the final moment, however,
they will reserve the right to say no. Those from Asian cultures may
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appear tediously slow to U.S. businesspeople, who may, at their peril,
become impatient and press their partners too aggressively toward
closure. Japanese negotiators often demand a close interpersonal relationship characterized by mutual trust. U.S. partners often view
the development of empathy as needless and even harmful in light
of the U.S.-style goal of relatively depersonalized negotiations. On
entering negotiations, U.S. partners must be aware of nuances in
differing approaches to bargaining and should try to understand the
other party’s expectations.
Reliance on trust as a substitute for a formal agreement requires
either strong cultural norms, under which trust is so institutionalized
as to be a viable proxy for a contract, or a history of ongoing relations
between the parties to the IJV. In such instances, mutual confidence
compensates for a cultural environment of mistrust. Therefore,
where the partner’s culture is resistant to a formal contract, it may
be advisable to replace the formal contract process with a negotiation-and-planning process.
The first years of an IJV typically involve the need to mesh what
may be conflicting cultural attitudes by board members, executives,
and managers from different countries. With goodwill on the part of
all, this process can conclude satisfactorily, provided the participants
are prepared to be flexible in learning how to work with one another.
Determining Shares of Initial Capital
In some countries, a minimum amount of foreign capital must be
invested for the joint activity to be considered an IJV. Although this
amount varies from country to country, a minimum ownership of 30
percent of the outstanding shares and a capital investment of
$100,000 to $1,000,000 is typically required for a foreign partner. For
example, Ukraine requires foreign partners to invest 20 percent of
the initial capital and the Russian government requires foreign partners to invest 30 percent of the initial capital. Initial investments can
be limited in other cases. The government of Indonesia requires a
minimum of 5 percent of the initial capital to come from within the
country, thus allowing the local government to have at least minimum control over the activities of the foreign partner. In international practice there are also examples of countries allowing 100
percent of initial capital to be of foreign origin. In this case, regula-
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tions typically require that partners of the IJV be from different
countries.
Parties quite often invest assets other than cash. For example, one
party can contribute production facilities and know-how and the
other can contribute cash and/or marketing skills. It is very difficult
to quantify the value of intangible assets contributed to the IJV.
Given this fact, it may be better to start negotiations with defined
shares of initial capital rather than with a finite investment figure.
Usually, parties come to a mutual understanding through this approach because they share an interest in determining the value of
the initial investment of all parties.
Mistakenly, many U.S. businesses consider the problem of convertibility of foreign currencies as the most important aspect of their
negotiations. Lately, inconvertibility has become less of a problem.
Through banks and financial companies, U.S. businesses can buy
dollars with domestic currency at auctions and invest domestic currency in a dollar-producing business, or they can opt for a barter or
collateral deal instead. In addition, bartering is common in emerging
markets. This is due to lack of hard currency, the limited number of
financial institutions whose guarantees can be accepted in developed
countries, and the scarcity of cash. Few banks in emerging markets
accept Western letters of credit, because such banks lack working
capital. Even if banks accept letters of credit, some lend on only half
the required amount. A common practice for addressing this problem is for Western firms to buy raw materials from companies in
emerging markets and to pay for them with equipment instead of
cash, pursuant to a predetermined agreement.
Another form of international lending has the local manufacturer
pledge a title documenting interest in a precious metal or other commodity to a bank in a third country, a practice that permits the nonU.S. borrower to acquire foreign-made machinery and equipment.
As the business begins to generate profits, the borrower repays the
loan and is returned the pledged title on full payment.
The most important point during the negotiations is determining
the share of initial capital investment that each party contributes to
the IJV, an element that may last the life of the IJV and govern the
division of profits. Western companies should calculate the purchasing power of currencies from emerging markets during the negotiations and recognize the value of any contributed property.
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Operational Issues
Export-Import Activities and Special Privileges of IJVs
In many countries, IJVs have the temporary privilege of importing
parts and materials necessary to produce and to export finished
goods. In many emerging market countries, export-import operations are the only legally permissible way to open IJV accounts
abroad and keep money in them. This is very important for IJV operations in countries with inconvertible or partially convertible currencies. Quite often, IJVs in emerging markets report higher annual
imports than exports because they repatriate only a portion of their
export revenues. A major part of the profit is kept in foreign accounts
to fund imports and to avoid excessive home country taxation or
currency devaluation.
Inconvertible currency makes it difficult to finance imports of
equipment, components, and services unless the IJV is involved in
import-export operations. The IJV must export enough to offset any
imports needed for the production process and to generate foreign
currency for remittance to the parent.
Some countries isolate IJVs from the rest of the economy, either
through special regulations or outright zoning. Countries do so in
the hope that such an arrangement will attract advanced technology
and generate hard-currency inflow. Most countries impose a special
tax on repatriation of profits of foreign investors. Some countries,
especially those trying to attract foreign investors, offer tax holidays
that avoid such repatriation.
Many countries create free economic zones (FEZ). Foreign companies and IJVs registered in the zone usually have privileges of tax
exemption on profit, on repatriation of profits or capital, on exportimport incentives, and other tax holidays. In some FEZs, there is a
regulation giving an IJV the right to use any currency or to enjoy
special privileges in investment activities. For example, China has
five FEZs and fourteen Special Technology and Economic Development Zones. Uruguay, Bulgaria, and Albania are now trying to create
special zones as well.
Hiring and Compensating Employees
The governments of some countries apply regulations to IJVs that
differ from the ones applied to domestic companies. IJVs have
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greater flexibility in employee compensation than domestic companies do. Often, IJVs can pay their employees either in the domestic
currency or in U.S. dollars and euros. Such an option is viewed favorably by most employees; therefore, the IJV is more preferred by international investors.
Cultural, economic, and social differences must be considered
when setting salary levels for local employees. For example, the average Russian or Ukrainian worker is often better educated than his or
her U.S. counterpart and can be an excellent employee given the
proper conditions. But the average salary of a Ukrainian employee is
only about $120 per month. Some of the gap is filled by employers
who supply amenities, such as apartments, food, and household and
medical products that are in short supply in many transitional and
emerging market countries. Such amenities represent excellent ways
to motivate workers and to strengthen relationships between employer and employee.
Restriction of Activities
Companies engaged in IJVs are typically driven by a consistent set of
goals. Some ventures are created to provide entry into a host country
that otherwise restricts direct foreign investment. Contrary to popular belief, post-socialist countries are not the only ones to impose
such restrictions. For example, foreign investment in Japan was relatively restricted until the 1960s but was gradually liberalized through
the 1970s and 1980s. Likewise, Mexico has traditionally prevented
foreign corporations from operating wholly owned subsidiaries
within its borders. Indonesia does not allow foreign companies to
directly participate (even in an IJV) in building bridges, roads, or
housing projects.
china
Chinese industrial policy encourages foreign investors to purchase
from local vendors new equipment or materials that address local
needs, particularly in the energy, transportation, and telecommunications industries. Producers that fail to comply with these priorities
may be ordered to cease production and may have their business
license revoked and their sales proceeds confiscated. At a minimum,

122

understanding the global emerging market

all products must meet product quality standards, which are determined either by the State Council Quality Supervision and Control
departments or by industry custom and practice. Typically, however,
IJVs do not produce the type of goods that are rigorously controlled
by the Chinese government.
eastern europe and the former soviet union
Before the demise of Communism, foreign direct investment (FOI)
was generally prohibited or suffered from overregulation. Around
1989, most countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
removed restrictions. Since 1992, most have enacted or amended
foreign investment laws, often in advance of legislation, to support
the new market environment.
As markets have liberalized, most organizational forms and economic activities have been opened to foreign capital. It is now common for governments to ensure that foreigners are not less favorably
treated than their domestic counterparts. Complete foreign ownership is permitted in most former Soviet Bloc countries and in albania. But there are some industries and regions where FDI is
restricted. Special registration procedures for IJVs are still required
in some former Soviet Bloc countries; and depending on the business
segment, authorization and licensing are frequently required. Not
unlike the practice in the United States and elsewhere, limits on
FDI generally apply to certain military products and in the financial,
insurance, banking, and mass media industries. Foreign participation
in voucher privatization programs is increasingly permitted but is
often subject to approval by different levels of authorities. But normally, in cash privatizations, foreigners are allowed to participate in
both the primary and secondary markets, as is the case in Bulgaria
and Russia. In most countries with a transition economy, foreign
investors are permitted unrestricted after-tax repatriation of profits,
but many countries permit capital reparations only when the IJV’s
operations cease. In addition, capital control rules in Slovenia, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic restrict the transfer of salaries to expatriates. Romania, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic,
Ukraine, and Uzbekistan charge withholding taxes of 10 percent to
15 percent on such remittances. Conversion of revenue derived from
local currency by means of foreign exchange may be subject to prior
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approval. Furthermore, in some of the republics of the former Soviet
Union, profits in local currency must be exchanged at less favorable
rates tha those applicable to other current account transactions. In
some countries, governments extend guarantees to foreign investors
against losses due to restrictions on property use by such investors.
In the majority of countries, subject to some restrictions, foreign
enterprises may own buildings and other assets, though land ownership is either prohibited or remains the subject of debate. Thus, in
many countries like Poland, some argue that were it not for restrictions, nations like Germany could easily acquire considerable
amounts of Polish land. This issue has raised painful political as well
as economic questions. Restrictions on property ownership may be
ameliorated by government-granted leases of up to 99 years.
latin america
Latin American countries have also shown increasing interest in attracting foreign investment to develop their economies, though
much progress still needs to be made. New legislation and economic
programs involving privatization and elimination of tariffs have facilitated access to these markets through free trade agreements in the
region. For example, in Venezuela and Argentina, prior approval for
foreign investment is not required, nor is capital or dividend repatriation restricted. New legislation and economic programs in Peru give
foreigners the right to acquire up to 100 percent of Peruvian enterprises. Privatization of state-owned companies, as part of a government effort to attract foreign investment, has also helped increase
private investment in Peru by 30 percent.
Another benefit of investment in Latin America is access to natural resources and the ports from which to ship them. Ecuador’s location, for example, allows easy passage to North America, Japan, and
Europe; but the privatization of telecommunications systems, roads,
airports, and highways has only recently begun. Many of these countries offer great potential for mining. Chile, being such a country, is
the world’s largest producer of copper. The state-owned petroleum
producer provides the Venezuelan government with 80 percent of
its revenue. Yet the drawbacks of political and economic instability,
demonstrated by high inflation rates, recessions, and high levels of
poverty and unemployment, require foreign investors to carefully
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calculate each opportunity. Countries with a high level of government debt are likely to reduce spending, which includes the funding
of economic development programs.
africa
In South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, the situation is similar
to that in Latin America. All require external investment to alleviate
low savings rates and deficits. Egypt and South Africa have loosened
their restraints on investment by not restricting repatriation of investment capital and by permitting the transfer of dividends and
branch profits if the income is derived from trading. South African
development has and will promote regional cooperation among
southern African countries, including the development of telecommunications and energy systems. Yet South Africa still has protective
tariffs that diminish its attractiveness as a good passageway to the
sub-Sahara. Liquidity problems and high levels of government debt
result in minimal tax incentives. On the positive side, South Africa
has good communication networks (albeit government-controlled),
efficient port facilities, and highly developed financial infrastructure,
including the world’s tenth largest stock exchange. The elimination
of apartheid has drawn foreign investors despite risks of political instability, racial polarization, and violence—factors worth assessing
when considering the merits of a South African IJV.

IJVs and Their Relationships with Multilateral Financial
Institutions and National Governmental Agencies
The past 30 years have seen the development of international rules
and standards covering IJVs, among them the International Chamber of Commerce Guidelines (1972), the International Labor Organization Tripartite Declaration Concering Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy (1977), and Principles and Equitable Rules of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1982). The
development of these rules and standards may reduce the application of conflicting laws in IJV contracts.
IJV activities are not restricted to the private sector. Many multilateral institutions, like the World Bank Group and the IMF, con-
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sider IJVs to be a useful vehicle for implementing global strategy in
the developint world economy. Of course, these institutions mainly
fund governments and their agencies, but their expertise and participation are crucial in many cases. IJVs are arguably the most efficient
foreign investment mechanism used by these institutions. After 50
years of operation, the World Bank experimented with three private
projects in 1995. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Pakistan were selected to receive World Bank loans for the energy sector. Because of
the participation of domestic companies and well-known international companies, such as Enron Corporation (still successful at that
time) and others, all three projects took the form of IJVs.
In addition, IJVs have gained strong support from national institutions of many countries, such as the Export–Import Bank of Japan,
the U.S. Export–Import Bank, and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). OPIC is a semi-governmental agency
that offers financial support and insurance to protect private U.S.
companies from political risks when investing abroad. When OPIC
or any of the export–import banks offer loans, they become important partners of the private investors. The involvement of these institutions assists companies monetarily and helps address bureaucratic
problems too difficult to solve for companies entering new markets.

Differences and Similarities in IJVs in Emerging Markets
Compared to Those in Developed Countries
Purposes for establishing IJVs vary depending on whether the IJVs
are to be established in an emerging or a developed market. When
companies decide to establish IJVs in emerging markets, one of their
purposes is to reduce costs, because by so doing, companies often
gain access to cheaper labor, raw materials, natural resources, and
energy sources. As a result of low production costs, a company may
obtain the competitive advantage of low prices in the market in
which it intends to sell. Most frequently an IJV located in an emerging market targets the market of developed nations, rather than the
emerging market in which the IJV operates. One reason for locating
IJVs in emerging markets is that there are fewer environmental regulations—a phenomenon not likely to continue indefinitely.
Conversely, IJVs in developed countries are often formed to ac-
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quire high technology that may be employed to reduce overhead
costs. Establishing and registering IJVs in developed countries can
reduce the political, legal, and financial risks associated with foreign
investment in emerging markets. For example, PLD Telekom Inc. is
a company registered in Canada (1993) that operates exclusively in
former Soviet Union republics like Russia and Kazakhstan. The firm
was listed on both the Toronto Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq
(from the year 2000 it is part of Metromedia), from which it can
access capital. A recent example of IJVs among companies from developed nations is the IJV of the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and
Exxon Corporation.

Special Role of IJVs in the Internationalization
of the World Economy
The IJV is a rapidly developing form of global business organization.
The advantages of different IJV forms of busienss organization may
reasonably be expected to result in their proliferation. In the process,
they will help bring the businesses of developed and emerging market countries together and, by so doing, become a vehicle to assist in
the continuing development of a global marketplace. Creation of
IJVs can bring together strengths such as inexpensive labor force,
rich raw materials, cheap energy, high technology, and managerial
skills from parent companies of different countries. IJVs in which
people from different cultures work together help create and develop
new standards of business management and are thus a vehicle for
unifying management systems. We confidently predict that (1) IJVs
are models from which new international standards will be developed
and applied; (2) IJVs will be one of the forms for implementing project finance systems; and (3) multilateral financial institutions will
increase their role beyond that of providing project finance and will
become partners of IJVs. An IJV is one of the most effective ways of
attracting foreign investors to the primary markets in the emerging
market economies’ privatization process.
As the potential IJV partners negotiate the IJV and its location,
each party will have different priorities, although there will be certain
common concerns requiring mutual attention. These issues will help
both parties evaluate political, economic, business, and technologi-
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cal risks of investing in the IJV. The following checklist of risk factors,
while not all-inclusive, provides a fairly clear understanding from
which prospective partners can make the critical choices.

Checklist: Risk Factors to Consider When Choosing the
Location for an IJV
I.

Political Factors
A. Enforceability of constitutional and other rights; stability of
constitutional and political structures.
B. Risk of expropriation and nationalization of invested assets.
C. Risk of civil disobedience and property vandalism.
D. Risk of currency inconvertibility.
E. Political relationships with neighboring countries and bilateral agreements.
F. Membership in international political and military organizations (UN, NATO, etc.): willingness to abide by nuclear nonproliferation treaties and agreements concerning export
restrictions on weapons or dual-use high-tech products.

II. Economic Factors
A. Membership in international economic organizations
(World Bank, WTO, IMF, EBRD, regional trade blocs).
B. Business laws to protect private property, foreign investment, foreign trade transactions.
C. Tax laws (profit tax, export tax, tax on repatriation of profits,
double taxation treaties).
D. Trade barriers (duties, quotas, export-import licenses, nontariff barriers).
E. Trade relations (such as most-favored-nation status).
F. Existence of free trade zones or special economic zones.
G. Relations with Paris and London Clubs.
H. Competition (difficulty of gaining and maintaining market
share when confronted by both foreign and domestic competition).
I. Confidentiality of purchase and sale agreements, trade secrets and technology, operational information.
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J. Patent, trademark, and copyright protection.
K. Nepotism/corruption.
L. Nationalism and its effect on legal and commercial areas.
III. Infrastructural factors
A. Availability of business services.
1. Legal services.
2. Insurance services.
3. Accounting and auditing services.
4. Investment and commercial banks.
5. Trust services.
6. Stock exchanges.
7. Commodity exchanges.
8. Foreign exchange services.
9. Trade settlement and clearinghouses.
B. Development of capital and financial markets.
C. Level of activity of institutional investors.
D. Existence of established trade and distribution systems
(whether there are established channels of distribution, such
as import/export firms, distributors’ agents, brokers, wholesalers, warehousing facilities, retail outlets, and aftermarket
service and support).
E. Adequacy, quality, and cost of telecommunications, including local, long distance, and international telecommunications channels; telephone penetration, access to fax, cellular,
or satellite communications; data communications links;
packet switching abilities; LAN (local area network) capacity.
F. Transportation.
1. Quality and extent of highways and secondary roads.
2. Access to air, rail, or water transportation.
3. Freight-forwarding and customs-clearing services.
4. Quality and cost of transportation services.
G. Energy (availability, reliability, and cost of energy for industrial and residential use).
H. Medical services, education, housing, and nutrition for local
and foreign personnel.
I. Hotel and hospitality services (availability, quality, and price
of hotels, restaurants, and other hospitality services).
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J.

Level of development and growth potential for:
1. Heavy industries (mining, metallurgy, machinery building, etc.).
2. Light industries (textiles, clothing, food processing, etc.).
K. Agriculture.
IV. Types of business risks requiring evaluation in the process of preparing feasibility studies for IJVs.
A. Product Risk
1. Raw materials/parts risk.
2. Human resources risk.

DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL JOINT
VENTURES IN RUSSIA: RISKS
AND OPPORTUNITIES
For 74 years of Soviet history, foreign economic activity was a monopoly of the state. Even state enterprises and industrial ministers
were not authorized to have direct business relationships with foreigners. All foreign trade and foreign business cooperation belonged
exclusively to two state executive bodies, the Ministry of Foreign
Trade and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Ties. The
former was responsible for all export and import activities, while the
State Committee was responsible for Soviet investment abroad, such
as construction of a cement plant in Iraq, a ferrous metallurgical
facility in India, and a nickel plant in Cuba. The great majority of
this activity is now in the form of unpaid debt to Russia from these
countries. The total amount of debt to Russia is $64 billion, while
Russian debt to foreigners is $80 billion. All activity of the state,
however, was the result of political, not economic, decisions. Thus,
in terms of economic implications, it was not until 1986 that foreign
bodies were permitted to own property within the Soviet Union, with
the exception of embassies and some foreign government trade representative offices. When foreign investors like FIAT went to Russia
between 1966 and 1970, this was not a true form of foreign investment, but rather a trade transaction, as the USSR government
bought the plant.
Inefficient economic mechanisms virtually exhausted all the natural resources which were easily extractable or harvestable. More and
more input was required to extract the same output, which led to
diminishing returns. In the USSR and its satellite countries, it was
necessary to garner resources from an ever-expanding geographic
area; to exploit the East and North; to dig deeper to try to maintain
In Creating and Managing International Joint Ventures, ed. Arch G. Woodside
and Robert E. Pitts (Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 1996).
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output. The industrial structure of the USSR was based on the extensive economic model. Even Western European countries came to
this meadow; Germany, France, and Italy started to drink from the
river of natural gas flowing through the Siberian pipeline. Finland
continued to receive its energy blood from Russia. But the natural
surface resources were depleted. The development of new oil and gas
fields and new nonferrous metal and diamond pits required more
investment and more resources, which Russia did not have. It required more workers and more equipment, neither of which Russia
had. As a result, the growth of GNP in Russia declined every year,
from 1970 through 1985. The cumulative decline was more than
250%. Moreover, this economic mechanism did not stimulate the
introduction of Russian scholars’, scientists’, and technologists’ discoveries and innovations into practice. Russian achievements were
more widely and more quickly put into practice in other countries.
For example, the Russian invention of the continuous steel casting
method for steel production is used for 90% of steel production in
Japan and the United States, while in Russia it is for used only 30%.
Seventy percent of steel production in Russia is based on older, outdated methods. The same happened with Russian laser technology,
for which they won the 1964 Nobel Prize, as well as with other technologies.
By the end of the ’70s, Soviet non-military plants had a technological base which was 15 to 20 years behind that of developed countries. While President Reagan encouraged modernization of
equipment by decreasing the amortization schedule from 7 to 5
years, the rate at which Russia upgraded its own equipment was only
2% per year. As a result, the gap in levels of technical modernization
between Russia and the United States and other developed countries
continued to grow. The situation continued through the mid-’80s,
and continues even today.
Computerization of industry in Russia began on a wide scale only
in the ’80s, and is still essentially in the introductory stage, especially
in services. It became clear that without industrial and technical cooperation with the world business community and the world market,
the USSR would continue to regress, compared to the rest of the
developed world. This became obvious even to the bureaucrats from
the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and these factors
combined to bring about the birth of perestroika and the new winds

132

understanding the global emerging market

of freedom. As a result, 1986 was the first time that the two state
monopolies for foreign economic activity were destroyed. Industrial
ministries like the Ministry of Machinery Building, the Ministry of
Nonferrous Metals, and the Ministry of Communication and Post
won the right to create foreign trading companies. Through these
companies, they were authorized to sell part of their output abroad
and to keep part of the export proceeds for technology development.
Also, they were authorized to buy new equipment abroad.
In 1987, the 500 largest state industrial companies were accorded
the same right. Finally, on January 13, 1987, an historical decision
was made to permit joint ventures with the participation of foreign
companies. But ideology was so central to this decision that Gorbachev signed two decrees that day; one concerning joint ventures with
participation of organizations from socialist countries, and one concerning joint ventures with participation of organizations from capitalist countries. The decrees said that up to 49% of the joint venture
could belong to the foreign partner, but the foreign partner could
not have its representative as the chairman or director general of the
joint venture. The result was that during all of 1987, only 23 joint
ventures were created, 2 of which were U.S.–Russian.
The disappointing outcome of all the changes in the USSR, and
the rapid disintegration of the national economy, made it possible
for market-oriented economists to prepare a draft of a new, more
liberal joint-venture regulation, which became law on December 2,
1988. The Communist Party bosses were kind enough to sign this
decree, because they were faced with the reality that by the end of
1988 only 192 joint ventures had been established. The party bosses
were amazed that more foreign companies had not come to take
advantage of the socialist paradise. From that point forward, foreigners could occupy any position in the joint venture, and the percentage of investment was not limited. The liberalized regulations
immediately gave rise to an increase in joint ventures—1,274 by the
end of 1989. Companies from Germany, Austria, and Finland, countries that had long experience and long-time economic relationships
with the Soviet government, led the way.
The year 1990 saw continued growth in joint ventures, which
reached 2,905 by the end of the year. I started my analysis of joint
venture experiences in 1988. These seven years showed trends and
problems in the creation of joint ventures. It was important to me
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because in 1988 I had participated in drafting the joint-venture regulations that still form the basis of current regulations in all the former Soviet republics. Of course, as usual, all the drafts developed by
scientists, scholars, and lawyers from academic institutions were duly
changed by the bureaucrats from the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and the USSR Council of Ministers. Nonetheless,
the final decision in December 1988 was a substantial improvement,
and I felt some responsibility for it. Following are the initial conclusions of this study.

Location of Joint Ventures with Foreign Companies’
Participation (Particularly from Capitalist Countries)
These firms were strongly influenced by their understanding of the
risk of investing in Russia, especially the political risks. During 1989,
85% of all joint ventures created were located in Moscow, 10% were
in St. Petersburg, and only 5% were scattered over all the other territory of the former USSR! This results from foreigners’ perception
that the highly centralized Soviet government structure was still very
much in place; that the iron curtain was not just an image, but a
virtual reality. Companies tried to be close to the government, and,
as a result, most of the offices were set up in central Moscow. However, there was no economic reason or basis for this decision. Lack
of information on other locations prohibited the joint ventures from
being set up elsewhere. Foreigners only knew of Moscow as the center for all activity, and did not want to be far from it.
At the same time, joint ventures in the Russian Far East and Siberia (a territory larger than the U.S. or Canada) accounted for only
1% of all joint-venture activity (12 of more than 1200 ventures). This
showed that foreigners had no information regarding the social and
economic processes that were taking place in the ruined Soviet
Union, as it approached its end. The political risk of investment is
much lower in the Far East and Siberia than in Moscow and St.
Petersburg. The Far East population is very involved in the political
struggle and there nationalists and pseudo-patriots have created centers of activity.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union seriously changed the
whole process of the creation of joint ventures. By 1992, 34% of the
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joint ventures created were in Moscow. During the same period, the
percentage of joint ventures in other regions of Russia increased by
only 4%. Serious changes in the Baltic States, however, caused the
number of joint ventures created there to increase markedly. The
Lithuanian parliament’s Declaration of Independence in March
1990 showed the world community that the Baltic States were on
their way to a market economy. Investors found that joint ventures
in the Baltic States enjoyed a more stable environment. But the Baltic States lack sufficient economic factors to contribute to the high
degree of profitability possible with Russian joint ventures. The Baltic States have no natural resources, the process of privatization is
behind Russia’s, and the economic conditions are not oriented
toward attracting foreign investment, but toward development of
domestic entrepreneurial business. This became especially clear at
the end of 1991, when almost 68% of joint ventures in the Baltic
States worked as intermediaries for exporting Russian raw materials
or products such as nonferrous metals, although the Baltic States do
not produce nonferrous metals. However, for foreigners, it was the
easiest way to receive nonferrous metals without export licenses from
the Russian government. But in 1993, this type of business with Russia decreased greatly because (1) the Russian government established borders with the Baltic States, (2) the Russian government
created customs posts with the Baltic States, and (3) it became easier
to receive export licenses from the Russian government to sell products in countries outside the former Soviet republics than to sell in
the former Soviet republics. It has at last been understood by Russia
that going directly to the world market with their products eliminates the middle man, and higher profits can be had. In 1993, the
Baltic States’s participation in this type of business decreased to 5%
of the total amount of joint ventures.
The growth in the number of joint ventures has been very stable
in Ukraine, Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan. This will continue from 1995 to 1997, particularly in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan,
Kazakstan, and Belarus. Regulations in these states have stimulated
foreign investment much more effectively than in the other republics. Kyrgyzstan is the first of the former republics to permit foreigners to buy land, and the political situation there is more stable than
in the European part of Russia.
The number of joint ventures in Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
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and Georgia has been insubstantial until now, and will, in fact, decrease because of the civil war in Moldova, and the strife between
Azerbaijan and Armenia, and between Georgia and the Abkhaz Republic. Armenian business leaders living abroad tried to create joint
ventures in Armenia, but the war and energy shortage (almost a complete lack of energy) halted any joint-venture activity.
Now, in November 1994 in the former USSR, 28,000 joint ventures with foreign participation or wholly owned foreign companies
have been established, with 17,000 of these in Russia. Creating joint
ventures is more difficult (only 8% of efforts were successful from
1988 to 1992, and in 1993 only 17% of efforts were successful) than
reaching profitability (32%–35% of joint ventures, once created, are
profitable, which is much higher than the rate of companies that
reach profitability in the U.S.).
Industries
When Russian joint ventures began, the majority were concentrated
in a few industries.
Intermediaries
These joint ventures do what the state can’t. They buy raw materials
and industrial waste from Russia and sell it abroad. The first legal
Russian millionaires came from this business. Companies have
played a very serious role in this industry because they receive money
from foreign companies for disposing of industrial waste. Moreover,
Russian industrial waste can very valuable. For example, one U.S.
company extracted 60 pounds of gold from 10 tons of microelectronics scrap. In 1992, this type of joint-venture activity increased considerably. In 1993, 43% of all joint ventures attempted to play an
intermediary role as a part of their activities.
Software
Another very profitable area for joint ventures, especially between
1987 and 1991, has been software. All the giants, such as IBM, Mi-
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crosoft, and Lotus, came to Russia and created distribution companies. These companies utilized Russian engineers’ and scientists’
achievements. Software has been customized and translated for the
Russian market. In addition, joint-venture activity in the computer
industry, particularly with firms from the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and
South Korea, has increased substantially in Russia, focusing mainly
on final assembly of computers. The shortage of computers in Russia
created an interesting phenomenon regarding payment terms; Russian customers (state, private sector, and cooperatives) agreed to buy
computers for hard currency because the locally assembled computers utilized inexpensive Russian labor, and so were slightly cheaper
than imported computers. However, once the initial urgent need for
computers had been satisfied, computers and software were then
sold for rubles. In addition, the July 1992 introduction of the currency exchange market enabled the vendors to convert their ruble
earnings rather easily.

Heavy Industrial Production
There was a great increase in the number of joint ventures involved
in heavy industrial production, particularly in Russia, then in Kazakstan. In Russia, the majority of industrial joint ventures are connected
with the enrichment of natural resources from raw materials and
from industrial waste, and with the conversion of military plants.
Instead of building tanks in Saratov, they now build buses. Likewise,
facilities for building military electronics have been converted to TV
production, while facilities that produced precision equipment for
submarines now produce sewing machines.

Travel and Tourism
More and more joint ventures are appearing in the tourism and hotel
industry. Prior to 1991, most of this activity was in the European
part of Russia, the Baltic States, Ukraine, and even Georgia. Now,
northern Russia, Siberia, and the Russian Far East see a great deal of
activity.
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Research and Development
In 1992 and 1993, an explosion of growth in R&D occurred. Foreigners began to understand and take advantage of the great resources to
be found in Russian scientists’ and scholars’ achievements, inventions, and knowledge. The number of joint ventures in this area skyrocketed. Firms, like Bell Labs, are working with Russian scientists
to study space, electronics, optics, lasers, and nuclear energy. Some
of the joint ventures concentrate solely on the transfer of Russian
technology and patents.
Telecommunications
Telecommunications problems were a major barrier to the development and internationalization of Russian business. But because telecom is a very profitable business, because it is easy to develop this
business, and because many military communication systems have
been and continue to be converted to civilian use, telecommunications has become one of the most internationalized industries.
Others
There has been a significant growth in the development of the insurance, banking, accounting and auditing, and social services industries. For example, many large insurance companies are in the
process of creating joint ventures. AIG was the first; it created a joint
venture with the Russian military pension fund in October 1994.
Only 12 foreign banks, including Credit Lyonnais, Chase Manhattan, and Citibank, have been awarded domestic licenses to take deposits. The creation of joint ventures is just beginning in the health
industry. Construction is a very attractive industry, with heavy participation from Turkish, Finnish, Austrian, and Polish companies.
Size
At the same time, the number of joint ventures with capital of more
than $10 million has decreased, as more and more small businesses
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go to Russia. Because of the limitation on foreign insurance firms’
activities in Russia and in all other republics except Belarus and Kyrgyzstan, President Yeltsin signed a decree in February 1993 regarding
the creation of the State Investment Company. This company will
insure foreign investment in Russia from political risk. It seems to
me that this will increase the size of foreign investments in joint
ventures in Russia.

Countries
Currently, companies from two nations dominate Russian joint venture business, Germany and the U.S. The growth in the number of
German companies has been smooth and steady, while the U.S.
growth was spurred on in 1992 by the failure of the 1991 coup. But
Germany was strongly involved with investment in East Germany,
and with new opportunities given to Germany by the creation of the
European Union. As a result, the activity of Germany in Russia has
slowed somewhat. They continue to build joint ventures in Russia,
but the rate of growth has declined.
The failed coup attempt also gave U.S. firms more confidence that
democracy would reign, and the market would open now, and U.S.
capital became the leading investor in Russia. Italy has also been
very active in the European parts of Russia and in Ukraine. Great
Britain is a very strong player in Russia and Azerbaijan. But Americans and Europeans, because of new opportunities afforded by
NAFTA and the creation of the European Union, will face a shortage
of capital for investing in Russia.
When the joint-venture process first began, Japan was very involved, especially in the Russian Far East. The majority of Japanese
companies that came to the Russian market were oriented toward
working with their old government contacts and groups with which
they had had contracts. However, the Japanese suffered the same
setback as Occidental Petroleum, an American firm. Their approach
did not work because most of the old bureaucrats and bribe takers
had retired or lost power, something for which the Japanese were
unprepared. Then, the Japanese government started to link investment with political decisions regarding the Kurile Islands. This has
combined to substantially lower the influence of Japan and Japanese
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firms on joint venture activity in Russia. It was not a surprise when,
under this pressure, Yeltsin canceled his planned trip to Japan in
autumn 1992. Japan also recognizes now that it faces strong competition in Russia, and especially in the Russian Far East, from South
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and, beginning in 1993, from China. After
Yeltsin’s 1993 visit to China, a Russian–Chinese business relationship quickly developed. South Korea’s position in the Russian Far
East and in Kazakhstan, where many ethnically Korean people live,
is also quite strong. South Korean firms are building good relationships with the Korean community in Russia, using them as a source
of market knowledge and assistance. As a result, in 1993 Japanese
leaders revised their policy regarding Russia, and reduced the pressure over the Kurile Islands, resulting in new opportunities for Russian/Japanese business relations. This will enable Japanese to come
to the Kurile Islands, at least as joint-venture partners. The Kurile
Islands became a free economic zone, and I hope some Japanese
companies will have special privileges there.
An interesting process began in the Caucuses and in the Russian
Central Asian republics, where 50 million Muslims live. One could
say that the Muslim business connection grew very quickly. Companies from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates,
as well as from Turkey, are fiercely competing in this area. These
business relationships also have a political side, and it is clearly very
important for the world community to protect this region from
strong Islamic Fundamentalists’ influence. It is, therefore, important
to help companies who are in this region for economic reasons, not
because of political or religious agendas. From that point of view,
the Turkish government plays a very important role.

Role of Multilateral Institutions for Foreign Investors in
Russia
In 1992, an historic event occurred for Russia: it became a member
of the IMF and World Bank. This was important not only for monetary reasons, but also because it was a major indication of Russia’s
movement toward supporting civilized, modern international business and of Russia’s readiness to abide by international economic
and business conditions. The IMF and the World Bank were created
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in July 1944, according to an agreement signed at Bretton Woods,
New Hampshire. (Later, the International Finance Corporation and
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency were created.) For 50
years these institutions have been working to coordinate and create
cooperation between developed countries and emerging democracies. Of course, conditions are different than they were 50 years ago,
but these institutions continue their goal of helping to create a free,
market-based economy and a stable economic foundation in Third
World countries, developing countries, and post-communist countries. In 1944, the Soviet Union had the opportunity to become a
founding member of this organization, and Stalin sent his representatives to several meetings. But then he decided that these institutions were ‘‘too imperialist’’ for USSR participation, and for 48 years
the Soviet Union remained outside the circle of legal international
economic and financial institutions. But at the end of the Soviet
Union, Soviet and then Russian leaders found that the IMF and
World Bank were two of the major resources for additional out-ofpocket expense money, and they started to use these institutions. In
April 1992, leaders of the Western countries, especially Bush and
Kohl, initiated a proposal to provide $24 billion in aid. In July 1992,
the IMF met to make a decision whether to issue this money to
Russia. But the bureaucratic mechanisms of these institutions were
not much better than those of the communist bureaucracy, and so
as of November 1994, the money still has not been issued or delivered in full.
Of course, the major problem of these multilateral institutions is
their mechanisms. They are oriented toward working only with the
governments of countries, not with private companies and entrepreneurial institutions in recipient countries. As a result, money flows
to inexperienced governments who have very few people or no one
who understands a capitalist economy. It is like sending money
‘‘down a rat hole,’’ as I called my August 1992 Forbes article. Membership in the IMF and World Bank, however, delivered a lot of
advisers and new conditions to Russia, which had a tremendous influence on the activity of the government there. Especially important has been the IMF’s and the World Bank’s role in developing
an economic and business information system in Russia. They have
created a system for calculating economic indicators. Russians representatives and a Russian Executive Director were appointed to work
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with the agencies, in what was basically an educational experience.
Unfortunately, the IMF and the World Bank, especially during their
initial involvement from 1991 to 1993, had a long-standing, primitive understanding of the processes in Russia. As a result, their recommendations led to negative results along with the positive. One
dramatic example occurred in 1992. The inexperienced Mr. Gaidar
was appointed as Acting Prime Minister, and inexperienced IMF advisers gave him recommendations. At the urging of Gaidar, with his
ignorance of Russian business and economy, the Russian government made a decision to liberalize prices before demonopolization
of the economy, before conversion of the military industry to civilian
production, and before privatization. Immediately this policy led not
to the liberalization of prices, but to a dramatic increase in prices.
Prices for meat, milk, clothes, and all basic needs jumped sky-high.
People were no longer able to feed their own families on their salaries. Executives, including joint-venture executives, had to increase
salaries.
At this moment, IMF ‘‘experts’’ recommended that the Russian
treasury NOT print new ruble bills. As a result, they exacerbated the
situation. In addition to inflation, Russia was also hit by deflation.
Due to the IMF recommendations, banks simply didn’t have enough
currency. For many companies, salaries went unpaid for 6 to 8
months, leading to civilian disobedience. Companies issued billions
of rubles of IOUs instead of salaries to employees, and people lost
all incentive to work. Finally, the Gaidar government understood
that they had to print money, contrary to all the recommendations
of the IMF and World Bank. They started to put into circulation
new money each month, in amounts far exceeding what was already
in circulation. This had a very negative influence for foreign companies which went, or tried to go, to Russia.
This illustrates that not all recommendations pertinent to, for example, Latin America will also be pertinent to former Soviet-bloc
countries. Moreover, if a recommendation leads to good results in
Poland, one cannot assume it will work well in Russia. For example,
in Poland, the so-called ‘‘shock therapy’’ has produced results which
were bad, but not as bad as the results in Russia. Why? Because in
Poland, even in communist times, almost all agriculture, and almost
40% of the economy, were in private hands, unlike in the former
Soviet Union, where less than 4% of agriculture was in private hands.
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In general, in Poland all generations remember capitalism, because
communism was installed only 45 years ago. In Russia, communism
reigned for 74 years.
This is one of the examples of the dangerous activity of the IMF
and World Bank, because they go to each country with standard
methods and procedures, without an understanding of how to make
recommendations that are specific to the situation at hand. And
western advisers who have spent not even a year or two in Russia,
but perhaps only a few weeks on business trips, put in their own two
cents, which can be dangerous because their understanding of the
circumstances is likely to be insufficient. At this point, the situation
speaks for itself; it is necessary to change the mechanism of activity
of these multilateral institutions.
Time has shown that the world business community needs a new
mechanism to solve large-scale economic and business problems.
First, this mechanism must be much more flexible. Second, the time
between making political decisions and putting the decisions into
practice must be shorter. Third, the mechanism must be oriented
toward private capital and entrepreneurs, not toward governments.
The world is giving birth to many institutions that work for a time
and then die. Some of the organizations, especially regional groups,
are functioning well. But, a global institution is evolving—the regularly scheduled meeting of the leading seven industrial countries of
Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and, of course,
the United States. Of course, now the G-7 meeting is a great world
political event that commands the attention of mass media and warrants front-page headlines. In most cases, during the meetings the
G-7 leaders are making good political decisions, but not all of the
decisions are implemented. Economic decisions are usually made
without input from economists, and are not as sound. It would be
smart to evaluate the price of the politicians’ economic decisions.
Unfortunately, most think that they are just as qualified to make
economic decisions as to make decisions about soccer or football
games, where they also are not professional. But naturally, this attitude lays the ground for mistakes to be made, and is part of the
reason why decisions are not implemented. At the same time, the
world may be fortunate that the decisions are not implemented.
How might the G-7 meetings be made into a workable global institution? These meetings of the greatest powers in the world have
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tremendous potential. It is necessary to convert these meetings to a
real institution and create a mechanism for implementing the resulting decisions. The leaders allocate money, but it is usually not delivered to the intended recipient countries. Why? Because the meeting
is a good forum for political decisions, but not for economic decisions. By developing the G-7 meetings into an institution, the resulting decisions will benefit from economic input and implementation
will be improved. Just as an army has a strategic branch and an operational branch, I could say the difference between institutions with
50 years of experience, like the IMF and World Bank, and the new
institutions will be their time frame. G-7, as an institution, should
be oriented toward short-term goals. But, G-7 will try to protect its
strategic role, and so the answer to the dilemma of an appropriate
mechanism for implementing strategic decisions is simple and already exists; the traditional Bretton Woods institutions.
Many plans to attack global problems must now be implemented
on a regional level. Several new regional institutions have appeared,
such as EBRD, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. I remember my participation in the initial steps, when the
Soviet Union, in 1989 and early 1990, participated in negotiations
with other leading countries to create this institution. Initially, the
Soviet leaders tried to create just one more source of loans. But, then
some Party bureaucrats understood that in order to play an important role in this bank, and not just act as a country with its hand out,
it was necessary to invest amounts comparable to what other leading
countries were investing. And, they finally did it. As a result, EBRD
became one of the first institutions where the former Soviet Union,
and now Russia, plays a role not only as a recipient, but also as a
decision maker. Unfortunately, this institution did not properly
focus its activity. As a result, EBRD is not terribly visible in postCommunist countries. In addition, the fact that they are also active
in Asia, which is certainly not part of Europe, is a mistake not only
of a geographic nature. Multilateral institutions, global and regional,
do not give any special attention to the Central Asian republics, and
so a very dangerous situation has evolved—because countries like
Iran and Iraq do give these republics special attention. As a result,
through business activities, the political influence of Iran and Iraq
has increased in this part of the world. It seems it is necessary to
create a Central Asian institution to work with these republics, and
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perhaps also to work with the southern part of Siberia and the Russian Far East. Now, for the first time in history, Central Asia comprises established, independent countries. They do not yet play a
geopolitical role, nor are they yet a major target of the world business
community, but both will happen within the next ten years. In addition, large multinational corporations are not wasting time. They are
already investing in activities in this part of the world.
Another very important point for business people is to understand
that multilateral institutions—even the World Bank, in spite of its
name—are not world institutions,. Many countries, even with formal
participation in this institution, are not recipients of funding. For
example, of the Eastern European countries, Poland has the best
connections with the multilateral institutions, followed by perhaps
Hungary and Romania. But Bulgaria definitely lies outside the vista
of these agencies. To them, Bulgaria is like a forgotten land in Central Europe. As a result, international business is only very slowly
focusing on this country. And, business people have not yet benefited from this country, which offers a relatively stable political environment and significant opportunities for business. Of course, it is
possible to find reasons for this: that they did not have lobbyists
(which are very important), or that they had to pay more attention
to settling debt with the Paris and London Clubs. But these are not
the reasons. The main reason Bulgaria has been all but forgotten is
that the Bretton Woods Institution does not have a sound strategy.
If we are to speak about the immediate future, an ironic picture
could take shape. One or two of the biggest beggars and recipients,
Russia and China, will also be key players among country donors.
The G-7 could soon be G-8 or even G-9, with Russia and China as
participants. In the Paris Club, Russia will be a full member, in spite
of Russian debt. This new reality has to be in the forefront of the
minds of business leaders. It is very important to understand that
any political decision made by the G-7 is not like news of a football
game, but can provide an opportunity to earn money.

Conclusion
Foreigners have gained experience. More and more information is
available to the world regarding this market, from newspapers, news-
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letters, and magazines that sprout like mushrooms after the spring
rains. Regulations in the former USSR are developing more and
more quickly. The limits put on foreigners are diminishing. Foreign
business people have become the darlings of the Russian, Kazakstan,
and Kyrgyzstan business communities.
The form of joint ventures has changed from simple incorporated
firms to firms that are privately and publicly held by shareholders. In
1993–94, the process of transforming joint ventures to wholly owned
subsidiaries of foreign firms began. Also, 1993–94 saw the flight of
mining companies to Siberia and the Russian Far East to mine nonferrous and precious metals, oil, and gas. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan,
Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan have many small foreign businesses
investing in the food processing and services industry, as it becomes
easier to convert rubles to hard currency.
The failure of the coup in 1991 and the formal disbanding of the
Communist Party also played a catalytic role in the future of foreign
investment and especially regarding American joint ventures. Americans believed that the political risk in Russia was now lower than
before. Between 1992 and 1994, there was a marked increase in the
creation of American joint ventures, with America having invested
more than any other country. In terms of capital invested, Germany
tied with the U.S. By the end of 1994, the number of American joint
ventures or wholly owned American companies in the former Soviet
Union will exceed 4,000.
There are many misconceptions about foreign investment in Russia. One of them is that while all joint ventures are registered entities
on paper, none of them are actually in operation. This is a fallacy.
While both exports and imports were fairly low and consistent
(below $1,000,000) through 1992, both skyrocketed thereafter. By
June 1993, imports had jumped to nearly six billion, while exports
increased nearly three times to three billion.
One may wonder how it is possible that imports of joint ventures
are three times higher than exports. Where are they getting the hard
currency to make this possible? The answer is that executives of joint
ventures are afraid to take money from their exports and put it in
Russian banks because of prior negative experiences (for example,
when Vnesheconombank froze accounts in 1991–92).
Money for imports is generally held by the joint venture in foreign
banks abroad. As a result, officially, import is higher than export.
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According to my estimate, Russian joint ventures have approximately $8 billion in foreign banks abroad.
The period of 1994–95 will also be a time for transportation firms
and telecom giants like US West, AT&T, Cable and Wireless, MCI,
Sprint, Alcatel and Italtel, to create a new infrastructure and business environment, enabling the next phase of internationalization of
business in the former Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union is dead, and in its place are newly emerging
markets which have just started to be really open for foreign investment. Competition in these markets is a new occurrence. One form
of a successful firm is a joint venture which is properly prepared and
whose operations management is appropriate to the conditions in
this new business world.

‘‘TO CAPITAL MARKETS, WITH
LOVE,’’ SAYS RUSSIA
With a carrying cost of roughly 65% on the latest auction of its outstanding government debt, Russia is keen on opening its government
bond markets to the world’s yield-hungry investors. Up to now, the
country’s treasury bill market has been dominated by Russian banks.
However, one of the steps necessary to attract investors made wary
by past sins (i.e., revoking the visa of an outspoken American investor) is restructuring past-due Soviet-era notes into more liquid
bonds, which the government managed to do this summer.

Bank Reform Equals Open Markets
It’s a given that the Russian government needs to increase the flow
of foreign capital. ‘‘Russia needs more portfolio and direct investment,’’ explains Dr. Vladimir Kvint, director of emerging markets at
Arthur Andersen Economics in New York City, ‘‘since it is falling
behind other emerging markets.’’
In order to attract foreign investment, Russia announced it will
open its capital markets on August 15, by ending the near-exclusive
access that Russian banks have had to the country’s high-yielding
government bonds and bills. Until now, foreigners have been officially able to buy Russian T-bills only on the secondary market, from
Russian banks acting as primary dealers. With yields of 65% at auction (down from a peak of 125% prior to the elections) and a mandated cap on the maximum interest rate paid to foreigners of only
25%, the franchise is a money-spinner for the teetering banking
system.
The first step was allowing non-nationals to purchase up to 10%
of a Russian bond issue earlier this year, enabling the Central Bank
to bring in $2 billion over a three-month time span. Those issues
featured a special capping of currency risks and maximum yields.
Financial Trader, 3, No. 6 (1996), 16.
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The newly available T-bills will continue to carry a currency hedge,
to protect against ruble devaluations, and thus will offer a current
19% annualized yield, whereas domestic investors still get up to an
80% yield. In addition, Russia’s central bank has moved to stop ‘‘back
door’’ access to the market by foreigners, insisting they now use the
rather narrow ‘‘front door.’’
The ultimate goal may be to reduce Russia’s overall interest costs
to as low as 2.5% over the inflation rate, which is expected to drop
to 25% on an annualized basis by the end of this year. Kvint predicts,
‘‘since foreign investments into Russia fell by 20% this year, we could
see a further opening of the debt market in the coming months.’’

‘‘Not-Quite’’ Brady Bonds
In order to convince global investors that the country is serious about
its financial health, Russia worked with the London Club of Creditors, a loose conglomeration of around 600 banks holding debt from
Vnesheconombank, to restructure past-due notes. This state-owned
bank, the only entity allowed to trade with the outside world during
communist rule, agreed to restructure into bonds $25.5 billion in
principal and $7 billion in interest arrears. On July 1, those bonds
started trading on a ‘‘when and if issued’’ basis.
There were reports that the bonds were recast under the Brady
program, but there is no forgiveness included in the deal, as is often
the case under a Brady restructuring for countries overwhelmed with
debt. Rather, the principal will have a 25-year payback period and
interest arrears will be paid within 20 years, and both instruments
carry a seven-year grace period. In the mean time, interest will be
paid at Libor plus 13/16. As a down payment on back interest, the
Russians have paid $1.38 billion out of a promised $2 billion.
New bonds will be issued to creditor banks this December, at
which time those banks will be able to sell off the bonds for more
money than they could hope for from the illiquid notes. The London
Club of Creditors is similar in concept to the Paris Club, but made
up of private banks instead of governmental and quasi-governmental
entities.

RUSSIA IS LOSING THE BATTLE
FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Although the present worldwide shortage of capital diminishes the
interest of Western investors in Russia, in the future, this country is
seen as an emerging capitalist market.
A year or two ago, Russia was placed high on investors’ priority
lists. The government established the foundations of main capitalist
institutions; however Russian bureaucracy strictly regimented their
rights. The old control mechanisms of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party and of the Control Commission vanished
without any effective replacement, thus allowing rampant corruption
and crime to emerge.
Russian government must realize that the competition for capital
among emerging markets is extremely intense. Many economic indicators, including those released by the World Bank, suggest that Russia should be considered a developing country. Arthur Andersen
takes a practical approach to the Russian market by emphasizing
the importance of capitalist institutions. Today, various insurance
companies, private banks, all of the Big Six accounting firms, and
many large law firms have representatives in Russia. Furthermore,
this country is currently going through a telecommunications revolution overlooked by most analysts. All these factors force us to consider Russia as an emerging market comparable to that of Latin
America, South Africa, or China. According to different sources,
there are 34 to 40 emerging markets in the world today. Most of
them are characterized by stable political structure and active capitalist institutions which allow them to attract significant foreign investment. Last year U.S. exports to Mexico were approximately $47.6
billion, to Taiwan, $19.6 billion, and to China, $12 billion. Direct
U.S. investment to China is projected to amount to $250 billion over
the next five years.
Russia, on the other hand, is not properly utilizing the existing
capitalist institutions. Moreover, the Russian government, influITAR-TASS-Business World (Moscow), August 2, 1995, pp. 1–2.
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enced by domestic lobbyists involved in a continuous power struggle,
makes inconsistent and rushed decisions impeding this country’s affinity for capital investment. The privatization process is a good example of very poor decision making. In all civilized countries,
companies are privatized based on their fair market values. The Russian president, on the other hand, issued a decree commanding privatization in Moscow to be based on companies’ book values, thus
leading to significantly understated enterprise valuations. Today, approximately 75% of the state property has been sold at these deflated
prices, creating a criminal business climate where the best properties
are given away for bribes.
Another example of this disadvantageous action undertaken by
Russia is the recent presidential decision to limit activities of foreign
law firms in the country. It would be hard to think of a more counterproductive move. Many Western companies terminated their activities in Russia because they were unable to continue working with
their trusted legal advisers. Even Baker & McKenzie, the largest international law firm operating in Russia, has to struggle with bureaucratic setbacks.
Russia is making a big mistake in yielding to lobbyists calling for
restrictions on operations of Western insurance companies. According to the current regulations issued by the illiterate cabinet of Mr.
Gaidar in 1992, foreign insurance companies cannot own more than
49% of their Russian subsidiaries—a move leading to a protected
monopoly of domestic insurance companies.
Starting in 1988, the government began the laborious process of
establishing free economic zones to create additional incentives for
foreign investment. Of the twenty such zones planned, only two—in
Kaliningrad and Nahodka—came into reality. The U.S., which has
never suffered from a lack of investment capital, has 129 various free
trade, technological, and economic zones. These were created by
state governments to bolster regional development. Arthur Andersen
has been using its credibility in the business world to encourage several Western companies to set up operations within Russian free
economic zones. However, the recent presidential decree abolished
all tax advantages and privileges of joint ventures operating in these
special zones, thus effectively eliminating the special judicial status
of free economic zones altogether.
As an enthusiastic promoter of investment in Russia who has been
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able to steer several large corporations toward the Russian market,
what should I tell my clients now? How can the investment community trust a cabinet made of uneducated politicians that is easily
swayed by lobbyists? How can Russia hope to attract capital under
these circumstances? Last year’s temporary increase in capital inflow
has promptly disappeared because of political and economic instabilities. One of the sources of this unreliability lies in the Chechen
conflict, which I approve in principal since I believe that Russia
should preserve its unity. The entire situation was poorly handled by
the government, allowing a small discord to escalate into a civil war
that has tarnished Russia’s world image. Once again, the main problem in Russia is the fact that many of the country’s economic and
military decisions are made by uneducated people.
Another problem is that many Russian politicians follow primitive
recommendations of Western consultants who do not have a thorough understanding of the local market. People like Jeffrey Sachs
rushed to offer free advice, creating a name for themselves at the
expense of Russia’s stability. He advised Gaidar’s government to liberalize prices before privatizing the economy. These unacceptable
recommendations, including the World Bank’s suggestion of stopping government subsidies for agriculture and heavy industry, are
continuing to be made. The Russian government should turn to the
economic history of other countries instead of blindly following such
recommendations. As an example of effective decision making, after
the Second World War, Japan and Germany supported industrial
development through state subsidies. Likewise, I am a strong advocate of Mr. Chernomyrdin’s stance on this issue and believe that
terminating state aid at this time would entail catastrophic consequences. Instead of covertly taking partial steps, the government
should publicly accept the need to support heavy industry and agriculture as well as redirect its investment initiatives from retail and
social infrastructure to these key economic areas.
To obtain the multi-billion-dollar investments it needs, Russia
must first create incentives for foreign companies. Instead of forcing
cooperation in insurance and legal services, where collaboration is
an inevitable economic necessity, the government must encourage
cooperation between domestic and foreign businesses in industry
and agriculture.

DESPITE ROUGH WATERS,
MARKET ECONOMY CRUISES
AHEAD: OPPORTUNITIES
ABOUND IN NIS FOR INTREPID
INVESTORS
Recent political events in Moscow and their coverage in the media
have been misleading about the situation in Russia. The battles of
October have had no real impact on the development of a free market economy. As practically all Russian leaders (except a few stupid
Fascists) understand, without the cooperation of the West it will be
impossible to revive Russia and the other countries of the Newly
Independent States (NIS). Even the recently dissolved Russian parliament was not opposed to foreign investment; rather, it was, in
its own time and manner, enacting legislation necessary to create
a favorable business environment insulated from changing political
winds.
While the media devoted its attention to the political fighting, it
completely forgot about Russia’s far more serious economic crisis.
The crisis began not after the 1991 coup, not even during Gorbachev’s time, but actually around 1969–70. Back then, the annual
growth rate of the USSR’s GNP was 7.5%. When Gorbachev came
to power in 1985, annual GNP growth had dropped to 3.5%. In 1991
when he left office, it was down to negative 2%. It seems to me that
the newly independent Russian government mistakenly ‘‘liberalized’’
prices before decentralization, demonopolization, and privatization
could take hold. This increased prices, pushing 85% of the Russian
people below the poverty line and perpetuating an inflationary environment.
As a result, during 1992 the rate of industrial output in Russia
decreased by more than 24%. Even more dangerous, food production
has decreased to 1988 levels, and meat production has decreased by
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 2 (November 1993).
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60%. This situation continues in 1993; the decrease in industrial output will be about 15%–17% for this year. However, the process of
economic stabilization will begin in 1994, when the decrease in industrial output will drop to 10%–12%.
How does this economic situation impact the interests of foreign
investors? Make no mistake: as the necessary business infrastructure
is rapidly created, sizable profits and plentiful growth can be
achieved by joint ventures and foreign investments that capitalize
on the current economic situation; this, in turn, will help build a free
market economy. The level of profitability can be quite high once
joint ventures are created—between 35% and 38%—which is higher
than that of businesses in Manhattan or Zurich. But the path is filled
with land mines, and one must have a good guide.

All You Need Is Parts
For example, about 20% of all industrial companies and 35% of all
infrastructure companies in Russia are not profitable. Many, however, once were profitable and could be so again. These firms desperately need components that Russia doesn’t produce, particularly
those used in light industry. Most got into trouble because the fall of
the centralized Soviet Union destroyed all their internal (and often,
ineffective) connections with suppliers from other former Soviet republics. New market connections are just beginning to develop.
Small investments into these companies’ unfinished products can
provide the basis for very profitable businesses. The products of
these joint ventures will be competitive in terms of quality and price
due to a cheaper, educated labor force, inexpensive natural resources, very inexpensive energy for intra-Russian use, and inexpensive production and office facilities A similar situation is also found
in other NIS markets.

Catalysts of Foreign Investment
The pace of investment has been slow in virtually all countries of the
NIS, but some regions have created special programs to attract for-
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eign investment. Thirteen free economic zones (FEZs) have been
established in Russia, and one each in Ukraine and Belarus.
Not all regions present the same political risks for investment. For
example, Azerbaijan and Georgia have quite favorable regulations
regarding foreign investment, but I would not recommend investing
in these regions at this time. Georgia is practically in a state of civil
war, while more than 20% of the former Azerbaijan is under control
of Armenian forces.
Hard currency in private hands totals $13–$15 billion; NIS governments hold about $38–$45 billion, most of which they are spending
on emergency needs such as food, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and
some military industries.

Prices Rise, Along with Dollar’s Value
The price of consumer goods and food continues to rise faster than
the rate of inflation. I forecast that the rate of growth of the price of
consumer goods will stabilize at around 8%–10% per month during
the next 12 months, and then drop to about 5% per month. Prices
for the same products also vary in different areas by as much as 150
times. For example, flour in the Kamchatka region of Russia costs
150 rubles/kg., while in Chechen republic it costs only 12 rubles/kg.
In the Tyumen oil region, sugar costs 720 rubles/kg., while in the
Orel region, sugar costs 160 rubles/kg. The price of chicken has risen
by about 30% per month, and in some regions such as eastern Siberia
and near the Volga River, by more than 200% per month.
Yeltsin’s October decision to liberalize the price of bread will again
broaden these regional differences, as well as seriously increase both
inflation and the cost of transportation.
The NIS is practically the only market in the world where the
strength of the dollar is steadily increasing. In June 1992, US $1 ⳱
128 rubles. By August 23, 1993, US $1 ⳱ 987.5 rubles, and I predict
it will rise to US $1 ⳱ 1,300 rubles by the end of 1993. While the
purchasing power of the ruble slowly declines, the value of a roll of
dollar bills will significantly increase, making the NIS a very good
market for U.S. investment. Companies with foreign capital participation will become more and more successful.
Finally, some analysts have concluded that Yeltsin’s September
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decree, which seriously limited the circulation of dollars in Russia,
will make doing business more difficult. My opinion is different. Now
foreigners can officially operate with both dollars and rubles. (See
The Kvint Newsletter, October 1993, p. 3). This law may limit the
activity of Russian companies, but not foreign companies in Russia.
Unfortunately, the black market for money will once again work well.

KVINT’S FORECAST:
BEYOND THE POLITICAL FOG,
THE BUSINESS HORIZON LOOKS
CLEAR
What has happened in the former Soviet Union in the past three
years has no analogy in history. The world’s biggest and last empire
has collapsed. When I wrote in The New York Times on October 28,
1990, that by 1992 there would no longer be a Soviet Union, very
few people shared this idea. Now it is an historical fact.
Sometimes, the business community acts as if the collapse occurred a decade ago; in fact, it was not even two years ago. Now,
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and other former Soviet republics hold
the attention of the world’s investors and traders. Of course, politicians still keep the score in these countries. And the creation of a
democratic government and market economy is a long, arduous
process with ups and downs. But no serious person is arguing about
the direction of change—only about the velocity and methods. Considering how far we have yet to go, the business climate is robust.
In Russia alone, there are about 3,300 private banks, thousands of
brokerage and trading houses, one stock exchange, and approximately 480 commodity exchanges which are already operational. To
date, some 11,580 joint ventures have been formed. I estimate that
more than 25% of the Russian economy has been privatized, because
freedom is working.
As a result, market-oriented leaders and foreign entrepreneurs are
now forging ahead, despite the many difficulties and restrictions of
Russian law. The legal codes of the Newly Independent States (NIS)
are being legislated from scratch, while the people are desperate for
a greatly improved economic outlook. Here are some notes on legislation and other developments that will impact foreign trade with the
NIS.
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 1 (October 1993).
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First in Russia
When the Russian parliament reconvenes in December, there will
be lots to do. And President Yeltsin will be eager to push through
many of his laws to enhance the foreign investment environment.
Among the first will be the Law on Investment in Equity and Debt
Securities, which will regulate all securities including bonds and
notes. Another is the Law on Free Economic Zones. In 1989–90, I
participated in the process to create the first free economic zones,
regions that offer business privileges such as tax holidays. (The government is only now getting around to legislating their existence!)
Also expected is a decree from President Yeltsin on the liberalization
of foreign investors’ activity in the Russian marketplace.
Upcoming decrees of the Government will include:
• Decision on the state investment program for 1993 (the year is almost finished, but the decision has not yet been made);
• Decree on stimulation of foreign investments in priority industries
of the national economy, i.e., food processing, pharmaceuticals, and
waste processing; and
• Decree on either abolishing or decreasing export quotas, and also
decreasing the Russian Federation Government’s regulation of export.

Outlook on Ruble Exchange Rate
During the summer and prior to the political fights of late September, the exchange rate between the ruble and the U.S. dollar had
been stable at 985–1,080 rubles to the U.S. dollar, higher than it was
last spring, when it fell to 1,200 rubles to the U.S. dollar. This was
the result of hard currency interventions at the Russian currency
auctions in Moscow, as well as artificial measures to keep the ruble
high and encourage spending. The State Bank sold almost $4 billion
in hard currency at these auctions in 1993. With the recent dissolution of the Russian parliament, the ruble rose above 1,250, a high it
last held in March 1993. The political situation vis-à-vis the lack of
a straight economic course will devalue the ruble to 1,700 or more
by the end of this year, and especially in the first quarter of 1994.
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Foreigners Receive the Right to Open Ruble Accounts
For the first time since 1917, foreigners have been granted the right
to open ruble bank accounts in Russia. These accounts will be of two
types:
• Account T, for import-export; and
• Account E, for participation of foreign investors in privatization,
and also, I expect, for currency speculations.

These accounts will enable foreigners who are trading for rubles in
Russia to repatriate their profits abroad in hard currency. This would
eliminate the need for intermediate steps such as barter or hard currency auctions.
I would like to recommend that interested parties open these accounts immediately. Later, it is very possible that there will be a
limit on the number of Accounts E that can be opened. There is
already a limit of one Account E per foreigner.

Eastern European Trade with Russia
Trade between Russia and the former Soviet bloc of Eastern European countries decreased from $31 billion in 1990 to $12 billion in
1992. The drop is the result of the shift in trade from direct product
exchange to the use of hard currency as the only means of payment.
Formerly, Soviet-bloc countries and Russia would trade buses for oil,
for example, without involving any exchange of hard currency.
The lack of hard currency has halted production in many companies whose products were once competitive on the world market.
One might conclude that small investments in such companies
would give them the boost in production necessary for them to sell
again on the world market (and at low prices because of the lower
costs of their production).
For example, from 1991 to 1993, the high-quality Hungarian bus
plant Icarus decreased its production from 14,000 buses per year to
3,500. It could present a promising joint-venture opportunity for the
right company.
Also, New York City–based Standard Trade and Investment Co.
has signed an agreement with the Russian state-owned foreign trade
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company Vneshintorg, establishing a mutually exclusive and reciprocal purchasing and sales relationship. The companies agreed to represent each other in North and South America, and in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS is the Newly Independent States plus the Baltics), respectively.

Part II
THE TOP EMERGING
MARKETS OF EUROPE,
CENTRAL ASIA, AND LATIN
AMERICA

WE FORGIVE YOU
A solution to poverty and unemployment in
emerging market countries.
The movement of foreign capital to emerging markets is usually as
relentless as the eastward flow of the mighty, murky Danube. Capital
seems inevitably attracted to the lower expense bases of developing
countries, with their weaker regulatory regimes, tireless work forces,
and six-day work weeks. And investment flows usually mean gradually rising levels of net wealth, health, and education for the target
markets.
Paradoxically, though, one category of emerging markets finds itself consistently capital-poor—and getting poorer. These are the
emerging markets where corruption and xenophobia rule—such as
Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. Foreign investment rarely
occurs here, and when it does, employment increases in the short
term, but poverty and unemployment remain intractably high, and
the country remains capital-poor. Successful domestic entrepreneurs, who would normally be inclined to invest locally, usually move
their assets rapidly to banking havens abroad and are loath to return
capital to the country for fear of punitive or unpredictable tax regimes.
Bulgaria illustrates the paradox. Its population has, during the last
nine years, declined more dramatically than that of any other nation
on earth. In addition, the birth rate—7.7 live births per 1,000 people—is the lowest in the world. A country that once boasted a vast
Black Sea tourism business now finds it harder to raise foreign capital
than Egypt, Colombia, and Sri Lanka, according to a recently released ranking done by the World Bank. Based on my research as a
Fulbright scholar, I concluded that Bulgarians have transferred some
$7 billion in flight capital—or ‘‘fright capital’’—out of the country
in the last 13 years. The story unfolds in the same way throughout
the region. Albanians have taken a minimum of $3 billion out of
Forbes Global (July 21, 2003).
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their country. The International Monetary Fund estimates that
about $170 billion has left Russia out of domestic bank accounts.
The West cannot afford to ignore the plague of protracted unemployment in these countries. First, these countries, which should be
rich new export markets for multinationals, have become crippled
bazaars of market failure and corruption. About two-thirds of Russia’s 150 million people live on less than $2 per day. Ukrainians,
Belarussians, Albanians, and Moldovans get by on about $2.25 per
day. This is the reality unfolding not only in Eastern Europe, but
also in parts of Asia and South America. More pernicious is the fastgrowing resentment of people in these countries toward the West
(the U.S. primarily), driving them to support dictatorial, anti-freemarket regimes such as those of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez and Belarus’s Alexander Lukashenko.
In North Africa, Indonesia, and the Philippines there appears to
be a close link between economic disenfranchisement of the majority
of the population and the increasing appeal of Islamic terror groups.
There is an obvious link between a pervasive sense of economic
hopelessness and whipped-up ethnic hatred, as evidenced in BosniaHerzegovina, the Philippines, and Indonesia, particularly among unemployed young men.
Currently there is a dearth of foreign capital to reverse the fortunes of these emerging market countries. Today’s geopolitical climate, coupled with the anemic recovery in the U.S. and Western
Europe, make it unlikely the solution will come from foreign investors. Even when the West emerges from its economic malaise, there
is no reason to think that there will be enough foreign capital to
mitigate the massive unemployment even in the poorer European
regions, much less in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Instead, these countries should move forward with a plan that
would encourage people to return their capital and reinvest locally.
A capital-amnesty program, a step further than a traditional tax-amnesty strategy, is the only realistic approach to strengthening these
economies with the capital they need to reverse their own fortunes.
Under such an amnesty program a government agrees not to launch
any criminal probes into anyone who returns capital to the country.
The taxpayer is exempt from late-payment penalties or fines for having sheltered income by moving cash out of the country. Funds returned to domestic bank accounts should be subject to tax at a
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nominal rate—in the range of 5 percent—to make up for the fact
that these fortunes were made tax-free and to provide the government with money to sponsor microcredit programs designed to nurture family-owned and small business ventures in the less prosperous
regions of the country.
The International Monetary Fund needs to play a role in bringing
about amnesty programs, but it has discouraged governments from
adopting such proposals. There should be an established legal framework to allow the tax-efficient repatriation of profits.
The amnesty concept has yielded positive results in a number of
countries struggling to locate capital for investment. In recent years
Italy, Turkey, and Kazakhstan implemented such programs with considerable success. More than $1 billion in capital returned to Kazakhstan. In February 2002 Italy secured approval for such a program
from the European Union, and, following the measure, saw $63 billion flow back into its domestic accounts. Given the success Italy had
with its program, the administration of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
is lobbying for a similar program in Germany. Turkey launched a
similar program in June 2002. Capital-amnesty legislation is pending
in the Russian and Ukrainian parliaments.
Such measures would also encourage native talent to engage in
more entrepreneurial activity. Such a program would have to grant
amnesty to people from the threat of tax penalties and potential
criminal investigations into the sources of their holdings. Opponents
of this idea dismiss it as a moral hazard that in some cases could
reward people for ill-gotten gains. But is it moral to keep hundreds
of millions of people poor and unemployed? In the end it does more
harm to rob the majority of the population of hope for a better life
than it does to ferret out the few wealthy people who made their
money illegally.
What makes the most sense is for governments to agree on a reasonable, practically minimal tax rate on the money that returns
home, no greater than, say, 8 percent. Government officials should
then use this capital to sponsor microcredit programs targeted
toward funding small businesses in rural areas and smaller towns.
The idea is that these firms would employ dozens of people, not
hundreds, mimicking the success of small business development in
the U.S. and Western Europe, where 52 percent and 72 percent,
respectively, of the people work for firms of fewer than 100 people.

EUROPE’S SIX TOP EMERGING
MARKETS
Overview
In the early 1990s, the global business world changed entirely, due
to the ascendancy of the emerging market countries. In comparison
with the previous decade, emerging market nations as a group increased in land mass, population, and industrial production. Due to
a complete lack of local capital and investment, these developing
nations needed foreign assistance, although they still tried to maintain some elements of centrally planned, inefficient economic structures. They soon realized that they needed to attract foreign
investment by reforming market policies. The processes of privatization, demonopolization, and demilitarization of the economies of
these states in transition and countries with dictatorships caught
the attention of the global investment community. Nevertheless, the
shortage of investment in the world business community still restrains the desired growth and development that would elevate these
countries to developed nation status. Today, by our estimates, there
are 69 countries that qualify for emerging market status. Among
these, certain European countries are playing vital roles. Portugal,
Greece, Turkey, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland are
among the economic pacesetters of the emerging market world.
They are ahead of other emerging markets in terms of their development of capitalist institutions and capital markets, as well as their
level of cooperation with developed nations.
These six countries have many similarities. They all have membership in the European Union (at least as an associate member), have
constitutionally elected presidents or prime ministers and parliaments, maintain positive relationships with their neighbors (excluding Turkish and Greek tensions), boast nuclear-free status, and have
special regulations prohibiting the expropriation of property, includBusiness Briefing—Emerging Market Investments, London, World Markets Research Center, July 23, 1996, pp. 34–38.
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ing foreign capital. In terms of exchange rate regimes, Turkey,
Greece, and Portugal allow their national currencies to float on world
markets. The remaining three nations offer only limited convertibility, but the Czech currency could be convertible within one year.
Political risk varies among the six nations. Turkey poses the greatest risk to potential foreign investors, as the political arena is the
most unstable. No one party has a substantial majority; hence, a
coalition government is required. There are ethnic problems present
as well, and all these factors discourage foreign investors. Within the
former Soviet-bloc satellite countries, the communists have returned
to power through democratic elections. Although these new governments have distanced themselves from the former rulers and claim
to be social democrats of the new order, nationalization of industries
and a protectionist environment is not completely unimaginable.
Economic risk in these countries can be gauged by membership
in international lending institutions, the nature of their respective
relationships with the Paris and London Clubs, the amount of total
foreign debt outstanding, and the ratio of foreign debt to GDP. The
six nations under discussion are all members of the WTO (the successor to GATT), IMF, World Bank Group institutions, and EBRD,
among other institutions. In December 1995, the Czech Republic
became the first former Soviet-bloc country to become a member of
the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), followed by Hungary in spring 1996. Poland was formally
asked to join the OECD in July 1996, and must ratify the accession
treaty this fall. Overall, the group enjoys good relations with the Paris
and London Clubs and offers encouraging signs to bankers. One
such sign is the Czech Republic’s recent payment in full of its IMF
loan, ahead of schedule. As of 1994, foreign debt to GDP ratios
among the six ranged from 19% (Portugal) to 55% (Poland), which
indicates that the six nations’ economic expansion is funded, to a
significant degree, by foreign debt. When compared to developed
nations such as the United Kingdom, whose foreign debt to GDP
ratio is only 2%, it would appear that these six nations must make
considerable improvements to reduce their reliance on foreign capital.
In five of the six nations, foreign investors may freely repatriate
capital, with no restrictions. Turkey is the lone exception, with some
minor restrictions. Poland is the only country of the six that does
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not allow free remittance of dividends and profits. Some restrictions
on foreign direct investment (FDI) appear in all but two of these
nations, Portugal and Greece. For instance, Turkey mandates that
nonresident investors bring at least $50,000 per person into the
country, and Hungary retains majority control of the energy sector
and outright control of the aluminum, automobile, and pharmaceutical industries. In Poland, agricultural tariffs still exist. As countries
apply to and pursue membership in the EU and OECD, most quotas
fall to EU levels. Lower tariffs and the elimination of quotas within
the EU can be considered positive signs for these economies, and
they are poised to continue in this vein.
Foreign direct investment is crucial to the future success of these
nations. Hungary’s FDI cash flows have steadily increased over the
past two years, by 24% in 1995, and by 27% in 1994. Hungary had
nearly $6.9 billion in total inflows last year alone, and has become
the darling of the international investment community. The other
five, while not replicating the dramatic performance of Hungary, are
also attracting investment. However, Turkey and Greece suffered a
net decrease in FDI earlier in 1996, which could have resulted from
the substantially heightened tensions between the two neighbors.
But, both nations realize that this hostility discourages foreign investors, and have begun to back away from their previous threats. The
three former Soviet-bloc nations, at close inspection, have too many
restrictions on foreign capital, which puts them at a disadvantage
when compared to the South American and Asian emerging markets.
Of the other three countries, Turkey, Greece, and Portugal, Turkey
has the most restrictive policies on foreign capital investment.
Portugal does not offer any special economic development zones,
but the other five nations all have various types of free trade or free
economic zones which offer grants, tax allowances, and other financial incentives.

Turkey
Because of geographical considerations, Turkey plays an important
role in the surrounding region. If one includes the Asian portion of
the country, Turkey ranks as the largest country in Europe (except,
of course, for the European part of Russia). It has strong Western
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ties, which have been solidified with the completion of the Ankara
Agreement with the European Union earlier this year. Its proximity
to Central Asia (including the republics of Kazakstan, Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) and the Caucasus region
(Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) ensures that the nation will play
a significant role in the development of the Newly Independent
States.
Turkey’s importance soared after the Soviet Union collapsed, for a
number of reasons. Most significant is the issue of religion. Turkey
has been a secular state dominated by Muslim traditions since its
inception in 1923. The rise of the Islamic political party Refah and
its recent dominance in national elections raised concerns about the
direction of the nation, but these fears have not been realized. Refah
has toned down much of its leftist, pro-Islamic platform and seeks
to govern in a legitimate, moderate coalition.
The significance of Islam cannot be overstated. There are autonomous republics such as Tatarstan, Daghestan, and Bashkortostan
within Russia, and former Soviet republics in the Caucasus region
and Central Asia with predominantly Muslim populations. There are
also Muslim populations living inside Ukraine on the Crimea Peninsula.
Nascent economies have begun to search for a suitable model on
which to base their respective market economies and international
relationships. One possible model is offered by Iran, an Islamic fundamentalist nation that espouses anti-Western rhetoric and has militaristic tendencies. Significantly, all rulers of the Central Asian
republics have visited Iran, with the president of Turkmenistan the
last to do so, in July 1996. It is obviously in the best interest of the
world investment community that Turkey becomes the economic
template for these new developing nations.
Turkey’s geopolitical role is also significant. Its signing of the Black
Sea Cooperation Agreement and its bilateral trade accord with Bulgaria (almost 9% of this Balkan nation is Turkish) ensure that Turkish
people have a special role in southern Europe. For centuries, Turkey
guarded the straits from the Dardenelles through the Bosporus, and
controlled the flow of commerce between East and West, North and
South. This unique location will continue to make Turkey the crossroads of international trade in the area and a focal point for international investors for years to come.
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From a financial perspective, Turkey remains categorized as an
emerging market nation. While capitalist institutions are entrenched in the economy, Turkey continues to struggle to become a
fully developed country. This is reflected in its relatively low literacy
rate of 81%, one of the lowest in Europe. Furthermore, the nation’s
standard of living, defined by GDP per capita, is adding to the difficulty of placing this nation outside the emerging market category.
Turkey should still remain interesting to investors due to its cheap
labor resources and potential in several sectors of its economy, particularly in industries such as iron and steel, seaports, construction
and construction materials, and tourism. Turkey needs further infrastructure development. But, with its membership in all the main
multicultural economic institutions and a population of 60 million,
Turkey represents a major market for exporters and importers alike.

Greece
Greece is a country that also deserves closer inspection. On an economic level, Greece claims the highest GDP per capita of these six
selected nations, and has only one-sixth the population of Turkey.
Of course, one must realize that this high level of GDP is also the
result of subsidies from the European Union, of which Greece is a
full member. Full members in the European Union must have a
minimum standard of living. It is the subsidies of the EU that ensure
that Greece maintains the level of the other full members.
The main industry of Greece is the service sector, with tourism
and shipping being the largest components. Industrial development
is severely limited by the nation’s mountainous terrain, which makes
up nearly 90% of Greece’s total land mass.
Greece has less geographic importance than Turkey, but its location is, nevertheless, quite significant. Greece has historically faced
the backyard of communist-bloc countries, as it borders Bulgaria, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Albania. In terms of
investment potential, this was a lifeless region. However, with the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union,
economic cooperation between Greece and its neighbors could open
up countless possibilities for Greece. From 1992 through 1995, the
Greek government, for political reasons, refused to recognize the in-
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dependence (and even the flag) of the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. Developing an economic relationship with this nation
was, therefore, impossible. However, relations have vastly improved
of late, and Greece will now be able to capitalize on its location.
On the border of Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece is a territory known
as Thrace. This territory has an interesting historical location, as well
as fine sites for spas and resorts. It also has tremendous agricultural
potential. However, capitalizing on this to the utmost degree requires the cooperation of all these nations. No single nation would
be capable of developing the region of Thrace on its own. Current
tension between Greece and Turkey could make cooperation somewhat difficult, and the initiative could fall to Bulgaria, which has
a positive relationship with both these nations. Furthermore, it is
important for Greece to solidify its transportation network and develop ground transportation links with Northern and Western Europe in order to expedite trade in the region. The most likely route
for transporting products would be through the Greek seaport of
Alexandroupolis, through Bulgaria, and then on to Northern and
Eastern Europe.
Greece is unique in that it is the only member of the European
Union that does not share a border with another European Union
nation. Greek sentiment toward the European Monetary Union
(EMU) is positive, but whether the government begins to impose
the requisite austerity measures is still far from clear. If the Greek
government can deregulate more rapidly, the insurance industry and
other capital market service firms can expand into the Balkans
quickly.

Portugal
Another emerging market nation with vast potential is Portugal. In
the last three years, Portugal has made great strides in developing its
economy and is approaching industrial nation status. The Portuguese market is largely open to foreign investment. Pharmaceutical
industry investment is one factor that has significantly contributed
to the economy’s growth. Foreign investors are attracted to Portugal
because of the relatively low cost of labor, and because the Portuguese currency, the escudo, has become much more stable in recent
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years—a sign that it is becoming more respected internationally.
However, because of high export volumes, and the similarity of Portuguese and Spanish exports, the escudo is identified with the Spanish peseta, and when Spain devalues its currency, Portugal inevitably
follows.
The growth of the Portuguese economy in recent years has
brought it to a level of development somewhere between the lessdeveloped Central and Eastern European countries and the highly
developed Western European countries. Among full members of the
European Union, Portugal has the lowest GDP per capita. However,
its GDP has grown to a level high enough to include it among developed nations. The IFC’s criteria for a developed nation is $8,625
GDP per capita. Portugal already meets this criteria. While the rise
in Portugal’s GDP per capita results at least partially from direct
European Union subsidies, another significant contributing factor
has been the vast technological development that has occurred in
recent years. However, Portugal is in need of a new development and
growth strategy, as the economy’s emphasis shifts from industry to
the service sector. Developing and implementing such a strategy
takes time, and as a result, the Portuguese economy has recently
suffered some stagnation. Despite the cooling economy, Portugal has
been able to attract a great deal of foreign investment, and is ahead
of the Czech Republic, Greece, and even Poland, although it is still
behind Hungary and Turkey. The recent creation of the Community
of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLD), consisting of Portugal,
Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tome and Principe, Angola,
and Mozambique will certainly raise the profile of Portugal in the
world. Furthermore, Portugal has not yet taken advantage of its geographical position in terms of Euro-African development. Several African countries, such as Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and even Israel to
some extent, are on the rise, and being located on the corner of the
Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, Portugal is in a perfect
position to take advantage of these emerging markets.

Poland
If we shift our attention to Poland, we can see a nation where the
former Communist Party regained national power in recent elec-
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tions. With its application to the OECD just accepted, Poland
seems poised to regain its economic footing. FDI growth rates have
been increasing, and exceeded 75% in 1995. The Mass Privatization
Program (MPP) has been successful in selling off hundreds of stateowned enterprises to the Polish public, though this process has
slowed considerably. In order to make its application to the OECD
appear more attractive, Poland plans to allow its citizens to buy foreign stocks, and to lower its curbs on portfolio investment.
There is a noticeable anti-foreign sentiment among Poland’s population, as local opinion polls show almost three-quarters of Poles
against unrestricted land sales to foreigners. This feeling is aptly
demonstrated by the government’s insistence that foreign investors
be allowed to purchase only small plots of land in city areas. Polish
farmers support this policy, and have been rewarded for their efforts
with protective quotas. However, this is a natural reaction, as all
nations embarking on a course for a market economy feel that their
natural resources, land being the most precious, should not be monopolized by foreigners. This reaction should not be considered a
major obstacle to foreign investors. Even in the most developed
countries, this sentiment can be found. One need just recall the
popular uproar in the U.S. when a Japanese corporation bought
Rockefeller Center. However, a foreign company cannot take land
back to its home country. For example, Belgium reached this conclusion many years ago, and foreigners currently control 35% of the
state’s economy. Belgians do not see this as a threat, since foreign
investment stimulates their economy.

Czech Republic
Among our group of nations, the Czech Republic has several characteristics that are rather unique. As part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czech Republic has a special role in reintegrating
the economies of the nations of the former Empire. Of course, this
role involves only economic reintegration and is not related to political reunification.
Of the former Soviet-bloc countries, the Czech Republic is the
most westernized. This results from its geographical location as well
as from its history. The nation is, literally, on the border between
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East and West, and therefore, Western influence was inevitable.
Prior to World War II, the Czech Republic was one of the top six
industrialized nations in Europe. During Soviet rule, the country
advanced technologically, but not to its full potential. Now, with the
return to capitalism, the nation has the opportunity to capitalize on
its unique location as well on the entrepreneurial spirit of its people,
some of whom remember what it was like to live in a thriving capitalist society fifty years ago.
Among former Soviet-bloc countries, the Czech Republic has the
strongest democratic tradition. In fact, it is the only country whose
executive leader, President Vaclav Havel, is a former dissident. Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev is also a dissident, but has no real
political power.
The privatization process in the Czech Republic has been the
smoothest of the six nations. The transformation of property from
the state to the private sector has been very efficient. Moreover, although the Czech Republic has about the same population as
Greece, Portugal, and Hungary, its territory is smaller, and the privatization has been more easily managed. Foreign capital has been attracted to the Czech Republic by the general availability of
educated, low-cost labor. Furthermore, foreign investors are not
overly concerned about the political risk, since the Czech lands have
never had a history of political violence or terrorism. The present
political climate leads one to believe that this will remain the case.
Foreign capital is also attracted by the efficiency, the innovative
spirit, and the dedication of the Czech people. This attribute, coupled with the fact that Czech society is very westernized, makes investors more willing to put their money here. As a result of the
foreign capital that has been invested, the Czech Republic’s economy has developed several very strong sectors. High technology, machinery, and shipbuilding are all thriving industries. This nation also
enjoys small but efficient agricultural, food processing, and beer production industries, as well as beautiful spas and resorts, including
the world-famous Karlovy Vary.
Hungary
Finally, we will take a closer look at Hungary. Geopolitically, it has
no special advantages, as Turkey, Portugal, or the Czech Republic
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has. But Hungary is also part of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, and has a significant location. It borders nearly every Central
European country, placing it at the door to the Balkans. Moreover,
Hungary’s role, from an international political perspective, is more
important than its location. Of all the Soviet-bloc countries, Hungary was a pioneer of economic and market reforms in 1968. Unlike
Czech communists in the 1960s, who tried to incorporate a human
rights agenda into their reform and provide more basic social freedoms, Hungary sought to liberalize small businesses and provide
them greater business freedoms, flexibility, and incentives. The
Czech approach was unrealistic under communist conditions of the
1960s and therefore doomed from the start. However, both the
Czech approach and the economic reforms that Hungary undertook,
even in the ’60s, prepared them for the later demise of communism
and the opening of the Austrian-Hungarian border. This economic
reform, begun 20 years earlier than in any other Soviet-bloc country,
is the reason that Hungary later received the benefits of East–West
cooperation and more foreign direct investment than any other East
European nation, and more, even, than Russia itself.
Hungary has the highest FDI per capita of the six nations under
discussion, with FDI totaling $6.9 billion (including in-kind investments) in 1995. Poland, Greece and the Czech Republic combined
have slightly less foreign direct investment. Even in terms of cumulative investment over the last five years, the combined totals of Poland and the Czech Republic did not reach Hungary’s. In reference
to GDP per capita, Hungary ranks ahead of Poland and the Czech
Republic.
But now, after six years of transition, Hungary has faltered in its
position at the top of emerging market nations. Countries that are
instituting capitalist changes and restructuring more quickly are becoming more attractive to global investors. This new elite includes
Poland and the Czech Republic. In general, the strategy of deregulation and openness has better implementation and practice in the
other five countries than in Hungary. Hungary seems to have become
content with the rate of change while other nations have maintained
comparatively frenetic paces.
Hungary continues to have the potential to be the leading country
in this region of the world, but is not fully utilizing its capabilities.
As an associate member of the EU, it has relatively positive relations
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with its neighbors, although there are instances of minor ethnic tensions with Slovakia and Romania. It boasts a highly educated workforce and a well-developed infrastructure, particularly in
telecommunications and transportation. The social infrastructure
and the relatively high level of cooperation with Western countries
make the business climate in this country very appealing for international investors. Some of the most interesting industries in the Hungarian economy are hospitality and tourism, electronics, food
processing, wine production, and exports for the Russian consumer
market.
However, in terms of the efficiency and profitability of these investments, Hungary still lags behind the other five countries we have
mentioned. One should not be surprised if the Czech Republic
moves ahead of Hungary in the near future. Hungary’s foreign trade
balance is negative and has been so for some time. However, export–
import business in Hungary is operating, and Hungary could become
the home base for many foreign industrial firms who, following four
years of war and international sanctions, are ready to enter the market of the former Republics of Yugoslavia, now more or less open for
business.

Summary
The six countries we have been discussing have been selected for a
specific reason: of the 22 emerging markets in Europe today, these
six represent the most developed economies, and in as little as five
to ten years, they will be among the leading European countries.
All these countries must further develop the major capitalist institutions, especially in the industries of banking, insurance, and auditing services. To date, such development has been insufficient, with
relatively few insurers active, and only a few foreign insurance companies operational. Portugal is the most advanced in this regard, with
Turkey, Greece, and Poland trailing behind. The presence of foreign
banks is most noticeable in Turkey, Greece, and Portugal, but Poland
and the Czech Republic have made substantial inroads in recruiting
non-domestic banks. Of the six nations, the Czech Republic has the
highest number of private, local banks, though their capitalization is
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small. There are only two wholly state-owned banks in the Czech
Republic.
Poland and the Czech Republic lead the way in signing doubletaxation treaties with their trading partners. The Czech Republic
was the last to start the privatization process, but is now in the forefront of former Soviet-bloc nations that have sold off state-owned
enterprises.
These countries will continue to enjoy the majority of foreign direct investment in the emerging market countries of Europe for
many years to come. In terms of economic power, Poland will emerge
as the leader of this group. This is due to several factors apparent in
the Polish economy: the strong industrial base, the burgeoning energy sector, the potential for development in telecommunications
and transportation networks, the solid social infrastructure, and the
population’s embrace of capitalism. Following Poland, Turkey could
be considered the most vibrant economy. Its great location, however,
has one negative aspect. Turkey borders some countries with unstable and tyrannical regimes, such as in Iran and Iraq, which substantially decreases the interest of international investors. The remaining
countries, measured by various criteria, have equal economic potential, but the Czech Republic will likely more fully utilize its potential
and pull ahead of Greece, Portugal, and even Hungary.

BALKANS: EMERGING MARKET
FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union
created not one but several new markets for the international investment community. Serious investors must view each market separately, both in terms of development opportunities and in terms of
their level of readiness for working with international business. I believe that in 1995 former Soviet-bloc countries in the Balkans will
become the new focus of activity.
Some Eastern European markets, such as the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland, after experiencing tumultuous economic, social, and political upheaval, have emerged with a high level of opportunity. Due to Russia’s huge heterogeneous economic landscape,
development has been uneven. But oblasts of Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the 15 Free Economic Zones, especially those on the Russian Pacific Coast, have already become areas of activity for
international businesses. The remainder of the Russian territory has
yet to emerge as an international market.
The dissolution of Czechoslovakia, in reality, was very peaceful,
and the resulting Czech Republic is already a capitalist country with
an emerging market. Slovakia, even with its economic and political
problems, is a fairly stable market-oriented economy offering low risk
for foreign business investments.
The Balkans, on the south of Europe, are a particularly attractive
new region. Still, a combination of instability and political problems
have deterred the international investment community from viewing
the Balkan region with an opportunistic eye. The bloody disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the political problems surrounding
FYRO Macedonia are two examples of the types of disasters that
have plagued the area in the past. This, however, is no longer the
case. Moreover, for some countries in this region that by association
have been painted with the same brush, this was never the case.
The territory of the former Yugoslavia is even more surprising.
The Kvint Newsletter, No. 5 (1995).
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Rather than headlines proclaiming war, one can read about the fact
that the majority of the countries on this territory have been at peace
for almost two years and are ready for business. Slovenia, Croatia,
FYRO Macedonia, and most parts of Serbia (currently named Yugoslavia) not only are peaceful but are working in cooperation with
international business on a number of important projects. In fact,
tourism is very strong in Croatia. In 1994, tourism was responsible
for bringing a total of $1.3 billion into its economy. More important,
those businesspeople who have recognized the changes and opportunity are currently profiting from doing business in this region.
One region that was always stable, yet is still recognized for its
investment potential, is Bulgaria. Arthur Andersen & Co., SC, hosted a meeting for business leaders with President Zhelyu Zhelev of
Bulgaria on his official visit to the U.S. on February 15. At that time,
President Zhelev took the first concrete steps in the privatization
process, encouraging Western investors to participate in Bulgaria in
the first stages of privatization. Companies wishing to enter this
market may want to consider investing in the enormous potential
now while one can get considerable value for the dollar.

An Important Route to Europe
The stability of Bulgaria and its location on the Black Sea create a
natural role for this country as a bridge between the Black Sea and
the Adriatic Sea, to North, Central, and South Europe. It is, perhaps,
the most stable entrance through the Black Sea to Russia’s natural
resources. All these factors will make Bulgaria more attractive for
international business once transportation systems are developed.
For example, the best way for Turkey, Greece, and Macedonia to be
connected with central, western, and northern Europe is by railroad
through Bulgaria and Romania. But between Romania and Bulgaria
there is only one bridge, located over the Danube River.
A priority project will be to build a second bridge. It is clear that
the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development will allocate the money for this, and international companies should think about competing for this project. The
project would entail construction of not only the bridge but the infrastructure of the surrounding area as well. This bridge will satisfy
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the immediate need of building railroads between Romania and
Hungary, Hungary and Austria, and Hungary and Slovakia.

Transportation Is the Key
Another major international project awaiting development is ground
transportation between the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea. This will
facilitate direct access to Italy, via the Adriatic. It is important to
remember that Italy is the fifth largest investor in Russia and an
extremely active trading partner. For Italy it is critical to have a more
direct route.
Currently, the sea route is through the Mediterranean Sea and
Black Sea to Bulgaria, FYRO Macedonia, and Albania. Revising the
sea route will create an extremely important role for FYRO Macedonia. It seems to me that the American State Department recognized
this role two years ago when it started to pay attention to Macedonia.
Today in Macedonia there are American peace-keeping troops.
Through diplomatic channels, the U.S. State Department did much
to help Macedonia maintain its independence.
All the Balkan countries, including southern Romania, offer many
business opportunities. For example, unknown Albania, which shares
a border with Greece and is very close to central Italy, has many
natural resources. Albania is one of the largest oil producers per capita in Europe, and is a producer of copper, nickel, black metals, food,
and vegetable oil. Albania also has a highly skilled workforce. Currently, it is the sixth largest source of legal foreign labor for Italy.
The business relationship between Albania and Greece improved
dramatically at the end of 1994. This is a very important relationship
for Greece since the only land route to Europe is through Bulgaria.
Greece is now looking to create another route through Albania.
The Balkans are one of the biggest new emerging markets in Europe. This area has already forged close ties with the EEC, both
economically and politically. For example, Bulgaria and Romania are
now associate members of the European Union.
This market is actively seeking foreign investors. But investors will
enter the market only if the capitalist institutions are in place to
support the activities. I view this as an opportunity for institutions
such as auditors, banks, law firms, and other service providers. The
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timing is right to be in the Balkans. They will deliver a service that
in turn will bring clients. It is like the development of railroads. Many
people think that it is time to build the railroad when the cargo is
ready to be shipped. But in reality it is too late. If the railroad gets
built, there will be cargo. It is the basic principle of supply and demand. Capital institutions likewise must be created early, and business activity will grow.

BALKAN REFUGEES IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
UNITED STATES: STRATEGIC
ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS FOR
MIGRATION
Migrants and refugees suffer from a number of social ills that compromise their human rights no matter where they live. They have
limited access to social and health services and their plight is hardly
the primary concern of governments and public administrations.
This is despite the fact that migration is more of a symptom than a
causal condition. Academic studies on the topic view migrants as the
source of many problems. Chronic unemployment, low standards of
living, and indifferent governments are the reasons that these people
become refugees in the first place. Consequently, the view of the
refugee as the root of the problem is flawed. Instead, the solution
lies in seeking ways to bolster the quality of life in the countries from
where these migrants came.
Let us focus on the refugee situation in the Balkans, a region that
was ripped apart by ethnic bloodshed and civil strife during the
1990s. The turmoil in the Balkans prompted an exodus of its many
talented professionals. As a result, future economic development in
this region is sure to be slow. In addition, the disruptive effects of
massive illegal migration present a real threat to European integration. Thirdly, the deplorable conditions faced by Balkan refugees in
emerging markets and those of other illegal migrants present a fertile
breeding ground for terrorist activities. In the end, an anemic economy in the region will always threaten to undo the fragile peace that
has taken root in the last several years. Destabilization is still a very
real possibility.
Given that migration is a social and economic phenomenon, this
study looks at demography, sociology, and economic boundaries
through statistical methods of direct and indirect accounts of migra-
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tion; sociological methods of factor analysis; economic fact-finding
missions; representative analysis of migrants; surveys of different migrant groups; economic analysis of transportation; unemployment
and poverty statistics; and questionnaires, whose construction will
differ from country to country to account for differences in culture
and religion. The goal here is to show the correlation between the
variables of unemployment and poor standards of living. These then
culminate seemingly intractable poverty and, ultimately, migration
from the Balkans.
To understand the trend of Balkan migration, we have to:
• Analyze the impact of Balkan migration on the European Union
and the United States
• Assess the effects of globalization on migration
• Accumulate data and develop improved methods for its collection
(currently, there are no data for half the Balkan nations on numbers
of people living below the poverty line, even in UN and CIA population statistics)
• Recommend new programs for public administration, as well as develop strategic economic recommendations and incentives to decrease emigration from the region, and a system to motivate
refugees to return
• Prepare recommendations for multilateral institutions in regard to
issues surrounding migration
• Build foundations for a new Theory of Economic and Strategic
Management of Migration

The idea here is to erect a structure where necessary economic
resources and social protection produce a better standard of living
and decrease unemployment among potential migrants in the Balkans. The goal is also to decrease the number of legal, but particularly illegal, immigrants and refugees in Western Europe and the
United States. This is a situation that would not only lead to better
relations between Balkan countries and the Western world, but
would also remove some of the reasons that young, disaffected refugees join terrorist organizations.
There is a popular albeit specious notion popular in Western intellectual circles that migrants in large numbers destabilize economies
and provide cover for drug smugglers and terrorists. But why look at
the migrant this way? These are human beings who are desperate to
feed their children, but are often unable to find work on which they
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can survive. The ‘‘pyramid of concerns’’ upon which the Balkan governments and international institutions build their policies must be
changed. The migrants, and not the problems that they generate,
must be the concern of the international aid community.
After years of war and ethnic conflict, stability and peace in the
Balkans have finally been achieved. Characteristics of a fledgling
democratic government structure have taken hold and there is a positive atmosphere in the Balkan political sphere. However, the emigration rates in the region still rank among the highest in the world.
This illustrates better than other statistics that there is still much to
be done to make life in the region livable. The direction of change
and the speed at which these changes come about must be increased,
as must the funds to foster and support these changes.
There are four additional reasons why the study is not only significant, but also absolutely necessary. The brain drain of the region’s
best-skilled workers, technicians, and academics will continue until
they have reason to stay. The region is still plagued by economic
stagnation in large part due to a substantive lack of capital to fund
social reform programs in areas such as education and healthcare.
Secondly, migration as it currently stands threatens the welfare of
European integration of the Balkans as well as that of Central and
Eastern Europe. The EU has welcomed new countries, which expand
its borders, but the inter-country transport of drugs, prostitutes, and
weapons which this expansion facilitates threatens this open-border
policy.
Thirdly, the conditions of migration fuel the threat of terrorist
activities. When people travel from countries where they cannot survive to countries in which they are not welcome, they are more easily
lured into terrorist organizations that promise them respect and a
sense of purpose, as well as a way to support themselves and their
families. The Balkan countries have always been a gateway between
Europe and the Muslim world, making it a hotbed for terrorist recruiting activities.
Economics, rather than civil strife, threatens to destabilize the
region today. If the issue of migration is not addressed, there is the
potential for another outbreak of bloody conflict such as there was
in the 1990s, but this time with economic rather than political issues
at its core. Clearly, providing proper care for the refugees is in the
vital interests of the international community.
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A Historical Perspective
The Balkans have been a region that fosters international conflict
throughout the twentieth century, be it the Balkan Wars in the early
part of the century, World War I, the Cold War, or the bloody ethnic
strife that ravaged throughout the 1990s. The Cold War dynamics
have disappeared, and the Dayton Agreement successfully pacified
the region in 1996. The problems that arose in the wake of the hostilities continue to fester in the region. More specifically, there is the
very serious, three-pronged issue of mass migration. The first and
most important aspect of this problem is the astoundingly low quality of life of the migrants themselves. As mentioned earlier, an existence below the poverty line drives thousands to relocate. They seek
out better lives in the neighboring nations of Greece, Turkey, Italy,
and as far away as Switzerland and Germany. Others make their way
to the United States and Canada. According to the International
Organization for Migrants (IOM), there are currently at least three
million illegal migrants in the EU—up from two million just a decade earlier. This number, however, is just an estimate, as actual figures are difficult to establish due to ‘‘the clandestine and global
nature of migration flows’’ (IOM) and are likely to be much higher.
Furthermore, three million illegal immigrants is a small number
compared to the number of those legally migrating; for example, two
million people legally left Bosnia alone in the past ten years. ‘‘The
civil war in the former Yugoslavia has generated the largest numbers
of displaced persons in Europe since the Second World War’’ (Held
et al.). In Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Netherlands, Hungary, Germany, Greece, and Belgium, Balkan people make up the majority of
legal immigrants. In Italy, 96,900 or 36 percent of the 268,000 legal
immigrants hail from Balkan countries. The U.S. is host to over 13
million illegal immigrants and at least one million of these people
hail from the Balkans.
The negative impact of all these movements cannot be overstated.
The resulting economic destabilization can wreak havoc not only on
the developing Balkans, but has the potential to seriously distress
the nations into which the destitute masses are pouring. For the
countries from which people are leaving, there are serious drops in
population. The two largest percentage population decreases in the
world are in Bulgaria and Albania, and the result is national degrada-
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tion. These states subsequently lose control over population movements and are not able to maintain the integrity of their borders.
On the flip side, the receiving nations grapple with inevitable social
conflicts as their own people react with suspicion to the influx of
these newcomers. Migrants are also used as covers and breeding
grounds for international terrorists.
Outward migration is only half the problem. There is also a very
significant amount of migration within the Balkan nations. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) reports, nearly half of the refugees are
displaced persons within their own states because many migrants
only make it as far as their neighboring countries when running away
from ethnic conflict. This creates three serious problems, the first
perhaps being the most complicated as it has ethnicity and religion
at its base. When Muslims leave their nations and enter largely
Christian areas, there is always the threat of ethnic violence, as the
local populations generally do not welcome the refugees. Secondly,
these host countries are already impoverished, and supporting hundreds of thousands of penniless refugees puts significant strains on
their economies. We saw this when ethnic Albanians from Macedonia fled to Albania and ethnic Croats left Serbia for Croatia.
As part of the Dayton Accord, there have been attempts to convince people to return to their homes, but they have met with only
limited success, mostly because they failed to take into account the
third aspect of the problem—the reasons these migrants left in the
first place. Without an incentive to return, the programs were
doomed from the start. Grants, seed money, professional re-orientation and re-education are just some of the activities that would make
the concept of returning home more attractive. Balkan governments
need to create an environment in which the people will find the work
that they so desperately seek. Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords outlines several conditions that are conducive to the return of refugees
in Bosnia. ‘‘Interventions including legislative reform, the provision
of multisectoral assistance to areas that are prepared to promote returns’’ and other similar ideas are advocated (UN Balkan Report
2002). Unfortunately, in 1998, of the one million people who fled
Bosnia, only 140,000 returned. Out of that 140,000, only 35,000 to
40,000 went back to areas where they were considered an ethnic
minority (UN Balkan Report 2002). Croatia is the one country that
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has been successful at persuading its citizens to return home. The
UNHCR attributes this development to the Croatian government’s
‘‘political will and actions taken to create and support a receptive and
positive environment for free and unhindered return’’ (UN Report).
About 25 percent of the prewar population has returned to the Danube region, according to Croatian government officials. People
would always rather stay in their homes and will do so if they are
able to support themselves. Also, it is much cheaper for governments
and multilateral institutions to control and motivate internal migration than to attempt to contain the effects of cross-border movements.

Reasons for Migration Flows
I would contend that the major causes of the formation of the current population of migrants are largely economic in nature, as evidenced by the extraordinarily high rates of unemployment, low per
capita GDP, and the resulting low standard of living. Another factor
aggravating the situation is the lack of attention that the new democratic governments give to social problems. When one cannot get a
job and social welfare assistance is not forthcoming, as the government and public administration are concerned solely with fiscal balance, people leave the Balkans. Bulgaria, for example, is the leader in
the world in population decline. Between 1996 and 2001 the nation’s
population has dropped on average by 1.15 percent. The populations
of Albania and Romania have fallen by 0.38 percent and 0.25 percent, respectively. Anyone who has traveled to either of those nations
would have seen two beautiful countries with magnificent mountains and coastlines that could rival many resorts in the south of
France or other global vacation hotspots. The natural resources of
these nations are vast, yet people are continuing to leave in record
numbers. I would contend that from the perspective of the average
citizen, there is a hierarchy of reasons that creates a situation from
which they wish to escape. Ethnic cleansing and war used to be the
two main reasons, but not anymore. Today’s reasons include the following: a lack of security (recently aggravated by the threat of terrorism), political instability, government corruption, unemployment,
low standards of living (rampant poverty and hunger make it nearly
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impossible for people to survive), lack of social protection (no pension or medical insurance), and incapable governments. While I will
touch upon all of these issues, I will focus on the economic concerns
here.
Unemployment: Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria,
and Albania rank among the top ten countries in Europe with the
highest unemployment. Nearly one third of the population in the
Balkans is unemployed—three times the European average. Further,
official statistics are not fully representative as de facto unemployment numbers are often much higher, reaching all the way to 80
percent in Bulgaria’s historic Thrace region and Albania’s southern
regions, for example. Many people do not register as unemployed,
and many are removed from the rolls of the unemployed after three
to five years, regardless of their actual status, and many more are
listed as employed in businesses which have been shut down. The
flip side of this is that the sector of the population that is employed
works for businesses that have not registered with state authorities.
Low Standard of Living: Recently, the United States and the European Union, along with multilateral institutions, have honed in on
the topic of poverty, though examining it from a global perspective.
However, programs resulting from these studies are targeting Africa,
Pacific-Asia, and Latin America. The post-communist nations of the
Balkans have been largely ignored, and the fact that a substantial
portion of the Balkan population lives on $2 per day ($720/year),
putting them on par with some of the poorest nations in the world,
has been overlooked. Out of the six billion people in the world, half
live on less than $3 a day. In Europe, this type of poverty exists
only in the Balkans, Moldova, and the Ukraine. Even Russia with its
troubled economy has a higher average standard of living. There is a
strong correlation between real wages (GDP per worker hour) and
migration rates (Williamson in Frieden & Lake).
Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, and Serbia-Montenegro occupy the six last positions in GDP per person in Europe.
A low standard of living is inherent in such a situation, and the result
is that nearly 40 percent of the Balkan population cannot afford even
the basic necessities—food, clothing, and shelter. People take their
children and parents and move west as they have nothing to lose and
everything to gain.
Inactive Governments: Since 1995, the governments of the Balkan
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region have been concerned primarily with bolstering their economies. However, the improvements in macro indicators have not
yielded a higher standard of living for the majority of the population.
No significant improvements in the day-to-day living conditions have
occurred. Most citizens blame the government’s poor performance,
and the result is that every election sees the sweep of a ‘‘new’’ political party and the ushering in of a ‘‘new’’ government to power. These
rapid changes have brought about uncertainty and destabilization,
a problem that is pernicious inside and outside the region of the
Balkans.
In conclusion, thousands of migrants move in and out of the Balkan nations every year. The international community and its armies
of academics must study the situations that force these people to
leave their homes. Researchers must concentrate on the correlation
between such astounding migratory flows and unemployment, low
standards of living, and poverty. The key to solving the problem is
dissecting the effects of the exodus on the Balkan region, the European Union, the United States, and the world at large of internal
Balkan migration, and the deficiencies in available statistical information upon which to build studies. We need to explore how
multilateral institutions, governments, and regional public administrations can use their budgets more efficiently to better serve migrants, to aid in the return of those who would like to come back,
and to help dissuade potential migrants from leaving by creating new
opportunities in their native countries. The findings and ensuing
programs will benefit both the individual migrants and the entire
global community.

BULGARIA LAGS BEHIND
DANGEROUSLY
Every year The Wall Street Journal, in collaboration with the Heritage
Foundation (an independent organization), publishes an index on
the degree of economic freedom. The major business circles in the
world are defined by these data. The analyses and evaluations are
based on ten basic indicators: market freedom, freedom of fiscal policy, degree of government intervention in the business sector, monetary policy, foreign investments, banking and finance activities,
wages and prices, the rights of property and regulations of the state,
and the black market.
Estonia has the highest index for economic freedom among the
countries from the ex-Soviet block. The state shares fourth place
with Luxembourg, Ireland, and the United States. From the countries among the ex-socialist block, the Czech Republic is in 32nd
place, and even Armenia is placed 45th in the index.
In 2001 Bulgaria was unfortunately in 95th place, tied with Burkina Faso and ahead of Albania. However, during the current year
the situation worsened significantly. Bulgaria has now dropped to
105th in the index. It shares this place with Herzegovina, Georgia,
Ghana, Lesotho, Nepal, Rwanda, and Tanzania. Never before has
Bulgaria had such a low rating in the index. Only three steps below
are Moldova, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Albania.
When I started to analyze the reasons for this low evaluation of
Bulgaria, I understood that the results for 2001, which carry over to
the index for 2002, are not coming only from the activity of the new
government. The 2002 index includes the results from the policy of
the previous government of Ivan Kostov and the first steps of the
new cabinet of Simeon Saxcobourg. During 1999, Kostov’s team received a positive evaluation because of a tax cut, but now the evaluation is negative.
In repeated points on Bulgaria the experts put an emphasis on one
basic problem: ‘‘there is bureaucracy.’’ Their opinion is that this is
Trud (The Labor), Sofia, Bulgaria (January 22, 2002).
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the basic obstacle to foreign investment. In order to start a business
in Bulgaria many authorizations are required. The black market, the
gray economy, and corruption are very popular and make Bulgaria
unattractive for foreign capital.
The index is based 70 percent on activity in the national capital.
We need to pay attention to the Bulgarian entrepreneurs who experience many problems. The biggest one is monetary policy, where Bulgaria is five times behind the leading countries. For Bulgaria, this is
the lowest among the ten indicators for country evaluation. The rating for activity in the banking and finance sectors is unsatisfactory as
well.
The second reason for the poor evaluation given to Bulgaria is
government intervention in the economy and tax policies. During
the past years there has been increased intervention by the Bulgarian
government in the economy. Taxes have risen, which is evaluated
negatively. The economists state that the proportion between taxes
and income during 2001 is the worst in the last ten years.
On the other hand, Bulgaria loses 18 percent of its national income, a very large amount, sustaining the governmental bureaucracy. One of the protectors for economic freedom, the judicial
system, offers very low wages and cannot attract qualified employees.
Research indicates that the procedures are outdated and are a step
behind contemporary judicial standards. All of this puts the judiciary
in the role of victim. Maybe this is the reason why the black market
continues to be strong and Bulgaria is more than three times behind
the leading countries based on this indicator. In other words, if Singapore is 1, then Bulgaria is 3.5. However, the black market and gray
economy haven’t expanded substantially. They are evaluated as 3,
which is positive.
At the same time, privatization is not going smoothly. I recall that
someone promised to sell the public-sector industries by the end of
2001. It was a naı̈ve promise, and no step forward was made. It is
important that privatization takes place not only quickly but also
honestly and without protectionism.
The indicator ‘‘business policies’’ is also negative for Bulgaria.
Every transaction requires a tremendous amount of paperwork. The
markets also define the index for economic freedoms. I believe the
import-export activity with Turkey and Russia is very limited. It is
unthinkable that the import-export portion of the Russian market,
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traditional for Bulgaria, is 5 percent and for Turkey, a neighboring
country, only 7 percent. This leads to the conclusion that there is a
lack of business economic strategy for the country. Capital continues
to flow away from Bulgaria. At this moment it is crucial to attract
foreign investors. But when a large investor came into Bulgaria and
bought M-Tel, there was an amazing amount of bureaucracy that he
needed to deal with.
Bulgaria needs to work hard to change its current economy and
present information regarding its progress. The public expenses need
to decrease, the approval system needs to be liquidated, and the
principle that ‘‘everything not forbidden is allowed’’ needs to be
adopted.
Currently, a change of image is not on the agenda in Bulgaria. No
one works with the rating agencies directly but all developed countries have business liaisons in the United States. They are obligated
to work with Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and the Heritage Foundation in order to present a realistic index for economic freedom.

AMNESTY FOR CAPITAL
EXPORTED ABROAD: ITALY DID
IT, WHICH MEANS BULGARIA CAN
DO IT TOO
At the end of January the European Commission approved the special Italian law regarding the nationalization of capital exported
abroad. This means that Italy is the first country from the euro zone
to announce that illegally exported capital will be nationalized. A
major part of this capital is located in offshore zones or in secret
bank accounts in Switzerland. In doing so, the Italian government
opens the door for this money to be returned until February 28,
2002. All businessmen and private companies from the bottom up
have the right to take back an unrestricted amount of money to the
country. The nationalized money will not be subject to taxes. In
addition, all personnel of the companies opting to return their capital are free from prosecution and have no legal responsibility for it.
It is expected that the Italian government is going to receive around
51 million euros.
The debates on the fiscal amnesty began in the Bulgarian mass
media during the summer of 2001, immediately after an interview I
gave on the subject. During previous years, I was working as a Fulbright-sponsored expert in Albania and Bulgaria. I made an analysis
of the basic economic factors involved and concluded that while Bulgaria has natural resources, strategic geopolitical location, and many
educated, hard-working people, it also has one of the lowest standards of living in Europe. Many people have emigrated abroad because of the hopelessness of earning money and sustaining
themselves.
The primary reason for this problem is the lack of capital. Without
capital it is impossible to create employment and give opportunity
to people to work and sustain their families and themselves. Without
24 Hours (Sofia, Bulgaria), February 11, 2002
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the existence of capital it is equally difficult to increase micro-credit
activity in Bulgaria. During the 90s a big portion of the capital has
been accumulated through activities that are outside the boundaries
of law or that are part of the gray economy. Later, people were fearful
of paying taxes on this money and they exported it abroad. Thus,
this capital does not exist in Bulgaria in a period when the country
most needs it. Some money, from the same sources, was invested
back into Bulgaria but in activities that are ‘‘under the table.’’ The
owners of these businesses are afraid to invest because of tax penalties.
All this leads me to conclude that fiscal and economic amnesty is
essential for Bulgaria. Now is the time to take these steps because
Bulgaria can model the successful example of Italy and Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan announced amnesty on June 15, 2001 and for a period
of 30 days accumulated more than 3 billion dollars. Moreover, Bulgaria has more citizens living abroad than Kazakhstan and can expect
around 10 billion euros in returned capital.
Many times I have been told by the opponents of this idea that
the European Commission will be against Bulgaria establishing a
period of fiscal amnesty. However, considering the fact that the
Commission recently approved a similar Italian law it is evident that
statements of this kind have absolutely no ground.

BULGARIA AS THE LAST
KLONDIKE IN EASTERN EUROPE
During the four-year revolution of President Boris Yeltsin, Russia has
sold, for almost nothing, about 75% of its economy. Most of the
Eastern European countries have finished their process of mass privatization. Only one stable country has not yet begun a large-scale
privatization program: Bulgaria. Two years from now in Bulgaria
there will be little to buy. But for now, it is a country of great adventure for entrepreneurs who want to make a fortune. That was the
reason for my recent visit to Bulgaria.
Not only is Bulgaria across the Atlantic Ocean, it is also in the
United States at JFK airport. There you can find the small and unpleasant terminal of Balkan Airlines. The airline works on the Bulgarian time schedule. If a flight is scheduled for 6:30 p.m., boarding will
definitely start two hours later. Likewise, the crew will not arrive
until that time.
Bulgaria, unlike all the other post-communist countries of Eastern
Europe, is not yet tired of Americans. In Bulgaria, I focused on the
current economic policy and short-term prospects. I met with President Zhelyu Zhelev, Prime Minister Jean Videnov, and Speaker of
the Parliament Blagovest Sendov. I also visited with the Chairman
of the Committee for Mass Privatization, the head of the Agency for
Privatization (cash privatization), ministers, private entrepreneurs,
bankers, and people in the street. It is from these meetings that I
have drawn the picture I will share with you.

Strategically Positioned and Politically Stable
Bulgaria is a typical Balkan country, and it is under the pressure of
different political strategists of Russia, the European Union, the
United States, and neighboring countries. Although Bulgaria’s
neighbor, the former Yugoslavia, has had terrible battles during all
The Kvint Newsletter, 3, No. 5 (February 1996).
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these years of transformation, Bulgaria has remained a stable country. Notwithstanding political fights inside Bulgaria, there is no sign
of civil war. From a practical point, the political fights are divided by
a Chinese Wall from the day-to-day life of the Bulgarian people and
from business activities.
The presidential office is held by former dissident and anti-communist Zhelyu Zhelev. However, the parliament and local executive
bodies are populated overwhelmingly by the new communists who
call themselves ‘‘socialists.’’ New presidential elections are scheduled
for October of this year. The democratic forces are divided without
any reason between their only real leader, President Zhelev, and a
variety of politicians. Without support from the party, he can lose
the election to the new communists.
Zhelev’s contenders are numerous, including the current Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Pirinski, and the nonpartisan Speaker of the Parliament, Sendov. But this is not cause for alarm. All the current political leaders in Bulgaria are strong supporters of cooperation with the
West. In what may seem ironic to someone in America, the new
communists strongly believe that Bulgaria needs to be a member of
NATO and a full member of the European Union.
In the offices of the President, Prime Minister and Speaker, I saw
displayed not only the Bulgarian flag but the 12-star blue flag of the
European Union. The Bulgarian leadership is highly appreciative of
its associate membership in that Union. It is funny that a few days
later when I visited the President of Greece, a full member of the
EU, I could not find such a flag.
For neighboring countries, Bulgaria is a crossroads. Because of political relationships it is the only ground route for Turkey and Greece
into Western Europe, and Bulgaria is practically the only country
that has relationships with both countries. Even though Bulgaria has
no mutual border with Russia, the two countries have had one of the
strongest relationships in Eastern Europe over the past two centuries.
For America, its relationship with Bulgaria, as well as FYRO Macedonia, is quite important. It is interesting to note that Bulgaria was
the first country to recognize the independence of FYRO Macedonia. Both Russia and the U.S. welcomed this decision. Bulgaria’s strategic location on the coast of the Black Sea and in the heart of the
Balkans, along with its friendly relations with neighboring countries,
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is key to diplomatic consensus-building. And a European Union
without Bulgaria has no ground connections between two parts of
the EU.
To understand the political climate in Bulgaria, I would like to
underline one important characteristic of the Bulgarian nature: tolerance. Bulgaria and Denmark are the only two countries that, during
Hitler’s occupation in World War II, did not betray their Jewish population. Not one Bulgarian Jew was sent to a concentration camp.
Now the Jewish population is being given back property that was
nationalized during the communist regimes. Significantly, this decision has gained the support of all political leaders.

Timing Is Everything
Economically Bulgaria is an industrial country with strong potential
in machinery building (particularly in the electro-technical industry), production of textiles and linens, and manufacturing for the
fashion industry. Bulgaria also produces the best tobacco in Eastern
Europe and fine red and white wines, vegetables, and fruits.
Even though residents of Bulgarian cities, including the capital,
Sofia, dine in darkness, there is a great potential for development
of the electrical energy sector. Other attractive areas for Western
investment are the mass media, the hospitality industry, and small
but potentially profitable products like rose oil (attar of roses) and
carpets. The tourist industry is ripe for development. Bulgaria not
only is on the coast but also has the beautiful Rila mountains, which
are the highest in the Balkans.
Prior to 1996, foreigners were not allowed to participate in the
privatization process. There were a few exceptions such as the hotel
Vitosha, which is now managed by InterContinental and owned by a
former Bulgarian-German citizen. Internal capital fought for influence, and the only companies that were available for privatization
were small ones. Now that mass privatization using the voucher system is in the final stage, 1996 will mark the beginning of cash privatization.
The first 500 Bulgarian companies, large and medium-sized, from
heavy industry to telecommunications to large manufacturing com-
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panies, will be for sale. This is the way that the foreign investor can
participate directly, rather than in the secondary market.
However, this process will not be easy, due to the Mafia-style corruption on the part of government officials and private industrial
commercial groups, which are mostly funded by illegal capital. Nevertheless, none of these groups have sufficient money, and Westerners with capital can win tenders officially and legally.
The Bulgarian agency that conducts cash privatization issued
more that 11,000 licenses for private Bulgarian auditors to evaluate
companies that are for sale. Unfortunately, these local auditors do
not have experience in this area. Also, the local auditors are not
respected outside the country.
Additionally, in what appears to be a strange decision, the auditors
are not permitted to participate in the process of raising capital, once
the value of the company has been established, as is done in the
West.
On the other hand, the Big Six certified accounting firms have
been excluded from the process. This is one of the biggest negatives
for investors trying to determine the true value of companies on the
block.
A positive side is that, due to a lack of capital and understanding,
the market value of the companies will be extremely low. Westerners
with capital will be able to complete very profitable transactions.
Sheraton, InterContinental, GE, May & Co., AT&T, and Cable
and Wireless have already moved into the market. These companies,
like many others, are looking for opportunities but have not yet made
major investments. Unlike in other Eastern European countries,
major banks have not received licenses for cooperation. The Bulgarian government will be making a big mistake if it does not change
this situation.

BUILDING CAPITALISM IN
BULGARIA BY DECREE
Q: Mr. Kvint, what are your impressions from your contacts with the
Bulgarian Government?
A: The first thing that I noticed is that Bulgaria is steadily going
toward a market economy. However, Bulgaria lags behind the rest of
the former communist countries with respect to privatization. On
the one hand, this is good because Bulgaria has not yet sold its plants
and assets below value. The bad side, however, is that the people
responsible for the privatization program do not know much about
privatization. They still estimate the value of the plants on the basis
of the historical cost principle. This is absolutely incorrect from an
economic point of view.
Q: How do you think this should be done?
A: I will give you an example. Let us take a plant for wine production.
It might be very old, with bad facilities, ugly bottles and labels, although the wine may be very good. Therefore, the product should
be valued, not the plant. The market price of the plant could be a
thousand times higher than the value of its basic assets. The privatization should be executed using the market value of the plant in
mind, not the historical value of obsolete assets. It would be very sad
if Bulgaria repeats the experience of Russia—selling its assets for
nothing. Following this path, nothing will come into the national
budget. I would say that somebody is trying to build capitalism with
decrees in the same way as communism was built in the past.
Q: Do American executives show any interest in investing in Bulgaria?
A: I would say that there are 59 countries in the whole world awaiting
foreign investment that are actually ready for it. These are the countries where markets are currently being formed. There is a large capital deficit because these countries are trying to attract investment. It
Trud (Bulgaria), December 14, 1995, pp. 1, 9.
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seems that Bulgaria does not understand this. It is not enough simply
to open doors for capital to flow into Bulgaria. It is necessary to
create special privileges for contemporary Western capital, knowhow, and technology if you want to attract investors. In my opinion,
the potential of Bulgaria is not evaluated correctly at this moment.
It is not true that this is an unstable country where there are high
risks for Western executives. On one hand, Bulgaria is considered
not stable enough for investment, and, on the other, it is felt that
after the war in the former Yugoslavia ends, investment will be directed toward Yugoslavia, not toward Bulgaria.
Q: Do you have any advice for Bulgaria regarding the privatization
process?
A: I have met many representatives. They listen but they understand
only a portion of what we are talking about. I met with Kalin Mitrev
in New York. He understands what the problem is, but I don’t know
if he has any influence on the privatization process. In my opinion,
it will be better, if people have a choice, to start with cash privatization and then include mass privatization.
Q: What kind of business do you think would be the most lucrative
for a foreigner in Bulgaria?
A: Bulgaria has unique natural resources and can develop best in the
tourism industry. This industry can attract enormous investment.
This should be your number one priority. In some regions, the ecological situation can be improved, and international resorts can be
built for recreation, business, and large conferences. Bulgaria can
become the center of Eastern Europe. It is a very stable country and
has numerous advantages; with resorts as number one priority, the
second priority should be the wine industry, and the third, conferences. You have always demonstrated high quality but you do not
have contemporary models or processes. There is also potential for
this industry. In your refineries there is a shortage of oil; this is the
primary industry that will attract foreign investment.
Q: Do you think that the American model can be applied to Eastern
European countries?
A: The American and Western European models are absolutely compatible with the Bulgarian lifestyle. It seems to me that the people
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here have no idea about application of contemporary methods for
governing. The problem is that the major capital in Bulgaria, from a
few of the financial groups here today, will have to go behind the
scenes. The firms that use contemporary methods will make progress
in the future.
Q: Why do you think that the primary capital in Bulgaria is speculative?
A: This is because you do not know how to carry out privatization
and you do not know how to attract strategic, not financial partners.
Nobody does a market valuation of the companies that should be
privatized. Ninety percent of the firms do not have balance sheets in
accordance with Western standards, and even fewer are audited in
accordance with Western standards. Here is what happens. They go
to a Western executive and tell him that in Bulgaria there is a nice
plant that they want to privatize and ask him to buy it. He says:
‘‘Show me the financial statements of the plant.’’ However, they are
not prepared. Serious investors who invest long term will not invest
in Bulgaria. Instead, the speculator will come. He will correct a few
things and then sell it again.
Q: Why do you think the left parties came into power again in Eastern European countries?
A: This is understandable. The economists in these countries are few
because the economy has been under the pressure of communist
rules and regulations. However, there were several groups of economists. Two Russians received the Noble Prize in Economics, including Leonid Kantorovich, leader of Siberian economists. In practice
though, literate economists are few. The political goal was only to
bring freedom. The politicians, who set Eastern European countries
free from the communist rule, did not know anything about economics and did not orient themselves at the right time. Besides freedom,
people also need economical conditions suitable for living. The cost
is a significant increase in prices in Russia and in the rest of the
Eastern European countries. The volume of production did not increase, and the standard of living for 90% of the population dropped
below the minimum. While people wanted freedom in the beginning, they were later forced to vote for those who promised to take
care of their everyday needs. Therefore, ideology should not be separated from economics. The democrats who brought freedom to the
Eastern European countries forgot about economics.

UKRAINE: LIVING IN RUSSIA’S
SHADOW
Living in the shadow of the neighboring Russia, Ukraine, Europe’s
largest emerging country, but one of the least known, is making considerable strides in reforming its economy and attracting foreign investment.
Some of its effort is showing results. Ukraine now offers just as
many investment opportunities as Russia does. It is attracting attention particularly in the United States, which, without much media
attention, has become Ukraine’s largest foreign investor.
With hardly anyone taking notice, earlier this month, Ukraine,
once among the five strongest nuclear powers in the world, voluntarily gave up the last of its nuclear warheads.
Although invisible on anyone’s radar screen, Ukraine, sitting in the
middle of the former Eastern bloc, will play an enormous role in
shaping the political future of Europe over the next 10 to 15 years.
It currently holds the European security hot seat, and its role and
behavior are crucial, particularly when considering the future of
NATO in Europe. In a policy move that could prove strategically
significant for the entire region, Ukrainian President Leonid D.
Kuchma said his country is not looking for NATO membership now,
but instead wants closer ties to the Western alliance.
Ukraine is experiencing the longest period of independence in its
history—it was independent for only two years between 1918 and
1920—and is trying to make the most of it. Foreign investment,
mostly from the West, has taken off. However, total cumulative foreign investment has remained quite small relative to Ukraine’s size,
totaling only about $1 billion. The country sees its obscurity as one
of the key reasons why it does not attract more foreign capital.
There are other reasons, however, including the challenging economic environment. Although the government has succeeded in getting inflation under control, the economy and industrial production
continue to decline. In 1995, the gross domestic product fell nearly
The Journal of Commerce, Tuesday, June 25, 1996.
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12%, industrial production was down 11.5%, and agricultural output
was off 4%, all from the previous year. Capital investment (mostly
domestic) fell 35% last year. Production in virtually all energy sectors
(electricity, oil, gas, and coal) fell, although less steeply than in the
previous years.
Another major problem for foreign investors is the lack of insurers
in Ukraine. Western insurance companies are not allowed to establish wholly owned branches, and are limited to a 49% joint venture
with a local company.
The same 49% restriction applies to the ownership of banks and
savings institutions, which is hurting the development of financial
services. Ukrainian banks haven’t developed to a stage where they
would inspire foreigners’ confidence. The government’s restrictive
licensing policy in the financial sector is largely the result of effective
lobbying by domestic banks, which have been paying huge bribes to
keep their privileged position.
There is another area in which Ukraine is making a serious error.
The Ukrainian government is repeating the mistake of Russia by
using book value, rather than market value, to establish the price of
privatized companies and their shares. As a result, the government
receives only a fraction of the companies’ real worth, and the enterprises often fall into the wrong hands.
However, the Ukrainian investment climate has seen a significant
improvement since the beginning of spring when Mr. Kuchma
signed a new decree giving potential foreign investors a direct route
to the privatization process, instead of access only to the secondary
markets, as previously was the case.
As a result, international investors are beginning to fight for the
best investment opportunities in Ukraine’s military-industrial complex (90% of which is under conversion), sugar and oil refineries,
high-tech industries, food processing, and machinery building (especially agricultural equipment). There is also a growing interest in the
Black Sea port facilities, which, although antiquated and inadequate,
are the best in the former Soviet bloc.
In addition to U.S. investment, which accounts for 22.8% of the
total, foreign capital comes from Germany, which holds 17.3%, Britain, 6.3%, and the Netherlands, 6%. Cyprus is next, with 5.1% of the
total, and only then comes Russia, with 5%.
The level of Russian investment and commercial influence, how-

204

the top emerging markets

ever, is expected to grow once Moscow begins to recognize the tremendous value of having property and investment in the geographic
center of Europe.
In spite of Russia’s preoccupation with political battling and its
lack of a clear policy on investment in neighboring countries, it is
Ukraine’s largest trading partner, accounting for more than 50% of
Ukraine’s two-way trade.
American business is not sleeping either. U.S. exports to Ukraine
grew 25% last year, reaching $225 million. But, Ukraine’s exports to
the United States went up 60% to $550 million, giving Ukraine a
substantial trade surplus.
An investment in Ukraine is an investment in a European country
with the fifth largest population, a stable business environment, market-oriented reform, and a president and government that, to their
credit, have been democratically installed and rule by law.

KAZAKSTAN: RICH IN HISTORY
AND RESOURCES
Kazakstan is a very young nation and one of the ten largest countries,
by territory, in the world. The first is Russia. The territory of Kazakstan equals approximately all the territory in Europe. Anyone who
tries to conduct business in the former Soviet bloc knows Kazakstan.
But very few know the opportunities that lie in this stable and rich
environment.
Kazakstan became independent for the first time in its history in
1991. Its land mass occupies roughly 12% of all former Soviet Union
territory. Because of its size, the country has the lowest population
density of all the former Soviet states, 6.2 people per square kilometer.
Even the nationality of Kazakstan was questionable in this century. When the Soviet government decided to create Kazakstan as
an autonomous territory in the 1920s, there were two different major
nationalities in the land, the Kyrgyz and the Kazaks. Although the
Kazaks were in the majority, the land was named Kyrgystan. All official maps carried this name for 16 years. In 1936 Stalin corrected the
mistake and renamed the territory Kazakstan (Kyrgyzstan became a
separate republic). Only in 1995 was the new English spelling of the
name Kazakstan (without the h) finally established.
When the Soviet Union was established in December 30, 1922,
it was formed by bringing together five republics: Russia, Ukraine,
Beloruse, Caucasus (which included Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) and Turkestan. Turkestan was a territory on which 20 years later
all five Central Asian republics appeared: Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakstan.
Ethnicity
The ethnic structure of this country is very interesting. Officially the
Kazaks, as an ethnic group, constitute less than 50% of the populaThe Kvint Newsletter, 3, No. 7 (1996).
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tion. The second largest group is Russian. A study I conducted in
1989 showed that Russians constitute approximately 46% of the population; only 42% were Kazaks. Current statistics show the mix to
remain close: about 43% Kazak and 36% Russian.
A surprise to many is the fact that another substantial component
of the population is German. In fact, Germans have a long history in
Russia dating back to the time of Peter the Great. In 1941 when
Hitler invaded Russia, Stalin expelled all the Germans living in the
Volga region to Kazakstan where they were under guard. They remained there until the past six years when approximately two million
emigrated to Germany. Even with the mass exodus, Germans still
comprise four to six percent of the Kazakstan population, depending
on whose statistics you believe.
Politics and the Economy
Nursultan Nazarbaev, president of Kazakstan, is on good terms with
Russia’s President Yeltsin, a point that is important to both countries. Indeed, of all the other 14 former Soviet republics, and even
among all former Soviet-bloc countries, Kazakstan has the best relationship with Russia. Moreover, Nazarbaev has been able to secure
good relationships with countries in the region. He was the first
leader of Kazakstan to make a state visit to China and was able to
establish good relations with all major Muslim leaders. Although he
is personally against Muslim fundamentalism, he has visited Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Interestingly, President Nazarbaev is also
the first leader from one of the former Muslim Soviet republics to
make a state visit to Israel, in January 1996. Additionally, as a result
of its German constituency, Nazarbaev has developed a special relationship with Germany.
It is, in fact, difficult to overestimate the importance of Nazarbaev’s role as a political leader between the Christian and Muslim
worlds, or, for that matter, the role of Kazakstan in Russian–Chinese
relations.
Strategic Military Relationships
Because Kazakstan was a major site for underground nuclear tests, it
had a unique role in the former USSR’s nuclear program. After the
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disintegration of the USSR, Russia was faced with another very difficult situation, in view of the fact that its entire space program depended on Kazakstan’s Baykanur, the equivalent to the U.S. NASA’s
Cape Canaveral. In response to this dilemma, Russia signed a special
agreement with the Kazakstan government regarding Baykanur, and,
as a result, the Russian space program continues to operate there.

Natural Resources
The Kazakstan territory is extremely rich in natural resources. Kazakstan is the third largest worldwide producer of copper, after Chile
and Russia. Two of the largest mining-metallurgical plants are Djezkazgean and Balhash (copper production). Kazakstan is a leading
producer of lead, more than Russia and Ukraine combined. It also is
a significant producer of zinc, titanium, and magnesium, and is
among the top five worldwide of steel, chromium, pig iron, radioactive materials, and stone coal.
Kazakstan is not yet among the leading producers of oil. But its
untapped oil resources rank fifth among the leading nations. Some
of its oil resources in the western part of the country are producing
crude oil, in cooperation with Chevron. Other oil fields are being
developed through a concession agreement with ELF of France.

U.S.–Kazakstan Trade
In 1993 Kazakstan had a trade deficit with the U.S. of about $28.6
million. Kazakstan exported almost $39 million of products to the
U.S., which included radioactive metals, iron, copper, fish, precious
and nonferrous metals. It imported from the U.S. more than $67
million of products which included equipment and supplies for data
processing, agricultural machinery, mechanical handling equipment,
and telecommunications equipment.
In 1994 the U.S. trade surplus with Kazakstan had grown to $70
million. But for the first six months of 1995, Kazakstan exports to
the U.S. jumped to $58 million; close to all of 1994 exports. During
this period, Kazakstan had a trade surplus with the U.S. of approximately $14 million. Some of the most significant export items were
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pig iron, iron and nonalloy steel, ferrochromium, uranium and other
radioactive metals, nonferrous metals, zinc, inorganic chemical elements, metallic salts, and copper.

International and Multilateral Institutions
Key to Kazakstan’s acceptance as a trading partner and a place for
investment is its relationship with significant world financial institutions. Kazakstan has been a full member of the World Bank since
1992, and is a member of all of the World Bank groups. The World
Bank provides capital financing for building the country’s infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, roads, and ports. In 1994,
the International Monetary Fund signed a $179 million standby arrangement for Kazakstan. During fiscal 1995, the World Bank approved three project loans in Kazakstan, totaling $283 million.
Since 1993, Kazakstan has been a member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It has received from the ADB a $100 million
loan and more than $2 million in technical assistance grants for its
agriculture sector, as well as $20 million in concessional loans for the
country’s educational system.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
loans are available for foreign investors in Kazakstan. They are distributed through three commercial banks there: Centerbank, Kazkommertsbank, and Kramdsbank. By December 31, 1994, EBRD had
committed ECU 111.9 million for two projects. Kazakstan has observer status in the World Trade Organization but, unlike Russia, has
not yet requested full membership.

Foreign Investment
In 1992 Kazakstan passed a law permitting 100% foreign ownership
of companies including 100% foreign ownership of banks. Foreign
banks in Kazakstan can be fully operational with both foreign and
domestic currency accounts. For example, Chase Manhattan Corporation established a 50/50 investment banking joint venture in Kazakstan in 1993.
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In the same year, Kazakstan became the first former Soviet republic whose parliament passed a law permitting foreign concession. In
January 1995, a new law on foreign investment was passed, which
augmented the rights given to foreign investors in 1990. The new
law allows for repatriation of profits, grandfathers all foreign investment for ten years, and protects foreign firms against expropriation.
However, the same law eliminated all tax holidays.
Kazakstan has attracted more direct foreign private equity investment than any other country in the former Soviet Union, including
Russia. Commitments for long-term private obligations for Kazakstan amount to $46 billion, compared to Russia’s $36.5 billion. By the
end of 1995, the Kazakstan press reported 2,025 foreign joint ventures in the country. Most of these joint ventures were in the mining,
agriculture, energy, and telecommunications industries. Foreign investment is authorized in all industry sectors except for the military.
Furthermore, foreign joint ventures are not subject to export performance requirements, local content requirements, or restrictions
on foreign personnel.
New laws effecting subsurface rights (except for certain mineral
resources) were also enacted on January 29, 1996. The law dictates
that Kazakstan and foreign subsurface users have the same rights
and obligations. Rights may be granted by a license or contract, or
both, depending on the use.
The new constitution does not allow private ownership of land but
does allow for both domestic and foreign businesses to have longterm leases on land, and for the leases to be inherited.
As of January 1, 1995, most of Kazakstan’s double-taxation treaties, which were carryovers from the USSR, were repealed. Treaties
with Canada, Germany, France, and Japan remained in effect until
the end of 1995. Currently, Kazakstan has double-tax treaties with
only two countries, Poland and Pakistan. New treaties with Hungary,
Italy, Turkey, the U.K., and the U.S. are awaiting ratification.
Of major importance to American businesses is the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the U.S. and Kazakstan. It provides guarantees against discrimination, permits hard currency repatriation,
compensation in the case of expropriation, and the ability to have
company/government disputes arbitrated by a third party.
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Privatization
In March 1993, Kazakstan approved a privatization program. Although implementation has been slow, there have been some notable successes. For example, Philip Morris successfully took over a
state cigarette factory in 1993.
The first privatization auction took place on April 29, 1994. In the
first six months of 1995, 1,526 companies were privatized, but this
was 322 fewer than were privatized in the corresponding period of
1994. Of the 1,526 privatized companies, 74% were small businesses,
and 21% were agricultural enterprises. The majority of businesses
taken private are in the retail and service sectors.
In the next two to three years, 8,000 medium-sized firms are expected to be privatized via a voucher or coupon system. Citizens can
invest the coupons through a licensed investment fund. Investment
funds are expected to purchase about 49% of the shares of these
firms, while the rest of the shares are to be split among workers’
collectives (10%) and the government (41%). In addition, about 280
very large or special businesses are expected to be privatized, but this
will take place only on a case-by-case basis.
More than a dozen of the largest enterprises in Kazakstan that
are insolvent have been put under temporary management, which
consists primarily of foreign investors. The government has decided
to sell 10% of the stock of these enterprises. Half the shares would
be sold at cash auctions, and the rest would be exchanged for the
investment coupons.

A Stable Investment Climate
Politically, Kazakstan is a relatively stable country, ranking higher
than average among emerging market countries. But the level of development of democracy is lower than the average in emerging markets.
The former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakstan,
President Nursultan A. Nazarbaev, while a supporter of market reform, is practically a dictator. Oddly enough, this is good for Western
business and entrepreneurs. They are investing in a country with a
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relatively low level of uncertainty and investment risk compared to
the average worldwide.
Initially, foreign capital was attracted to developing the resources
of Kazakstan. Telecommunication and hospitality industries were
the next areas to become hot for Western investors. Now that Kazakstan has completed the initial steps of internationalization, its political, social, and economic environments are ripe for almost any type
of investment. Special support is provided by the Kazakstan government to help establish companies in terms of capital market institutions and financial infrastructure: stock exchanges, commercial and
investment banks, and settlement, trust, and custodian organizations. Basically, Kazakstan is now open for global business.

BRAZIL: SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MARKET ANALYSIS
Foreword
In the contemporary world, a strong connection exists between the
development of the telecommunication (telecom) system and the
social and economic progress of the country. This relationship is
multi-directional. On the one hand, a country whose telecom system
is well developed can benefit from social progress and an increase in
economic achievement. On the other, the telecom sector is strongly
influenced by that country’s cultural traditions and political factors,
as well as its business and economic environments. Based on this
point of view, in order to properly evaluate the market’s full potential, we need to give priority not to the telecom system, but to the
economic, social, and political systems of the country. This is the
basis of our study of Brazil as a market for telecom and of Telebras
itself.

Brazil Overview
On a global basis, Brazil is the fifth largest country in the world, with
a land mass of over 8.5 million square kilometers. With a population
of more than 161.8 million people, Brazil is also the fifth most populous country in the world. Our projections indicate that population
size will increase to more than 184 million by the year 2010. Population density in Brazil is 18.1 persons per square kilometer, which is
low compared to the world average of 38 persons per square kilometer. At the end of 1993, the Brazilian labor force consisted of 71
million people, or the equivalent of 61.1% of the country’s economically active population. Of this total, 66.6 million persons were emThis study was prepared with the assistance of N. Podbereasky and L. A. Novaes.
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ployed. Currently, there are roughly 173.3 million illiterate people
over the age of 14 in Brazil. Of this total, 53.2% are located in the
Northeast region, 28.5% in the Southeast. From a regional perspective, Brazil is the largest country in South America, sharing common
boundaries with every South American country except Chile and
Ecuador. Despite this, Brazil is one of the world’s largest untapped
markets for telecommunications services and one of the last markets
in Latin America to be fully liberalized.
Brazil’s potential in becoming an economic force in the region,
given its vast natural resources and its strong domination of the continent’s Atlantic coastline, has yet to be fully recognized after years
of stagnation. The Brazilian economy itself, with large agrarian, mining, and manufacturing sectors, entered the 1990s with declining
real growth, hyperinflation, an unserviceable foreign debt of more
than $120 billion, and a lack of policy direction. In addition, the
economy remained highly regulated, inward looking, and protected
by substantial trade and investment barriers. Ownership of major
industrial and mining facilities was principally divided among private
interests—including several multinationals—and the government.
Most large agricultural holdings were private, with the government
channeling financing to this sector.
The Collor administration, which assumed office in March 1990,
launched an ambitious reform program that sought to modernize
and reinvigorate the Brazilian economy by stabilizing prices, deregulating the economy, and opening it to increased foreign competition.
Itamar Franco, who assumed the presidency following Collor’s resignation in December 1992, was out of step with Collor’s reform
agenda; thus, initiatives to redress fiscal problems, privatize state
enterprises, and liberalize trade and investment policies lost momentum. Runaway inflation—by June 1994 consumer prices on a
monthly basis had risen to nearly 50%—had undermined economic
stability. In response, then–Finance Minister Fernando Henrique
Cardoso launched the third phase of his stabilization plan, known as
the Real Plan—a bold monetary reform program that called for a
new currency, the real, which was introduced on July 1, 1994. As a
result of the plan, inflation dropped to under 3% per month through
the end of 1994, and confidence in the Brazilian economy was once
again restored.
Cardoso was inaugurated president on January 1, 1995, and has
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since called for the implementation of sweeping market-oriented reform, including public sector and fiscal reform, privatization of several key sectors, deregulation, and elimination of barriers to
increased foreign investment. Indeed, all these factors have thus far
contributed to a stabilization of the economy and the financial system which has set the backdrop for a new stage of development in
the telecom sector.

Brazil: Economic and Political Analysis
The success of the Real Plan, introduced in July 1994, is unquestioned. Inflation was brought down from approximately 2,300% in
1994 to some 9.2% in 1996, with the monthly inflation figures thus
far in 1997 suggesting a current annualized rate of 5.8%. At the same
time, real GDP growth is expected to rise 3.4% this year following
growth of 4.2% and 2.9% in 1995 and 1996, respectively. Real GDP in
Brazil rose a stronger-than-expected 5% year-over-year in the second
quarter of 1997, driven by a continued strong increase in industrial
production, agriculture, and telecommunications.
Since its inception, the Real Plan has relied on a stable currency
(based on a ‘‘managed’’ floating-exchange rate regime) to anchor
prices. This is instrumental in the development of a successful telecommunications system. While the administration has had some
success in tightening fiscal policy (with respect to state governments
and state enterprises expenditures), it has primarily been committed
to retaining its current policy mix of high real interest rates and a
strong currency in order to restrain inflationary expectations. As a
result of this policy mix, the Real is currently considered by many
analysts to be overvalued by 15% to 20%. Indeed, currency appreciation has led to a serious deterioration in the trade and current account balances in recent months. A $10 billion trade deficit is
expected in 1997, double the $5.5 billion trade deficit in 1996. This
rise exacerbated the current account deficit, which is now projected
to account for 4.5% of GDP in 1997. However, the deterioration in
the external accounts is not just attributable to the appreciation of
the Real. An examination of Brazilian import composition indicates
a high percentage of capital goods imports versus consumer
goods—a trend that is seen in developing countries as they look to
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rebuild their domestic economic infrastructure and expand their exporting capabilities.
In the case of Brazil, the country has also benefited from the liberalization of intra- and interregional trade policies particularly with
respect to Mercosul (the Southern Cone customs union which covers as much as 63% of the South American territory). This agreement
not only will increase the role of Brazil’s international practice, but
will also have a special impact on its telecommunication system.
Thus, by the year 2000, when Mercosul and its associate members,
which include Chile and Bolivia, are expected to form an agreement
with the European Union, international call traffic will substantially
increase.
In light of the growing shortfall in the external accounts—which
reduces the availability of capital for technological upgrades and services such as telecom—the government enacted measures throughout 1997 designed to encourage exports, and imposed various
restrictions in order to discourage imports. Government officials,
nevertheless, are optimistic on the amount of external financing
needed to fund this shortfall, given the strong portfolio investment
flows into the equity market, expectations for future foreign direct
investment (FDI) and privatization proceeds. In 1996, foreign direct
investment was $9.5 billion, almost three times 1995’s level, providing little doubt that this rise is attributed to recent government reforms. Besides inflation reduction and the assurance of a relatively
stable currency (supported by high foreign exchange reserves of over
$60 billion which provides 12 months of import coverage), the government has granted attractive tax advantages to encourage foreign
investment and to entice foreign corporations to construct domestic
manufacturing facilities.
After generating privatization revenues of approximately $10 billion in 1997, the aggressive schedule of privatization in the next
three years ensures strong capital inflows during the period. Indeed,
with the privatization process of infrastructure in Brazil finally under
way this year (with the first phase of the CVRD privatization and
the Cellular Band-B concession), the telecom and energy sectors are
also expected to generate more than $80 billion over the next several
years. Not only do these very significant privatization proceeds create
a positive economic benefit and environment for Brazil, but the spe-
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cific industries being privatized are unleashing enormous untapped
revenue potential for themselves.
Despite its success in implementing structural reform, according
to our analysis of the process of political development, the Brazilian
government still has more work to do. Important fiscal policy measures submitted to Congress—which include the reining in of spending by the municipalities in order to reduce internal public debt,
reforms to the social security system particularly with respect to employers’ contributions, and new taxes, of which the most significant
is a financial transactions tax (slated to raise $6 billion annually)—
have lost momentum in Congress due to political debate. While
progress on this front is expected to come to a halt as campaigning
for the October 1998 presidential and congressional elections begins
in earnest, several successes as of late must be acknowledged. First,
the amendment to the constitution to allow President Cardoso to
run for a second consecutive term was passed into law. This has
increased the confidence level of the international financial community that, with a second term in office, Cardoso will have the time to
enact the necessary structural reforms in the economy and stay the
course of the Real Plan. Second, the administration won a narrow
victory in the Chamber of Deputies in gaining congressional approval for continued administrative reform. Although it is uncertain
whether these reforms will become constitutional amendments, any
progress on this front would strengthen Cardoso’s ability to carry
out the additional structural reforms needed to produce sustained
economic growth.
In conclusion, Brazil has the time, the resources, and increasing
political will to rectify the economic imbalances currently restraining
the economy from attaining its full growth potential in excess of 6%
per year. Until the reform package is approved and implemented,
the economy will be characterized by ‘‘go–stop–go’’ growth. We
think the government realizes that its credibility and popularity rest
solely on the success of the Real Plan; hence, we believe that maximum effort will be devoted to maintaining control over inflation and
the exchange rate, and so a maxi-devaluation is highly improbable.
Although the current account deficit is likely to be in excess of 4%
of GDP over the next few years, we believe that continued strong
inflows of portfolio and foreign direct investment will provide the
necessary financing for the telecommunications sector. This is sup-
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ported by an improving fiscal account, political progress on reforms,
a stable international interest rate and liquidity environment, and a
financial system that is reasonably healthy.
Risk
Investors may be right to point to a worrying rise in the government’s
internal debt, and to lack of control on spending by state governments and to the possibility that the political climate for continued
reform may yet deteriorate. However, they may underestimate at
their peril the Brazilian capacity for economic growth and stability.
Under the direction of President Cardoso and the Mercosul trade
agreement, Brazil is quickly becoming an attractive investment alternative for foreign investment.
In terms of the expectation of foreign direct investment to Brazil’s
telecom sector, it is important to evaluate the risk of investment,
We suggest using the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA), a division of the World Bank Group, or a national analogy
to MIGA, the U.S.’s OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) as benchmarks. All of these organizations use the same integrated indicators for investment in industry and services of emerging
market countries. These indicators include (1) nationalization or expropriation of foreign property, (2) physical violence to foreign property during civilian disobedience, (3) or inconvertibility of currency.
From the point of view of these three major indicators, we can then
conclude, based on previous experiences of foreign investment in
Brazil between 1992 and 1997, that there is a relatively low risk of
investment in telecommunication of Brazil.
In terms of the 75 typical indicators used in order to evaluate
political, economic, business, and technological risk of investment in
Brazil, only one is higher than the level of other emerging market
countries. And that is the level of corruption. But even this indicator,
on a relative scale, is lower than that of Russia.
The Brazilian Telecommunications Market
The Brazilian government’s plan to privatize the telecommunications industry is expected to raise a substantial amount of revenues
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and provide a significant increase in telephone services throughout
the country. However, the repressed demand for telecom services,
including wireless, will ultimately be constrained by the consumer’s
ability to afford these services. Unlike the United States, where approximately 98% of households have telephones, Brazil has fewer
than 10 telephones per 100 residents. While this statistic is 2.5 times
higher than that of China, it is still 8 times lower than that of Russia
and the majority of Eastern European countries. In addition, income
inequality among Brazil’s southern, northern, and western states is
high, as the country is highly stratified by class. The resulting degree
of Brazil’s economic stratification is evident in the distribution of
telephone lines across varying income levels. Based upon 1993 data,
households with the highest income levels, representing just 16% of
Brazil’s population, accounted for 81% of telephone lines. According
to the World Bank, 32 million people (20% of the total population)
live in extreme poverty, while the richest fifth of the population has
about 50 times as much wealth as the poorest fifth. The ratio is 27
for Mexico, 16 for Argentina, 12 for Chile, and 12 for the United
States. And although income distribution continues to improve,
given the current success of economic reform, these data continue
to be representative of the current situation.
Brazil can be characterized as a nation in waiting for ‘‘plain old
telephone service’’ (POTS). Indeed, Telebras’s operating subsidiaries
are far behind in meeting the demand for landline telephones, with
consumers and businesses waiting twelve months on average for new
installations. For example, Telesp, which serves the state of São
Paulo, is reported to have a backlog of 3 million unfilled orders for
new telephone lines. And as the population continues to grow, the
gap between the population and the number of lines installed will
continue to widen. As a whole, at the present time, Brazil’s reported
national POTS order backlog is estimated at 10 million lines. However, if we were also to include the number of people who do not
apply for phone service, the actual backlog would be 20% greater,
according to the emerging markets statistics. In general, not only is
the Brazilian telecom infrastructure inadequate to satisfy existing
demand for service, but much of the existing network is antiquated
and expensive to operate. The liberalization of Brazil’s telecom market is expected to promote strong growth, as new entrants look to
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satisfy a high degree of commercial demand for dependable telecom
services.

A Summary of the General Telecommunications Law
In August 1995, the Brazilian government ended the monopoly of
the state-controlled telecommunication operator, Telebras. After
passing the initial amendment to the constitution, the government
had to prepare legislation for the institutional model that would be
used to carry out the privatization process. On December 12, 1996,
Communications Minister Sergio Motta delivered the General Telecommunications Law to the Brazilian Congress for review. The beginning phase of a country’s development occurs during the initial
stages of capitalization and privatization of the market. As such, this
plan provides the framework for the privatization of the Telebras
system, opening up the telecommunication sector to competition,
and the creation of a formal regulatory structure to oversee the
sector.
The Telecommunications proposal to restructure the telecom sector, which was made into law on July 16, 1997, is divided into three
main parts:
• creation of the independent regulatory body, ANATEL, to regulate
the services, monitor the concessions, and ensure competition and
univeral access to services;
• reorganization of the 27 Telebras subsidiaries into four regional
companies and Embratel, the long distance carrier; and
• development of a competitive telecommunication sector by allowing other carriers to bid and gain entry to offer regional services.

Though the law has been made public and progress is being made,
several key issues remain, including the structure of the new regulatory body, the process and timing of the dividing of the Telebras
system, the timing and methodology for rebalancing the tariffs, and
the timing on the introduction of competitors to the region. Considerable time and effort will be devoted to this issue over the next few
years, but this law demonstrates the Brazilian government’s strong
support for the privatization of the telecommunication sector.
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Telebras Overview
The Telecommunicaes Brasileirad, more commonly known as Telebras, as a system represents the largest operator in the Southern
Hemisphere and is one of the 20 largest telecom companies in the
world. Telebras was created in 1972 in an effort to streamline the
Brazilian telecommunications infrastructure, replacing over 800 municipal and state companies. By late 1993, Brazil had 12.79 million
lines installed, 92% of which belonged to the Telebras network and
the balance to five independent companies that had received concessions before the 1988 Constitution that granted Telebras its current
monopolistic status.
The Telebras system is composed of the Telebras holding company, 27 local operating subsidiaries, and the long distance subsidiary, Embratel, which provides international and inter-state long
distance telephone services. Telebras is responsible for the operation
of roughly 90% of the telephones installed throughout Brazil, and as
a state company it plays a key role in operating the state’s quasimonopoly on telecom services. The Telebras system owns approximately 94% of all public telephone exchanges and 92% of local telephone lines. The Telebras local operating companies also comprise
the majority of the incumbent Band-A Cellular providers.
Telebras is governed by the Ministry of Communications, in conjunction with the Ministry of Economy, and must receive congressional approval for its annual capital budget, which is part of the
federal government’s annual budget. The federal government retains
exclusive rights to grant concessions to provide telecommunications
services in Brazil. Centralized federal telecommunications regulation
in Brazil contrasts sharply with the regulatory model in the United
States, where individual state regulatory authorities dominate wireline regulation.
The federal government effectively controls Telebras by ownership
of 22% of Telebras capital stock and 51% of the voting rights. The
Telebras holding company’s ownership of the publicly traded operating subsidiaries ranges from 75% to 95%. The holding company’s
interests in the non-public subsidiaries are higher than in the publicly traded subsidiaries.
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Market Analysis and Forecast
A review of Telebras’s domestic telephone network highlights an annual average growth rate of 10% over the past eight years, with lines
in service per 100 inhabitants increasing to 8.8, as of December 1995,
from 5.3 in 1988. Based on the aggregate growth rate in the GDP of
10.7% for the next 5 years, and 8.6% for the next two five-year periods, we project that the economic growth rate to be 3.9% through
the year 2010. Given this average annual economic growth forecast,
we estimate that Brazil can reach line penetration with an upper
range of up to 184 lines per 100 inhabitants and the lower range of
as little as 114 lines per 100 inhabitants, with a median penetration
of 138 lines per 100. Because the actual outcome depends on so
many factors (such as capital inflow, number of licenses awarded,
growth in number of executives, etc.) and it is not possible to predict
there the exact change in magnitude, the actual demand will fall
somewhere in this spectrum. Based on the compounded weighted
average of the two scenarios, the total number of lines in 2010 will
equal 266 million lines, including mobile, public, and fixed lines; we
refer to this as the median scenario. The highest possible outcome
of our analysis is 338 million lines according to the optimistic scenario and 209 million lines based on the conservative projection.
This type of growth will also be evident in the rural regions where
agriculture continues to be dominant component of the economy.
As such, the respectable growth in this sector is likely to attract more
foreign investors to regions that were previously not involved in international business and have a strong influence on Brazilian telecom.
The Recovery and Expansion Program for Telecommunication
and Postal Systems (PASTE) identified among its goals the potential
for a significant increase in the number of telephone lines throughout Brazil. Specifically, PASTE estimates suggest that on a nationwide basis phone service installation for fixed lines will increase by
13.5% through the year 2003. We found these estimates somewhat
conservative. Although our figures were based on the original PASTE
estimates, in our projections we also incorporated the impact of (1)
line growth as represented by all lines including land lines, public
phone lines, and cellular phone lines, (2) domestic and foreign in-
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vestment in the telecom sector, and (3) ‘‘subsidy’’ financing (i.e.,
varying installation fees per region based on GDP per capita levels).
In forecasting line penetration, we also took into consideration all
telephone services, including wire lines (fixed telephones and public
phones) as well as wireless telephones. Installed lines include main
lines in service, including residential and non-residential lines, as
well as inoperative lines. Our projections for the residential line
growth were based on:
•
•
•
•
•

population growth
GDP per capita
housing growth
education levels
crime statistics.

Non-residential line projections were based on:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

GDP per capita
capital inflow (local and foreign)
population growth estimates
labor force statistics
education and illiteracy rates
industrial output
regional development statistics.

We estimate main lines in service to be made up of approximately
75% residential lines and 25% in non-residential lines. We also determined that, based on current GDP per capita levels, out of 100 million adults only one-fourth could currently afford phone service.
Thus, a tariff restructuring is necessary in order to satisfy current
demand.
For modeling purposes, based on the above-mentioned assumptions, we estimate that fixed line service installation, including residential and non-residential lines, will grow to as much as 18%, with
public phone growth lagging by 6%, by the year 2010. The increase in
growth of fixed line service is a result of privatization, technological
improvements, and tariff restructuring, whereas public phone estimates are directly related to the number of licenses awarded for public phone installations.
Penetration of wireless lines in Brazil will be higher than can be
expected in a country with a similar macroeconomic profile. Mobile
phone estimates were based on:
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GDP per capital
the number of executives
income per family
crime statistics.

Comparing Brazil’s cellular phenomenon with the U.S. experience, Brazil’s cellular population penetration is already considerably
higher than per capita income would appear to support in several
markets, such as the northern and middle-eastern regions. Although
we propose no tariff ‘‘subsidy’’ financing to the cellular telephone
sector, based on the above-mentioned criterion, we predict that the
growth of mobile lines will far outpace that of fixed lines, with cellular phone service growth averaging about 35% per year. Cellular service should remain increasingly popular, as its costs decrease with
technology advances and the expected onset of competition. To consumers and businesses accustomed to waiting for a single line installation, comparatively prompt cellular service is an attractive option.
These circumstances may facilitate cellular demand rates disproportionately higher than in countries of similar economic and demographic development. Thus, by the year 2010, Brazil may have on
the median more than 150 million with wireless service compared to
slightly more than 3 million public phones.
As of 1995, Brazil had 150,450 intra-production lines (as indicated
by the number of extensions). Intra-production line projections were
based on:
•
•
•
•

GDP per capital
population growth
industrial and services development
inflow of foreign capital.

We estimate that intra-production line growth to be as much as 3
times the main fixed line growth due to an increase in foreign investment. Again, the actual outcome will depend on the magnitude of
change of all the factors and will fall somewhere in the range between the optimistic and the conservative scenarios.
Sensitivity Analysis
Historically, the development of Brazil’s telecom infrastructure has
been hindered by the government’s tariff policy. Past presidential
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administrations sought to keep tariffs for basic, local telephone service low in order to help suppress inflation. Notwithstanding crosssubsidizing of cheap basic monthly service rates with high tariffs for
domestic and international long distance calls, Brazil’s tariff structure has limited Telebras’s ability to capitalize on building a worldclass infrastructure to meet the demand for new service.
Telebras’s fundamental problem has been that basic local telephone service rates have been set too low to support a massive investment in infrastructure to meet the demand for new service. In
modeling the Brazilian telecom sector, we have assumed that tariffs
will be rebalanced gradually (i.e., local tariffs increase and long distance tariffs decrease) to converge to regional and subsequently international levels. With new tariffs, basic local service rates will
approach a level that would support the costs of service.
In addition to continuing to rebalance service rates, the new tariffs
will reduce the cost of new phone installation and eliminate the required purchase of Telebras’s stock by the Baby Brases. By altering
the current Telebras structure to a program where each Baby bras
would be compensated for long distance calls originated and terminated in their respective regions, the more profitable subsidiaries will
have to contribute a higher percentage of their revenues, subsidizing
the less profitable operators. One of the key components of this proposal is to ensure that cross-subsidies are eliminated to create a competitive environment.
In addition, it is important to focus greater attention on the impact of the international call traffic. With the increase of the international emphasis placed on trade and foreign investment, the role of
international calls cannot be undermined. The United States alone
contributed US$10,300 million in 1995, a 54.32% increase in relation
to 1994. Argentina is the second largest, followed by Germany, Italy,
and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Mercosul, and the trade opening
that lies behind it, will demand significant adjustment in the infrastructure and the international call traffic. However, in terms of development of international traffic calls we need to focus on the
market as a whole, not on a country-by-country basis. As such, the
market may be represented by the European Union, U.S. Mercosul,
Japan, Switzerland, Canada, and all others.
We began our analysis by determining elasticity of demand on a
national level to changes in installation fees, in order to be able to
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determine the Brazilian sensitivity to installation fees. We found out
that on a national basis, the Brazilian market has a fairly low elasticity of 39%. We then created three scenarios with varying fee proposals and were able to see that the Brazilian market on a national level
is not responsive to changes in fees. However, this analysis gave us
the understanding that we must look at market sensitivity on the
regional level instead.
We analyzed the installation fee change impact on line demand
across various regions by introducing fee reductions (for fixed line
service only) whose levels were based on differences in the standard
of living represented by (1) income per capita, (2) housing growth,
and (3) educational level of the labor force, and (4) crime statistics.
We assumed the average installation fee in Brazil to be R$300. In
order to make up the difference in the standard of living levels, we
applied a fee reduction of R$100 for poorer areas. The difference
would, in effect, be subsidized by an increase in the tariff rates introduced in the higher income states such as Rio de Janeiro and São
Paulo. We kept the fee at R$300 in the south because we felt that
this region best mirrors the profile of the nation.
The outcome of this sensitivity analysis had been just as expected—much greater stimulated growth in demand for fixed lines
as compared to demand generated without the ruse of varying the
installation fee level. For instance, in the northeast where demand is
highly elastic (we define elasticity as a unit change in line demand
for a given unit change in price), we found that we were able to
stimulate demand by as much as 22% by the time we dropped the
installation fees to R$200. Meanwhile, in the southeast, where demand is less elastic, the demand for phone service dropped by less
than 5% in total when we increased the installation fee by R$25, or
8%.
It is our opinion that changing the tariff structure in such a way
makes it possible to decrease the social and economic gap of regions
through the development of the telecom in the regions. Not only
will the industry be able to create a more homogeneous country by
the year 2010, but the Ministry of Communications will no longer
have a need to look for subsidies.
We also analyzed the tariff impact on line demand across various
regions. We found that the full impact of tariff change on line demand was apparent in the same month the change went into effect.

226

the top emerging markets

We also noticed that nationwide price elasticity of demand is higher
on long distance services as compared with local calls, where we recommend dropping prices in incremental fashion to bring them more
in line with local call rates. For example, the effect of a R$.02 drop
per year took almost two years to take full effect. This stems from
the low price elasticity ratio, which implies that Brazilians hesitate
to make fewer local calls following price increases. We propose gradually increasing local tariff rates to bring them more in line with
social and economic development goals as well as international levels. This will enable phone companies to cover more of the expenses
incurred in providing local telephone service.
The impact of a change in the tariff rates on international calls
showed a 12.38% increase in demand by the year 2000, at which time
tariff rates (based on our recommendations) will have been reduced
to R$1.50 per minute. This is an extremely encouraging result, indicating marginal price elasticity of demand.

Conclusion
Demand in the telecommunications market cannot be evaluated
solely by the use of traditional methods. Instead, the government
needs to examine social, economic, and political developments
which influence the size and potential of the market. According to
our study, the Telecom services market has excellent potential in
terms of traffic growth and line-in-service penetration. Furthermore,
Telecom has great potential to improve its operating efficiency.
Without the old rigid rate requirements, Telebras will have not only
the ability to generate higher revenues, but the tremendous opportunity to improve its network modernization and expansion. Global
competitiveness of Brazil will be strongly determined by the development of the telecom services.

CLIMB TO THE TOP
My friend Lori Minard was born 51 years ago at the foot of Mount
Rainier on the West Coast of the USA. He dared to climb to the top,
as he had promised to himself. On August 2, 2001, at 4.4 kilometers
up, he told his 16-year-old daughter he was choking. He sat down
and unbuttoned his collar. In two minutes Lori was gone.
At the end of the 1980s I was attempting to publish an article
about the inevitable decay of the USSR by the year 1992. Austria,
Switzerland, Bosnia, Holland—everywhere I tried was in vain. I spoke
to Henry Kissinger in his New York office and he told me ‘‘No, Dr.
Kvint, the country is bound tightly by the Communist Party, the
Red Army, and the KGB.’’
I say this to remind the reader that twelve years ago everyone
thought the idea was nonsense. Finally, I had a meeting with the
Managing Editor of Forbes, where I met Laurence Minard. He appeared much younger than he was, very young to be in the leader’s
chair of the most prestigious magazine for American business admirals. Despite his attentive glance from beneath his glasses, he was a
man of strong build. After an hour of conversation, he heard my
arguments and brought me to Jim Michaels, the editor who was the
head of Forbes for 37 years. It was Jim who had noticed Lori among
other young reporters. Two weeks following our conversation, the
cover of Forbes had five words: ‘‘Russia should quit the Soviet
Union—A Soviet Economist’s revolutionary proposal.’’
That was unexpected at the time. The intellectual curiosities of a
scientist along with the quick reaction of a reporter led Lori to success and recognition. Since 1997, Lori was the head of the European
Bureau of Forbes in London and was creating the international edition of the magazine, Forbes Global. In 1999 and 2000, he won the
‘‘Best business reporter of the year’’ award. During his 25-year career,
Lori has changed not only Forbes but business journalism across the
globe. In 2001 he climbed to the mountaintop forever.

New Time, August 19, 2001

Part III
THE EMERGING MARKET
OF RUSSIA

Transition to a Free Market

PUTIN’S WAR ON THREE FRONTS
In ‘‘Watch Out, Kleptocrats,’’ I predicted that Vladimir Putin would
be elected president of Russia in March and that he would declare
war on corruption. But what I didn’t foresee was the decisiveness
with which Putin would prosecute this campaign, by waging war on
two fronts—against the oligarchs, such as Boris Berezovsky, who control the commanding heights of the economy and the provincial governors who have financially benefited from their business links. That
makes three fronts, if you include the guerrilla war in Chechnya.
Taking action on one front would be hard enough; battling against
three sets of enemies simultaneously is extremely dangerous. Putin
should watch his back.
He had little choice other than to attack corruption. His government and the economy will be permanently crippled unless he can
increase tax revenues and reprivatize the state assets that were sold
for next to nothing in the early 1990s. Russia’s federal budget—
including defense, health, and education—totals only $21.9 billion,
less than that of New York City.
To curb the power of the governors, he has proposed a new territorial structure for Russia, dividing the 89 regions into seven federal
districts. Without waiting for parliamentary support and subsequent
constitutional changes, he has appointed heads of these areas, five
of them generals from the army, police, or security service. He proposed to parliament that the 89 regional governors be stripped of
the immunity that comes with their seats in the upper house of
parliament—and that their seats be taken away. The upper house
voted against this very popular measure, but the lower house will
soon override its opposition. With the governors stripped of their
immunity, more than a dozen can be expected to end up in jail for
corruption.
The attack on the oligarchs, however, will not be so straightforward. In the past four weeks, charges of tax evasion have been
brought against the largest oil company and the biggest carmaker.
Other charges have been leveled against the largest independent
Forbes Global, August 7, 2000

234

the emerging market of russia

television station and the majority shareholder of the world’s largest
platinum and nickel producer. But it will be hard for Putin to gain a
legal victory against them, not least because of the low quality of
lawyers in the prosecutor general’s office.
But if Putin succeeds, the benefits for both Russia and foreign
investors will be enormous. According to James Hatt, the CEO of
Metromedia International Telecommunications, an ambitious player
in Russian telecoms, ‘‘The fight against corruption in Russia is a
most welcome signal for foreign investors.’’
To ensure that Putin keeps the Russian people on his side, he will
soon reintroduce in parliament a proposal to legalize private land
ownership. This hugely popular reform was attempted several times
by Putin’s predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. But because of the high degree
of support he enjoys among lawmakers in the lower house, Putin will
be able to get the appropriate laws passed.
Another important measure will be to reprivatize companies that
were virtually given away by Yeltsin’s ministers. Putin will start by
having these companies evaluated using Western accounting standards. The government will then pay the current owners the derisory
sums it received the first time the companies were privatized. Then
the companies will be sold at auctions in which both Russians and
foreigners will be invited to participate.
How thoroughly will Putin clean up the Russian economy? One
yardstick is whether he will prosecute his former mentor, Anatoly
Chubais, the father of privatization. Putin has to be able to show the
illegality of most of the privatizations masterminded by Chubais in
the early 1990s. If he fails to do this, it will be extremely difficult to
reprivatize the companies.
Putin’s war has only just begun.

WATCH OUT, KLEPTOCRATS
In ‘‘The Last Days of Boris Yeltsin,’’ published in the September 7,
1998, edition of Forbes Global, I wrote: ‘‘[Boris] Yeltsin might strike
a deal to step down (he is not a well man) before the next elections,
which are set for June 2000.’’ On New Year’s Eve, 1999, Yeltsin announced his resignation. Thank you, Boris, for making me look good.
This is not the end of Yeltsin, however. Believe it or not, he has
hand-picked almost all of the candidates available to the Russian
electorate in the presidential campaign of 2000. Vladimir Putin, Yevgeny Primakov, Sergei Kiriyenko—all of them were ushered onto
Russia’s political stage by Yeltsin.
It’s not a given that all of these men will run. And of course other
candidates will appear, such as the outrageous nationalist and antiSemite Vladimir Zhirinovsky and the Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov. But as a practical matter, the choice for the Russian
people has already been made by Yeltsin. Barring some extraordinary
event in Russia over the next three months, on March 26 Russia will
elect a new president, Vladimir Putin. His only real competition is
Zyuganov, who can expect to capture 25 percent of the popular vote.
It would be easy to view Putin in a negative light. He is a former
lower-level KGB officer turned bureaucrat in the St. Petersburg city
government. But it would not be a full and truthful picture. The
Russian people certainly don’t see him that way.
Why is Putin now the most popular Russian leader? First, because
he has taken a tough and, in the opinion of most Russians, proper
step to counter the Chechen terrorists. He demonstrates persistence
in pursuing that aim. And, in contrast to the previous Chechen campaign of 1994–1996, the offensive he has pressed has so far resulted
in relatively few casualties for the Russian Army. For this, Putin is
no less popular than Zhirinovsky, Primakov, or General Alexander
Lebed among the officers and enlisted men of the Russian Army.
Second, the Russian people are tired of all of their aged leaders.
Putin is only 47. And he is especially popular among Russian women.
What does it all mean for the rest of the world? Mostly, it means
Forbes Global, January 24, 2000
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new life for Yeltsin’s stalled economic reforms toward a market economy. The world’s leadership will gain a very tough partner, not an
enemy, at the negotiating table. Regarding his likely economic strategy, there is little to go on. During his five months as prime minister,
Putin has not made a single serious attempt to improve the efficiency of the Russian economy. But that doesn’t mean he will not
develop such a program. I expect that in the next 30 days it will
appear.
To reform the economy, Putin needs to muster support on a level
similar to that of the Chechen War. It is therefore not difficult to
predict that the following steps will be taken: First, he will declare
war on corruption. He knows the value of creating examples. I am
certain that his enforcement agents (many of them drawn from his
former employer, the KGB) will arrest and jail some bureaucrats on
the regional and federal levels who are taking bribes.
The next (and related) step will be to revise some of the worst
excesses of privatization, specifically those that clearly resulted from
illegal procedures. This will hurt the kleptocrats who have essentially
robbed the state of valuable assets. Examples: in the aluminum and
nonferrous metals industries, companies worth hundreds of millions
of dollars were ‘‘sold’’ for a small fraction of their true market value.
Putin may also reclaim for Russian taxpayers criminally privatized
assets in other natural resource industries and in the telecommunications and mass media services.
Russia’s privatization needs to be put on a more transparent basis.
Companies that are for sale should be evaluated by the ‘‘Big Five’’
international accounting firms. Tenders should be opened to all investors, not just Russian ones. Putin’s close relationship with Anatoly
Chubais, Yeltsin’s former first deputy prime minister and architect
of the privatization program, means that Putin will be less forceful
in reversing criminal privatizations than he should be. But at least
he’ll start the process moving.
Finally, based on Putin’s experience in the city government of St.
Petersburg, it is reasonable to predict that he will be in favor of
encouraging international investment in the Russian economy. Putin
is no xenophobe. He has enough understanding and information to
realize that without foreign investment in key industries and services, it will be impossible to increase the average Russian’s very low
standard of living.
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Following the Chechen war (which I predict will be wound up by
election day in March), Putin’s first order of business will be the
declaration of an all-out offensive against corruption. To govern effectively, Putin will require popular initiatives. Fighting the
Chechen terrorists has been very popular with Russians; to fight the
kleptocrats who, in the opinion of most of Russian society, stole their
national wealth and prosperity, would be just as popular. If Putin
can take on Russia’s economic terrorists as effectively as he has battled the Chechen terrorists, he could be a great president.

THE LAST DAYS OF BORIS
YELTSIN
In February 1990, Forbes published an article by Vladimir Kvint predicting that the Soviet empire would fall apart and Russia would go it
alone. Most of the experts scoffed: It couldn’t happen. The accepted
view was that the KGB, the Communist Party, and the Red Army
would hold the empire together. They didn’t. Two years later the USSR
expired more or less peacefully into 15 republics. Again putting his
neck out, Kvint predicts that the Yeltsin government will soon fall and
be replaced by a much more authoritarian regime.
Eighty-one years ago this autumn, the October Revolution swept
from power a weak and ineffectual democratic government in Russia
and replaced it with totalitarian rule. As it turned out, this was a
dark day in world history.
Today Russia is ripe for another revolution. Weak and utterly rotten, the current government came to power by democratic means
but is anything but democratic. It is a little more than a cover under
which a gang of kleptocrats impoverish the country. Under communism, people had rubles but nothing to buy. Things are reversed now,
with shops full but most people’s wallets empty. If this be capitalism,
most Russians aren’t sure they want it. The situation validates for
them the old communist joke: Capitalism is man’s exploitation of
man, and communism is the other way around. If that weren’t bad
enough, tens of millions of Russians are not being paid even their
miserable wages. In protest, unpaid coal miners block the Trans-Siberian railroad for weeks at a time. Unpaid soldiers sell weapons,
uniforms, even tanks and aircraft to any willing buyer: a pretty frightening situation in a country that still possesses thousands of missiles
and a large nuclear stockpile.
You can’t judge Russian prosperity by what you see in Moscow.
One hundred miles outside the capital, a mere 20 miles from regional centers, there is hunger, and people are wearing rags. Tattered
Forbes, September 7, 1998, pp. 145–151.
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clothes and bread-and-potato diets are more representative of Russia
today than the relative prosperity of a few big cities.
In Siberia’s frigid Krasnoyarsk region (population: 3 million) the
average wage is less than $300 a month, and Krasnoyarsk is a hostile
place to stay alive.
Not insignificantly, the elected governor of Krasnoyarsk is General
Alexander Lebed, the tough and disciplined military man who became a popular hero for ending the war in Chechnya. Whether the
Yeltsin government lasts a few more months or somehow staggers
into 1999, Alexander Lebed is Yeltsin’s probable successor.
Tossed out by the Yeltsin government because he was too popular,
Lebed was elected governor of the Krasnoyarsk region, which covers
14% of the Russian territory, by a landslide. He is relatively untouched by corruption and has to his credit brought an end to the
fighting in Chechnya. He has been brutally critical of the Yeltsin
government and of the kleptocrats. Although he himself is not an
extreme nationalist, he could well come to power with their support
and in alliance with Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin’s former prime
minister, who is close to Russia’s communist-era leaders.
What would it take to trigger a coup d’état? Asked that late last
year, Gen. Lebed told Forbes: ‘‘Maybe it will be a woman whose child
dies from hunger or cold, who will carry him out on the street, and
the crowd will explode. It’s an unpredictable situation’’ (Forbes, January 12, 1998).
In that sense the situation resembles that of October and November 1917. The democratic Kerensky government was not so much
overthrown; it simply crumbled. Describing the Kerensky regime, the
writer Alan Moorehead declared: ‘‘It was like a body with no bones
in it, like a mind with no will.’’ You could say much the same about
the Yeltsin government. ‘‘Bolshevism,’’ Moorehead writes, ‘‘succeded
to an empty throne.’’
Less than two years ago (December 30, 1996) Forbes explained
how a handful of Russian bureaucrats-turned-businessmen were able
to grab control of Russia’s prime assets at a small fraction of their
true values. By my calculations, they and their hangers-on have taken
over assets worth as much as $150 billion since Yeltsin’s corrupt privatization program started in 1992.
The tycoons and their friends and retainers flaunt their new
wealth in such places as Cannes and Nice on the French Riviera.
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Last year, as poverty spread through much of Russia, those two Mediterranean resort cities were host to 100,000 Russian tourists, three
times as many as in 1994. They come loaded with so much cash that
almost every expensive shop posts the franc/ruble conversion rate
and signs in Russian as well in French.
As a Russian, it hurts me to say this, but I think the new government, authoritarian though it will be, will govern better and prove a
better partner for Western nations than the present so-called democracy. I once admired Yeltsin (see ‘‘Who’s in Charge Around Here?’’
below) and put great faith in him. Unfortunately, Gorbachev was
right when he predicted that Yeltsin would create widespread corruption.
In Soviet times, the state exploited the workers by paying barely
subsistence wages and using the rest of the national product for its
own purposes. But the profits from industry, which once help fund
the government, now go into private pockets and are neither invested nor paid out in taxes, leaving the government seriously short.
In past times a government faced with spending in excess of revenues would rev up the printing presses and use inflation as a hidden
tax on the economy. But the Yeltsin government cannot use the
printing press. Its sole financial accomplishment has been a stable
ruble that stopped hyperinflation—and with the August 17 devaluation, even that achievement is history. Thus Yeltsin and his aides
have to finance the deficit in the most primitive of ways: By not
paying its bills. According to Washington, D.C.’s PlanEcon, a research outfit specializing in former Eastern-bloc economies, the Russian state owes its workers 77 billion rubles, equal to one-third of all
rubles now in circulation. Private-sector industries owe their workers
another 70 billion.
How do people live without paychecks? They subsist on dwindling
savings and the food they and their relatives raise on tiny plots outside of town.
Most experts and, of course, the government claimed positive
GDP growth for the economy in 1997. These claims were based more
on wish than on reality. Had the growth occurred, living conditions
for ordinary people might have gotten slightly better and they would
have regained some hope. But it didn’t happen. By my estimate,
there was no growth in 1997, and 1998 will be even worse. I believe
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Russia will suffer a 2% fall in both industrial output and GDP, thus
continuing the downward trajectory of recent years.
Agriculture is a disaster: During the last five years, livestock production declined, in absolute terms, to the level of 1953, the year of
Stalin’s death. Why? Because while the cost of inputs had risen
sharply in real terms, the price of food has not.
Russia has a trade deficit this year for the first time since the
breakup of the USSR. Yeltsin apologists like to blame this shortfall
on low world prices for oil and other raw materials, but this is only
part of the picture.
In a situation like this, the IMF loan is useless. It may enable
Russia to roll over its foreign currency obligations but will not do
anything for the country’s underlying economic problems. It will not
close the gap between what the government takes in and what it
pays out.
Almost alone among nations that privatized, Russia got close to
zero for the assets it divested thanks to the privatization program
carried out by Yeltsin and his two main aides—Anatoly Chubais and
Yegor Gaidar—between 1992 and 1995. Instead of selling businesses
in open bidding at fair prices, they basically gave state-owned monopolies to a small group of clever opportunists, without competitive
bidding and usually without first breaking up the monopolies.
Once basic industries like fuel, fertilizer, and machinery were in
private hands, the new owners were permitted to push prices as high
as they wanted. It was shock therapy, but the shock didn’t accomplish what it was intended to do: Scarcely a ruble of the monopoly
profits were reinvested in the economy. Much more went to places
like the French Riviera, Swiss banks, and expensive jewelry shops.
In early privatizations there was the legal fiction that the buyers
were paying book value, but this was a joke. It was book value unadjusted for the inflation that at one point in the early post-communist
days reached an annual rate of 2,200%. So-called book value often
amounted to mere pennies on the dollar.
Abetting the opportunists were the bureaucrats. A few months ago
I was in Toronto with a midlevel Russian government official. He
wanted to buy a briefcase. I took him to a leather goods shop where
he examined bags priced between $300 and $700. He turned up his
nose. Then he saw one with a price tag of $3500. He bought it—with
cash. That would have been ten months of his official salary.
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When the October Revolution of 1917 snuffed out the weakling
Kerensky government, it was a tragedy for Russia and for the world.
The communist government that followed was one of the cruelest
regimes in human history. The fall of Yeltsin need not end so badly
for the world, though it may cost many of today’s new rich dearly. A
tough new government must expropriate the tycoons’ assets and
then resell their ill-gotten gains in competitive bidding at prices that
reflect true economic values. By my calculations, this would raise
upward of $30 billion, and create a tax-paying industrial base. It
would be a first step toward creating a sound economy that might
be able to support democracy.
Yeltsin? He is so badly tainted by association with the kleptocrafts
he has just about lost his legitimacy in Russian eyes. For instance,
last year Yeltsin’s son-in-law Valvery Okulov was named chairman of
Aeroflot—a holding of one of Russia’s richest new capitalists, Boris
Berezovsky. Okulov’s qualifications for the job: He had been an Aeroflot navigator. But few were surprised at the appointment: Berezovsky had financed Yeltsin’s re-election bid.
Yeltsin himself may or may not have any hidden assets. But Anatoly Chubais has come under strong suspicion in the press for the
sources of his money.
Meanwhile, former acting prime minister Yegor Gaidar was so
thoroughly discredited by the privatization and price reform fiascos
that he lost his low-level seat in the Duma in the election in 1995.
How will the end come? This is Russia and anything can happen.
A military coup is possible, but the end could come in other ways.
Yeltsin might strike a deal to step down (he is not a well man) before
the next elections, which are set for June 2000. In the event of his
early retirement, power would go briefly to Sergi Kiriyenko, the 36year-old prime minister, who has no political base. Within three
months new elections would be called.
My understanding is that Boris Berezovsky, desperate to hold on
to his newly gained millions, has tried to broker a deal between Yeltsin and Lebed. Such a deal would enable Lebed to come to power
via the ballot box. For arranging such a deal Berezovsky apparently
hopes to be allowed to keep most of his fortune. He may be kidding
himself. Lebed is tough and cynical, and at any rate knows he can
succeed only if he can recapture the assets the government gave
away.
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So, forget those IMF loans; they are almost irrelevant. Equally
futile is the suggestion made by speculator George Soros that the
IMF and G-7 countries impose a currency board on Russia. Forget
it. Unlike Argentina, say, Russia is not a country with capitalist institutions; a currency board will change nothing because it will not
address Russia’s basic problems.
The August 17 devaluation will simply make matters worse. As
London’s Financial Times observes, devaluation will take another big
chunk out of Russians’ savings and make its foreign-debt burden
even harder to service. And as Forbes Global publisher Domingo Cavallo observed (Forbes, April 6), currency boards and other reforms
succeed only when introduced by local leaders—as in Argentina—
not when imposed from outside.
The 90-day debt moratorium compounds the problems. Having
stiffed the world’s lenders, where does Yeltsin think he can turn for
new money?
What about dollarizing the economy? This, too, would not help.
Russia already has more than 40 billion U.S. dollars in circulation,
more than any country save the U.S. But ownership of these dollars
is concentrated in a relatively few number of hands. Dollarizing the
economy would make life even harder for those without them.
Smelling the end, many lesser kleptocrats are scurrying for foreign
passports—hundreds of Russians have bought themselves residency
status in the Bahamas and other Caribbean places. Canada also gets
lots of votes.
Whoever seizes the vacant throne, it will not be Bolsheviks this
time because communism is discredited here as nowhere else in the
world. It is conceivable that Yeltsin will resign and Lebed brought to
power via elections. But however the government changes, it will try
to force through the social and economic reforms that Yeltsin is unable or not prepared to carry out.
Unwilling to face these facts, the International Monetary Fund,
under strong pressure from the U.S. government, is providing new
multibillion dollar loans to the Yeltsin government, presumably to
save Russian democracy and to keep its nuclear arms in relatively
safe hands. They will do neither.
It is not even clear that IMF money can postpone the day of reckoning. Where did the $50 billion that Russia already borrowed go?
(There is another $17 billion in IMF commitments plus $100 billion
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in now-frozen Soviet-era debt.) Will the new IMF money simply end
up in the Swiss bank accounts of the kleptocrats and their friends?
These people have already grabbed many of the best assets that belonged to the old Soviet State and diverted to their overseas bank
accounts a large share of the foreign exchange Russia has earned
from exports. One of the first priorities of any post-Yeltsin government would be to bring that money back home and undo the phony
privatization that was tantamount to grand larceny.
In running away, the new rich may save their skins but not necessarily their fortunes. Any future government, whether it emerges
from new elections or from a coup d’état, will most certainly press
criminal charges against the big guns and demand repatriation of its
capital. There’s plenty of precedent—Switzerland has handed back
money Ferdinand Marcos stole in the Philippines, and has frozen the
Salinas drug money from Mexico.
Look, therefore, for a renationalization of much Russian industry
and a reimposition of many controls, at least for a while. The future
of post-Yeltsin Russia will not be the American model of capitalism.
Assets genuinely owned by foreigners will probably avoid expropriation since any Russian government will need foreign capital and will
go to great lengths not to offend its sources. Shares owned by small
investors are also probably safe: The owners had no part in the looting and paid market prices for their holdings.
If things go well, Russia could go the way of Taiwan and Chile: a
period of authoritarianism paving the way for the establishment of
democracy. But don’t grieve for Yeltsin government when it falls: It
is neither democratic nor capitalistic, but simply kleptocratic.

FIXING RUSSIA
In his speech announcing his nomination of Viktor Chernomyrdin
as prime minister, President Boris Yeltsin stated that no one could
have expected the Russian financial crisis. Soldiers and workers
aren’t getting paid, export earnings end up in Swiss bank accounts,
and no one could have foreseen a crisis? The man is clueless.
The crisis cannot be ended by IMF loans or half-hearted reforms.
It can end only when the crooked privatizations of the early 1990s
are reversed, some controls reestablished, and the crooks who stole
the proceeds from Russia’s exports forced to disgorge their foreign
bank accounts. This Yeltsin cannot do: He is the creature of the
kleptocrats.
When Yeltsin falls—whether via resignation or by a coup d’état—
his successor will have to do things that may be seen abroad as a
backsliding to communism, but that will be a misconception. I do
believe that money honestly invested in shares and physical assets
from abroad and by ordinary investors at home will not be confiscated. To attract foreign investors back into the economy and to
persuade ordinary Russians to invest their savings, both groups will
have to be made whole—although foreigners who bought those nowfrozen government bonds (GKOs) are going to be stuck holding the
paper for a long time. Voiding the crooked privatizations and doing
it again honestly and openly could bring in more foreign exchange
than all the money that would come right out from under Russian
mattresses.
I think, therefore, that sound investments made now in Russia will
pay off: in telecoms—but not in mass media—in oil exploration,
public utilities in some regions, transportation, high-tech and software companies, the construction industry, and a few reliable banks.
But know what you are buying. There is a big difference between
companies run by Western-style management and publicly traded in
the U.S. and those that are run by the old-style bureaucrats and their
kleptocratic masters. Which means that companies controlled by
Russia’s new magnates should be avoided. These companies are
Forbes, September 21, 1998, pp. 70–72.
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likely to be renationalized and ultimately resold, perhaps in part to
foreign interests, in open tenders organized by foreign and domestic
accounting, law, and investment banking firms.
On the other hand, several of the mutual funds managed by foreign firms, such as Templeton Russia fund, could be promising investments once Yeltsin is out of the way and Russia starts afresh.
With their prices down 87% and more, there are certain to be bargains among Russia stocks.
We had all better hope that the change comes quickly. For many
years, when Westerners asked me about control of nuclear weapons
in Russia, I laughed, because these weapons were always in strong
hands: Brezhnev, Gorbachev, Yeltsin. These guys would never use
nuclear weapons. They loved life and the privileges their rank
brought them. They had no death wish.
It is different, though, with military men who have not been paid
and whose families have no money for decent food. Discipline in the
Russian army hasn’t been at such a low level since the last days of
the czar. Soldiers have been selling guns and tanks and aircraft.
What’s to stop them from selling nuclear and biological weapons?
Terrorists do not need to buy a nuclear bomb as a whole; they can
buy them in pieces from different places. Chechen guerrillas have
already threatened Russian leaders with word that they possess biological weapons.
Americans worry about the possible coming to power in Russia of
a nationalistic dictatorship that might turn aggressive to make the
Russian people forget their troubles. Not to worry. Even a military
dictatorship would have an enemy close at hand: the pseudocapitalists who hijacked the Russian economy and stole the bread from
Russian mouths. As recently as 1992 these pseudocapitalists were as
poor as most other Russians. They had no capital and no access to it
but bribed and muscled their way to wealth by methods described in
previous issue of Forbes. They then proceeded to send abroad the
money earned from Russian exports, leaving Russian companies unable to pay their workers. These people, not foreign investors, will
feel the wrath of Yeltsin’s successors. Indeed, selling foreigners a
stake in the economy will be seen as the only real hope of putting
Russia on a more prosperous path.

YEAREND—BULL RUN IN RUSSIA,
EAST EUROPE MAY SLOW
New York, Dec. 12 (Reuters)—More players, more issues but lower
returns are expected for the fixed income markets in Russia and East
Europe in 1997, U.S. experts said.
Investors expect 1997 to be less bountiful than 1996, which so far
has seen Russian debt double in value while Poland has risen 35%
and Bulgaria 28%, they said.
This year’s heady ride, of course, followed the 1995 liquidity
crunch brought by rising U.S. interest rates, while next year’s performance will be compared to the much stronger baseline levels of
1996.
Vladimir Kvint, senior consultant at Arthur Andersen Economic
Consulting, said Russia’s political risk has diminished with a succession of free parliamentary and presidential elections, and portfolio
investments have risen to reflect the changing perception.
Kvint estimated that foreign direct investment would touch $3
billion this year, up from $2 billion in 1995. Yet he said he thinks
foreign investment remains paltry if one considers Russia’s wealth of
natural resources, educated labor force, and well-developed industrial infrastructure.
What is holding foreign investors back from directly participating
in Russia’s epochal transformation? Long-term foreign investors still
fear Russia’s financial instability, Kvint asserted. He said a financial
crisis could erupt in five months, noting that Russian citizens have
been putting $2 billion to $3 billion worth of rubles per month into
foreign currencies. Their savings—estimated at 25% of the gross domestic product—are not deployed productively in the Russian economy, he added.
Kvint did not expect Russia’s economic growth to turn positive, as
Russian officials have projected. Instead, he expected a contraction
of one percent in 1997. Faced with mounting wage arrears and social
unrest, the central bank may not resist the temptation to print ruReuters, Thursday, December 12, 1996, 14:13:09 (partial).
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bles, leading to rising inflation and currency devaluation, he said.
The specter of devaluation could speed capital flight from Russia
and reverse the portfolio investment flow, he said. This could
prompt investment in East Europe to spread between large markets
of Poland and the Czech Republic and smaller new markets of Slovenia and Romania, he added.
But Jaroslaw Aranowicz, senior European analyst at Freimark,
Blair, and Co., doubted a financial crisis would happen in Russia. He
pointed to the economy’s resilience and promising progress on tax
collection by the government.
But he agreed with Kvint’s assessment that under-investment
would limit Russia’s economic growth, predicting a flat growth rate
for 1997, compared to the official forecast of a two-percent rise.

WATCHING RUSSIAN BUSINESS
VENTURES
While the world waited for the first stage of Russia’s presidential
elections, Vladimir Kvint was watching commercial activity more
closely than the balloting. Kvint had predicted the breakup of the
Soviet Union two years before it disintegrated in 1991, and he expected Boris Yeltsin to be elected president. What he cannot forecast
is when the new Russia will realize its promise as a global economic
power.
Kvint is a professor at Fordham University and an emerging markets expert at Arthur Andersen & Co., S.C., in New York. His analysis
of events in Russia starts with a basic point: No country this huge
has ever tried to so totally change its economic system. So, it is remarkable that Russia has made as much progress in six years, despite
the resulting problems of crime, poverty, and confusion, he said.
‘‘My opinion of the future of Russia is very optimistic,’’ he said.
‘‘In 1987, there were 23 foreign companies in Russia. After the rules
were lifted that limited foreign investment, there are now 60,000.
Now the situation is not drastically better than it was . . . in 1992
when inflation was 2,300%. But without capital flow a country cannot survive.’’
Of 100 U.S. firms trying to create joint ventures in Russia from
1988 to 1992, Kvint found only 8% were successful. Among the failures, 28% cited the absence of a reliable partner with financial resources; 20% blamed financial problems; and 15% said they were
victims of a bureaucracy that was in turmoil. One example was a
joint venture by Du Pont Co. drafted by a U.S. lawyer that fell apart
in Russia simply because it was written on the wrong form, he said.
In the period 1992–94, Kvint’s survey saw the success of joint ventures double to 17%. The top obstacle remained the absence of a
reliable local partner, he said, but other factors have improved. Limited convertibility of the ruble, privatization of huge amounts of land
Interview with David Wallace, in Philadelphia Business Journal, August 30–
September 5, 1996, p. 16.
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and resources, and a stabilizing government have improved the business climate. ‘‘We are working with a totally different country than
we had only four years ago,’’ he said. ‘‘I don’t want to paint a rosy
picture, but it is not what the mass media says it is.’’
News accounts of organized crime and the cash-strapped local
economy have scared away investors and business interests, except
for those with the deepest pockets. Riding out the transition period
hasn’t been easy for Russians or anyone else, said Nikolai Tchoulkov,
the deputy permanent representative of Russia to the United Nations. He pointed to disorder in the tax system that has impeded
economic development and said efforts are under way to eliminate
the double and triple taxation that have plagued start-up ventures.
The number of different local and regional taxes and their definitions are to be changed, he said. Regional taxes can be as high as
25% and a value-added tax can quickly turn profits into losses.
‘‘Russia will be moving from net losses of investment dollars to a
slow gain in the next few years,’’ he said confidently. ‘‘Russia’s imports have increased and export duties on oil and timber have been
cut, some by as much as one-half.’’
The tax initiatives came after Yeltsin gave local and regional officials unprecedented power to deal directly with foreign companies,
Tchoulkov said. Local governments want tools to reduce unemployment, create economic development, and assist their residents. And
most local officials are viewed completely separate from the presidential elections—the way a city’s election for mayor may be isolated
from the party politics of a national campaign.
U.S. exports to Russia could reach $3 billion this year, a new high,
said Kvint. Last year’s $2.8 billion in U.S. exports represented a 10%
increase over 1994—so companies are finding ways to make deals,
whether through cash sales, barter, deferred payments, or other
methods. Russia remains a risky place for business but an important
market in the long-term.
After all, he said, Russia and its former satellites represent 25% of
the entire world population that has only opened for business since
the early 1990s.
Russia controls vast quantities of natural resources as the thirdlargest oil producer and the largest supplier of natural gas, cobalt,
and platinum.
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So, instead of campaign promises and other election year hoopla,
Kvint is watching the companies who wait on the sidelines. When
they finally get the signal from Russian voters that they are ready
to continue with economic reform, then the real competition will
begin.

RUSSIA’S IMBALANCE OF POWER
On June 16, Russia will hold its most important election of this century as its people vote to retain or replace President Boris N. Yeltsin.
But this political puzzle, like all puzzles, has a clear, finished picture:
No matter who is elected, Mr. Yeltsin will remain in power. The only
question is what title he will hold—or give himself.
I will not predict the mechanism by which Mr. Yeltsin will keep
his power in the framework of the Russian constitution and political
struggle. I can only draw analogies. In China, there is a president, a
prime minister, even a general secretary of the Communist Party,
but power is held by Deng Xiaoping, whose only title now is President of the Bridge Association. Or one can go back to the 1920s in
Poland, where Jozef Pilsudski, a hero of World War I, created the
title Boss of the State after he seized power from the parliamentary
government.
Mr. Yeltsin will likewise remain Russia’s ruler in some way after
the election (which could not conceivably, by the way, be won by
the undeclared candidate Mikhail S. Gorbachev, whose popularity in
the West is not at all matched in Russia). The communists in parliament already know the rules of the game and the limits on their
power. Mr. Yeltsin taught them much of this in 1993 when he had
parliament shut down by a barrage of tank fire. Democracy? No. But
it did provide three years of stability.
Today, the new communists are staging a comeback. And while
this does not threaten Mr. Yeltsin’s power, it will, like his overwhelming presence, help shape the nation through the rest of the decade.
New communists won about 35% of the seats in the lower house in
Russia’s parliamentary elections on December 17, largely because
voters had had enough hardships from the ‘‘shock therapy’’ employed to build a market economy.
The communist resurgence has needlessly worried many Western
investors. The new communists are not against a market economy,
only the method used to get there. In fact, it is too late for Russia to
revert to the old-style communist system, as capitalist institutions,
The New York Times, March 10, 1996, Section 3, p. 14.
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such as private banks and insurance companies, have already been
established and the country cannot live without foreign cooperation,
trade, and investment.
This story has been played out in almost all the former Soviet
republics and the countries of Eastern Europe except the Czech Republic and Albania. Many anti-communists and dissidents who came
to power on the wave of independence in 1990–91 have lost elections, and former communists have returned to power.
Perhaps the most prominent example is Poland, where the anticommunist Lech Walesa lost re-election as president last year to
Aleksander Kwasniewski, a former communist. Even in Bulgaria,
where the dissident Zhelyu Zhelev remains president, new communists have won parliamentary elections and the office of prime minister, who holds the economic power.
These events show that while the people would like to have a
market economy as dessert, they prefer to retain as a main course
some social protections of the communist era and, of course, to have
adequate wages. The election results in Russia are not an indication
that people want to live under communist dictatorships, but only
that their best choice was to return to office those leaders with socialist and protectionist orientations. The vote also represented a
protest against the business and government corruption that has
swept the country.
All this should reassure Western investors. In addition, the Russian parliament, where the new communists largely reside, has no
direct influence on business in Russia or on business cooperation
with the West. Only Mr. Yeltsin has that power, both directly and
through the government of Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin.
Most Russians know that without cooperation with the West the
nation cannot expect to survive. They and their former Soviet neighbors know they cannot rebuild businesses without Western technology, managerial skills, and capital market institutions.
Still, these countries’ efforts are clumsy. Just as the Soviet Union
tried unsuccessfully to build communism by decree, so the new leaders are making futile attempts to build capitalism by decree. They
began privatizing companies at book value, not market value, thus
raising minimal capital. Soon, nothing will remain to sell, and they
will not have enough money to provide the social protections they
promised.
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And so in the elections after 2000, these new leaders will suffer
the same fate as their predecessors: the people will reject them. In
their place will be democratically elected leaders who will have an
understanding of market economics and who will not need to rely
on socialist-communist slogans. These elections will mark the end of
the transition from communism to democracy in post-communist
countries.

ELECTION RESULTS IN THE
RUSSIAN DUMA
As usual, the American mass media is overestimating political
changes in Russia and their implication for business. The conventional wisdom about the election results in Russia is that the communists have come back to parliament. The communists won
approximately 22% of the vote, the party of the opportunist Vladimir
V. Zhirinovsky won about 11%, and less than 9.5% was won by Viktor
Chernomyrdin’s party called ‘‘Our Home Is Russia.’’
According to Western popular opinion, Chernomyrdin’s party is
the one hope to protect freedom and the market economy in Russia.
Don’t be misled. Remember December 1992 and January 1993 when
Yegor Gaidar was forced to resign as acting prime minister, and the
American media was unified in its opinion that the then new Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin, the ‘‘apparatchik’’ and communist, would
cause Russia to revert back to the dark days of communism. When I
published an article in The New York Times in January 1993, I received negative letters asking how I could support the apparatchik
Chernomyrdin! It is interesting that today he is viewed as the only
protector of freedom.
This is the image the press provides. But it is misleading for American business. What is the reality? In 1991 when the Soviet Union
disappeared, and the people spoke about a ‘‘velvet’’ (bloodless) revolution, democrats in Russia had not yet come into power. The highest levels of communist apparatchiks were replaced by second-class
apparatchiks (a younger generation from the provinces). The appointment of Gaidar was a move typical of the communist bureaucrats. Who was Gaidar? He worked for a magazine called The
Communist, the party’s main public relations machine. When, as
acting prime minister, he made serious mistakes, throwing 90% of
the people below the poverty line, President Yeltsin had no choice
but to replace him. Yeltsin then appointed the much more experienced Chernomyrdin, who served in the Communist Party, but
The Kvint Newsletter, 3, No. 3 (1995).
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whose executive experience was in heavy industry, mostly natural gas
and oil.

Definition of Communism
The term ‘‘communism’’ in Russia also has varying meanings whose
subtleties the West does not understand. In Russia there is another
Communist Party, ‘‘Communists-Labor-Russia-for-the-Soviet-Union,’’
that is trying to restore the former Soviet Union. This party did not
attract enough votes to secure a party spot in parliament. The
‘‘Communist Party of the Russian Federation’’ received 22% of the
vote. Together with its members who secured seats individually and
its main ally, the Agricultural Party, they control 33% of the seats in
the new Duma. This group is not against cooperation with the West.
Nor is there an agenda to take military actions in the world. What is
its position? It’s a socialist democratic party. One interesting side
note is that of the six members who organized the coup in August
1991, two are members of the Communist Party and were elected
to the Duma: Anatoly Lukiynov, the speaker of the former USSR
parliament, and General Varennikov, of the army.
Through personal experience, I strongly believe that after 70 years
of communism in Russia very few people (with the possible exception of some old-timers and a few young extremists) would like to
rebuild communism in Russia. The overwhelming majority know
what Stalin’s Communist Party accomplished; at least 20 million
people were killed or died in prisons. Is it possible to believe that
22% of the population would like to revert to that?

Voting Against, Not For
What are they voting for? The public is not voting for a particular
candidate or party; rather, it is voting against Yeltsin’s government.
They are the same 25% of the people who in 1993 voted for Zhirinovsky. However, in 1993 they had no choice. They did not want to
vote for Yeltsin (they thought that he did not care about the day-today life of people). Because Yeltsin sent his political rivals to prison,
they voted for the opportunist Zhirinovsky. This election was differ-

election results in the duma

257

ent. There were 43 parties on the ballot. People voted for the party
that paid attention to their everyday needs. Because the Chernomyrdin party, created only this year, was viewed by many as the party of
Yeltsin, it was a vote against Yeltsin. All the hundreds of millions of
dollars spent by Chernomyrdin’s Party of Government Power were
not enough to make people believe in Yeltsin’s vision for the country.
Tactically, it was a dramatic mistake for President Yeltsin two days
before the election to make a speech on television against the Communist Party. Yeltsin tried to show people how to vote by speaking
against the Communist Party.
In Russia it is usual that when a dictator proclaims he is ‘‘against’’
something or someone, the people become united in their feelings
‘‘for’’ it. During communist times, when the Communist Party propaganda machine wrote negative articles about the U.S., people drew
opposite conclusions. Yeltsin, from some points of view, is a dictator,
and he intends to survive as such in Russia.

What the Election Really Means
What are the positive and negative outcomes of this election? On
the positive side, it is important to keep in mind that ultra-nationalist parties such as Communists-Labor Russia-for the Soviet Union
received only 4.2% of the vote or less than the number required to
be in parliament. Nor did the Russian communists get sufficient
votes to take over parliament. It means that very few people are
voting for ultra-nationalists. The party of Gaidar also did not win any
seats. This signifies that people are not voting for those candidates
trying to be populists, and who are not taking responsibility for their
inflammatory slogans.
One more note: Chernomyrdin did not lose; he won, despite a less
than 10% showing. He had no choice. He could not distance himself
from Yeltsin, because, if he tried to do so, Yeltsin would have fired
him. But he is still a powerful contender in Russian politics.
On the negative side, people with strong economic programs and
with an understanding of the market economy do not have sufficient
political experience. Rather, opportunists like Zhirinvosky and the
leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennadi
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Zyuganov, have learned how to manipulate public opinion. This is a
very negative result of the elections.
There is one clear message for the presidential elections scheduled
for June 16, 1996. President Yeltsin is very unpopular. Currently he
has no strong competitor, and many view this as very dangerous,
because any opportunist who could manipulate public opinion could
become president. However, that is the wrong conclusion to draw
from this. Yeltsin is not a Gorbachev. He will not give up power, and
the bureaucrats around him will not give up their privileges. Elections will take place, and instead of receiving minimal support from
the people (like 5%), Yeltsin will win. He knows how to handle the
political process.
What does it mean for business leaders? Russia has arrived at the
same stage as Italy. Politicians are fighting for power and privilege,
but business is going on and the market economy is developing.
More and more capitalist institutions have appeared in Russia.
There are 3,000 private insurance companies, more than 2,000
private banks, 75% of Russia’s industrial companies are in private
hands, as well as 90% of trade and 90% of the law firms. This is the
real guarantee against communism. Communists who gained in the
elections know they are there for the moment. It is also in their best
interest to continue to privatize business. They are using the political
arena for their private interest, looking out for their income.

PRIVILEGES OF THE DUMA AND
BORIS YELTSIN’S POWER
On December 17 there will be a new political spectacle in Russia:
election to the parliament. Some believe that this is an important
election, one that will have an impact on business, or be a prognosticator for the presidential election on June 16, 1996. This election,
however, is of no real importance. The parliament has no influence
on business or the power structure in Russia.
Recently, at a business lunch with a very prominent Wall Street
analyst, we discussed the upcoming parliamentary election. I gave
my rational for saying that the parliament has no influence whatsoever on what happens in the business community. The analyst’s reply
is typical of those dealing with investors whose information comes
predominantly from the Western media, ‘‘I believe your argument,
and even your reasoning, but I cannot tell it to investors because
they are taking this election seriously. I have to play the game, or
they will think I do not understand the political situation.’’
I do not agree with the opinion in the popular press, which places
importance on the parliament. The parliament (State Duma and
Federal Council) has no importance. An example will make this
point very clear. Earlier this year, the State Duma had a vote of no
confidence in the government of Viktor Chernomyrdin. The act was
a direct reflection on President Yeltsin, because every minister, including the prime minister himself, was appointed by President Yeltsin. The day following the negative vote, Yeltsin told the Duma that
if it cast a no-confidence vote again, he would dissolve the Duma,
divesting it of all its power. The next day, the Duma reversed itself
and voted positively for the prime minister. The members of the
Duma understood their mistake.
The fact that the State Duma has no power is fortunate for the
country. The Duma is composed primarily of opportunists and former or current communists, who change their clothes depending on
the situation or political weather. This has not been recognized by
The Kvint Newsletter, 3, No. 2 (1995).
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the Western media, because they are not familiar with the backgrounds of the members, and do not track their American counterparts. The overwhelming number of Duma members are concerned
only about their personal power or their privileges, or about both. In
Russia these two concerns are very strongly connected.
The semi-democratic election to the last soviet parliament we saw
in 1989 was the last election of romantics. Opportunists and bureaucrats understood the rules of the new political game. Today, the parliament definitely does not represent democracy. I do not know who
is an advocate of the democratic cause in Russia. Perhaps its strongest protection is a result of the development of a market economy.
Even the former communists and ‘‘apparatchiks’’ (functionaries)
have a stake in the new game and understand that power is in the
hands of the president and government.

Privileges Are a Key Motivator
One of the goals of the new parliament was to take away the special
power and privileges the members had during Soviet times. The result has been quite different. Current parliament members have
even more privileges than in former days. First of all, under Soviet
rule, being a member of parliament was not a job in itself. Members
met only twice a year for approximately two days. Now membership
is a full-time job with a huge salary (which they could never get in
business because the majority do not have the necessary skills to be
employable in private industry). Each member has a free office in
the center of Moscow, free assistants (a minimum of five), 24 days a
year paid vacation in the best spas, a dacha, an apartment practically
free in Moscow for those from the regions, free limousine service,
and special prices for food. There are even special tailors for members of the Duma. Yeltsin, as a former associate member of the Politburo, understands the value of these privileges and how to mange
the members. Yeltsin knows both how to give and how to take away
if they are ‘‘bad boys.’’
In October 1993, he demonstrated vividly what he can and will
do, by dissolving the parliament.
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Members of the Cabinet
Unlike the system in the U.S. in which cabinet members do not
also serve in Congress, in Russia members of the cabinet are often
members of the Duma. In fact, the members of the Duma who wear
those two hats do have power. Many in that position, having been
appointed by Yeltsin, are most interested in maintaining the status
quo.
Members of the government are individuals of a much higher
quality than those in parliament. They are doing a good job of conducting business in a difficult transitional time.

Parties Vie for Power in Parliament
Among the leaders who are emerging for the December election is
Yegor Gaidar. He is the ‘‘democratic,’’ former communist, son and
grandson of major players of Stalin’s propagandist machine. His
party is called Choice of Russia. They have no chance.
Other powers on the scene include the Communist Party, the
Yabloko Party that presents itself as the party of reform, and several
chauvinistic movements with charismatic leaders like General
Lebed. Among the secondary group, there is the party led by former
Vice President Rotskoi (Yeltsin abolished the position of vice president when drafting the current constitution), and the party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky.
All these parties, with the exception of Zhirinovsky’s, favor cooperation with the West. In the previous election, when leaders of viable parties were in prison and could not participate, Zhirinovsky’s
party received 25% of the votes. There is no chance that will happen
again. It is likely that the new parliament will include members of
the Agricultural Party, Women’s Party, and various other parties
such as the Party of Economic Freedom.

High Stakes in June
The real test is in the presidential election that will take place on
June 16, 1996, four days after President Yeltsin’s presidential powers
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end. The outcome of that election is definite and positive. If he is
alive, Yeltsin will continue to be president or head of state. It does
not matter what his title is; he is Boris Yeltsin. Even if it is a different
title, he will remain in power.
He could use many approaches in maintaining his power. He could
use the traditional approach of scaring regional officers by helping
them have a clear picture of what could happen if he is not reelected.
Or he could use his control over the power structure (security services and the Ministry of Defense) to ensure his power. Unlike Gorbachev, Yeltsin has demonstrated that he knows how to manage his
constituents in order to win. And they are just awaiting his orders on
how to be useful.
I remember how many people discussed Chernomyrdin’s comment that he was not going to run for the presidency. It was never
an option. If something happens in the next three or four years, he
could be a successor; after that time a new leader will emerge.
I have very simple advice for the many investors who are focusing
on the political fights in Russia. There is going to be stability. Yeltsin
will remain in power if he is alive, and the Duma will continue to
fight for its privileges. For those doing business, it is best to work
with the owners of privatized companies, with executives of stateowned companies, with local and federal authorities, and with the
office of Yeltsin, for those are the people in whom the power resides.

RUSSIA’S CRUMBLING
INFRASTRUCTURE
Russia needs investment in modern technology and more financial
experience from the West if it hopes to make a difficult transition
from socialism to capitalism. But Russia will have a hard time attracting foreign investment without a transportation system.
Certainly, the big international lending institutions, which are
providing aid to Russia, are paying a great deal of attention to its
economy. Yet they have given practically no thought to its woefully
underdeveloped transportation infrastructure, especially to ground
transportation. A modern transportation system is crucial to Russia’s
growth, to developing its vast stores of natural resources, and to playing a larger role in international business.
For example, ships sailing from the U.S. and Canadian west coasts
to Western Europe require 14 days of transit if they use the Panama
Canal. If this cargo traveled via the Russian Arctic Seaway, it would
take half the time. But this option is foreclosed because there is no
modern port on the Russian Seaway. To take advantage of this
money-saving route, American and Western European shipping
companies first must invest in developing navigation systems and
ports for the Arctic Seaway.
Russia’s government also must find funds to build and improve
roads. Although money in Russia is in short supply, one source of
funds could come from a reduction in the military budget. The Russian army continues to have funds to build railroads, and could cut
this expense by transferring the activity to building civilian roads and
railroads.
Russia’s crumbling aviation infrastructure also presents real and
growing problems. In 1994, the air transportation industry suffered
45 accidents, including 14 crashes in which 299 people were killed.
This compares with 53 fatalities in 1993. Not surprisingly, the airline
industry experienced a decrease in total miles flown and a 12% decline in passenger traffic.
The Journal of Commerce, Tuesday, September 12, 1995, p. 8A.
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The former Soviet republics are trying to renovate airports and air
traffic control systems, and are looking for foreign cooperation. But
foreign investment is coming in only slowly.
One reason is that no one has tried to place a value on potential
investment properties. Potential investors do not know the real
worth of investment opportunities. Still, a few positive things are
happening. Recently, the United Nations Economic Mission in Eastern Europe decided to invest in the construction of an international
airport in the autonomous republic of Kalmykia, on the western
coast of the Caspian Sea.
By and large, however, Russia’s transportation problems are pervasive, and they have led to a reduction in the volume of goods being
shipped. The total decline for all modes of transportation was 75% in
1994 compared with 1993. This includes transportation by railroads,
trucks, ships, river boats, air carriers, and pipelines.
The transport picture for goods headed for export markets was
somewhat better. Those deliveries actually were on schedule in 1994
more often than in 1993.
For some goods, such as oil, the improvement was dramatic. Average waiting time for oil deliveries in 1994 decreased by 37% over
1994. The average railcar turnaround time was seven days, which
shows that Russians are starting to understand the penalties for late
delivery.
Still, Russia has a long way to go before its transport system functions effectively. Most of its trucks do not meet international standards. During the first four months of 1995, the number of road
accidents jumped by 17%, and about one-fourth of those accidents
resulted from the poor conditions of the roads.
In addition, the sea merchant fleet has not recovered from mismanagement under Communism. Delivery of goods declined by 17%
in 1994, even though much of the Russian fleet was rented by foreigners for export/import operations.
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia lost most of
its important seaports on the Black Sea. Novorossiysk is an exception, but it needs substantial investment to become a modern port.
Fully 60% of Russia’s ports are too shallow for modern tankers.
Gas and pipelines, too, require repairs and modernization. They
have a crucial function in Russia’s economy. In 1994, they were used
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to deliver 397 million tons of natural gas, 250 million tons of crude
oil, and 15 million tons of oil products.
What role can foreign industrial companies play in repairing Russia’s infrastructure? Above all, they can pool their resources via consortia to improve the transportation system in the regions in which
they operate.
That will require a substantial investment of funds; a rough estimate would be $60 billion over the next 15 years. Even with that
level of investment, Russia will not have a transport system on a par
with America’s in the 1950s.
Still, it would be a vitally needed start. Russia’s transport system
is at least a century behind America’s. But Russia’s economy cannot
begin to move forward without a substantial upgrade in the nation’s
transportation infrastructure.

RUSSIA’S CAPITALIST
INSTITUTIONS
There is no single Russia; there are many, and they are intertwined.
There is the Russia of great opportunity, the Russia of political upheaval, the Russia of crime and bribery, and the Russia of entrepreneurs and executives trying to conduct business despite uncertainty.
These differing faces confuse foreigners who want to invest in this
emerging market. Considering the Western media’s preoccupation
with bad news from Russia, a sensible business executive would reasonably hold back. Still, there have been enormous changes for the
better in Russia, and many of those changes specifically benefit investors.
Among the typical misconceptions about Russia is that Western
commercial involvement there is extremely limited. There is no
truth to that. In 1987, when it first became possible to establish
joint ventures with foreign capital, there were only 23 companies
registered in the entire Soviet Union. Today there are more than
40,000 firms in the former Soviet Union; companies wholly owned
by foreigners account for nearly 25% of the total.
During the first half of 1994, imports by these companies alone
reached $4 billion, and exports topped an estimated $12 billion. It is
difficult to get exact figures because many companies deposit some
of their revenue in foreign banks to protect themselves against unexpected adverse decisions by the Russion central bank.
Despite numerous obstacles, the number of American companies
venturing into Russia has increased. Between 1988 and 1992, only
eight out of every 100 American companies that tried to establish a
joint venture succeeded.
But the situation has improved substantially in 1993 and 1994.
The percentage of successful ventures with foreign participation
more than doubled, from 8% to 17%. The main reason was a legal
change in June 1992 freeing foreign investors from the requirement
to find a Russian partner and allowing them to establish wholly
The Journal of Commerce, January 25, 1995, p. 8A.
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owned companies in most industries. The exceptions were insurance
companies, railroads, and defense manufacturers, which still had to
find local partners.
Beyond restrictions on establishing subsidiaries, foreign direct investors must consider the quality of the infrastructure for conducting business. This requirement goes beyond roads, bridges, and
telecommunications systems; it includes the services of an array of
capitalist institutions and service providers, including banks, insurance companies, accounting firms, and stock and currency exchanges.
The U.S. government has stepped into the breach to offer political
risk insurance. The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corp. has guaranteed almost $1 billion in private U.S. investment in Russia and
another $1 billion in other former Soviet republics.
Earlier this year, the Russian government stepped in, too, establishing its first insurance company abroad. The firm, registered in
the Bahamas, insures U.S. investors against political risk in Russia.
Before 1989, there were no private insurers in Russia and only
two USSR state insurance agencies. Now there are more than 3,000
insurance companies. While only about a dozen are reliable, their
very existence shows the financial services industry is beginning to
grow.
Other financial services also are expanding. Russian banking has
gone through major reforms since the end of the Soviet era, when
there were no private banks. Now there are more than 2,000 private
domestic banks and 25 foreign ones, including Chase Manhattan,
Citibank, and Credit Suisse.
Another vital step on the way to a market economy was the establishment of the Moscow Currency Exchange in July 1992. The exchange is open for business four days a week, and the ruble has
become a limited convertible currency. Today, individuals can buy
and sell rubles in banks and kiosks in any big city in Russia.
As interest grows in the Russian market, effective information exchange becomes all the more crucial. The Iron Curtain was not just
a physical structure represented by the Berlin Wall. It was a state of
mind maintained by a lack of information, business, and otherwise.
Now, little by little, that situation is being reversed. Hundreds of
institutions have expanded their services to provide business data.
Itar-Tass, Reuters, the Associated Press, and Dun & Bradstreet, to
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name just a few, respond to hundreds of requests from Russian and
Western business people daily. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
also plays an important role in exchanging information. About 150
different private counsel and information services have developed
both in Russia and abroad.
Physical infrastructure, particularly in transportation, also is improving, although more slowly. The breakup of the Soviet Union
left Russia with fewer than half its seaports. The unstable political
situation there and in other former Soviet states does not make
transportation within the country any easier.
A strong economy cannot be developed without laws and regulations to govern it. As a totalitarian country, the former Soviet Union
was not concerned with protecting investors and their property. Business law had to be created practically anew, and it will take a long
time to bring it up to the level of sophistication enjoyed by most
Western countries.
Many Russian statesmen and lawmakers understand the need for
a regulatory environment favorable to investors. They are hampered
by a totalitarian mentality that still prevails in the government bureaucracy. For example, while announcing a general strategy to encourage investment, the government approved a draft law that would
essentially establish mandatory government participation on the
board of directors of any company in which it owns stock.
Despite such setbacks, Russia has made impressive progress in a
short time in building a capitalist infrastructure. Potential investors
should not be deterred by sensationalist media coverage of Russia’s
problems. They should focus, instead, on Russia’s real advantages—
including abundant natural resources and an educated work force—
and the progress that already has been made.

CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN RUSSIA:
FACT AND FICTION
The notion that criminal activity in Russia is rampant is quickly
making the rounds of potential investors. Whether it is real or imagined, the issue of crime and the power of the ‘‘Russian Mafia’’ is
taking a front seat in strategic decisions on investment, trade, operations, and capital markets. President Yeltsin issued a decree at the
end of 1993 initiating a campaign against organized crime. But this
new problem continues to be a topic in the newspapers and on TV
programs. What is the reality? And what are the genuine risks for
foreigners?
The answers to these questions are inextricably linked to the failure of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Empire into
15 independent republics. The absence of a central totalitarian government gave much awaited freedoms to its citizens. Unfortunately
it also gave greater freedom to criminals.
The connection between a police state and crime makes sense on
many levels. One only has to think back to the Stalin era, when
criminal leaders suffered the same fate as the political leaders whom
Stalin secretly rounded up in the middle of the night to be sent to
prison or killed without the benefit of a trial. More recently, the KGB
was responsible for tracking foreigners in Russia. Almost every step
of a foreigner was closely watched. When I heard the song by the
Police, ‘‘Every Step You Take, Every Move You Make, I’ll Be Watching You,’’ it reminded me of the KGB. But then foreigners were protected, even from street criminals.

An Increase in Crime
As everywhere around the globe, the rate of growth in criminal activity in Russia has risen over the past few years. Official statistics suggest a 52% growth from 1990 to January of 1994. By my calculation,
The Kvint Newsletter, 1. No. 8 (May 1994).
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however, the rate of growth has been approximately 30% per year.
The basis for the government’s figure is shown below.
Types of Criminal Acts
Rate of Growth
1990–1993
Muggings
2.5
Robberies of private house
and apartments
2.2
Murders and assassinations
1.9
Rapes
ⳮ4.0

Actual Numbers
1993
516,000
450,000
29,900
14,400

In all probability, the real number of crimes was much higher, but
victims are often afraid to go to the police (militia). My estimate is
that there was a total of 2,800,000 crimes committed in Russia during 1993.
In 1992, the first government program to fight organized crime
was created by Alexander Rutskoi, but the crime issue was put aside
when he became involved in the political battle for power. Later, in
1993 and 1994, when mass media headlines reported the deaths of
11 heads of Russian commercial banks, including that of the second
largest bank, Rosselhoz Bank (Russian Agricultural Bank), attention
again focused on the problem.

The Issue of Crime in Perspective
The image with which we are left, that Russia is a land filled with
reckless hoodlums, is very deceptive. In terms of the number and
crimes per capita, crime continues on a relatively small scale. Additionally, organized crime controls relatively small amounts of money.
Many of the foreigners who are becoming victims are those who
enter into relationships with criminals, who do not exercise caution.
The fact that many foreigners don’t speak any Russian complicates
the situation.
It is true that since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Russian streets
have become more dangerous. There is no justice system to handle
criminals under the new democratic laws. Many criminals who are
arrested on the street are freed the next day. Today, Russian crime
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mirrors that of America, and Moscow rivals some of the most crimeridden areas in the United States.
Republics with the Worst Records
Criminal activity is not homogeneous throughout the Republics.
Places like Kazan, the capital of the Tatar Republic, Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, and several Moscow suburbs have always been
plagued with high levels of crime.
Republics with weak central control, such as Georgia, have become very dangerous. For example, in 1993, an employee of the U.S.
State Department, traveling by Russian jeep with the chief bodyguard of Georgian President Schevardnadze, did not stop when signaled by a young Georgian soldier. One shot was fired, directly into
the head of the U.S. government official, who immediately died.
In Tajikistan, many criminals, including rapists and muggers, became leading members of the government. One of the muggers was
even called ‘‘Father of the Nation.’’
From 1991 onward, organized crime first appeared on the streets,
then penetrated the militia, and finally became intertwined with
local government structures in many of the republics.
Americans Stand a Greater Chance of Being a Victim of a
Crime in America than in Russia
Russian Entrepreneurs: True Victims of Crime
The artificial exchange rate between rubles and dollars made foreigners the target of crime. In reality, the main targets of street organized
crime are Russian entrepreneurs and leaders of the financial markets.
The first to gain attention were the babushkas selling wares on the
streets and young Russian merchants; then the process of privatization of stores and public catering created new potential victims.
Entrepreneurship Open to All
After the breakup of the former Soviet Union, two new industries
were created. Former KGB agents and militia officers utilized their
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training by entering organized crime or becoming private bodyguards. Militia officers retained special rights to use their uniforms
and guns after official work hours. They worked as doormen in restaurants and hotels, which gave them the opportunity to supplement
typically low police wages.
Some entrepreneurs, particularly those who were affiliated with
the Communist Party, became leaders of white-collar crime. The
tremendous amounts of money they received from the Communist
Party opened the door to illegal activities. Other leaders of this new
wave of white-collar crime became ‘‘black marketers.’’ For them Market Economy equaled the ‘‘Black Economy.’’ Such was the creation
of organized crime in Russia and the republics.
The Black Market
I recently met with the leader of a large financial group whose powerful private empire includes banks in Russia and abroad, insurance
and consulting companies, trade houses, and construction organizations. I asked him where he received his initial capital. He responded,
‘‘Black Money, but no one can prove it.’’ The construction business
provides him with about $1 million a month, and by laundering
money through his other businesses he justifies his income.
The Closer One Is to Cash, the Greater the Likelihood of
Becoming a Target
Usually, the first clue to participation in unsavory organizations is a
fancy brand name watch, worth 410,000 rubles or more, and expensive Italian clothes. How any Russian could buy a Rolls Royce with
honest money is a mystery.
The most dangerous situation occurs when government authorities and especially state-owned companies fall into the hands of
bribe-giving criminals.
Criminals Participate in Privatization
The first signs of privatization appeared in 1987 and 1988, when
entrepreneurs opened a few stores and cafeterias. Criminals were not
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ready to participate. Between 1989 and 1991, however, kiosks began
to appear selling everything from underwear to pants and other
goods that were in short supply. Criminal groups, for the first time,
organized to control different markets. It was a time of violent,
bloody street-fighting.
Today, the typical criminal has become more sophisticated. When
privatization of small businesses became commonplace, a new area
of activity, racketeering, opened to criminals. Its focus was almost
exclusively on cash businesses. Kidnapping became a regular occurrence. The militia was not prepared for this new level of crime, as its
weapons had become obsolete, and its cars were too slow. Further,
because of the large sums of money involved, bribery of the police
became a common practice.
The real big-money crime, however, is white-collar crime in connection with the privatization process. The criminals seek help from
the officials in achieving two goals: to set the valuation of a particular
factory that they would like to buy at as low a price as possible, and
to complete the privatization without competition. At the federal
level, only the scale is larger.
New Structure to Face Problems
In an effort to stem the tide of criminal activity, the militia was
restructured in late 1992. For the first time, the militia joined Interpol. But Interpol was naı̈ve and even gave commendations to individuals with criminal connections.
While the militia was restructuring, the first capitalist institutions
appeared in Russia: private banks, trading houses, commodity and
stock exchanges, and small insurance companies. But regulations to
govern the operation of capital markets did not appear in any of
the former Soviet-bloc countries until 1994. As a result, activities of
capitalist institutions were often in conflict with normal Western
business protocol, leaving the door open for white-collar crime.
White-Collar Crime
Also of great concern are the former bureaucrats with white-collar
experience in Russia who left with large sums of black-market
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money. These people are engaging in international crime that is
more difficult to detect and stop.
Special criminal investigations began in 1992 concerning former
Communist Party funds. At that item, the Russian government hired
several investigation companies including Manhattan-based Krill
and Associates. Although public statements were made exposing
large sums of communist money, I’m not sure how accurate they
were. Recently, one such investigation company in Russia reported
it has statistics on how many tons of gold and platinum the Communist Party sent abroad.

The Criminal Problem Is Overrated
While crime is a serious problem, it would be wrong, even absurd,
to overestimate its influence. A vast majority of people are trying to
build and operate businesses honestly, under difficult circumstances.
One way to reduce the risk of corruption is to heed the advice of
Senator Howard Baker, Jr., former White House Chief of Staff. In a
recent conversation, Mr. Baker, who created the merchant banking
company Newstar, Inc., to invest in Russian projects, suggested investors stay away from high-profile projects, because they are under
a high level of bureaucratic control and are often connected with
bribes.
A substantial percentage of projects involving bribes are in hard
currency materials such as oil and oil products, natural gas, fertilizer,
nonferrous metals (especially aluminum, nickel, copper), and to a
lesser extent precious metals. In these deals, bribes are given to bureaucrats to secure issuance of export licenses and an increase in
export quotas. Trade negotiations are based on world prices. However, in order to justify the lower prices that are achieved through
bribing officials, problems such as poor quality of products and shipping delays are raised. The result is a 30%–40% drop in prices.

Protecting Business Ventures
One of the ways to protect a venture is to exercise due diligence on
the source of initial funding. This is particularly important when
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dealing with private companies, small banks, insurance, or industrial
companies. Checking should also be done with the Russian banks
and with government authorities.
Since cash is the target of organized crime, it is best to limit exposure. For example, employee salaries can be paid by direct transfer
of funds. Today, all major credit cards are available in Russia, and
more than $0.5 billion of credit card money was spent last year. Remember, not all public officials or police are corrupt. Problems
should be reported not only to local officials but also directly to the
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Foreigner complaints are given much
quicker attention.

NEW RUBLE ZONE DOOMED,
EXPERTS ON RUSSIA SAY
‘‘Russian economic and financial policies are not stable or honest. Why
should anybody want to follow Moscow’s lead?’’
The pact signed this month by Russia and five former Soviet republics to form a new ruble zone is doomed, Russian specialists and
economists said.
The agreement to create an economic and monetary union with
the ruble as a common currency would require the republics to bow
to Russian demands on fiscal and monetary policy, they said.
‘‘Russian economic and financial policies are not stable or honest,’’ said Vladimir Kvint, Russia specialist, economist, and professor
of management systems and international business at Fordham University in New York. ‘‘Why would anybody want to follow Moscow’s
lead?’’
The new ruble zone will only be temporary because it will fall
apart, said Mr. Kvint, who also is a senior consultant with Arthur
Andersen & Co., which has 300 people in the former Soviet Union
to provide consulting and accounting services.
The Commonwealth of Independent States ‘‘has no government
and no president; it’s just a piece of paper,’’ he said.
The ruble-zone agreement signed September 7 includes Russia,
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The plan to
unify banking, tax, and customs systems is designed to help the Russian Central Bank gain control of the supply of rubles in order to
dampen inflation. In the past, the money supply of the member
republics was determined by national actions that were not coordinated.
‘‘Some of the republics with relatively good economic situations
didn’t sign the pact,’’ Mr. Kvint said. He said that Turkmenistan, for
example, has been successful with its own currency.

The Journal of Commerce, Tuesday, September 14, 1993 (partial article).

RUSSIAN EXPERT ADDRESSES
COMMUNITY GROUP AND
FACULTY: PROFESSOR,
CONSULTANT, AND AUTHOR
VLADIMIR KVINT ON CAMPUS
Vladimir Kvint is an internationally recognized specialist on the
economy and natural resources of Russia and other former Soviet
Republics. A professor at Fordham University and a senior consultant at Arthur Andersen Economic Consulting, Kvint spoke before
the California–Russia Trade Association at Whittier Law School
September 21, and addressed Whittier Law School faculty on September 22.
Kvint was on tour to support his new book, The Barefoot Shoemaker: Capitalizing on the New Russia, a contemporary examination
of the Russian economy and the social, geographical, and historical
forces that drive it.
Vladimir Kvint was the keynote speaker at Whittier’s International Law Symposium in 1990 following a cover story he wrote for
Forbes magazine in which he predicted the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the rise of Boris Yeltsin to power. Since then he has become one of the most sought experts on trade with the former Soviet
Republics.
On September 21, addressing the California–Russia Trade Association, Kvint brought to light the many advantages of trading with
the new republics. For example, it is two and one-half-times more
efficient to ship goods from American west coast seaports to Western
Europe using the Russian Arctic Seaway than to cross the Atlantic
via the Panama Canal. Also, many companies are taking advantage
of the low cost of manufacturing in the new republics, including
South Korea’s Hyundai Corporation and Goldstar Corporation. Most
important, according to Kvint, is that Russia is a new, untapped marLaw School News (Whittier Law School) 12, No. 1 (Fall 1993).
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ket where goods can be manufactured and sold. Kvint contends that
any government maneuvers will not affect foreign business interests
in the long run. ‘‘It is inevitable that Russia will become part of
the international business community,’’ he said. ‘‘Political fights are
absolutely not connected with business negotiations with the West.’’
As if to challenge this point, later that afternoon Russian President
Boris Yeltsin abolished the parliament to gain more power. Parliament in turn impeached Yeltsin and promoted Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi to President. Russia’s Constitutional Court, which is
in place to preserve the constitution and act as a check to the executive branch of the President, declared that Yeltsin’s move to disband
parliament was unconstitutional, and that parliament’s impeachment of Yeltsin was valid.
The next morning Kvint spoke to law school faculty at a breakfast
meeting, explaining the economic ramifications of these political
moves. He said that violating the constitution in order to obtain
power or privileges has many historical precedents. Peter the Great,
for example, killed many people by his own hand and violated the
constitution to expand Russian interests into Eastern Europe. Lenin
and Stalin constantly violated the Russian constitution to achieve
their ends.
‘‘Stalin’s motto was: ‘Where there is a person, there is a problem,’’’
Kvint relayed. ‘‘Stalin eliminated 40 million problems.’’ He perceived
that Yeltsin dismissed parliament because they stood in the way of
his reforms, but that a radical change in government was highly unlikely.
Although there is still great unrest in the former Soviet republics,
Kvint perceives these kinds of constitutional crises as growing pains.
In the Soviet Union, 97% of business was controlled by the government. Russia is now moving rapidly toward privatization, with, for
example, over 300,000 private farms being sold to individual Russians. He concluded, ‘‘If the KGB, the Communist Party, and the
Militia cannot stifle capitalization, it [political in-fighting] will not
affect negotiations with the West.’’
Kvint has gained fame through his predictions, and he offered the
following to the faculty: that Yeltsin will win the elections in the
spring; that he will attempt to abolish the Constitutional Court; that
Russia will continue to move toward a more open economy; and that
personal freedoms will continue to grow in the former Soviet Union.

RUSSIAN DIAMONDS
Boris Yeltsin does not consider himself bound to deals made by Mikhail
Gorbachev—as Harry Oppenheimer and De Beers are learning.
Harry Oppenheimer and his son Nicholas were in Moscow early last
September. The Oppenheimers control De Beers Consolidated
Mines Ltd. and were there for the opening of De Beers’s first Moscow
office.
De Beers, South Africa’s giant mining company and marketer of
diamonds, is the world’s largest producer of diamonds. Through its
Central Selling Organization cartel, De Beers has long controlled the
prices and supply of raw diamonds to cutters and polishers around
the world. Russia, the world’s second-largest producer of diamonds
(after South Africa), is important to De Beers.
According to top Russian officials, the Oppenheimers were scheduled to meet with Boris Yeltsin, the prime minister, and other top
Russian officials, but at the last minute the appointments were canceled. The snub was apparently deliberate: It was a Russian way of
telling De Beers it wanted more money for its diamonds than it had
gotten in the past. (De Beers’s spokeswoman denies appointments
were scheduled but confirms that no top-level meetings took place.)
Not that De Beers needed reminding that it needs the Russians.
Angola, one of the world’s largest diamond producers, virtually
stopped doing business with the Central Selling Organization in the
late 1980s. De Beers’s operatives have been scrambling to avoid losing the vital Russian diamond production.
In 1990 De Beers signed a five-year deal with Mikhail Gorbachev’s
government promising De Beers 95% of all Russia’s raw diamond
production. De Beers agreed to pay $5 billion over the life of the
deal.
But Gorbachev is out, and Boris Yeltsin apparently wants more.
Under the Gorbachev agreement, the Russians receive from
De Beers an average price of approximately $68 per carat, Yeltsin
figures he can do better. He knows that last year De Beers paid $205
Forbes, February 15, 1993, pp. 42–43.
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per carat for uncut diamonds it purchased directly from Yakutia, the
eastern Siberian region that accounts for most of Russia’s diamonds.
The Yakutian diamonds were of higher quality, but not three times
better.
Yeltsin has an out. De Beers’s 1990 deal cut with Gorbachev says
only that Russia must sell 95% of its uncut diamonds to De Beers. It
says nothing of cut and polished stones. What Russia will probably
now do is start cutting and polishing more diamonds rather than
delivering them raw to De Beers.
Russia already has several diamond-cutting and -polishing plants.
Three of them—in Smolensk, Moscow, and the city of Barnaul, in
western Siberia—have modern equipment and experienced cutters.
Aware of the possibilities, several small Japanese, Israeli, Dutch, and
American firms are trying to create joint ventures with the Russian
cutting plants.
If the Russians are playing rough with De Beers, it’s because they
badly need foreign exchange. With their gold holdings dwindled,
diamonds (together with platinum) remain Russia’s major quick potential source of more hard currency. Squeezing more money out of
De Beers is one way to get it. Adding value through cutting and
polishing is another.
From the end of World War II until early 1990, the Soviet Union
sold almost no diamonds in the 5-to-10–carat range, and no diamonds larger than 10 carats. When they were found, such treasures
were kept in the Russian State Diamond Fund. Worth billions, the
trove includes such mammoth stones as the 232-carat ‘‘Star of Yakutia’’ and the 332-carat ‘‘XXVI Congress of the CPSU.’’
As it begins to sell off its big stones, Russia will need to cooperate
with Westerners. That’s because the market is highly specialized,
and customers want their diamonds rough or cut and polished to
their specifications.
On the prowl for large uncut stones is Maurice Tempelsman.
Working out of Paris and New York, Tempelsman lines up a buyer
for a large stone, locates the stone in Russia, then gives the Russians
the designs for cutting and polishing the stone.
With most uncut stones, however, De Beers is still in control. Last
year Yeltsin’s government signed an agreement with officials from
Yakutia (now Sakha). It says employees and managers of Yakutia’s
diamond mines and factories will retain ownership of 23% of the
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proceeds; Sakha/Yakutia’s regional government and local authorities
get 40%; the Russian government, and government funds, such as
the armed forces’ social security fund, get 37%. De Beers figures it
will end up as marketing agent for all three groups.
To further strengthen ties with the local government, De Beers
agreed to help build a diamond-cutting plant in Sakha called Polar
Star.
Clearly, De Beers is doing everything in its power to retain control
over Russia’s diamond output. But that big X in President Yeltsin’s
appointment book suggests that the Russians are going to be driving
increasingly hard bargains.

A HEALTHY REALISM FOR THE
RUSSIANS
For 40 years I lived in Russia, where communist propaganda bombarded people with images of the United States as the enemy. But
this was largely ineffective, since most Russians distrusted such information. Only now that I am in the United States do I understand
just how effective media propaganda can be.
A case in point: After Yegor T. Gaidar was replaced as Russian
prime minister last year by Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, the American
media routinely used negative labels like ‘‘former apparatchik’’ in
referring to Mr. Chernomyrdin, while asserting that under Mr. Gaidar’s leadership, a revolutionary shift to capitalism was taking place.
These views are incorrect. There is only one true revolutionary
among Russian leaders, and that is Boris Yeltsin. But while revolution
may bring down an old system, it does not create a market economy.
Mr. Gaidar did not privatize a single large enterprise. People simply
cannot be ordered to capitalism by executive fiat.
More to the point, Mr. Gaidar had no relevant experience. While
Mr. Yeltsin is a great politician, he has at least one serious drawback—an inability to admit mistakes. And he made a mistake when
he appointed Mr. Gaidar.
First, Mr. Gaidar had essentially worked in only one place, at the
magazine The Communist. Still, the American media dubbed him
‘‘the progressive leader of economic reform in Russia.’’
In addition, Mr. Gaidar never worked in Russian industry and had
no understanding of the Russian economy. He was educated at the
Department of the Economic Geography of Foreign Countries at
Moscow University, a privileged school mainly for children of high
party officials and Politburo members. His doctoral thesis, about
managers’ workstyles, was not a dissertation on economics. He began
his economic education only when he became prime minister. No
country, especially Russia, can afford such on-the-job training.
Mr. Chernomyrdin also served the party machine for several years,
The New York Times, Sunday, January 24, 1993, F13.
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but a critical difference is that he earned his position the hard way,
advancing because of his achievements. Starting as a laborer in a
petrochemical plant, he worked his way up to being minister of the
Soviet gas industry. When the Russian economy was in a bad slide,
Mr. Chernomyrdin bucked the tide by finding the means to increase
production, not cut it.
Mr. Chernomyrdin and Mr. Gaidar do have much in common,
including favoring a market economy. But only a few old-timers remain who fail to grasp that Russia has no alternative.
The essential difference between the two is that Mr. Chernomyrdin knows from experience what tough choices must be made, understands the economy, and has true managerial experience. His
choice of executive deputy prime minister was excellent: the best
and youngest Russian financial expert, Boris Fedorev. Unlike Mr.
Gaidar. Mr. Fedorov has broad experience in Russian banking as well
as with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the World Bank. Mr. Chernomyrdin and his deputy know it is
impossible to help Russia without broad involvement in the world
economy.
Mr. Chernomyrdin inherits a catastrophic Russian economy, in far
worse shape than when Mr. Gaidar became acting prime minister.
Mr. Gaidar, following the advice of a Harvard professor, Jeffrey
Sachs—also ignorant about the Russian economy but hired because
of his American credentials—enacted disastrous reform policies.
Their reforms were based on liberalizing prices, but when property
belongs to the state monopoly, that amounts to nothing more than
the monopolization of price increases. Thanks to this ‘‘serious and
deeply thought policy,’’ about 95% of Russians now find themselves
living below the poverty level and inflation is running wild.
I hasten to stress that it was necessary to start reforms, and affirm
that I am no supporter of the hard-liners. But only after property
belongs to workers can prices be liberalized. It was Mr. Gaidar and
his supporters who brought devastation to Russia’s first 200,000 private farmers, who faced bankruptcy when prices for industrial products rose well beyond their reach.
Now that Mr. Yeltsin has appointed Mr. Chernomyrdin, he is
much stronger than when the unrealistic Mr. Gaidar was at his side.

WHY YELTSIN IS STYMIED
When President Boris N. Yeltsin of Russia failed to get his congress
to approve his economic plan along with his choice for prime minister, Yegor Gaidar, he accused the legislative body of seeking to return
the country to the dark days of communism. Then Mr. Yeltsin proposed holding a national referendum next month to determine who
is the country’s boss—the president or the congress. But not everyone agrees that congress is against reform; some say it’s just Mr.
Yeltsin’s current plans. ‘‘Who gave Yeltsin special powers to conduct
his economic reform? Congress,’’ said Vladimir Kvint, a professor of
international business at Fordham University. What annoys congress
now is that Mr. Yeltsin’s reforms have been badly executed, Mr.
Kvint said. ‘‘When Gaidar started the reform process, inflation was
150%. Now it’s 1,850% a year.’’

The New York Times, International Section, December 13, 1992.

GORBY TAKES THE FIFTH
Is Yeltsin persecuting Gorbachev? Or could it be that the deposed Soviet leader can’t get used to a system where even the highest are accountable to the law?
Recently Mikhail Gorbachev has been complaining bitterly to Western correspondents that the Russian militia, acting on orders from
the Russian government, seized not only the building housing his
Gorbachev Foundation but his limousine as well. Poor Gorby. Is this
any way to treat the man who brought about the end of Soviet tyranny?
The story, however, is not quite so simple as the Western media
has made it out. The huge building has an interesting history. A
showcase property built of marble and situated in central Moscow, it
was built by the Communist Party with public money. It housed the
institute where leaders of foreign communist parties studied how to
topple their governments.
When Russia’s president, Boris Yeltsin, abolished the Communist
Party after the August 1991 coup, who became the true owner of the
property? The Russian parliament gave Yeltsin the power to allocate
former Party property. But by this time, Gorbachev had already taken
up residence in the building and had also taken over a luxurious villa
once reserved for Politburo members. Gorbachev declared all this
the property of the Gorbachev Foundation.
Poor Gorby indeed.
On several occasions, the Russian government told Gorbachev
that he could use the building but would have to pay rent. Gorbachev not only ignored the government but rented out one-third of
the space for a huge new restaurant and for various foreign jointventure tenants. For this he had received at least $120,000 in hard
currency during the past few months. The foundation also didn’t pay
taxes due on the property.
Obviously miffed, in early October Yeltsin declared the building
the property of the Russian Finance Academy, and the militia took
Forbes, November 9, 1992, p. 48.
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over the building. That’s when Gorbachev began complaining resentfully to Western correspondents.
That’s not Gorbachev’s only woe. He has been summoned to appear as a witness—not as a defendant—before the new Constitutional Court, Russia’s highest court, in a case involving the abolition
of the Communist Party. Gorbachev has refused to appear. Why?
Could it be because he is afraid of two questions: How much money
did he send abroad as General Secretary of the U.S.S.R. Communist
Party; and to what accounts did he send it? Educated as a lawyer,
Gorbachev knows that if he makes a false statement under oath, he
could be arrested.
He clearly does not want to explain to the Russian people why, at
a time when they were suffering privations, Gorbachev sent money
to foreign communist parties as well as to their leaders. In 1990,
for example, $2 million went to the General Secretary of the U.S.
Communist Party, Comrade Gus Hall. Receipts signed by Hall are
on the desk of the General Prosecutor of Russia. When money is
sent abroad, it leaves a paper trail. This trail haunts Gorbachev.
During Gorbachev’s time, the gold in Russia’s reserves fell from
983.5 tons in 1985 to 450 tons in 1991—at $350 an ounce, the difference amounts to almost $6 billion. And because additional gold was
produced during that period, the amount shipped abroad was probably much higher. Much of this gold was used to buy food and other
supplies from the West, but did some of it find its way into the
Party higher-ups’ numbered accounts in Switzerland, Liechtenstein,
Panama, Hungary, and elsewhere? Most Russians think it did.
If he wanted to, Gorbachev could provide some answers. Only
Gorbachev had the power to decide how much gold, platinum, palladium, diamonds, and other precious stones and metals should be
sent abroad, especially those not officially for sale. A Politburo member who helped him with the Party’s foreign financial dealings, Oleg
Shenin (Forbes, October 28, 1991), is now in prison, charged with
organizing the August coup.
Expect more bitter complaints about political persecution from
the deposed Soviet leader. Gorbachev must find it most unfamiliar
living under a system where even the highest of the high are subject
to the rule of law.

DOWN THE RATHOLE
Doesn’t anyone remember what happened to the loans to Latin
America or to Mikhail Gorbachev’s regime?
The recent political summit in Munich ended with only one concrete result. The leaders of the industrialized countries agreed to
give the Russian government $1 billion through the International
Monetary Fund. This amount will likely be followed by another $6
billion stabilization fund to support the ruble by year’s end, with
many more billions to follow. But anyone who thinks this money will
improve the situation in Russia is in for a big disappointment. It will
be money down a rathole, as people from the staff of the Russian
government find ways to take part of the cash.
The IMF is working according to the following logic: Mr. Yeltsin
is fighting with the Communist Party mafia to create a market economy in Russia, and he is decreasing the risk of nuclear conflict. To
help this democrat, President Bush has urged giving Russia $24 billion as soon as possible.
The flaw in this humanitarian logic is this: The money would take
the form of sovereign loans and be handed over to politicians and
bureaucrats who haven’t a clue as to how the money should be put
to work. In this the Russian aid proposals remind one of the more
than $100 billion in sovereign loans that were extended to Latin
America in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Seventy years of Soviet history show that government in Russia
can’t manage money. During Gorbachev’s six years in power, the
Soviet government received $93 billion in Western loans and aid.
Where is this money? Did it help the Russian economy? In June of
this year production of meat and food products fell to 65% of the
level of 1988’s output and is now at a critically low level.
The $6 billion in funds for the stabilization of the Russian ruble
will soon evaporate. How is it possible to hope that $6 billion will
help a country where every month the government is printing 275
billion worthless rubles? The IMF experts urge the Russians to stop
printing money. Unfortunately, this is impossible.
Forbes, August 3, 1992, pp. 40–41.
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Hyperinflation has set in. Inflation jumped from an annual rate of
150% in 1991 to almost 1,400% during the first half of this year. In
April the average salary was 1,000 rubles; in June, 2,500 rubles. In
August, it will be 3,500. If the government tries to stabilize the currency by not printing new rubles for two months, the effect will be
like slamming on the brakes of a speeding freight train. Deflation
will be so strong that almost 70% of Russian industrial companies
will not be able to pay salaries. Civil disobedience will soon follow.
But there is a way in which the IMF’s money could help develop
the competitive market economy Russia needs if democracy is to
take root. Rather than send this money to the Russian government,
the IMF and developed countries should make it available as nonsovereign loans for Russian entrepreneurs, private companies, and the
first capitalist institutions that are more or less working in Russia—
the 500 commercial and private banks, trading houses, 450 commodity exchanges and brokerage houses, and 2 stock exchanges. (Foreign
stocks are now being traded in Moscow and St. Petersburg; the shares
of American and German companies will be traded in seven other
cities next year.)
Money should be sent to Russia through the Western companies
that want to invest there. Far better than bureaucrats, these companies will produce the equipment, technology, and management systems Russia needs. This money is also necessary to hire foreign
managers who will help to install and use this equipment in Russia;
otherwise, much of the equipment will never be installed. In all former Soviet republics, approximately $10 billion worth of brand-new
foreign equipment sits quietly in storage.
Like the IMF, the U.S. Export-Import Bank is trying to help Russia. But the people at Ex-Im are going about it the right way, by
providing loans directly to Russian buyers of American exports. The
IMF should follow the Ex-Im Bank’s line, which will create U.S. jobs
as well as help Russia.
An outstanding politician who has made a lot of economic mistakes, Yeltsin is now doing a good job of improving the business
climate in Russia. In June Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Shumeiko as
executive deputy prime minister and Georgy Hija and Victor Chernomerdin as deputy prime ministers; all three had previously occupied positions as chairmen of big industrial companies.
Under new business regulations passed earlier this year, foreign
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insurance companies, including American International Group and
others, were finally allowed to enter the Russian market. Privatization is now on the fast track. Foreigners now not only can become
partners in joint ventures in Russia but also own companies outright.
Another key reform was enacted June 14: Foreigners can now purchase land, but only if they agree to buy and improve the structures
that are on the land. And in July Russian and American officials
eliminated the double taxation of profits earned in Russia. I believe
that by the end of the year five free economic zones will be operational, including Nakhodka (on the Russian Pacific Coast), Kaliningrad (formerly Konigsberg), St. Petersburg, Novgorod, and Kemerovo
(a coal region in eastern Siberia), with perhaps free circulation of
hard currency in each one.
Western business people are responding to the new business climate. Each month nearly 100 new joint ventures and enterprises are
created by foreign investors. Since January of this year 75 RussianAmerican joint ventures have appeared.
To help Yeltsin & Co. keep things moving in the right direction,
some Western aid is necessary. But the U.S., the IMF, and others
waiting to help should remember that the purpose of aid is not to
give handouts and create dependency, but to support the foreign
and native entrepreneurs who will cultivate real long-term economic
growth. Anything else is money down a rathole.

OPPORTUNITY IN A SHATTERED
LAND
The business map of the future is being drawn in the old Soviet
Union and in Eastern Europe. Most of the attention is going to the
disintegration—the splitting apart—of the world we knew. But another process is at work, too, which could be significant for Western
business. A reintegration—the creation of new alliances—is beginning.
The entities forming in the wake of the Soviet Union’s breakup
will develop nontraditional economic ties with each other, and there
will be new opportunities for Western investors to profit. There are
risks—risks that the new nations will develop protectionist stances
as they come to understand their potential and risks that the political
leaders on whom foreign investors bet will simply prove to be the
wrong ones. Remember Mikhail Gorbachev.
But countries with common histories as former Soviet republics
or allies will integrate into loose economic blocs of fully sovereign
countries in the next few years. This will happen, I think, so economies can be linked and strengthened. These new alliances offer rare
opportunities for Western businesses.
Already the Soviet Union has broken apart as a union, and something similar is likely to happen in the Russian federation because of
ethnic divisions, economic and social problems, and territorial disputes over rich natural resources. At least three republics—Tatar,
Bashkir, and Checheno-Ingush—will break away from Russia. For
some of the same reasons, Georgia will probably lose the republic of
Abkhasia and the autonomous territory of South Ossetia.
This is not to diminish Russia’s importance—and potential. It
produces more oil each day than Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait
together, and more natural gas, steel, cement, and tractors than any
country in the world. Boris Yeltsin and other leaders know Western
participation is necessary for economic revival, and have opened the
market.
The New York Times, Sunday, Janaury 19, 1992, p. 11F.
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Yet uncertainties remain. Russia is not homogeneous. The Russian
Far East and Siberia are stable and have low political risks, so are
excellent places to invest. But in the Caucasus region, in middle
Asia, and in the new state of Moldova, ethnic conflicts are a possibility, increasing risk.
The process of reintegration is happening elsewhere, too. Austria,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and Slovenia, which have a common economic history and leaderships interested in such an alliance,
are likely to form the next economic commonwealth in central Europe.
In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, leaders have formed a Baltic
Council, for economic and political ties, creating the Baltic Bridge
Union to link Russia with Scandinavia and Poland. The three nations
knew they could not make it, economically, without each other.
It is also possible that Moldova will unite with Romania. In the
Near East, we will see a new economic and political role for Turkey,
which could help former Soviet republics form economic ties to
countries in Asia and the Middle East.
Taking advantage of reintegration requires know-how on the part
of Western investors. For example, although the monetary systems
of the newly sovereign countries are expected to be ruble-based,
Western executives would probably be wise to consider the possibility of doing business in at least five to six new currencies in the new
commonwealth. The independent states will probably adopt something similar to the existing Benelux monetary system, under which
the currencies of Belgium and Luxembourg differ in appearance but
are considered by central bankers to be equal.
Furthermore, the former Soviet republics are likely to become
more protectionist. Executives interested in this market must establish a legal presence there soon so they will not be shut out later.
Executives must build relationships with local and central authorities, and with business leaders, too.
The effort will be worth it. Real estate prices are unbelievably low,
and, during impending privatizations, enterprises will be sold at low
prices. The former Soviet market still does not know its own value.
Purchases of enterprises at below-market prices is risk-justified.
Watch the new maps. The opportunity is there.

COPYING THE COMMUNITY
While Western Europe was unifying, the Soviet Union was becoming unglued. Last week Russia’s President, Boris N. Yeltsin, and the
leaders of Ukraine and Byelorussia, replaced the union with a new
commonwealth. The republics will use the ruble as their common
currency, defend themselves jointly, and harmonize their economies.
Five Asian republics joined the commonwealth last week. That
leaves the Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, ‘‘a king without a
country,’’ said Vladimir Kvint, a lecturer at Babson College. In the
new commonwealth, ‘‘the relationships between the republics will
be like the relationship between countries in the European Community,’’ he said. That is a remarkable transformation. All that’s needed
now is a workable economic plan. Some things remain the same.

The New York Times, Business Section, Sunday, December 15, 1991.

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
LEGAL REFORM IN THE
SOVIET UNION
The development of Soviet-American relations has received much
attention in the United States. Clearly, the development of such a
relationship facilitates peace; for those who trade do not start wars
with one another. Currently, the Soviet Union is undergoing the
process of social revolution. Public forces are becoming polarized.
This process has its own dynamics and logic.
When perestroika began in 1985, economic tasks were considered
the most important. Prior attempts at economic reform were made,
but they always occurred without a corresponding change in the political sphere. Political leaders of the USSR failed to understand that
economic and political changes must occur simultaneously. However, the present leadership of the Soviet Union understands that
without political change, economic change is bound to fail.
By the end of 1985, steps were taken toward the political democratization of the Soviet Union. For 70 years, Soviet propaganda described Soviet society as the best and most democratic. Suddenly,
people realized that they were living in a tyrannical country. Gorbachev counseled that this was the moment when the Soviet people
had to learn how to live under a democracy. For many Soviets that
was a major breakthrough.
In the field of democratization of life, the Soviet Union has
achieved a certain degree of success. But these achievements represent only the first steps toward democracy. The regime continues to
suppress personality and the open market economy.
Economic changes in the Soviet Union have been very slow. Dramatic improvements have not occurred. To some degree, however,
capital investments were reoriented to the needs of the people. In
addition, the state’s monopoly over foreign trade was slightly decreased, and the bureaucratic machine was to some extent dismantled.
Whittier Law Review, 12, No. 2 (1991), 143–146.
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Before perestroika began, there were 106 all-Union ministries and
approximately 800 different ministries in Union republics. During
the years of perestroika, approximately 350 ministries were abolished. The upper echelon of the bureaucratic machine were reduced.
However, there still are 19 million people working in this sphere.
Three million out of these 19 million are just drivers of the official
cars. The Soviet Union trained people not to make decisions. The
bureaucratic machine does not have technology of management.
During the first years of perestroika, the bureaucratic machine experienced pressure from democratization. Bureaucrats looked to the
General Secretary for support. However, the General Secretary was
on the side of democratic change and provided no support.
The leaders of perestroika were much more decisive in the political sphere than in the economic sphere. The economic changes did
not lead to an increase in the standard of living. The Council of
Ministers tried to solve new tasks using old methods. As a result,
economic changes that were introduced did not give birth to a new
economic mechanism. The leaders of perestroika and the government progressed very little in these areas. This gave the opponents
to perestroika enough time to organize and consolidate.
At the end of 1989, chauvinistic and negative forces joined the
bureaucratic machine. Consequently, the pressure on economic and
political reform became much stronger in all directions. In addition,
opponents had enough influence to slow down changes in the legal
sphere of democratization. Moreover, some new laws were openly
aimed at preserving the economic interests of the central machine.
As a result, the laws that were adopted go only half way toward the
goal of complete reform, and do not protect the rights of enterprises
to economic freedom. This crippled Soviet enterprises. These enterprises are currently unprotected from the willpower and dictate of
the ministries. Furthermore, cooperatives, which were created during perestroika and had more freedom of action, came into conflict
with state-run enterprises. The main producers of all goods and services are still state enterprises. The contribution of cooperatives is
much smaller than that of state enterprises. While the countries’
gross national product is 875 billion rubles, the contribution of cooperatives is only 2.8 billion rubles.
Drafts of new laws and regulations were prepared, but the process
of adoption proved problematic. The law providing for private own-
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ership was not included. The joint-venture regulation, the foreign
trade law, and the laws concerning free economic zones were not
introduced by the Supreme Soviet or the Supreme Council of the
Soviet Union in 1989 or 1990. However, the parliaments of separate
republics have begun to introduce such laws.
The political struggle between the center and the republics, to
achieve widespread social reform, has become extremely heated over
the last six months. In response to these problems, Gorbachev proposed the creation of a president’s power. He has tried to strengthen
his diminishing influence over the people.
The democratization process in the Soviet Union has slowed. The
situation in the Baltic republics and Russia has severely hampered
political and economic reform. This problem can largely be attributed to the decision-making process used by the Soviet leaders. Retroactive decision-making process predominates. Progressive remedial
measures are rarely implemented. Consequently, when a destabilizing event occurs, the process of reform is severely disrupted, allowing
time for other unexpected exigencies to arise, thereby delaying progress. Real economic and political reform is difficult to come by in
this environment. This is frustrating when the vast majority of the
Russian people want dramatic and far-reaching reforms to be instituted immediately. However, economic and legal reform will continue to erode the state machine. American lawyers should pay
special attention to the latest regulatory developments within the
various republics. Economics and law will become interrelated.
The regional unrest and political turmoil has frustrated the opportunities to integrate with Western businesses. This has adversely affected the Soviet Union’s ability to obtain technology and
investment from abroad. Nevertheless, joint ventures with the West
have developed very quickly. While in 1988, only three joint ventures
per month were created, in 1989, 85 joint ventures per month were
established. These numbers have increased to 125 joint ventures per
month in 1990. Currently, there are more than 2,300 joint ventures
in the Soviet Union.
On December 11, 1989, a regulation was adopted making it necessary to obtain licenses for 80% of everything that is exported from
the Soviet Union. The USSR became the first country in the world
to require licenses for exports, not imports. This represents one more
victory for the bureaucrats. Bureaucrats justify this regulation by
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pointing to their desire to satisfy the domestic market, to enable
people to buy more, and to prohibit valuable goods from being exported. However, economic principles dictate that the more restrictions, the lower the level of optimization.
It is patently apparent that, during the past 70 years, nothing good
was achieved. The market was never properly utilized. New restrictions will only bring similar results.
Today, the Soviet people can buy only 3% of their necessities on
the open market. Recent elections to the Republican Supreme
Councils and to local bodies of power have shown vividly that the
populace supports the movement toward the market.
The hard currency situation in the Soviet Union has deteriorated,
and international debt is growing dramatically. It has currently
reached $58 billion. However, for a country the size of the Soviet
Union, this is not a large debt. The Soviet Union should have little
difficulty paying the interest.
What tasks will the lawyers face in 1991? The economic and political situation in the Soviet Union is consistently changing. The turmoil and chaos of the various republics has created an extremely
unstable environment for reform. The question remains as to what
extent the future confederation will retain the vestiges of the old
legal system. It appears as though only ten or eleven of the current
republics will join the confederation. It will be difficult for American
lawyers to understand the legal framework that exists in the republics. Perhaps most important, American law firms will face the problems of protecting American investment in the USSR.
This widespread involvement of American lawyers will help create
proper legal standards for the Soviet legal community. Furthermore,
it will bring Soviet legal principles in line with modern legal standards, thus promoting continued political and economic reform.

THE NEW MAP OF EASTERN
EUROPE
Vladimir Kvint, a Russian-born economist, has contributed forwardlooking coverage for Forbes on the collapse of socialism. In ‘‘Russia
as Cinderella’’ (February 1, 1990) he was perhaps the first writer to
predict that the Soviet Union would come unglued. Now, he looks
beyond the dissolution and sketches out the new economic and political groups he is convinced will emerge.

Forbes, September 16, 1991.

SIBERIA: A WARM PLACE FOR
INVESTORS
The breakup of the Soviet Union presents great opportunities for U.S.
investors and business people. But to grasp them they will have to
recognize that there no longer is a Soviet Union.
Shortly before the failed coup took place, this joke came out of the
Soviet Union: Mikhail Gorbachev sits in his office, musing on a huge
portrait of himself. ‘‘Soon, my friend, the people will take us down,’’
murmurs Gorbachev. ‘‘You are a fool,’’ the portrait responds. ‘‘The
people will unhang me. They will hang you.’’ The joke was close to
the mark. Leaders of the coup had counted on the Soviet people’s
being ready to dump Gorbachev. In that they were probably right.
But the coup leaders, along with most foreign governments, ignored
the fact that Gorbachev had become irrelevant. It was Boris Yeltsin
and his Russian government, not Gorbachev and the Soviet government, that the people and large parts of the military defended
against the coup.
Which is another way of saying that the Soviet Union is dead. In
its place 15 sovereign nations are emerging— Russia, the largest by
far. Some of these new nations, or old ones reborn, will gravitate
economically toward Russia; others will move closer to Eastern Europe or the Balkans.
Each of these new nations will seek a seat in the United Nations,
will establish its own diplomatic relations and create its own military
forces. Most of them will be as independent of the old center as
Poland or Hungary has become. What remains in the Kremlin will be
something like the British Commonwealth of Nations: a ceremonial,
consultative body based upon common interests whose commonality
will fade over time.
A late August headline in The Wall Street Journal said that people
‘‘worry’’ that the Soviet Union may break up. Why this should worry
anyone in Washington or anywhere else is beyond me. I suppose
Forbes, September 16, 1991, pp. 96–97.
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some people simply cannot confront change. This fission is a wonderful development. Breaking the vast empire into more manageable
pieces, grouped on economic rather than political lines, presents tremendous opportunities for foreign business.
The USSR will no longer be the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The terms ‘‘socialist’’ and ‘‘soviet’’ will disappear, just as the
word ‘‘empire’’ disappeared with the emergence of the British Commonwealth. Its disappearance will be of more than formal significance because the breakup hastens the move toward market-based
economies. All political maps, encyclopedias, political directories will
become outdated.
The Baltic republics, Georgia, Moldavia, Armenia, Ukraine, Belorussia have called it quits. Others may follow. They will not even be
part of the new, loose union. Altogether, more than 80 million people will secede entirely.
From now on, the republics remaining in the union will decide
what rights, functions, and money to delegate to the center. The one
who pays is the one who orders the music. Republics will finance the
army, which will shrink because of that.
Civil war? Most unlikely, except for the small-scale continuing war
between Armenia and Azerbaijan and some ethnic clashes in Georgia
and Central Asia. Over the last 18 months the leaders of the republics proved that they can solve mutual political and economic problems directly.
What’s the timetable for the new order? The treaty that will replace the one aborted by the coup will last for about three years as a
progressive document of a transition period. It will take at least that
long for the various republics to stand on their own feet economically. Except for Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, and Georgia, none of
the other, smaller new republics has an economic basis for independence. At least not yet.
Every historical epoch creates its markets out of a mixture of politics and economics, and this one will be no different. There was the
European Hanseatic cities union in the 14th to 16th centuries. There
were trade routes like the Silk Route. Now America, Canada, and
Mexico are uniting in one market, as European countries were.
In place of one gigantic market created by force and maintained
by force in the old Soviet Union, the new market groupings will
follow more economic logic, which itself will lead to different politi-
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cal ties. While lecturing in Austria recently, I witnessed a similar
process close up. Austrian, Hungarian, and Czechoslovakian businessmen were going back and forth, putting together an economic
grouping not unlike that of the old Austro-Hungarian empire; this
grouping will probably be the link between Western Europe and the
countries farther east. Ukraine, having left the Soviet Union, will
gravitate toward this grouping.
Siberia, though part of the Russian Republic, will get a certain
independence. Because it faces the Pacific Ocean, it will become a
Pacific Basin economy in good part. A federation of several Siberian
cities has already been created. New air routes are connecting California and Alaska with Far Eastern Russia. In June Alaska Airlines
began offering service three times a week from Anchorage to the city
of Khabarovsk. And the Soviet carrier Aeroflot has had weekly flights
to Khabarovsk from San Francisco via Anchorage since May. All this
suggests American business should look at Siberia via the Pacific
rather than via Moscow.
Kazakstan and the republics of Central Asia—Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirgizia—will soon establish a kind of
union among themselves. But this union will not gravitate toward
the Middle East, despite historical and religious ties. As a market,
these republics will establish close economic relations with the Russian Republic, but as equals, not as colonies as under the communists.
All this turmoil, this breaking of old ties, presents a tremendous
opportunity for U.S. business. This year more than 100 joint ventures a month have been created in the USSR. Since August 1990
the U.S. has been the leader in total capital invested.
But the Americans are not necessarily looking in the right places.
Now 60% of Soviet-American joint ventures are situated in Moscow,
focusing on the western part of the old Soviet Union. Small Estonia
has as many joint ventures with Americans as Siberia does. Yet 75%
of all Soviet natural resources are found to the east of the Ural
Mountains. Western investment in Siberia and the Far East is very
safe. But the U.S. will need to move fairly fast. The Japanese are
already very active in Russia’s Far East, and the South Koreans even
more so. Investments in fisheries and timber will pay off fast in Siberia.
American investment in the reconstruction of the machine-build-
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ing and metallurgical plants may be very profitable. Factories to recycle the rich mining, metallurgical, and agricultural waste that covers
the former territory of the USSR are badly needed and can be highly
profitable. The Japanese are already buying coal waste from Yakutia
and other regions in the Russian republic to produce chemical elements for manufacturing.
The new order in the East will require huge investments in communications and transportation—and large doses of modern technology. The KGB has been artificially blocking cooperation in these
spheres in efforts to keep the Soviet Union isolated. The KGB will
have a diminished influence in the new republics. I think a fiberoptic cable will soon connect Europe and Japan through Soviet territory. The time has come to fully use the potential of the Arctic Seaway. I have studied it for many years and know that it is the shortest
and the cheapest way from Europe to Asia as well as from Vancouver
to Europe.
There is so much to be done that there is opportunity for everyone. But, first, Western governments and Western investors must
learn from their own experience that aid and investment channeled
through the central government is inefficiently used. Money spent
to shore up Gorbachev is money wasted. Government loans should
be channeled only to specific republics and for specific programs.
Private investors should concentrate on projects, backed by reliable
feasibility studies, that can pay back their investments in three to
five years.
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is as dead as the Holy
Roman Empire. The Russian people know this. Foreigners haven’t
yet gotten the full message.

GENNADI YANAYEV,
OVERACHIEVER
The rise of a mediocre man like Gennadi Yanayev demonstrates how
weak and desperate the Soviet Communist Party has become. Neither a smart reactionary nor a talented technocrat, he is gray, cynical,
and pragmatic just like the party machine itself. As an economist, he
is nonexistent.
I first met him in 1970 and since then I have watched his rise in
the communist power structure. At the time, I was head of a students’ construction unit and knew him when he was a mini-boss of
the Komsomol, the young communists’ organization that is a breeding ground for party bosses. Obedient and cautious from the beginning, he liked to tell off-color anecdotes but never the most
innocuous political joke. Even then, however, he was cunning.
He never had any experience of real work at a factory or a research
organization or as a manager. Instead, he rose from one meaningless
job to another. In one position, his main expertise was hosting foreign delegations. In his next career leap he was in charge of building
latter-day Potemkin villages, ensuring that Soviet reality was polished for foreigners. His next promotion was to a high job directing
phony Soviet trade unions.
Then, an unseen mighty party hand moved him up, and last year
he became a Politburo member, at a time when Mr. Gorbachev
was trying to sit on two chairs—democracy and reaction—
simultaneously.
But President Gorbachev fell from both chairs. He abandoned
democratic goals and surrounded himself with men of the old breed
like Gennadi Yanayev, and they finally crushed him.

Editorial, The New York Times, August 20, 1991, p. A21.

THE COUP’S AFTERMATH: WILL
GORBACHEV BE THE LOSER?
The coup last week in the Soviet Union failed before most people
outside of Russia could learn how to pronounce the plotters’ names.
But it demonstrated powerfully how deeply the Soviet Union has
committed itself to reform. ‘‘Even the heads of the KGB and the
military could not succeed with a coup,’’ said Vladimir Kvint, a lecturer at Fordham University. ‘‘That means political risk has diminished. Investment in the Soviet Union is safe.’’ But the Soviet Union
still is likely to undergo more wrenching change. Boris N. Yeltsin’s
heroic stand elevated his status even more. He will no doubt use it
to push harder for autonomy for the 15 republics. ‘‘Yeltsin already
has agreed to recognize the Baltic states as independent,’’ said Mr.
Kvint. The real loser from the coup may turn out to be Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Though he will stay on as president, he
will become ‘‘a king without a kingdom,’’ Mr. Kvint said.

Business, The New York Times, International Edition, August 25, 1991.

DEAD SOULS
Workers in the Soviet Union seem lazy and thieving, but the Soviet
people are fundamentally honest and capable of hard work. It is the
system that has made them bad—and the system is dying.
All the economic news from the Soviet Union is bad these days.
But underneath the turmoil, and with unemployment heading for
30 million, change for the better takes hold slowly but irresistibly.
Under new laws Soviet citizens can work for foreign companies in
the USSR and abroad, not as runaway serfs but legally. This is a
tremendous step toward freedom. And foreigners, who have always
been officially considered in the USSR to be capitalist spies working
under cover, can now work at a Soviet enterprise and even manage a
Soviet company on a contract basis.
This means Soviets can leave, though new travel laws still have
not been passed. A brain drain is developing. It is still difficult to get
out, but you can do so if you can land a contract from a foreign firm.
Such contracts are highly coveted. The average monthly salary in the
USSR is 290 rubles, about $2.40 a week at my estimate of the blackmarket rate of exchange. Though Gorbachev makes 12 times more
than an average citizen, he makes less than $150 a month at an
official rate set by himself. Of course, neither of these figures represents reality: Ordinary citizens get cheap rents and cheap bread, and
Soviet bigwigs get nearly everything free. Still, these pitiful figures
indicate how little disposable income Soviet citizens have.
So, people who can are leaving. Soviet biologists, mathematicians,
economists, and financial specialists are welcome in a world labor
market where there is an overall shortage of highly trained professionals.
Salomon Brothers, for example, invited a 30-year-old Soviet
banker with ten years of experience in a Soviet bank to join a company’s New York office.
The Soviet Union has brilliant computer specialists, especially in
the software field. These too are trickling out and adapt quickly
Forbes, May 27, 1991, pp. 96–102.
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abroad. Soviet immigrants never ask for money in the subway; in a
matter of several years they get their own houses, cars, things they
could never have hoped to have at home. Most of these highly
trained people swim well in the stormy waters of American business.
But the emigrants represent only a fraction of the Soviet Union’s
vast store of trained and educated people. Most of these will stay at
home. They represent one of the Soviet Union’s greatest resources.
All these workers need to become productive is the introduction of
capitalist incentives.
And that is why I say that, underneath the turmoil, a better way is
developing. Forget what you have heard and read about lazy, thieving
Soviet workers. It is the socialist system that is rotten, not the people. The old Soviet socialist system was unproductive because it was
a mass of disincentives. Moscow dictated the salary of a Norilsk
miner far in the North and of a cotton grower deep in the South.
You got what some bureaucrat said you should get rather than a
market-clearing wage. This led to bad labor discipline; the fired
drunkard immediately crossed the street and went to another factory
for the same small salary.
Yet factory managers fought to swell their payrolls. To squeeze
more money out of the bureaucracy, each company tried to fake the
number of working hands it needed. Unneeded workers were known
as ‘‘dead souls’’—after Nikolai Gogol. There were some 12 million of
them in the Soviet Union.
In a way, this situation may be better than the American system
of welfare, as far as the recipients are concerned; at least they do not
get something for absolutely nothing. But the dead souls are a drag
on productivity; why should Ivan work hard when Stefan is sleeping
on the job and Ivan and Stefan both get the same wage?
In the Soviet system jobs were not so much for production as they
were a means of regimenting people. Not to have a job was a crime,
even though loafing on the job was not. A person out of work was
called tuneyadets, ‘‘the one who eats in vain,’’ a sponger. Laws against
unemployment were also used as a political whip against dissidents.
The brilliant poet Joseph Brodsky, who later received a Nobel
Prize, was sent to prison for doing nothing. ‘‘But I am a poet,’’ he
said to a judge. ‘‘Okay,’’ argued the judge, ‘‘but I asked you about
your job.’’
Finally, in January Gorbachev introduced the ‘‘Status of the Un-
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employed.’’ Giving the jobless rights is a major step away from communism and toward a free society. It comes in the nick of time:
Soon millions will need it. In East Germany, where the economy and
productivity of labor was better than in the USSR, 4 million out of
8 million workers lost their jobs after reunification.
New, productive jobs aren’t opening up as fast as the old, useless
ones are being shed. But still they are opening up. Case in point:
There are more than 7,000 new cooperative technical consulting and
manufacturing firms, employing more than 300,000 people.
Making the situation worse, the whole system has been rife with
the disease of stealing; lacking the bargaining power to get a living
wage, workers are driven to theft. The so-called nesuni—the ‘‘carriers’’ or the ‘‘factory-lifters’’—are everywhere: A worker at a meat factory carries away every day under his coat 3 kilos of meat; at the cable
factory, a piece of cable. If somebody works at a rubber factory, he
will take home ‘‘article 噛2’’—the modest official name for condoms,
which are always in great demand. Condoms are a kind of currency
for such workers. Some workers say: ‘‘A day without a gift from the
factory is a day lived in vain.’’
This happens not because Russian workers are any more dishonest
than American workers or any others. The chief explanation is that
in the USSR nothing belongs to anybody one knows. Some people
think that it all belongs to the bosses in the Kremlin, and in a way
they are right. Others say it has been declared that this property
belongs to the nation. ‘‘And that means, to me, since I am a part of
the nation. So, I am not stealing, I am just taking what belongs to
me,’’ a Soviet worker might reason.
It is, however, rather easy to stop the disease. Those who work in
cooperatives, where part of the property really belongs to them, do
not steal.
Many years of work among and with the Russian workers allow me
to conclude that they are diligent, assiduous, and creative under the
right circumstances.
When I was head of a construction team in Norilsk, we had to lift
permafrost by shovel; there was a constant shortage of bulldozers.
To save my workers from this hellish job, I illegally hired a bulldozer driver. He agreed to work during the night, because by the
morning he had to be back with his Caterpillar on his regular job.
How did I pay him? Vodka is hard currency in the Soviet Union.
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Unlike rubles, vodka can buy everything, so I promised the bulldozer
driver that he would be paid for his work with three bottles of vodka.
But I was young then and made a terrible mistake—I gave the
vodka to the driver when he started work. So when I came at 2 in
the morning to see what he had done, the first bottle was done indeed, and the driver was lovingly opening the second one.
Next time I knew better. Work first, vodka later.
Does this mean that Russians are bad workers, and that they drink
too much? In the USSR private agricultural lots are tiny; they constitute only 3% of arable land. However, these tiny plots yield 30% of
all the country’s meat and milk production, 60% of potato crops.
People work when they get paid properly.
Since 1989 the Chinese have leased a lot of land in Kirgizia. The
local Soviet collective has a crop of 23 tons of tomatoes per hectare.
The Chinese get 1,000 tons!
Of course, the American seeds that the Chinese use play their
role. The seeds of the American management system, implanted into
the Russian soil, will yield good crops, as well. The Soviet Union has
everything it needs to improve its standard of living. Everything, that
is, except proper management.
Seventy-five percent of the most important natural resources sit
to the east of the Ural mountains—in Siberia and in the Far East.
The regions suffer from significant labor shortages. A free market
economy would offer financial incentives to attract workers where
they are needed and would offer them goods and services to spend
their wages on.
The mismanagement and waste of resources under the old regime
were almost incredible. In the late 1960s the bureaucrats decided to
introduce the Asian Tadzhiks, who knew only cattle breeding and
trade, to heavy industry. It took 20 years and a vast fortune to build
an aluminum plant in Tadzhikistan. Three hundred Tadzhiks were
sent to the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant in Siberia, the second biggest in the world, to study for nine months. When the brand-new
specialists in metallurgy returned home, only a dozen of them went
to work at the plant. The rest of the Tadzhiks went back to what they
knew best—cattle herding.
Or take what happened to the nomadic Siberian nationalities, cattle breeding ethnic groups in Hakassia and Tuva. Soviet power forced
them to be settled in towns. Their children were taken to the city
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orphanages, where both urban and rural lifestyles became alien to
them. They found refuge in vodka.
Using politics rather than economics to dictate resource allocation, the Kremlin wasted billions of dollars and ruined lives. Uzbekistan, for example, has 30% unemployment and constant water
shortages. Moscow created chemical plants in Uzbekistan that do
not need a lot of people but demand a lot of water.
These things happen when you substitute central command planning for the free market.
At the same time, plants assembling agricultural combines, refrigerators, and TV sets were established in Siberia, where there weren’t
enough workers to man the plants.
You don’t undo a mess like this without creating new problems.
The sprouts of new growth first poke through the old asphalt. The
millions of unnecessary jobs started to shrink.
State companies newly leased by the workers usually begin by
eliminating unnecessary jobs. A better system evolves only slowly.
During the past two years more than 3.5 million people have deserted the state enterprises to go to work for cooperatives. By my
estimates, by 1993, 8 million to 10 million others will join them as a
semicapitalist economy grows up alongside the socialist one. By 1996
the private sector will employ 20 million.
Don’t be confused by the fact that the Kremlin first moves toward
freer markets, then pulls back. Such ebbs and flows are inevitable,
but they cannot salvage the old system. Socialism is dying in the
Soviet Union. The nation is irrevocably, if hesitantly, embarked on
the road to capitalism and economic freedom. Progress is slow, but
the Kremlin cannot turn back the clock.

UNITED WE FALL
I would immediately abolish the Union treaty and offer all the republics absolute independence and the opportunity to consider entering a new union on mutually beneficial terms. This actually
should have been done two or more years ago, because the desire to
keep the Soviet Union together is a surrealistic task, one could even
say an unrealistic task.
My forecast is that by the end of 1991 or in 1992, the union will
cease to exist. Gorbachev’s desire to keep the union in its present
shape using his police measures will unfortunately only lead the Soviet Union to a bloody civil war.
In the interest of peace, the West must stop all economic, political, and moral help to Gorbachev, and support, instead, the democratically elected republican parliaments. There is only one force in
the Soviet Union that can lead the country to civil war—and that is
Gorbachev.

Moscow Magazine. April 1991, p. 45.

CZAR GORBACHEV?
Vladimir Kvint’s articles in Forbes on events in the Soviet Union have
been close to prophetic: A year ago, when few thought the Soviet
empire could ever break up, Kvint predicted and advocated the withdrawal of the Russian Republic from the USSR (February 19, 1990).
Then, last June, he warned that the uncritical Western support for
Mikhail Gorbachev would create the unintended consequence of
strengthening the reactionary wing of the Communist Party. The
bloody Soviet repression in Lithuania in January confirmed that prediction. What now?

THE MYTH OF GOOD CZAR
GORBACHEV
The U.S. and Western Europe tried to help the cause of Soviet reform
by pandering to Gorbachev’s government. As the repression in the Baltics shows, the cause would have been better served had we been
tougher with the Kremlin.
In failing to press Gorbachev on behalf of Lithuanian freedom, the
‘‘Western governments . . . unwittingly brought to a halt the further
progress of perestroika. President Bush and his allies . . . have strengthened the hands of those in the Soviet Union who are trying to stop the
movement of progress.’’
So wrote Vladimir Kvint in an almost prophetic Forbes article. ‘‘The
Best Way to Help Gorbachev Is to Make Life Difficult for Him’’ (June
11, 1990). Kvint’s point was simple and blunt: By insisting that Gorbachev move toward reform and freedom we would strengthen his hand
in the difficult job of curbing Communist extremists and centralists:
by easing up we reduce his need to crack down on the hard-liners. The
dire prophecy was redeemed in a shower of lead and a clanking of tank
treads last month in Lithuania.
What does Kvint see now?
In 1991 the name ‘‘USSR’’ will disappear from the political map of
the world. It would be interesting to know what the Norwegian Nobel
Committee now thinks of last year’s winner, Mikhail Gorbachev.
Until January this revolution could have been peaceful. But unwavering Western support for Gorbachev and centralized Soviet power
have strengthened the hard-liners and increased the chance of a
bloody civil war.
Last spring Gorbachev imposed an economic blockade on Lithuania. In this way he tested the reaction that might come from the
West were he to back down on reform. Then, at the summit in May,
President Bush accepted several promises from Gorbachev. Gorbachev never fulfilled them. The law on freedom of travel and immigraForbes, February 4, 1991, pp. 36–37.
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tion, for example, was not passed, even though Gorbachev promised
to adopt it in June, right after the summit. Thus, the green light for
today’s tanks appeared then, in May.
Gorbachev is a master manipulator of Western opinion. He will
fire the generals who, he claims, gave the order to put down Lithuania behind his back.
In doing this, Gorbachev will be repeating an ancient Russian
drama. For centuries, Russian serfs believed in the image of the
‘‘kind’’ czar. They believed that everything wicked was done by his
evil ministers, acting behind his back. ‘‘If only the czar knew’’ was an
emotion that helped countless Russians rationalize the state’s irrational brutality against them. Many of those who knew about Stalin’s
atrocities believed that he was unaware of them. He was a ‘‘good
czar.’’ So is Gorbachev; only his generals and ministers are wicked.
Only this time the Western leaders behave like the Russian serfs.
By making Gorbachev the beloved child, they allowed him to become a despot.
Yes, a despot. The latest news, ignored or not comprehended by
the Western press, is that Gorbachev abolished the President’s
Council early in January. Now Aleksandr Yakovlev, the main promoter of democracy in Gorbachev’s team, is out of a job. And in
December Gorbachev fired Vadim Bakatin, the minister of the interior, who apparently disagreed with Gorbachev’s plan of suppression
for Lithuania and other rebellious republics. After Bakatin’s sacking,
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze broadcast to the world his
fears about the coming dictatorship. The Western World regretted
the resignation but pretended it didn’t hear his warning.
There are now democratically elected parliaments in 7 out of 15
republics. In these parliaments lies big potential for democracy. But
this potential cannot be realized in a despotic country, and that is
why civil war is now almost inevitable.
While it may fool naı̈ve Westerners, the image of the kind czar—
Gorbachev in his latest incarnation—cannot deceive people in the
USSR any longer. The real disintegration of the USSR will start
sometime between March and October of this year, when hunger
and economic crisis will reach their peaks. Lithuania, Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Georgia, and Moldavia will be the fuses of the explosion.
By my estimate, approximately 12% of the country’s territory
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could be enveloped in civil war. There is little hope that it won’t be
bloody.
At any rate, perestroika is dead. But perestroika was a naı̈ve notion,
anyway. It means ‘‘reconstruction,’’ but reconstruction could not
help socialism to survive. In any case, Gorbachev and his allies never
forswore socialism or even communism.
Gorbachev’s timing has been sophisticated. He made good use of
the approaching war in the Persian Gulf. It is clear that President
Bush is worried about retaining Gorbachev’s support, but at this
point there is no reason for Bush to worry. Gorbachev cannot back
Saddam Hussein: He needs Western capital and technology; and by
changing his position on the Persian Gulf, Gorbachev could incur
the real wrath of the West. This is something he is truly afraid of.
For Western businessmen interested in doing business in the Soviet Union, now is a time for caution but not paralysis. Some of the
new independent republics will voluntarily enter a new confederation. They will delegate to it some political responsibilities. The confederation will also deal with nuclear arms and military strategy. But
Gorbachev and his crowd will probably end up as figureheads. Boris
Yeltsin and the leaders of the other republics are the people to deal
with in the USSR now—both for foreign governments and for business people hoping to get a foothold. Yeltsin now is popular in all
the republics, not in Russia only. His main task is to revive Russia
and to rebuild ties with the other republics, without the center. Yeltsin understands that revival is impossible without integration with
the West. Under him the Russian parliament has already adopted
the best legislation as to the protection of Western capital.
What should the U.S. do? Stop all economic aid and loans to
the centralized USSR government; this aid is senseless. This would
involve suspending the trade agreement signed at the spring summit
until all Gorbachev’s promises are fulfilled. Nor should there be any
new meetings with Gorbachev until he provides a new union
treaty—signed by the republics voluntarily, not with a tank muzzle
at their heads. The U.S. and the other Western countries should
loudly and firmly condemn the invasion of Lithuania and establish
direct contacts with the democratic republics and their parliamentary governments. In continuing to back Comrade Gorbachev, the
U.S. is—not for the first time in recent history—backing the wrong
horse.

HARSH LOOK AT SOVIET
PROSPECTS
A top Soviet economist now lecturing and consulting in the U.S.
believes the Soviet Union will begin to break up over the next year,
that a significant portion is likely to fall into civil war, and that by
November the country will be swept by a food crisis of severe proportions.
Nonetheless, Vladimir L. Kvint, who lectured last week at Northwestern University’s J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management,
said now is the time for American and other Western businesses to
invest in areas of the Soviet Union that can be identified as having a
low risk of unrest and a high probability of a good return. Kvint
holds the lifetime title of Soviet Professor of Political Economy, and
currently is distinguished lecturer at Fordham University.
‘‘The Soviet Union will cease to exist as a political unit in the
next year, but the resources will stay,’’ Kvint said in an interview
at Northwestern. ‘‘A substantial number of the regions carry little
investment risk.’’
For example, he said, areas in Siberia and the Far East used during
Stalinist days for internal exile are alive with the entrepreneurial
spirit and have few, if any, of the social conflicts apparent in many
other regions. Some of those people were exiled for demonstrating
entrepreneurial skills.
‘‘It is no accident that the level of productivity [in such regions]
is 30% higher than [in] other regions,’’ Kvint said. ‘‘In some spots, it
is 40% to 50% higher. They have a totally different attitude to
work—they have pride in their work.’’
Kvint’s positive assessment of business opportunity comes as
American and Western firms are pulling back or retrenching in the
Soviet Union in the face of mounting repression in the Baltic states
and elsewhere, and in light of a host of difficulties and disappointments encountered in the past several years.
Kvint, who advises American businesses, said he was not of the
Article by John N. Maclean, The Chicago Tribune, Sunday, February 3, 1991.
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opinion that firms should invest in the Soviet Union ‘‘no matter
what.’’ But if careful risk analysis shows profits can be made safely,
‘‘then why not?’’ he said.
Kvint makes some of the same arguments in an article in the February 4 edition of Forbes magazine, blaming excessive Western support for Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev for helping bring on the
current round of repression.
‘‘Unwavering Western support for Gorbachev and centralized Soviet power have strengthened the hard-liners and increased the
chance of a bloody civil war,’’ Kvint wrote in Forbes. He said Gorbachev tested the West by imposing last spring’s economic blockade
on Lithuania.
When the West failed to react to that and other provocations,
Kvint argues, Gorbachev saw a ‘‘green light for today’s tanks.’’
Kvint, who was an advocate in the Soviet Union of market systems
as long as a decade ago, said he has used a variety of criteria to do a
risk analysis of the Soviet Union, combining historical, economic,
and political approaches. The analysis is so specific, he said, that he
can predict that about 12% of the country’s territory will be in a state
of deep unrest in the coming year, if not civil war.
In the long run, Kvint said, he believes at least some major areas
of the Soviet Union will successfully pursue reform.
‘‘Now is the right time to invest in a number of regions in the
Soviet Union,’’ Kvint said. ‘‘You should invest in separate producing
regions where you know the local government has been democratically elected [7 of the 15 Soviet republics have elected parliaments].
‘‘You should invest in those that have gained a significant independence from central controls such as where enterprises are leased from
the state by employees,’’ he said.
In hotel construction, for example, there are some businesses that
have been leased back from the state. Building hotels raises the possibility of being paid in hard currency, as the concerns earn tourist
and business cash. The Soviet ruble cannot be converted into other
currencies.
The Russian Republic, containing 85% of the Soviet Union’s natural resources, is so large it cannot be seen as a single unit, Kvint said.
If the Soviet Union breaks up and Russia becomes a separate country, it would be the largest country in the world.
Kvint predicted the republic’s president, Boris N. Yeltsin, may
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emerge as a head of a union of republic presidents and become a
more powerful figure than Gorbachev.
Russia, like other republics, has claimed its natural resources for
itself, but said it would cooperate with the state for a set price. Kvint
said business has increased markedly in Russia, where in 1988 there
were about 8 new joint ventures announced each month, and in 1990
there were about 125 joint ventures a month.

THE SOVIET UNION ON THE WAY
TO THE MARKET: ONE STEP
FORWARD, THEN TWO [STEPS
BACKWARD]
Not only will the Soviets’ way to a free market economy be long and
hard for Gorbachev, but the population must also have some painful
experiences. The past year is proof. Inflation and unemployment
have increased markedly. According to my evaluations, in 1990 the
rate of inflation was at 18%, the unemployment rate at about 3%,
but on a trend to increase as 50 to 60 million people are still working
in positions that are not actually productive.
The civil wars in the republics are bringing economic losses on the
general order of 10% to 12%. Additionally, the concurrently uncertain political situation in the war regions has negative effects on
foreign investment. Although in the past year total joint-venture international investments increased to more than $800 million, actually only a third of the joint ventures work according to plan. With
half a billion dollars, American firms are the main investors.
The efforts at autonomy have borne fruit in at least one area.
Since January 1 the registration of joint ventures is no longer centralized at the Ministry of Finance, but, rather, administered by the
Ministries of the republics.

‘‘Experts’ Forum,’’ Neue Kronen-Zeitung Wirtschafts (Vienna), January 26, 1991.

OPPORTUNITIES IN SOVIET
DISINTEGRATION
Despite the Soviet parliament’s approval of President Mikhail S.
Gorbachev’s plan to create a market economy, the Soviet Union will
not live to celebrate its 70-year anniversary in 1992. The Soviet
Union’s political and economic crises are intensifying, and if the
forces of disintegration continue—as I expect they will—the Union
will come apart. By 1992, there will be no country called the Soviet
Union.
In place of the old Soviet Union, new states will appear. These
states will welcome foreign investment. For Europe and the United
States, these resource-rich republics could become the new Klondike. But to take advantage of the opportunities that will arise as the
Soviet Union disintegrates, investors will have to think in terms of
several diverse markets—not one country.
My own assessment, as a regional economist, is that the safest
place to invest will continue to be the Russian Republic. Even without its empire, Russia will remain the largest country in the world.
Siberia alone, which is part of Russia, contains not only 92% of the
Soviet Union’s oil, but also 85% of its natural resources. According
to my calculations, it would cost one-fifth to one-third as much to
transport oil to the United States from Russia as from the Middle
East.
But Russia is not homogeneous. That is why the degree of political
and economic risk varies depending on the territory.
The region of Russia called Dagestan, on the Caspian Sea, is
largely Muslim, but is also home to 36 other ethnic groups. Dagestan
is very stable and open to foreign investment, unlike its neighbor
Azerbaijan where ethnic fighting is rampant.
Moscow and Leningrad are attractive places to invest. In the Soviet Far East, the Sakhalin and Primorski territories near Japan are
especially attractive as markets. Political risk there is minimal, and a
basic infrastructure is already in place. The Pacific region in general
The New York Times, October 28, 1990, Section 3, p. 13.
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is becoming the center of world business activity, and the Russian
Far East, with its tremendous resources, can play a major role.
So far, the parliament of Russia is the most full-blooded and reliable in the Soviet Union. Next comes the government of Ukraine
and then, with more reservations, the governments of Estonia and
Latvia. Guarantees coming from the other republics are not worth
much now.
The 1990s will see the reemergence of Russian companies, after
nearly 70 years. The 1990s will also see these companies become
integrated into the world economy through alliances with foreign
companies. What will be created, as these changes unfold, is a new
nation, devoid of empire, but with the potential for creating abundant wealth.

WHO’S IN CHARGE AROUND
HERE?
In Russia, Boris Yeltsin, not Mikhail Gorbachev, is in charge. Bad news
for the communist elite and for Saddam Hussein, Fidel Castro, and
other scroungers. Good news for world oil supplies.
The fight for power between Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin is
almost over. Yeltsin and his team will define the future of Russia.
Gorbachev will end up in a largely ceremonial role.
Americans have been slow to understand this. They tend still to
think of Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian parliament, as simply
the opposition to the Communist Party. No. Mikhail Gorbachev is
president of the USSR, but Yeltsin has more real power in Russia.
In the long sweep of Russian history—from the 12th century, the
time of Novgorod, the Free City, to today—Boris Yeltsin is the first
leader, with the possible exception of Aleksandr Kerensky, ever
elected by the people. By the people, not by some gang, not by birth
or by the knife. Yeltsin started a real revolution, a breakthrough to
the lost future, lost in October 1917 when Russia last had a chance
for democracy and for real economic development.
Fourteen days after he had been elected chairman of the Russian
parliament, he managed to unite the divided Russian parliament for
the declaration of sovereignty. Today the USSR parliament, headed
by Gorbachev, is powerless against the fine-tuned Russian parliament.
Gorbachev, afraid to antagonize extremist groups like Pamyat, has
failed to speak out against anti-Semitism. Yeltsin has already talked
of creating a special commission to safeguard the rights of Russian
Jews.
With such moves, 76% of the USSR’s territory has gone out of
Gorbachev’s control. Russia becomes the biggest new country in the
world. It has 92% of the oil and gas condensate resources of the
USSR, 85% of the coal, 78% of the gas, 92% of the lumber, the
Forbes, September 3, 1990, pp. 54–57.
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majority of nonferrous metals. As for platinum and diamonds, Russia
is the only producer in the Eastern European countries. Russia has
powerful chemical, automotive, and machine-building production,
and the productivity of its labor is higher than that elsewhere in the
USSR.
In one and a half to two years Russia will achieve complete independence—quicker than Lithuania—because, unlike Lithuania,
Russia has an economic basis for freedom; it can stand on its own.
Yeltsin is already acting to implement that freedom. He has cut
the number of ministries from 51 to 28; in 8 of these ministries the
staff numbers only 20 people, and their direct task is not to interfere
in the economy but to cut back on the powers of the old ministries.
Aiming for financial sovereignty, the Russian parliament has authorized all Russian banks to withdraw from the USSR banking system, which would deprive the government of financial management
levers. Yeltsin clearly intends, for the first time in USSR history, to
break the monopoly of the central government on foreign trade and
currency transactions. The Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of
Russia was created. He has created a TV network for Russia independent of the USSR network.
Russian oilfields pumped out 115 million tons of the oil that was
exported by the USSR in 1989; 88 billion cubic meters of gas, 88,000
tons of copper, 17 million tons of pulp, 400,000 cars and trucks, and
17 million watches exported by the USSR were produced in Russia.
Export of part of the petroleum production generates hard currency,
all of which will go to this new bank, to remain in Russia, rather than
to the government of the USSR.
Why is Yeltsin so popular? In part because he defied a basic rule
for political careers in the Soviet system. The rule says there is no
comeback for a fallen politician. This terrible totalitarian machine
first produced bosses, then utilized them as fuel for itself to further
its horrendous movement. At best, it just threw people away, reduced them to ashes, letting them live and die in obscurity. At its
worst, it killed them.
But Yeltsin didn’t disappear into obscurity. He came back and became so popular that it is in the best interests of Gorbachev to protect him rather than try to edge him out. For if anything were to
happen to Yeltsin, it could cause a civil war. Yeltsin, however, has
already freed himself from ‘‘protection’’ by the KGB: His personal
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guards—up to ten people—do not work in the KGB and are responsible to the parliament of Russia.
In reemerging from obscurity, not only did Yeltsin become immensely popular, he helped make obsolete the very notion of the
USSR as a whole. This kind of makes Gorbachev a king without a
kingdom. Soon Yeltsin may become the chairman of a Council of
Presidents of Independent Republics, where there will be no place
for Gorbachev. Remaining president of the USSR, Gorbachev will
have purely nominal and ceremonial functions, not unlike those of
the queen of England in the British Commonwealth.
Meanwhile, Gorbachev, although an historic and definitely positive figure, still tries to solder the old saucepan of socialism. His
efforts are wasted, because this saucepan never did hold water. People in the USSR have a saying: ‘‘Soviet paralysis is the most progressive in the world.’’
Yeltsin’s past shouldn’t be idealized. He was the almighty party
boss of the huge Sverdlovsk territory. I am quite sure than in 1985
Gorbachev was closer to understanding democracy than Yeltsin was,
but in 1986, when Yeltsin was appointed Moscow party boss, he
started to leave Gorbachev behind.
Yeltsin worked from 8 in the morning until 12 at night and slept
in a small room next to his office. He really tried to improve the
quality of life for people. Suddenly Moscow started to look more
human, there were more vegetables in the shops, the ruined transportation system was improving. He kicked out the entrenched Moscow ‘‘apparatchiks.’’ Corrupted and lazy, they tried to stop him. In
1987 he made a critical speech at the closed plenary meeting of the
Party. Gorbachev had called for self-criticism within the Party, but
this was going too far. Within the Politburo, Yeltsin was abandoned
by everybody.
Badly hit by heart disease and ‘‘burnt out,’’ Yeltsin was pushed out
of the way, to the joy of bureaucrats. But Gorbachev did not destroy
Yeltsin entirely, instead giving him an insignificant job. That was
Gorbachev’s way of getting rid of Yeltsin and at the same time persuading the West that people could dissent and still hold top jobs.
But at home it made Yeltsin a martyr. He was thrown from the
top, he ‘‘suffered for truth,’’ he became more human and, at the
same time, a symbol. Sakharov was a bigger martyr, a real martyr,
but for the bulk of the nation he was too much of an intellectual,
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too much a ‘‘citizen of the world,’’ while Yeltsin is flesh of the flesh,
blood of the blood.
Thus, whatever was said against him by Gorbachev immediately
worked for Yeltsin. His modest ‘‘Moskvich’’ car, in which he used to
drive to the meetings of parliament, contrasted sharply with the
huge black party limousines, baptized by the people as ‘‘coffins.’’ At
the 19th party conference, when Yeltsin asked for political rehabilitation, Yegor Ligachev assailed Yeltsin with all the rhetoric at his command: ‘‘Thou are not right, Boris.’’ After that, the cooperatives
manufactured millions of badges with the words: ‘‘Thou are not
right, Yegor.’’ In 1989 92% of Moscovites elected Yeltsin to the USSR
parliament.
In 1990, before leaving for the summit, Gorbachev gathered the
Russian parliament deputies, asking them not to vote for Yeltsin.
That virtually guaranteed Yeltsin’s election.
Although power has moved from Gorbachev to Yeltsin, the critical
moves still lie in the future. The first move will be the conversion of
state enterprises into rented, private, stockholding companies. This
process will start widely at the end of 1990. The second will be abolition of a centralized distribution and supply system. Here the first
critical point will be reached sometime between February and June
1991, the second not earlier than the winter of 1991–92. These are
problems, but the problems of growth, not stagnation.
What is the near future? The economic privatization program is
already laid out—far ahead of Gorbachev’s timid moves to allow private property. When the Russian paliament meets again on September 3, I’m sure foreign economic activity will be a top-priority
question.
Some of the most far-reaching consequences of Yeltsin’s accession
to power will be in the area of foreign relations. This year the decisions will be made whether to cut supplies from Russia to such hot
points as Cuba, Libya, and Syria. Can Yeltsin and the Russian parliament overrule the USSR government on foreign relations? Yes. And
Russia will demand hard currency for its oil rather than almost giving
it away to Cuba. Soldiers from Russia will no longer be sent to interfere in ethnic conflicts beyond Russia’s border.
If Saddam Hussein has any hopes of help from Russia, he is only
fooling himself. On the contrary, Russia can help relieve any shortages Saddam Hussein tries to create. It can do so by stepping up its
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own oil production. All it needs is Western geophysical technology
and equipment. For this it will make its own deals, bypassing Gorbachev’s government.
The question of Russia’s participation in the United Nations and
the European Community will soon be on the agenda. Membership
won’t come overnight, but things are moving in that direction.
In all this, for the real initiatives, look to Boris Yeltsin and not to
Mikhail Gorbachev. Yeltsin is the leader. A poll of public opinion has
shown that 84% of the USSR population supports Yeltsin, while only
12% supports Gorbachev.
And, for perhaps the first time in Russian history, what the population really wants really matters.

COLD WAR ON OIL MELTING
WITH CHANGES IN RUSSIA
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait could be a blessing in disguise for the West,
and for the Russians, whose firm support for sanctions against Baghdad reflects the new, still unfamiliar, face of Soviet politics.
The increasing assertiveness of the Russian Federation under Boris
Yeltsin, its radical president, also promises to speed up the unlocking
of untold energy riches in Siberia to Western oil companies.
This favorable scenario for both sides of the diminishing East–
West divide is endorsed by Professor Vladimir Kvint, one of the
young Siberian economists who are striding boldly toward a Soviet
market economy. Currently lecturing at Fordham University in New
York, he was last week feted by Forbes, the American magazine, as
the man who accurately predicted the split between Russia and the
Soviet Union.
In an interview with The Times, he made clear that he believes
Mr. Yeltsin will by next year have created the right business climate
for Western companies. Within two years, he sees this producing
the boost in oil output vital to regenerating Russia and alleviating
pressure on world oil prices.
The Germans have long recognized that the Russians’ underdeveloped natural resources are a long-term answer to Western Europe’s
poverty in indigenous oil and gas. The battle Bonn fought against a
fiercely anti-Soviet Washington, in the early 1980s, over the Siberia–
West Europe gas pipeline demonstrated West German determination not to be caught out by over-reliance on Middle East energy.
The two oil shocks of the previous decade were enough.
Appalling mismanagement, lower world oil prices, and cold war
concern about military secrecy combined to discourage any oil rush
to the remoter regions of the Soviet Union by Western companies.
With hindsight, that would appear unfortunate.
Economic confusion and a lack of state-of-the-art oil technology
combined to reduce Soviet oil output to about 11.8 million barrels
The Times (London), Friday, August 10, 1990, p. 23.
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per day this year from 12.2 million per day two years ago. These
severe cuts in supplies to its former Eastern European satellites have
given a harsh reality to the statistics. But the picture for proven reserves is much brighter. At the end of 1989 these stood at 58.4 billion
barrels, putting the Soviets on a par with producers like Venezuela
and Mexico. American reserves, by comparison, were 34.1 billion.
Professor Kvint underlined it as the lack of financial, hard currency
resources that is behind the under-development of Soviet oil.
The Russian Federation stretches from the Baltic Sea in the West,
across Siberia, to the Pacific. Established resources are fabulous. The
huge oilfield discovered between the Lena and Tungunska rivers in
Siberia is just one of the many waiting to be tapped.
Professor Kvint cautions against investing hope in the traditional
Soviet oil center on the Caspian. He is also highly critical of the poor
quality of the equipment produced for the oil industry in Baku, the
capital of Azerbaijan.
In Mr. Yeltsin, however, he sees change for the better. Economic
policy in Russia, in his view, has undergone a decisive shift since June
when Mr. Yeltsin proclaimed Russian sovereignty. ‘‘This drastically
reduced the political risk of economic development, especially in
Siberia and the [Soviet] Far East,’’ Professor Kvint said.
The Yeltsin program allows only 500 days to reorient the Russian
economy, a healthier pace than envisaged by Soviet President Gorbachev. Professor Kvint is convinced that this will allow 100% private
ownership to Russians and foreigners alike within a year.
Though the ultimate goal of ruble convertibility will probably not
be achievable in less than three years, he expects the republics to
begin operating parallel currencies before then. The speed at which
they are introduced will depend on the republics’ relative economic
performance.
‘‘There are too many rubles without any backing,’’ Professor Kvint
says. Last year alone, some 8 billion [BP16.8 million] unbacked rubles were issued. The parallel convertible ruble, he anticipates, could
only be issued on a limited scale, probably some 20 billion initially.
This would be largely backed by hard currency earnings.
The market economy Mr. Yeltsin is going hell-for-leather toward
will not mean any rape of the Russian Federation’s resources. Professor Kvint expects it to put a real price on them. ‘‘Business will be
only on an economic basis,’’ Professor Kvint stressed. And that goes
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for oil too. ‘‘Russia has huge potential. And it does not even produce
offshore yet. Joint enhancement of existing fields and development
of new ones could drastically increase oil output.’’ If he is right,
Western companies could soon be treating Mr. Yeltsin like the governor of Alaska.

RESHUFFLING THE SOVIET DECK
Some people thought we sounded pretty farfetched when our cover
story February 19 predicted Russia would quit the present Soviet
Union, which would then re-form as a looser federation. That has
partly come to pass. Boris Yeltsin proclaimed the sovereignty of Russia’s laws over the Union’s; the Ukraine and Uzbekistan have made
similar moves. Our article was written by Vladimir Kvint, 41, a Siberian economist who is currently lecturing at Fordham University in
New York and doing consulting work. What does Kvint see now?
‘‘The most influential figure is not Gorbachev but Yeltsin,’’ he says,
and adds, ‘‘American companies must now consider the different
policies of the new governments of each of the republics.’’ He says
Siberia and the Soviet Far East are currently politically stable and
thus the safest and most fertile fields for foreign investment.

Forbes, August 6, 1990, p. 8.

THE BEST WAY TO HELP
GORBACHEV IS TO MAKE LIFE
DIFFICULT FOR HIM
Reagan, Thatcher and Kohl pushed Gorbachev toward democracy.
Until Americans understand this, they cannot deal intelligently with
the Soviet Union.
In failing to press Gorbachev on behalf of Lithuanian freedom, the
Western governments may have unwittingly brought to a halt the
further progress of perestroika. President Bush and his allies wanted
to avoid pushing Gorbachev into a corner. Instead they have
strengthened the hands of those in the Soviet Union who are trying
to stop the movement of progress.
The general attitude in the U.S. seems to be the following: Gorbachev has liberated the USSR and Eastern Europe, now he is in a
difficult situation, and America should support him whatever he
does.
I also think Gorbachev needs help. But a totally different kind of
help.
Few Americans, even those who specialize in Soviet affairs, have
any idea about the real processes of making decisions, about the
methods of collecting reliable data in the USSR. It is not their fault.
In Siberia, for example, only three or four cities are open to foreigners, and there they will definitely see nothing. It is almost impossible
to understand the situation in the USSR having never spoken with
the outlaws of society in Penza, or traveled to the Arctic zone, which
occupies 40% of Soviet territory.
Without correct information, it is difficult to understand the
forces moving Gorbachev to perestroika. These forces were partly
domestic: the sick economy and increasing demands for democracy.
But outside forces were at least as important. The outside forces
were Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl. Acting
Forbes, June 11, 1990, pp. 168–172.
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together, these forces brought the USSR to the table of negotiations
and led to the first historic agreements between Gorbachev and
Reagan.
I do not mean to say that Mikhail Gorbachev is not a positive
figure. He is. Other Soviet leaders would have tried to deal with
festering problems with military force. However, he is not the initiator; he is the follower. When he took over five years ago, the country
was already on the verge of disaster. The people had lost their faith
in everything. Labor productivity stopped growing after 1978. In natural resources, each additional unit of output required increasing
input; oil wells had to pump much deeper, mining and exploration
went farther and farther east, farther and farther north. In 1985–86
oil production started to decrease by 4.2% a year. In every respect,
the Soviet economy was at a dead end.
In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev, in charge of agriculture, was the
youngest member of the Politburo. Agriculture was proving to be
the Bermuda Triangle of the Soviet economy; vast investments were
poured into it, only to disappear without increasing output. He was
the first Soviet leader to take seriously reports sent to him by Siberian economists on the disintegrating economy. Most other Soviet
leaders tried to ignore the facts.
But remember this: Gorbachev did not appear from nowhere. He
was not a total break with the past. He grew within the almighty
party bureaucratic system. Gorbachev is an excellent tactician, and
he obeyed all the laws of that dark and illogical system.
Theoretically, under communist ideology, the majority rules. In
reality, a tiny elite minority suppresses the majority. The system creates lies upon cynical lies. For example, in 1964, when Khrushchev
was in the south on vacation with his longtime colleague Mikoyan,
the Politburo gathered in Moscow to overthrow Khrushchev. When
Mikoyan saw the way the wind was blowing, he immediately sent to
Moscow a ‘‘wise’’ telegram. ‘‘I side with the majority.’’ This cynicism
is typical of the Communist Party leaders. The ‘‘majority’’ Mikoyan
sided with was in fact a tiny minority suppressing tens of millions of
Soviet citizens.
So, while making Gorbachev a star, America should not forget that
he is a leader of the same Communist Party that did all this. And
Gorbachev always insists that perestroika is only an improvement of
socialism.
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By 1985 major forces outside the country were influencing Gorbachev. By escalating the arms race, Reagan and Bush pushed military
expenses sky-high for the USSR. The weak economy of the USSR
could not bear the burden any longer.
While Reagan, along with Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl,
was applying pressure, events within the Soviet Union were strengthening the position of the democratic forces there. People were becoming disgusted with the cruel, corrupted system and appalled by
the coffins arriving every day from Afghanistan.
Gorbachev, responding to the strength of popular anger, moved
toward democracy. For example, many people demanded the government confess Stalin’s guilt for his crimes. But only when these demands became almost irresistible did Gorbachev accede to them.
Gorbachev is and was part of that same reactive system, which does
not initiate reform but grants it only reluctantly when the pressures
become irresistible.
Up to the very last day Gorbachev spoke against the amendment
to the constitution abolishing the provision for the leading role of
the Communist Party. And only when members of the Supreme
Council, supported by millions of people, voiced their protest did he
agree.
To Gorbachev’s credit, he responded to the demand for democracy
in a positive manner. However, Gorbachev should not be called a
liberator of Eastern Europe. What is happening there was not a matter of his wishes. At the end of 1988–89 the communist regimes
there were in a state of clinical death. Hunger in Poland and Romania became a real danger. Economic war among the socialist countries was on the way. Democratic forces inside these countries were
ready to take power. The economic basis of tyranny had collapsed—
this, and not any special Gorbachev strategy, is what has liberated
Eastern Europe.
In the beginning of perestroika, bureaucrats and other reactionary
forces were thrown on the defensive. Political reforms in the country
found such strong promoters as Alexander Yakovlev. But Prime Minister Ryzhkov dragged his heels and proposals by market-oriented
economists were not implemented. The few elements of a market
economy that were finally introduced were overwhelmed in the horrendous chaos of a so-called planned economy.
By the end of 1989 the foot-dragging had allowed the bureaucrats
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to consolidate with Russian nationalists and anti-Semites to create
a powerful force against reform. This, combined with the West’s
weakening, less definite position, stopped social revolution in the
USSR in March 1990. This was reflected in the people Gorbachev
personally selected to join the President’s Council. Out of 16 members, only 3 can be called progressive. The notorious anti-Semitic
leader Valentin Rasputin is a member.
Hitler failed in his ambition to hold a parade in Red Square, but
Pamyat, the Russian fascist, anti-Semitic organization, held a meeting in Red Square. Just as the czar’s agents used anti-Semitism as a
means of turning popular discontent away from the regime, so the
KGB is using it today.
Lithuania came as a test of Gorbachev’s new position. Toward the
end of 1989 it was suggested to Gorbachev that he could abolish
the Union Treaty (which was signed in 1922; Latvia, Estonia, and
Lithuania were chained forcibly to the USSR in 1940) and allow the
republics the opportunity to join the USSR under new, mutually
beneficial, fair conditions. Gorbachev failed to do so. Lithuania and
the other Baltic states went on to declare their independence.
As the anti-reform forces gained strength, Gorbachev dithered, in
large part because the Western powers let up their pressure. Kohl
seems willing to concede anything for the opportunity to unify Germany. Thatcher is loyal to her views, but her own position in Britain
has become weaker. The While House has adopted a much softer
line.
However, what Gorbachev badly needs is renewed pressure from
the West, to help nudge the system back on to the path of reform
and democratization. It is a general belief in the West that if the
West supports Lithuania’s demands for freedom, it is going to ruin
Gorbachev. What about the supposed danger that Gorbachev will
be overthrown if the West puts too much pressure on the USSR over
Lithuania or any other matter? It’s nonsense. Gorbachev is not in
danger. What happened to Khrushchev cannot happen to Gorbachev. In Khrushchev’s time there was only one decisive force—the
Politburo, whose members decided to overthrow the leader. But
today there are four forces: Comrade President, the KGB, the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and the Supreme Soviet
(the parliament). But there is one main power: the President. He
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brings together other dispersed forces. They need him, if only as a
symbol.
The KGB? It is as active as ever. But it is controlled by the president. The party? I am sure that the Communist Party, which is disintegrating now, in half a year will be abandoned by a lot of important
people. After the next elections it will definitely lose its majority
status.
The military? The USSR should not be mistaken for Chile or Nicaragua. The Soviet military has never been a powerful force in its own
right. The rumors concerning the political role of ‘‘military discontent’’ are nothing but a political game. Soviet military people have
always been nothing but pawns on the political chessboard. The military is an instrument, not a wielder, of power.
As for the KGB’s overthrowing Gorbachev, that’s out of the question. The KGB’s people are counting on Gorbachev to rescue them
from the people’s wrath. They remember all too well what happened
to the secret police after the democratic upsets in Eastern Europe.
So Gorbachev is not in danger, but his reforms are. If America is
firm, Gorbachev will find arguments to resist the diehards in the
USSR. He will be able to say to them: If we crush Lithuania, America
will not sign arms control agreements or trade agreements, and we
will not be able to feed the people. We must let Lithuania go.
The USSR is a prison of nations, and no republic, including the
Russian Federation, wants this union anymore. The prisoner and the
guard are both unhappy.
The anti-democratic forces in the USSR have no economic basis
anymore, but they can flourish if the U.S. offers arms control, scientific-technical cooperation, and investments—without demanding
important domestic political concessions in return.
The 1917 revolution, or rather counterrevolution, repressed the
Russian spring of economic development for 72 years. Only the undoing of that revolution and its replacement with a democratic regime can get the country’s economy moving to market. Shortsighted
efforts to ‘‘save Gorbachev’’ will serve only to save a rotten regime
from history’s garbage heap for a few years longer.

FREE THE RUBLE!
Lacking an international currency, the people of the Soviet Union cannot speak the only language the free, international economy understands: money. So let currencies compete.
Vladimir Kvint is a member of the ‘‘Siberian School’’ of Soviet economists and an associate of economists Leonid Abalkin and Abel Aganbegyan, the godfathers of perestroika. Below, he rejects the idea of a gold
standard for his country but urges that the ruble soon be made convertible into foreign currencies. He urges that the ruble be allowed to float
by permitting foreign currencies to circulate freely in the Soviet Union,
thus setting a natural exchange rate. Only that way can the Soviet
Union be integrated into the world economy.
Is the ruble nothing but rubble, a weak substitute for money in the
crisis-ridden country? Definitely, no. It is just a prisoner that is not
allowed to go to the party of the world economy, for mostly political
reasons. But it is not worthless.
The ruble is already convertible. Wise foreign businessmen know
how to convert their rubles into hard currency, using not only old
methods of barter and counter-trade but also some new ones. In the
center of Vienna, you can convert your rubles into hard currency in
a bank. The rate is funny and unfair to those holding Soviet currency: 6 U.S. cents for one ruble. This is far below what the ruble
should be worth, but it’s all foreigners will pay today for a currency
they cannot easily use. The bank should not be blamed for this. The
Soviet government should.
The Soviet Union’s former leadership imprisoned the ruble the
same way it imprisoned Soviet citizens. Things are now much better
for citizens, but not for the ruble. It is still not freely convertible, not
officially free to travel outside the homeland.
Nonconvertibility of the ruble is a malignant tumor that affects all
aspects of the Soviet economy. It kills motivation of labor, it enlarges
shortages, it stops the flow of foreign investment to the USSR.
Forbes, April 2, 1990, pp. 92–95.
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Let’s look at this problem. The Soviet Union is not a poor country.
Statistics developed during Stalin’s time naı̈vely conceal Soviet gold
and diamond reserves, but a simple correlation analysis of Soviet
data and the world gold and diamond markets shows that the USSR
has one of the biggest gold reserves in the world. And since World
War II, the USSR hasn’t sold diamonds bigger than 10 carats and
almost no diamonds bigger than 5 carats. It is clear that, being
among the biggest diamond producers, the Soviet Union stores all
these treasures in its diamond fund.
The USSR is the owner of huge natural resources. It is the biggest
producer of oil, gas, steel, timber, and the majority of nonferrous
metals: copper, nickel, cobalt, and platinum. All of this is not mythical but real backing for the ruble.
So much for those who say the Soviet Union lacks the reserves to
back a truly international currency.
The USSR is known in all the banks of the world as one of the
most reliable payers of interest. And though the international economic debt of the USSR has grown to more than $50 billion, and its
hard currency debt today is 2.2 times its annual export revenues, for
the USSR it is only a matter of several months’ work to repay all the
debt. By comparison, Hungary needs about ten years to do it. Poland,
which has more than $40 billion in debt, does not even lend itself to
comparison.
Yet the currency of the Soviet Union is close to worthless abroad
because it lacks convertibility. Call it a wooden ruble. The wooden
ruble is worsening the economic crisis under way in the USSR. People have 330 billion rubles in their savings accounts, and 120 billion
rubles more, as we say, ‘‘in the stockings’’ at home. With inflation in
the consumption sector at 15% in 1989, the holders of these rubles
lose purchasing power month by month. Meanwhile, there is little to
buy. Where they can, people resort to simple barter. For example,
Soviet collective farms exchange 500 tons of grain for one 10-ton
Kamaz truck, or 6 tons of grain for 1 ton of cement. This shows not
only political but also economic nearness of our system to feudalism.
The American economist Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) wrote
about the formation of a money civilization in a negative sense. But
I think that money civilization reflects a healthy economy. The
USSR has not yet reached this level of health.
Not all the steps of the present government are incorrect, but the
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government is lagging behind the real tempo of perestroika. The
steps are extremely, damagingly slow. Soviet enterprises are now allowed to keep 70% of their hard currency profits; the enterprises hold
$3 billion. A hard currency auction has been held. The dollar/ruble
rate for nontrade operations has been changed—since last November
foreigners have been able to change $1 for 6.2 rubles, or 16 cents to
the ruble, versus the silly official rate of $1.60 to the ruble. Collective
farms are paid hard currency by the state for certain food products.
The exchange rate granted to foreigners, 16 cents, is barely onetenth the official rate, but it is still nearly three times what I can get
for my rubles in Vienna.
What we need, clearly, is a single realistic rate. This can be
achieved only through a ruble that is freely convertible into other
currencies. Based on my analysis of the current Soviet economic crisis, I will risk the following forecast: By 1991 a limitedly convertible
ruble may already be available for joint ventures and in free economic zones; two or three such zones will become operational. One
of them, near the Far Eastern port of Nakhodka (which means ‘‘discovery’’), has already become a discovery for the Japanese businessmen who for over ten years have been pouring investments into this
region.
The other forward station of entrepreneurial activity will be the
city of Viborg, near the Soviet–Finnish border. My opinion is that in
free economic zones all currencies will circulate, competing in terms
of their ‘‘hardness.’’ Currency auctions this year and especially in
1991 will become an everyday practice and not, as now, just a fashion
show. Because of all this, the number of joint ventures will come up
to 2,800 in 1990. In 1991, I think, a stock exchange will be established.
A serious problem remains. Whatever is the best in the USSR is
exported, sold for hard currency. But the Soviet workers who produce
these goods suffer burglaries by their own government worse than
the ones described by Marx at the hands of the capitalists. They are
completely separated from the hard currency profits they produce.
(In a few small cases, hard currency salaries do exist. In 1988, for
example, I went to the Latvian fishing collective farm Uzvara. There
the fishermen get 25% of their salary in hard currency.)
In the USSR more than 15,000 enterprises export their goods to
the West. All the workers of these enterprises and of the enterprises
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supplying them should get part of the enterprises’ hard currency
profits as some percentage of their salaries.
Will that be unfair to others? When I am called a proponent of
capitalism in the USSR, I quote Marx. He said that total equality is
a total inequality. Good labor should be motivated.
They should be allowed to spend their hard currency inside the
USSR as well. This will also create a good market for foreign producers of consumer goods. This year the domestic hard currency consumer market will total about $2.5 billion. With such innovations
the USSR can only benefit: The government will receive taxes on
profits and customs duties for repatriation of hard currency profits
by foreign businessmen.
It is necessary to abolish the stupid restriction that prohibits foreign companies from operating with rubles. Today, many of these
companies already have rubles and many more would like to have
them, but the former are prohibited from selling them to the latter.
Last summer, walking along Lexington Avenue in New York, I tried
to find out what I could buy for $1. Practically nothing. Even a hot
dog is more expensive. In Moscow, with 1 ruble in your pocket, you
can have, on Gorky Street, a tolerable lunch in a canteen. For 1
kopek (there are 100 kopeks to a ruble) you can buy a glass of mineral
water or a box of matches. For 5 kopeks, less than 1 cent at the ruble/
dollar rate I envision, you can travel all day long in the underground.
For 20 kopeks you can buy a kilogram of good bread. So don’t tell
me the ruble is worth only 6 cents. But 6 cents is what it fetches
abroad because of the current government policy of nonconvertibility.
So as not to create great inflation, the amount of convertible rubles issued into circulation should not exceed the value of Soviet
exports and value of consumer goods and food products produced
on the quality level of the world market. Moreover, the equivalent
sum of wooden rubles should immediately be burned.
I do not think convertibility should be brought about by government fiat but rather by the market itself. I am proposing parallel
circulation of wooden rubles—the nonconvertible money we now
have—and limitedly convertible rubles. Hard currencies—dollars, for
example, or deutsche marks—should circulate, too, because that will
facilitate normalization and satisfaction of the market. We would
have a system of competing currencies, with the market, rather than
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government fiat, setting the correct exchange rate among them. And
the ruble would become real money in the international sense.
Speculations about putting the Soviet Union on a gold standard
seem to me practically useless because, in 1971, the U.S. officially
abolished the gold standard. And if the dollar has no gold standard,
establishment of a gold standard for the currency of any other country would lead only to melting of its gold reserve. One should not
violate the trend of internationalization of national economies—the
replacement of gold as a form of money by credit money.
Political risk is never far from the international businessman’s
mind. Yet political instability or even crisis has not always hampered
convertibility. In Yugoslavia, in the middle of bitter economic and
political crisis and violent ethnic conflict, the government has declared the dinar convertible. What happened? Contrary to many predictions, Yugoslavia has enlarged its hard currency reserves
significantly, just in one month.
In the Russia of the seventeenth century, all foreigners were called
nemtsy—meaning ‘‘the dumb’’—just because they didn’t speak Russian. Money is the language of an economy. If the currency is nonconvertible, the language is untranslatable. Strictly speaking, we
don’t have real money in the Soviet Union. With a convertible currency we would have.

LENIN’S LEGACY
Whoever attempts to guide the Soviet Union over the coming years,
he or she must confront the centuries-old nationalities problem. It
is a daunting challenge. Lenin declared that Ukrainians, Balts, and
other ethnic groups would, under communism, have the right to
secede from the Soviet Union. Under Stalin and his successors, it
was a meaningless right. But the Bolshevik promise has returned to
haunt the Soviet Union’s rulers in this time of glasnost and perestroika.
The author of our cover story argues that, economically, many of
the Soviet Union’s most independence-minded republics are better
off inside the Soviet Union than outside it. The startling conclusion
to the article: Russia herself should secede. ‘‘In order to unite,’’
writes the author, ‘‘republics of the Soviet Union should separate.’’
The story was written by Vladimir Kvint. A pillar of the now-influential ‘‘Siberian School’’ of market-oriented Soviet economists
since the early 1970s, Kvint has worked closely with deputy prime
Minister Leonid Abalkin and Abel Aganbegyan, principal architects
of perestroika. Kvint is currently honorable professor of economics in
Vienna, and a consultant to Western businesses interested in Soviet
ventures.

Forbes, February 19, 1990.

RUSSIA AS CINDERELLA
Instead of waiting for the outlying republics to secede, Russia itself
should break away from the Soviet Union. So argues this influential
Soviet economist.
Will the Baltic republics actually separate from the Soviet Union or
not? If yes, will Moscow’s response be military intervention, as it was
in 1968 in Czechoslovakia? These are the questions that have been
worrying many people for a long time. In the meanwhile, mutual
reproaches within the Soviet Union are growing into real quarrels
and may come to a dead end.
Is there no way out? Maybe a drastically new approach to this
problem is necessary. Maybe Russia should be the first to separate
from all the other republics and thereby give the others the freedom
of choice, too.
For decades the official image was of a ‘‘unanimous family of nations’’ in the USSR, a friendly circle of people in national costumes,
marching hand in hand toward progress and harmony. With glasnost, this fiction has given way to a more realistic picture. No more
‘‘hand-in-hand’’ circles.
Not so long ago my friends from Estonia were joking: Our republic
is the most independent—just because nothing depends on it. Now
that has changed: World peace, international stability itself, may depend on what happens in these Baltic republics and in Azerbaijan.
We are now accustomed to satellite photos of atmospheric masses,
quickly moving and powerfully changing the global weather. The
political and democratic will of people in the Soviet Union is changing the political atmosphere with the same power and speed. It goes
without saying: People of any nation should have the right of selfdetermination.
At the same time there exist certain economic realities, and national feelings—no matter how passionately felt and how legitimate—cannot ignore these economic realities. Economists should
have cool enough heads to give economic evaluation to political deForbes, February 19, 1990, pp. 103–108.
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cisions. The economic reality is that self-sufficiency is a two-way
street. If Russia itself—as I suggest above—were to adopt the principles of self-sufficiency and take its own measure, the standard of
living in the Baltic republics would inevitably and sharply decrease.
In this kind of divorce, the wife should not necessarily expect alimony. If Russia were to secede from the Soviet Union, it would not
have to continue giving economic aid to its former fellow states.
In the beginning of our century an Italian economist, Vilfredo
Pareto, formulated a principle of ‘‘economic well-being.’’ As applied
to the Soviet Union, Pareto’s principle would be expressed in this
way: The standard of living and effectiveness of the economies of
any of the republics can be increased only up the point where it is
not done at the expense of other republics. Otherwise, negative reaction, harmful to everybody, is inevitable.
There is a hope among Baltic nationalists that the Baltic republics
have good prospects for developing industries connected with scientific progress—high tech, in the American phrase—as well as for the
export of agricultural products. These hopes may not be realistic.
Compare the cost structure in Estonia with that in Austria. Estonian
costs for producing milk are 2.9 times higher than in Austria, and 2.8
times higher in the case of meat. The picture does not change in
terms of others’ products. In short, Estonian products simply cannot
be sold in international markets at prices that would recover their
costs.
Only 2.2% of Estonia’s output is exported at present, well below
the 6% figure for the Soviet Union as a whole. Lacking export income, where is Estonia going to get capital for the development of
high technologies?
Other Union republics buy goods from Estonia at prices that are
sometimes 10 to 20 times higher than prices on the world market.
On the other hand, Estonia gets oil, gas, raw materials of the highest
quality from Siberia at prices ranging from 50% down to 15% of the
price on the international market. That means that under a system
of regional self-sufficiency, the same Estonia will have to pay the real
price for energy resources.
Were Siberia to reduce its deliveries of energy resources to the
Baltic republics by 20%, it could cause a decrease of Baltic production output by 40%.
These concessional prices were part of the Soviet policy of aiming
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for equal economic development among the various republics. Instead of the full benefit of Siberian oil going to Siberia, some of it
was shared with Estonia and other non–oil-producing republics.
The leveling of social-economic development of the republics for
dozens of years has been carried out at the expense of ‘‘the older
sister’’ in this ‘‘unanimous family.’’ The older sister is, of course,
Russia. Those republics that were ‘‘helped’’ in many parameters went
far ahead of Russia. Instead of becoming the princess, Russia became
Cinderella.
It is clear that the example of neighboring, highly developed Finland impresses the Estonians. They would like to be like Finland and
hope that independence would do for them what it did for Finland.
If the Baltic republics could return to the beginning of the century,
maybe they could find their place in the economic system of the
West, as Finland has. But today world markets are already divided; a
system of world economic relations is formed already. It would be
extremely difficult for Estonia, if at all possible, to break into this
established system, where everyone fights for his place in the sun.
Estonia can quit the Soviet Union, but it cannot roll back history.
The Baltic republics and other secessionist regions may hope for
economic help from abroad. But it is highly unlikely that a whole
region will be granted ‘‘refugee’’ status. As for loans, how can the
Baltic republics repay them? With what? Overpriced milk?
It would be shortsighted and self-defeating for the Baltics and
other secessionists to sacrifice economic well-being to the dream of
political independence. For example, the idea of the introduction of
new Baltic currency won’t serve the purpose of creating a market
system; it is at variance with the concept of a ‘‘common European
home’’ and with the realities of today’s life. The European Community is integrating; a unique currency; ‘‘ecu,’’ has been created and is
already functioning.
The secessionists tend to forget the sacrifices made on their behalf
by the people of Russia and other areas. For example, in Sverdlovsk
(Urals) and Donetsk (Ukraine) the basic industrial facilities are the
oldest in the country, because much of the available capital has been
sent to other parts of the Soviet Union. Yet the productivity of labor
in Sverdlovsk and Donetsk is the highest in the country, and the
standard of living is almost the lowest. It is not by accident that
these regions became the sites of the biggest strikes of 1989.
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Look deeper into some of the ethnic/nationalist tensions within
the Soviet Union, and you find economic causes. Take the city of
Uzen, in Kazakstan. The main reason for the hatred of the Kazaks
toward the Caucasians working in Kazakstan is not a national one.
In the Caucasian republic of Daghestan there is severe unemployment—up to 35%. Many people there moved to take jobs in the
enterprises of Kazakstan. But there are no normal transport connections between Daghestan and Kazakstan. Because of that, many
Caucasians, instead of commuting to Kazakstan, had to settle there
with their families. Every thousand workers there manufacture production worth 3.5 million to 4 million rubles more than the equivalent production in Daghestan.
Several years ago I predicted that the economic disparities between these two regions would lead to conflict. They were unable to
become one economic unity without transport communication.
I proposed to improve the situation immediately by building
transport lines, but this proposal was not carried out. Unsolved economic problem, forecast in 1986, turned into bloody conflict in 1989.
So, I think it is criminal to pretend that there are no conflicts
between the republics. The immediate result of such head-in-thesand behavior is the war within the USSR between its republics of
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
What is happening to the Baltic republics, therefore, has meaning
for the entire Soviet Union. The notion of regional self-sufficiency is
a child of perestroika. At the same time, it is one of the great dangers
for perestroika. It can sharpen the contradictions and conflicts.
True self-sufficiency can be attained only by viable economic
units, not by purely political or nationalist regions. The effectiveness
of regional economies now depends first and foremost on interregional connections. One should take into account existing reality.
Out of 150 Estonian industries, as few as 18 are oriented only to
Estonian inner necessities. The same goes for other republics.
Whether the people of the various republics like it or not, their economic destinies are bound together. The European Community is
transcending national differences at least as great as those within the
Soviet Union. This must be our model rather than anachronistic
dreams of ethnic sovereignty. Autarchic development is impossible
today, under the conditions of internationalization of the modern
world.
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Even a rather short railway blockade of Armenia showed what the
results of a forced autarchy can be.
According to my evaluation, out of all Union republics only the
Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belorussia can independently solve
their problems. They alone could make a viable economic entity. In
Russia the ruble can be backed by gold, diamonds, mineral resources.
If Baltic republics create their own money, how can they be backed,
especially with the existing level of industrial and economic development?
This is not to denigrate nationalist sentiment. Indignation of any
Estonian—or any Russian, or Tadzhik—can be easily understood,
when an all-Union enterprise operates on their land having almost
extra-territorial rights, like a foreign embassy. It is also very clear that
no economic calculations can kill the eternal desire for freedom.
Hence my proposal for a Russian secession from the Soviet Union.
In order to unite, republics of the Soviet Union should separate.
The Russian Federation should be the first to put forward the
ideas of breaking the old Union treaty. This will give opportunity to
all the republics to regard all pros and cons and decide voluntarily
whether they want or don’t want a new Union.
Only under the condition of liberty and voluntary unification can
economic considerations be given full play. The quicker Moscow, the
Supreme Soviet of the country, cancels the old Union treaty, the
more probability there is that the Soviet Union will remain a union.
Cancellation of the old treaty would be not a destruction of the
country, but its revival. It is interesting that Russia possibly may be
the first to profit from that, because it can also enter the new treaty,
securing its interests.
Which of the republics is going to enter this new Union? I think,
almost all. But this is not what is important. Who has lost after the
end of the British Empire and creation of the British Commonwealth? England? Its role in the world of today shows that it has only
profited by the new structure.
Has Austria lost after the disintegration of Austro-Hungary eight
decades ago? I think the answer is even more clear—Austria has lost
nothing; the standard of living of the Austrian population has increased.
As I see it, the USSR’s future is one of politically and economically
independent states, united in a federation or a confederation. Every-
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thing depends on conditions, written in the future Union treaty.
Mutual benefit—not only mutual help—is the key to a strong Union
of independent states.
Such a Union, based on a market economy, will facilitate integration of economies of independent republic states. For the Baltic republics, formation of a Baltic market is of essential importance, but
it should be an open market, without obstacles in the way of effective
cooperation with Russia and other republics on the one side and
with the countries of the European Association of Free Trade and
the European Community on the other.
But speed is necessary. It is impossible to solve the Soviet Union’s
nationalism problems by using force. But dithering is almost equally
dangerous. If Moscow contemplates any longer, the results may be
extremely negative. From the point of view of economy, this is a
situation of dynamic balance. Whoever wants more in this situation
may lose everything.
In Antwerp, I have seen a small statue of a worker, and the inscription on it, which consisted of only two words, was ‘‘Liberty works.’’
It works for the people of Russia, though, as well as for those of the
Baltic republics.

‘‘WE ARE BOGGED DOWN’’
The Soviet Union is burdened with an energy crisis, tight food supplies,
and poverty. Vladimir L. Kvint, economist in Moscow, is now looking
for solutions in the West.
Soviet economists want to learn from the West to overcome the
crisis at home. Professor Vladimir L. Kvint, 40, a staff member at the
Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow,
serves on the consulting staff of the Head of State and Party Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev. Recently he visited the Federal Republic of
Germany.
Quick: Professor Kvint, the Soviet Union is experiencing a harsh
winter. Have supply shortages already surfaced as a result?
Kvint: This is the cold season of the great economic crisis. Within
the next few months the old system will self-destruct. On the other
hand, this is an opportunity for renewal.
Quick: What areas present the biggest problems?
Kvint: Last year the government cut back on investments in heavy
industry. This is a very dangerous step, because it results in lower
energy supplies, while we haven’t seen a concurrent increase in retail
food supplies.
Quick: How is it that the economic crisis has worsened since the
beginning of perestroika?
Kvint: It started long before perestroika. Economic growth has been
on the decline since 1966. This means more and more labor, natural
resources, and energy were thrown into the economy, but no actual
gains were realized. By the early 1980s we had exhausted our resources. Today, each ton of oil, for example, costs us more than it is
worth. When Gorbachev came to power, we had no idea just how
Interview by Wilhelm Dietl and Wolfgang Stockklausner, Quick (Munich), 4
(January 1990), 52–53.
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much trouble we were in. Continued economic growth is simply impossible under the present conditions.
Quick: Does it have anything to do with the fact that hard work
doesn’t pay off?
Kvint: No, the problem lies elsewhere. As soon as people get serious
about perestroika, they will realize that the old system has exhausted
itself. But there isn’t a new mechanism, yet. On the other hand,
economic reforms that aren’t preceded by political democratization
are useless. We tried before to implement one without the other. It
was dead before it was born. What we need is a fundamentally new
mechanism. People won’t work efficiently unless they are really free.
So far, they haven’t achieved an inner freedom. This is a difficult
process. That which can lead to democracy can also lead to anarchy.
Quick: One phenomenon that wasn’t discovered until the era of
perestroika is unemployment. How is it dealt with among the population?
Kvint: Of the Soviet working population a total of 8% are unemployed. A regional problem. In areas with high birth rates there aren’t
enough jobs. In mountainous Daghestan, as much as 40% are registered as unemployed. Part of the reason is that people don’t want to
work.
Quick: Forty million Soviet citizens maintain an existence below the
poverty level. How do you want to restore hope to them?
Kvint: An absolute minimum of 77 rubles per month is required to
make a living. However, 46 million of my fellow countrymen have
less. Retirees are hit the hardest. They have an average of 54 rubles.
We are in the process of designing a law that helps the poorest
among the poor. But everything depends on the economy. We need
an economy that is independent and functions without control and
as few subsidies as possible.
Quick: So, back to capitalism?
Kvint: Not at all. So far we haven’t had a sound model of socialism.
But this is where we are headed.
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Quick: Have you found a role model, yet?
Kvint: I suppose a sound model of socialism exists in Sweden and
Austria.
Quick: We would rather call it free enterprise. Your system has failed
for 70 years. To realize this must be painful.
Kvint: It isn’t for me. There are good shepherds and bad shepherds.
A good shepherd doesn’t pull the skin off his sheep but only shears
their wool. For many decades we have had bad shepherds.

CRISIS AND RECOVERY IN
SOVIET ECONOMY
The Soviet Union is only just beginning to understand the sheer scale
of its economic problems, according to Professor Vladimir Kvint, a
young Kremlin economic expert. In Kvint’s view, the USSR will scarcely
have enough time to fully introduce the perestroika process this century
and it could soon face serious inter-regional economic competition, a
threatening energy shortage, and soaring raw material costs. Despite
the difficulties he feels sure that the way to a foreign trade boom has
already been opened up and that the introduction of market elements
in the economy cannot now be avoided. Professor Kvint, 40, a member
of the Siberian School of Economics has had a successful career as an
academic and a practical manager in Siberia. He moved to Moscow at
the start of perestroika on the staff of Mikhail Gorbachev’s economic
adviser Abel Agenbegyan.
The character of the Soviet economy is becoming more and more
open. Contacts between Soviet business circles and foreign firms,
official and unofficial, are extending rapidly as a result of economic
reform. But the present economic reforms in the USSR are not the
first in its history. There were attempts at reform in 1956 and 1979,
but these were limited to theoretical rights. The basic idea was that
everything was in good order ideologically, but that the economy
required the benefit of a little economic reform. Only naı̈ve people
can believe that economic reform is possible without significant political change.

Siberia Ignored
Many leading economists took part in earlier reform attempts, but
without sufficient criticism. The real achievements of the Soviet
economy were too little used; for example, the Siberian economic
East–West Forum (Vienna), No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 76–77.
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school was very critical in the Brezhnev period, but no one listened—
even though the achievements of the school were well known. The
reform process is like learning to swim, and we are not quite able to
keep afloat yet. Political change has been relatively swift and has now
overtaken economic reform. It would not be a good thing if political
change were slower than economic reform, as has been the case in
China.
It would naturally be false to assume that there are no problems
with groups and classes—there is an element, the size of which we
cannot measure, that is opposed to reform. There is also a large passive section of society who are waiting for developments before they
throw in their lot with either side. But in my personal view, there is
no way back.

Quality Problem
When reform began in 1985 with a concept for acceleration, hardly
anyone knew about the depth of the problems we faced. In 20 years
the pace of our economic development had declined two and a half
times: between 1966 and 1970 national income grew 7.3%; from
1971 to 1975 income grew 5.8%; between 1976 and 80 growth was
3.8%; and between 1981 and 1985 some 3.2%. This pace of growth
has meant there have not been sufficient means available to fund
social requirements of the USSR. Three percent income-growth is
insufficient to cope with social growth.
I can give concrete examples of detailed problems in our economy.
We produce more shoes per person than most other countries. Unfortunately, the quality is in many cases so poor that the shoes remain unbought on the shelf and are returned to the factories to be
reused as raw materials. The mechanization of Soviet agriculture is
on a greater scale than in the U.S.A., but production is only 20% of
U.S. production. In future, we will not need to produce more tractors, but to improve their quality and learn to use them more effectively.
Attempts have been made to increase national income growth
from 3.2% to 3.8%. This does not sound like an ambitious plan, but
many possibilities for expansion appear to be exhausted.
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Energy Problems
In the 1970s the USSR broke many world records in the use of water
power and exploitation of oil resources—in 15 years oil production
in Siberia increased from 1 million tons to 350. The tempo has stabilized and declined. Oil wells are having to pump ever deeper to
maintain production. In my view, the plan for oil production will not
be fulfilled this year. Every third barrel of Soviet oil goes for export,
and this will bring increasing energy problems. My fear is a serious
energy deficit.
There are similar problems with raw materials and in mining.
Many metals are mined now at depths greater than 2 km, which
involves immense and ever greater investment costs.
We also face enormous interregional problems in a fairer distribution of resources and raw materials. Some 70% of production is in
the European part of the USSR, 75% of the energy is east of the
Urals, and the biggest area of population growth is in Azerbaijan
and the south. It is quite clear what the difficulties are between the
regions.

Important Events
All these problems should be taken into consideration in a reform
acceleration plan, but the unfortunate thing was that old mechanisms, in management, etc., were used. Perestroika had not made
the success of these mechanisms possible; things could no longer
function the old way, but this is not so negative. It is one of the most
important events in perestroika.
The whole process involves the fate of thousands of people, and
the one way to success lies in the destruction of old mechanisms and
the introduction of market mechanisms.

Plan Not Fulfilled
This is a difficult process, and our 1990 plan will not be fulfilled. In
1985 it was said we would need two or three years to make perestroika work. The same thing has been said in every year since then. I
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said in an interview with Novi Vremi magazine that there would not
be enough time to complete the process in this century. My view
caused a scandal, but now many people would agree with me.
There is a virtually complete absence of a banking system in the
USSR, and we have reached the limit of our strength with our foreign department. We plan further credits of 16 billion rubles, but
these will be sufficient only for the most essential purchases and for
debt servicing, although I also feel we will be able to maintain our
position as the most reliable international creditor.

‘‘European House’’
New steps in internationalization have been taken. The concept of a
‘‘European House’’ presents us with good prospects. The speed of
development of joint ventures, which will have a positive effect on
the further development of our foreign trade, has increased 20-fold
in two years. The Decree of May 18, 1989, has also made possible
the establishment of joint ventures abroad, using Soviet capital and
resources. This will be important with the establishment of the single European market in 1992, and will also have important effects
on our trade with Austria before Austrian entry into the EEC. A first
Soviet joint venture on Austrian territory has already been established.
Much will depend on the initiatives of local authorities in the
future. The special economic areas will be a main support of this
drive for foreign trade. Three zones are planned, and two more are
likely in the Kola peninsula and at Ilitchovsk. The first firms who
make their mark in these areas will be in a strong position for the
future.

AUSTRIAN MACHINES FOR THE
SOVIET UNION: IN 1990 THE
ECONOMIC CRISIS WILL WORSEN
Professor Vladimir Lwowitsch Kvint was born in 1949 in Krasnoyarsk
(Siberia). At 28 he became the Vice-General Director of the Unification of Companies of Nonferrous Metallurgy of Siberia. In 1978 the
economic expert Abel Aganbegjan appointed him to the Siberian Division of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. in Krasnojarsk. With
the beginning of perestroika, he moved to Moscow with Aganbegjan,
who is the economic adviser to Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev. In
Moscow Kvint worked in the Academy of Sciences. He is the representative of the USSR Academy of Sciences on two common consulting projects that function as joint projects. He is also the leader of the nonprofit organization East–West Business Circle in Moscow. In conjunction with the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of the Economic University
in Vienna and the State Academy of Lower Austria, Kvint is developing
manager training.
Austria’s interconnection with the Comecon Countries is still too
small, asserted Professor Vladimir Lwowitsch Kvint, leading researcher of the Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences in
the USSR, in an interview with Die Presse. The Eastern countries
have less than 10% of Austrian exports, of which the USSR has 6%.
One has to consider that the Soviet Union has enormous deposits of
energy and raw materials that Austria needs. Yet Moscow does not
want to sell more oil, natural gas, and coal, but, rather, process them
first.
In this area Austrian firms could form joint ventures with the
USSR. Through this, the share of machinery and equipment exports
could be raised. The share of exports is only at 32%, half as high as
in Japan, and two and a half times as few as in the U.S. Austria could
Interview by Erich Von Hoorn in Die Presse: Independent Austrian Daily Newspaper, Monday, November 13, 1989.
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also increase equipment delivery for the Soviet food and consumer
goods industries. In addition to this there could be good chances for
electronics exports.
Until now USSR companies have founded about 1,200 joint ventures with Western firms. In both September and October 130 joint
business undertakings were formed. In relation to the total number
of joint ventures formed, Austria places in fourth or fifth place.

Plenty of Free Enterprise, and Just a Little Planning
The professor and Doctor of the Economic Sciences judges the economic situation of his country as ‘‘complicated.’’ He estimates inflation at about 8%. The decline in oil prices has had a negative effect,
such that little is available for import. Debt, however, remains low.
In the coming year the economic crisis can only worsen. This will
lead to the downfall of the old commando system, and free enterprise will break through, albeit with Soviet characteristics.
Kvint points out that the USSR had and still has good economists.
As an example he reminds us of the Nobel Prize winner Leontieff,
who now lives in the U.S. The USSR should not completely abandon
planning, because of the enormous size of the country, but should
concentrate on linking individual departments. At the same time,
regional planning should be developed. Everything else must be left
to the free market.
The economist is proud that Western companies use Soviet-style
planning in their businesses. In the USSR, on the other hand, such
planning has been used in absurd excess. Not just the economy but
all of human life is completely planned.
Now new markets must be formed. For example, the workings of
the market for means of production, which currently is still controlled by the State. Also, different stock exchanges must be established. Only when this is all introduced will the ruble be convertible.
‘‘Only an open country can have a convertible currency’’ is Kvint’s
slogan.
He points out the contradiction that developing countries like
India and Bangladesh have limited convertible currencies, while the
USSR does not, in spite of the fact that the USSR has enormous
natural resources and large gold reserves. He expects a limited con-
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vertibility of the ruble within two years; in five years the ruble could
be completely convertible.
The opening of free enterprise, which many Soviet citizens favor,
also has its opponents. They claim that many want to sell the country
to the foreigners. Yet interest in the Soviet Union is always increasing: ‘‘Our hotels are full.’’
During his visits to the U.S. Kvint has determined that the American economy is much healthier than the Soviet economy. U.S. President Ronald Reagan has been successful in strengthening the
economy and reducing unemployment. At the same time, however,
he has cut social security. For that reason, Kvint sees the proper
economic development in Sweden and Austria. Austro-Marxism appears especially current to him.
One must view capitalism through modern eyes. Marx and Engels
analyzed capitalism in the nineteenth century. Lenin analyzed it in
the beginning of the twentieth. ‘‘Capitalism has reached a new
stage.’’

Development in China Is the Opposite
There are great differences between development in China and development in the USSR. In the People’s Republic, there have been
economic reforms, and the country has opened Special Economic
Zones; still, the political system has not been democratized. This
leads to the tension which ultimately resulted in the June 4th massacre in Tiananmen Square.
In the USSR, everything is just the opposite: Democratization is
going forward in leaps and bounds, but the economy lags behind.
One can no longer speak of a single party. The People’s Front in
Latvia or the Ukrainian Movement Ruch are, however, de facto single parties.
Kvint supposes that perestroika will first show its success at the
end of the millennium. He judges the development in Hungary as
especially positive, and praised their elimination of barriers to private
property rights. Even in Latvia there has been progress in this area.
There is currently preparation for similar legislation for the entire
USSR. This is necessary, as Western firms have already invested half
a billion dollars in joint ventures.

RUSSIA CHARTS NEW ISLAND
OF CAPITALISM
Murmansk brings to mind wartime arctic convoys, but a free economic zone the Russians are planning for the region could provide a
major opportunity for injecting dynamism into Anglo-Soviet trade.
This is the view of Professor Vladimir Kvint, vice chairman of the
Soviet Export Association and one of the fast-moving, market-oriented Siberian economists who have risen to prominence during the
Gorbachev era.
Though one of the experts advising the Kremlin on how to put
perestroika into practice, this leading economic researcher at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, made clear to The Times that he is far
from convinced that the Soviet government is going about reform in
the right way.
Failure to reorganize the economy in response to the political
changes of recent years has meant that it is entering an economic
and social crisis which will be at its worst at the end of next year, or
early 1991, he said.
He sees this crisis as helping to destroy the old economic order,
allowing a new one to be created more quickly. ‘‘There is only one
way—the market economy—but it will have a specific Russian
flavor.’’
But Professor Kvint, who has a background in heavy industry, is
critical of the ‘‘guns-into-butter’’ policies now being pursued, switching defense plants to the production of much-needed consumer
goods.
He says the policy is an ‘‘important mistake,’’ arguing that the
decrease in capital investment in the power and heavy industries
which has resulted could cause an energy crisis.
The attempts to reduce the vast central bureaucracy have also
proved a mistake, Professor Kvint said, pointing out that a 900,000
cut in administrative jobs failed to put more people into production
industries. Instead, they mainly took generous state pensions.
Article by Colin Narbrough, The Times (London), Business and Finance Section,
Wednesday, October 18, 1989.
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Having seen its plan for standardized regional development fail
miserably for the past 60 years, Professor Kvint thinks the Soviet
Union must now adopt a policy of ‘‘investing at the best place,’’
especially where it produces quick returns. Improvement would feed
through to the regions later. In this context, he sees the free economic zones playing a key role. Current plans are for zones to be
established next year at Vyborg, at the gateway to Leningrad on the
Gulf of Finland, Novgorod, to the south of Leningrad, and Nahodka
in the Soviet Far East. A zone on the Kola peninsula in the Murmansk region should be of particular interest to British industry, he
suggested.
The offshore oil and natural gas potential of the Barents Sea, plus
minerals, timber, and fish, could make the region attractive to hard
currency investors from Britain. A free economic zone would allow
Western industry to operate unfettered by Soviet costs.
Though Professor Kvint favors early steps towards ruble convertibility, all the indications from Moscow are that exposing the ruble
to market forces is a long way off.
Free economic zones, built on Soviet and Western investment,
would provide a solution to the currency problem, as they would be
islands of Western technology and productivity levels well located to
supply both foreign and Soviet markets.
The horrendous infrastructure problems of the Soviet Union
would also be overcome, as the zones would have access to the sea
lanes and the roads, railways, and services of their free market neighbors.

BEST LAID PLANS
There may be a different sort of crisis coming up, according to one
of the Soviet Union’s top economists. Professor Vladimir Kvint, one
of the small brood of free marketers who followed Mr. Gorbachev’s
adviser Abel Aganbegjan back from Siberia to top policy positions, is
now adviser to the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr. Nikolai Ryzhkov.
In a conversation with The Guardian, he said that the 28% fall in
industrial investment in the Soviet Union this year is a sign that
matters are coming to a head. Next year, he expects a showdown
over the future of central planning, conducted by the ministries and
by GOSPLAN.
The reformers, who have gained ground in Moscow infighting, will
then be able to push through the abolition of the influence of the
ministries altogether. GOSPLAN will become merely an organization for planning big state infrastructure projects. State enterprises
will then become genuinely self-governing, responding to price signals from the marketplace.
There is no risk, he says, of the momentum of economic reforms
being lost because no substantial part of Soviet society wants to go
back to the old system. A Chinese-style reversal is just not in the
cards.
Nevertheless, the Soviet economy has a long way to go before it
can be rated a mixed economy even on Austrian or Swedish lines,
examples of which Mr. Kvint approves.

The Guardian, Financial News, October, 18, 1989, p. 11.

DOING BUSINESS IN MOSCOW
Perestroika’s financial face is trying to make the Soviet Union more
accessible to foreign investment. But at this tentative stage it is a
moot point whether greater accessibility is more than a modification
of autarky. Foreign trade is a very modest part of the Soviet gross
national product, and the logic and effectiveness of applying a diluted International Monetary Fund regime to the currency is questionable.
The aim seems to be to narrow the Soviet Union’s $25 billion
balance-of-payments deficit and exploit Soviet technological advances commercially. Professor Vladimir Kvint, vice chairman of the
Soviet Export Association and a member of the USSR Academy of
Sciences, puts it another way, however.
Western business can deal directly with Soviet enterprises, and it
is no longer necessary to knock on ministry doors. Foreigners can
hold majority shareholdings in joint ventures, control their boards,
and repatriate their share of any hard currency profits. Joint ventures
with Soviet partners can be based overseas, and Soviet enterprises
have $2.5 billion to invest. There are 344 military plants being converted to peaceful uses.
Professor Kvint believes that joint ventures will get a shot in the
arm from the creation of free economic zones. Indeed, with joint
ventures being created at the rate of 130 a month, there has already
been some success.
But the problem is how to pay foreigners. Professor Kvint is pressing for the first step toward convertibility by the end of next year. By
then it may be possible to establish a limited convertible ruble in
parallel with the non-convertible variety. Westerners will have the
right to buy convertible rubles and Soviet enterprises will be able
to pay a portion of workers’ salaries in this currency to encourage
productivity.
Taking a leaf from the IMF’s book, the volume of new rubles
would be limited to the growth of exports. Full convertibility could
follow in three to five years. In principle, such a scheme would enThe Independent (London), Thursday, October 12, 1989, p. 31.
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courage efficient use of scarce hard currency resources and avoid
such abuses as the $10 billion worth of equipment bought by ministries and now lying idle.
Yet the experience of developing countries—which, in a sense, the
Soviet Union is—is that parallel exchange rates are an invitation to
corruption. In any case, how will the convertible ruble convert? Will
it be fixed, floating, or pegged? And will the joint ventures become
islands of relative efficiency with little impact on the vast ocean of
the Soviet economy? It would be a mistake if perestroika meant one
thing to foreigners and another to the Soviet people.

POWER TO PERESTROIKA
Strikes, local civil wars, growing dissatisfaction in the population in
the Soviet Union. The great rebuilding of the economy is only stumbling along. The politicians have had their circus, according to the
citizens; now we want bread. Cash flow asked the Soviet managers,
economists, and strategists how they want to stop the growing threat
of the bankruptcy of perestroika.
Strategy
THE THEORISTS
A Squad of Unconventional Economists Lean on Effort and
Individual Responsibility
The uproar in the little store in Moscow’s Kalinin Prospekt is overwhelming: The foreigners are coming to fill their traveling cash boxes
through the sale of jeans, radios, and sport shoes; then come the
Moscow inhabitants, to snap up the much-desired and otherwise unattainable Western wares. The legalized black market belongs to the
many new private Russian cooperatives, where demand creates an
offer.
In the USSR in these weeks, much is possible: For the first time
in Soviet soccer, two teams are bidding with large sums for a player;
a Swiss advertising salesman has created advertising space on the
‘‘Sojus’’ spaceships; and the Italian media businessman Berlasconi is
offering advertising time on Russian TV.
For the West, Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika is the most interesting experiment of the decade. For people like Vladimir Kvint, Jurij
Ponomarjov, and Tatjana Zaslawskaja it is more: Gorbachev’s new
guard of economists have to help the transition of the economy to
success. Or they will go down with it.
Professor Kvint is a born and bred Siberian. He becomes noticeably livelier when he talks of his home. He came to Moscow at the
invitation of the Academy of Sciences, in which the 39-year-old
Article by Arne Johannsen and Karl Wendl, Cash Flow (September 1989).

362

the emerging market of russia

economics professor works as an expert on regional economics.
Kvint, who comes from the ranks of the prominent Gorbachev adviser Abel Aganbegjan, is part of the ‘‘Siberian Mafia,’’ as the many
economic freethinkers from Siberia were called by the Kremlin.
Kvint gathered his experience in the far North, in Norilsk, the
northernmost city in the world, as the representative leader of a
Kombinat with 140,000 employees. His vision of a Russian economic
reform comes from his experience as a manager.
Without exception, the new economic policy of the USSR is oriented more toward the practical avoidance of former pitfalls than
toward a new theory. That which is possible will be tried. Each week
a dogma falls. Even in the universities. ‘‘In the colleges, there is no
great radical change,’’ knows Professor Kvint.
The old houses of knowledge have caved in, there are not yet new
ones—in all schools, therefore, history tests have been removed from
the lesson plans.
The decree for a new land-lease system, which makes possible 50year tenancies for private individuals and organizations over fields
and farms, as well as farm equipment and factory buildings, is
termed by the official news agency Tass as an ‘‘experimental document.’’ With many experiments there is money to be earned. A lot
of money. Already in Moscow there are stores like the boutique of
Marina Osadchuk, in which hand-tailored suits and dresses are offered for three times an average Soviet salary—and they are being
sold. Six hundred patients are on the waiting list of dentist Joseph
Bochkovsky, even though treatment is his private practice is four
times as expensive as in the state-run Polyklinik. Moscow’s ‘‘YUCCIES’’—Young Upwardly Mobile Communists—are slowly competing with the party secretaries for the privileged class.

Interview with Vladimir Kvint:
25 Million Price Changes
Cash Flow: Do you see examples of a new generation of economic
theorists coming to power now in the USSR?
Kvint: What do you mean by ‘‘theorists’’? I was already working in
heavy industry at 14.
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Cash Flow: Were you that bad in school?
Kvint: No, but I didn’t want to study anymore. After fourth grade I
already wanted to leave school, but my mother was afraid I would
become a hairstylist and so she kept sending me.
Cash Flow: And so out of desperation you became a professor?
Kvint: It didn’t go quite that fast. Next I really did work in house
industry and only then did I decide to continue my studies. Next I
graduated from a technical college for nonferrous metal, then I studied economics at the Plechanow College in Moscow.
Cash Flow: In Austria many academic careers generally develop
differently . . .
Kvint: In the USSR as well: People go from school to college, then
become assistants, and sometime later they become docents. They
read a lot, but the real work world is a completely isolated region
from this reality.
Cash Flow: What has to change in the practice of Soviet economics?
Kvint: Everything. We have to rebuild the entire economy.
Cash Flow: That sounds violent. But how does one begin such a
thing?
Kvint: The most critical factor is that the companies gain more economic independence.
Cash Flow: But greater independence does not exactly guarantee
higher production rates.
Kvint: No, but when the company has to make its own economic
decisions—from material purchases up to selling their product—
then the productivity as well as the quality of the products will increase. Actually this is our essential problem: quality. For example,
we are the largest shoe producer in the world, but many shoes do not
even leave the factory, but rather go directly from production to the
reworking department.
In order to really change anything in its essence here, we have to
offer the individual more incentive for his or her efforts.
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Cash Flow: Thus payment according to the principle of effort?
Kvint: Until now, almost every person received the same wages, independent of individual effort. In many companies that led to a
great number of employees receiving wages simply for attendance,
or—especially in administrative departments—simply showing up
once a month to pick up their pay. What that means for worker
productivity I don’t have to explain to you.
Cash Flow: The citizens ultimately judge the success of General
Secretary Gorbachev by what there is to buy in the stores. And that
does not exactly look rosy for the reformers right now. The production of fruit and potatoes is declining, and not even in Moscow can
you find tea, toothpaste, and sugar.
Kvint: The production of potatoes and fruit is not sinking, but also
not increasing. But especially in this sector is the increase in productivity so incredibly important. And that is just it, using agriculture as
an example: only through privatization is this possible. It was for
this reason that the building of private agricultural cooperatives was
allowed. And the number of such organizations is constantly growing. Every farmer can come out of his kolkhoz and receive a piece of
land; for machines, animals, and seeds he can request state credit.
Cash Flow: Privatization also means free trade. And in the USSR
many goods are so scarce that just about any price can be demanded
for them. Who should pay for the goods, when they even exist?
Kvint: A price reform is long overdue.
Cash Flow: There you imagine a lot.
Kvint: Of course: About 25 million price changes will be necessary.
Additionally the entire system of price structure needs correction.
The prices of certain basic grocery items haven’t been raised in 25
years, independent of production costs. But naturally a price adjustment must not decrease the standard of living of the people. And
finally, the quantity of products will not simply increase due to
higher prices.
Cash Flow: At the movies many in the audience laugh when someone on the screen says, ‘‘In our country we only have one goal: Com-
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munism!’’ The ancient capitalist ‘‘Monopoly’’ is now produced in
Russia. Is socialism at its end?
Kvint: One thing is clear: Without democratization and an increase
in the standard of living there is no socialism. There were attempts
at economic reform in 1964 and in 1979. But they failed, because
there was no simultaneous change in the political spheres. There is
a tight connection between the two. For three years now we have
been experiencing a reform of the political system, but a fundamental economic reform will last even longer. By the end of this year
nearly all companies should be functioning independently. With
that, we will be fast on the way to our goals.

THE EXPERIMENT OF
GORBACHEV: THE FREE-TRADE
ZONES FOR THE RELEASE OF THE
ECONOMY
Moscow—In the Soviet Laboratory, a new experiment is growing:
the creation of free economic zones, true and proper areas of development, and accelerated industrialization, that, at the sign of deregulation and de-taxation, should attract foreign capital and render
more agile and profound the intervention of the National Enterprises. The circulation of goods and services in these zones, both
from and to the USSR, will be free of duties. Foreign exchange will
have free rates of exchange. The doors will be open for anyone, to
the Soviets first of all, in the quest for a small ‘‘El Dorado,’’ to come
to work.
In this way, the economists hope, new industries will be born in
the selected zones. The old industries will be more easily restructured. The standard of living will improve for the population. Exports will increase, but, above all, the internal market will be
enriched with new products. In sum, the ‘‘free economic zones’’ can
be locomotives that are able to pull the Soviet economy out of the
swamp of stagnation.
However, avers Vladimir Kvint, an academician and Vice President
of the Scientific Council for Regional Economies, as well as one of
the brains of the Siberian group raised by Abel Aganbegjan, ‘‘the
Soviet economy is a convoy, too long and heavy for only three locomotives. We also need helicopters, and powerful motors. The zones
must contribute to an effective economy in the entire country.’’
Even though the economist of perestroika would have perhaps
wanted more, there are found, until now, three experimental free
zones, with differing scope and objectives, according to the economic and geopolitical characteristics of the regions in which they
La Republica, August 18, 1989 (translation).
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are situated. But, they share a common philosophy: to allow the best
utilization of the resources in which the Soviet Union is rich, but
which the bureaucratic economic management didn’t know how to
adequately utilize.
The first area, according to the map indicated by the Vice President of the Commission for the State for Foreign Commerce, Ivan
Ivanov, will be established around Vyborg, northeast of Leningrad,
almost on the border with Finland, and will have as a propeller the
lumber-processing industry. The reasons for this choice are clear; the
USSR, Kvint reminds, ranks first in the world in production of lumber, and 42nd in the production of paper.

A Jewel in Danger
The second free zone will be installed in the Siberian Far East, near
Nahodka, not far from the large port of Vostochnyy. Here, plants
should be established for the enrichment of carbon (of which Siberia
is a large producer, with 30% of what is extracted from the entire
Soviet Union), for wood processing, and for the production of fertilizer derived from minerals that could find natural markets in China
and Japan.
Finally, the third free zone will have a completely different aim. It
should be born in Novgorod, city of art, one of the historical and
architectural jewels of the Soviet Union, 600 kilometers from Moscow, and 250 from Leningrad—a jewel put brutally in danger, like
the health of its inhabitants, contaminated and polluted by the
many industries nearby. ‘‘But to return Novgorod to its ancient
splendors,’’ explains Kvint ‘‘will take Western experience in restoring
large centers.’’ Thus, the creation of the free zones seeks to put together the necessary resources to restructure the industries, to make
Novgorad a large international tourist center.
If, for the Soviet Union, one can speak of an experiment without
precedent, areas of free development don’t constitute a sure novelty
on the international scene. What strikes one, however, is the surprise
of China in the phase of its economic liberalization before political
liberalization, while the Soviet Union of Gorbachev searches for a
way to exit its great depression and made and makes modifications,
even in its experimental ways, to this ‘‘invention.’’ Here, though, the
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analogies end. According to Kvint, in fact, the causes of the Chinese
crisis are not to be sought in the economic liberalization model
adopted and even less in the creation of the ‘‘free zones,’’ but in the
gap that was created between the economic development and the
development of democracy. ‘‘The country,’’ he says, ‘‘has started to
develop economically and technologically, but the development of
the democracy has remained braked. The major part of the ruling
group was afraid of making the ‘next step.’ ’’
In the USSR, the situation is ‘‘exactly the opposite. Our political
changes have surpassed the level of our economy. From stagnation,
we passed into stagflation: stagnation plus inflation.’’ Now there is
not much more time. To start the upswing, it is necessary to move
with determination. But exactly from this, one would say, political
aspect of the problem arises some disappointment in the economist.
And he points to ‘‘free zones’’ as ‘‘a decision only half made.’’

The Weight from the Past
‘‘In Russia, they say, try to plow the ground looking backward’’—a
reference to the conditioning of a past that weighs all the time. The
project of areas of free development, it would seem to be understood, was more ambitious, with respect to how much was not decided, even taking into account the experience of China, where 19
tax free zones were established, 14 for technological and industrial
development and 5 for the development of commercial business and
services.
But is there no risk, one could object, to creating, within the ‘‘free
areas,’’ islands of well-being, with respect to a population constrained to managing with a frightful lack of a consumer market?
Kvint’s answer is what a Western manager could give. ‘‘As an economist, I can say that money must be employed where it can generate
the most profit. The more developed a zone is, the more need there
is to invest in that zone. Only when the development of this region
will be at the top will the rest of the country be able to pass through.
If these 240 billion dollars had been invested in the other towns of
China, instead of in the free zones, they would have been invested
all over vast China; it would not even have been felt.’’

Regionalization of the
Russian Economy

RESTORING THE ROMANOVS
Boris Yeltsin yearns for powers that his constitution denies him. Don’t
be surprised if he solves the problem with a typically Russian move.
Nearly five years ago Vladimir Kvint, a former Soviet economist, predicted in Forbes (February 19, 1990) that the old Soviet Union would
break apart. At the time most people scoffed. But come apart it did.
Now a professor at Fordham University’s Graduate School of Business
and a consultant on emerging markets at Arthur Andersen LLP, New
York, Kvint makes another contrarian prediction.
This will be very hard for a non-Russian to understand, but do not
be surprised if Russia restores the monarchy with a Romanov sitting
on the refurbished throne. If this sounds outrageously far-fetched, it
sounds that way simply because people do not understand how bad
the situation in Russia has become. I never thought a regime could
be as corrupt as the old communist system, but the present regime
is giving it a close race.
Russia today is not entirely a democracy. It is more a system of
soft-core totalitarianism. While it is more democratic than it was
under Gorbachev’s rule, it is less democratic and more totalitarian
than Spain was under General Franco or Chile under General Pinochet. That is a fact. Boris Yeltsin of 1994 is not the Boris Yeltsin of
1991. He loves power and will do whatever it takes to hold on to it.
Russia’s presidential election is scheduled for 1996, and the campaigning will start next year. But so unhappy are most Russians with
their lot today that Yeltsin knows he cannot win an election; he
would be lucky to get 15% of the vote. There is no party or group
that could hope to do better.
That is why I predict a return to monarchy. It will prove to be the
only way Yeltsin can hang on to power.
As market relationships have developed among private companies,
Yeltsin’s power to control the economy has weakened. That this
should happen is not surprising to people in the West. Democracy
Forbes, December 5, 1994, pp. 145–152.
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is, after all, a system of decentralization, with power and decision
making spread widely across society. But Russians are not comfortable with decentralization. The Russian tradition is to look for a
leader, for a ‘‘father of the nation.’’ Hence the surprising nostalgia
for Stalin. Even now, when all Stalin’s crimes against humanity are
well known, many Russians, young and old, continue to display his
portrait. This does not indicate nostalgia for communism. It is nostalgia for a strong leader.
The idea of communism did not kill the concept of adulating one
leader. The communist myth was that collective rule was vested in
the Politburo, but it was only a myth. There was always a strong man
at the center of power. For 74 years of communism, there was a
succession of dictators with tremendous personal power: Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, then two grandfathers who, despite illness, controlled the country: Andropov and Chernenko. Then there
was Gorbachev, a communist in liberal’s clothes. Now it’s Yeltsin’s
turn—a totalitarian in democratic clothing.
Yeltsin has learned well the lessons of Gorbachev. Gorbachev was
the first leader who thought it was possible to democratize society a
little—just a little—and still retain dictatorial power. Yeltsin has not
wanted to make the same mistake. He will not let power slip away
from him as it did from Gorbachev. The first indication that Yeltsin
would ignore democratic ideas and statements was when he directed
his artillery against the first democratically elected parliament in
Russia in October 1993—the same parliament that restricted the
activity of the Communist Party in 1991.
To protect his position, Yeltsin has placed under his control the
former KGB, the ministry of the interior (militia), border guards,
and the army.
There remains a formidable barrier to Yeltsin’s ambitions to recentralize power in his hands: the Russian constitution. He has continually invoked and promoted the constitution as a way of
destroying his political enemies, most notably Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi and former parliament leader Ruslan Khasbulatov.
During the October 1993 elections he attacked the old constitution
as undemocratic, which was true. He initiated the writing of a new
one that was almost equally undemocratic, giving all power to the
presidency.
Only one problem remained for Yeltsin: The constitution calls for
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elections. Set for June 12, 1996, presidential elections are just 18
months away. Yeltsin is now at the lowest level of his popularity.
Only 10% to 12% of the population supports him, about the same
level of support that Gorbachev had when he was forced out of office. At the same time, several political rivals have reappeared, including former Vice President Rutskoi; the current speaker of the
Duma, Ivan Rybkin; Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin; Aleksandr Nemtsov, who is one of the young, market-oriented regional
leaders; and the infamous Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Even though the
loudmouthed Zhirinovsky has no chance of winning, he is more popular than Yeltsin.
I do not think the election will take place as scheduled. That is a
flat prediction. How can Yeltsin avoid an election? He has several
options.
1. He could try to use his power in the upper house of the Russian
parliament to postpone an election. This would be a direct violation
of the constitution and would be opposed tooth and nail by the lower
houses of parliament, and Yeltsin lacks the strength there to pull it
off.
2. He could call for an immediate election. In this case no candidate would get more than 25% of the votes, Yeltsin included, and he
could use that as an excuse to stay in power as a stabilizing force.
On his most recent trip to the U.S., Yeltsin promised he would not
do this, but I am not convinced. Yeltsin is truly the owner of his
words: He gives them and takes them back.
3. Yeltsin could restore the Russian monarchy with himself as regent-for-life. He will never be able to create an absolute monarchy,
but he can create a constitutional one that will allow him to hold
the reins of power.
This is the most likely option he will take, because, unlikely as it
may sound, it is less unlikely than the other two options, and Yeltsin
will not go quietly from power.
This would not be the first time in Russian history that a regent
would become a real monarch. The most famous regent in Russian
history was Boris Godunov, a central character of Russian history as
well as of grand opera. Czar Fyodor Ivanovich was not a statesman
by nature, and therefore turned all his power over to his brotherin-law, Boris Godunov. After Fyodor Ivanovich died in 1958, Boris
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Godunov was crowned Czar Boris I. Now another Boris yearns for
absolute power in the Russian tradition.
Restoration of the monarchy would take people’s attention away
from the tribulations of their daily lives. But is there a groundswell
for monarchy? Eleven centuries of Russian monarchy were not wiped
out by less than a century of communism. After the disintegration
of the Soviet Union, members of Russia’s Romanov royal family who
visited Russia from Europe and the U.S. were given a very warm
reception. When the Great Princess Maria, first in line to the Russian throne, came to Russia for the first time last year, bringing along
her young son Georgiy, she was met officially by the mayor of Moscow, Yun Louzkov, who presented her with roses and housed her in
an official residence where the communist leaders used to put their
most respected guests. This could not have happened without Yeltsin’s okay. This is in stark contrast to the cold and rude reception
that the former king of Romania received when he went to visit
Romania in October.
Yeltsin has encouraged a regular flow of royalty to Russia. Queen
Elizabeth II of Britain, a distant cousin to the Romanovs, was one.
Other royalty have come from Belgium and Japan recently. It is almost as if Yeltsin were getting the people accustomed to royalty
again. I would not be surprised if there were a deal between Yeltsin
and Princess Maria. Yeltsin would agree to put her 13-year-old son
Georgiy on the throne, with Yeltsin becoming a sort of regent. It is
interesting to note that the other claimant to the Romanov throne,
Great Prince Alexiy, who lives in Madrid, has not been invited to
Russia, further evidence of a Yeltsin–Princess Maria deal.
I have no statistics but a great deal of anecdotal evidence supporting my belief that the ideal of a royal restoration would not be
laughed at. In 1991, at the height of Yeltsin’s popularity, one of the
leaders of the Society of Nobility gave Yeltsin the title of ‘‘Great
Prince.’’ He did not decline the ‘‘honor.’’
It attracted little attention, but the former nobility has already
received at least a smidgen of its privileges back. Descendants of
those whose properties were expropriated by the communists have
been granted preference in buying some of these properties, provided they are willing to at least match the other bidders. This isn’t
a big concession to the old nobility, but it’s a start.
Imagine this scenario: Georgiy could be crowned as the new Rus-
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sian czar. But because he is young and inexperienced, Yeltsin would
rule on his behalf. As regent, Yeltsin could appoint himself or a
stooge prime minister, and run the government.
Events could take the following turn: Parliament would vote for
the restoration of the monarchy, or Yeltsin could organize a referendum, and the people, who are tired of the political fighting among
current leaders, would agree. The Russian monarchy would not be
absolute, but it would be much stronger than Japan’s, Great Britain’s, Spain’s, or Sweden’s.
The next step would be revival of pan-Slavism. At first, Russia will
insist that it won’t take over Ukraine, Moldova, or Poland, but the
denials will grow weaker. A re-creation of the old empire isn’t as
unlikely as it may sound. As an example of Russia’s power, in September the prime ministers of all former Soviet republics (except
Turkmenistan and the Baltic states) signed an agreement creating an
Intergovernmental Economic Committee with executive power over
national governments of ten former Soviet Republics. This committee, situated in Moscow, gave Russia 50% of the voting power and
other states a combined 50%. So Russia is already first among equals.
Yeltsin yearns for dictatorial powers. The Russian people like a
strong leader. All that is needed to enable Yeltsin to fill this role is a
semblance of legitimacy, which a restored monarchy could provide.
What does this mean for foreign business people and investors? It
means they can expect a more stable Russia, if a nondemocratic one.
Under a restored monarchy and a strong central government, Russia
will continue down the road to a market economy and market reform. Borders between the former Soviet republics will become more
porous, an important element for foreign investors.
It won’t be easy for Americans and West Europeans to accept such
an outcome, but it could in the long run be a force for stability and
best for all concerned.

RUSSIAN HISTORY SHAPES
TODAY’S BUSINESS LEADERS
For Americans to successfully do business in Russia they need to understand the complex relationship between the country and its leaders.
This article provides an introduction to a topic that could fill volumes.
It is excerpted from Dr. Kvint’s upcoming book Management Strategy
of International Business in Russia and Central Eurasia.
Russia boasts a huge expanse of land, abundant natural resources,
and an educated workforce. These objective political and economic
factors make Russia into a world power. Despite this, Russia has an
inefficient economy and underdeveloped business capabilities. One
reason for this is that subjective factors also play a major role in
determining the success of an economy, especially the role of its
leader.
Certainly, the ill effects of communism are the most obvious
cause of Russia’s problems. But on a more subtle level, it has been
because there have been few true leaders to effectively manage both
the human and the natural resources.
What does the word ‘‘leader’’ mean to Russians? What is the role
of a leader in Russian history? What is the Russian approach to leadership for business development, for political leaders, executives, and
entrepreneurs? The concept of leader in these many forms must be
examined in the context of its history.

Role of Leaders in Russian History
Leadership in Russia is rooted in its totalitarian political history, and
is shaped by that experience. Despite the fact that in its thousand
years of history Russia was never a democratic country, there are a
few notable exceptions where local democratic societies did exist
(for example, the free city of Novgorod). During the 13th and 15th
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 1 (June 1994).
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centuries, Russia consisted of several principalities each competing
with one another, although they were all dependents of the TatarMongol empire. It is during this period that Russia gave birth to one
of its first great leaders. One of the smallest and poorest principalities emerged as the most powerful: its name was Moscow.
The Prince of Moscow, Ivan Kalita, demonstrated his political
prowess early on. He assuaged the ruling Tatars and in return was
awarded the title of Great Prince. With this authority he was able to
become the first leader and to begin the unification of Russia. The
first lesson of Russian leadership became clear. Russians always try
to find peaceful solutions with powerful neighbors. Power is the language they understand.
In a more modern example, even the tyrant Stalin followed this
precedent. Stalin was happy when Hitler agreed to sign a peace treaty
in 1939. He ignored the reports of Soviet intelligence indicating that
Hitler was preparing for war, and preferred a peaceful resolution, no
matter how tenuous. And just a decade ago, after Ronald Reagan
taunted the Soviets with rhetoric of an ‘‘Evil Empire,’’ and vastly
increased the U.S. military budget, the Russians recognized that it
was in their best interest to sit down with the Americans and negotiate.

Lessons for Business
Just as Ivan Kalita placated the Tatars and was rewarded for his good
behavior, the same, unfortunately, is true of Russian business leaders. The goal of a Russian executive is to look good in the boss’s eyes,
even at the expense of sound business policy. This is a result of years
of Russian tyranny that forced people to think one way, act in another, and document everything yet a third way. An old Russian
proverb shows that an obedient child will accept milk from two
mothers. Therefore, it is essential that foreigners working in Russia
learn the opinions of the top policy makers.
In America, leadership is valued. Americans want recognition.
Networking is an important part of business. This is not so in Russia.
For years, people tried to remain innocuous and invisible. Under
the totalitarian system, standing out could get one in trouble. The
consequences of making a mistake were substantial. One mistake
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could ruin a person, and it often did. This is a revealing difference
in how Westerners and Russians view leadership. Russians do not
want to stand in the spotlight; they tend to shy away from leadership.
The goal of a Russian worker is to look good. How one presents
oneself on a superficial level becomes more important than performance. For example, while most workers make every effort to be on
time, that is where the responsibility for many may end. Managers
must earn the respect of workers in order to get them to produce.
The old Russian saying, ‘‘Servant to the czar and father of your soldiers,’’ takes on important business meaning. Managers end up protecting the workers from the boss. A good team leader never tells the
boss who on the team is bad but announces all successes loudly by
name.
Another widespread tradition among Russian executives and managers is falsifying reports. The reason for this, again, is that looking
good in front of superiors is more important than achieving positive
results. Because it was impossible to continually check every plant
all the time, this practice was commonplace, and still is. Thus, the
first function of any venture is financial control. In ordinary management systems, controls are implemented at the end of the decisionmaking process, after strategic planning, gathering of resources, etc.
In Russia, however, it’s necessary that they happen first. Investors
must check initial information and reports; otherwise decision making may be based on information that is false or misleading. The cost
of such decision making can be very high.

The Power of Territory
The second lesson of Ivan Kalita that Russian rulers have since emulated is to focus on territory. For Russian political leaders, one of the
best indicators of strength is the size of the land. All political leaders,
like Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Stalin, concentrated on
increasing the sheer size of the country. The belief was that any
agreement should be signed if it created a chance of gaining more
territory from a weaker partner.
Yeltsin has been the one exception to this rule, and this has earned
him the reputation of a truly visionary leader. Rather than acquiring
more land, Yeltsin gave independence to 14 of the former Soviet
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republics. His place in history is secure, because he was the first of
the leaders to understand that the death of the Soviet Union was
inevitable.
Nonetheless, he has worked to find common ground between the
republics inside Russia and to form a central federation. For example, since he has become the leader of independent Russia, he has
done everything to keep the Chechen and Tatar autonomous republics as part of Russia, and not cede them independence. Even for
Yeltsin, size of territory continues to be central.
It is interesting that the importance of territory carries over to
Russian business managers. Emphasis is placed on the size of the
facility and land, number of employees, number of cars, and size
of machines and equipment, rather than the level of efficiency and
production. Most don’t even know their own rate of return on equity.
Russian managers will tend to bury income statements, and provide
balance sheets instead.
As a result, foreigners need to be aware of the fact that when a
Russian executive makes a business decision, productivity enters into
the Russian’s equation only long after size. The end result of dealing
with such a manager can be a big white elephant.

RUSSIAN PACIFIC COAST:
EXCITING OPPORTUNITY
When Americans think of the territory east of the Ural Mountains they
tend to think only of Siberia. In reality, the region in the Pacific Coast
is vast, both in terms of size and in terms of opportunity. The 6.2
million-square-kilometer region, abundant in natural resources and
only 50 sea miles from Alaska, now has the independence and power to
establish international relationships. Today, dollars are more important to the region than rubles. Rush hour has just begun.
The key to this shift in policy lies in the continuing decentralization
of Russia, and the strengthening political muscle of local governments. Under Soviet domination, these regions had no economic
independence. Today entrepreneurs and local government authorities focus more and more on international cooperation in the Pacific
Rim. Between 1987 and 1993, 400 joint ventures with foreign capital
were created in this region; now there are more than 2,000.
The single most important areas strategically on the Russian Pacific Coast are the four large seaports, connected to two major railroads. These seaports, open all year round, are the gateway to Russia
from the Pacific Rim. Whoever controls the seaport controls an invaluable trading post.

Primed for International Business
Of the seven administrative regions on the Pacific Coast: Primorsky,
Khabarovsk, Sahalin, Magadan, Kamchatka, Amur, and the Republic
of Sakha-Yakutia, each has a local government. In six of these regions
the leader is a governor. In Sakha-Yakutia there is a president. After
three years of political fighting with the federal government in Moscow, the local governments have obtained legal control over business
relations. Today, international companies can register to do business
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 7 (1994).
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directly in the region, and enjoy special tax privileges for international capital.
China is currently the most active trading partner with this area.
While Japan at one time used to be the most important partner,
countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and
Thailand have increased the levels of their investment. But the effects of Japanese investment are still felt through Japanese equipment and products that are used extensively in Russian industry. In
the 1980s, cooperation between regions existed primarily via barter
trade. Today, countries like South Korea and Malaysia, and some
American companies, are working primarily through consignment
and collateral trade agreements.
A good indication of the area’s attractiveness for investment is the
fact that it has become the seat of intense competition between the
major communication companies. US West, Cable and Wireless,
AT&T, and Sprint have all created subsidiaries to service the region.

Investment Opportunities
The process of privatization, which accelerated in this region in 1993
and 1994, desperately needs financial institutions, insurance services,
and other business institutions to support enterprises. There are too
few banks and commodity exchanges, and not a single large insurance company. Those institutions that do exist do not have the expertise to meet the needs of business.
American companies with financial expertise will find a ready market for their services. The fact that 35% of trading companies have
already been privatized is a sign that this area is ready to participate
in international business. In addition, daily flights will soon take
place between San Francisco, Seattle, and Anchorage and Magadan,
Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, and major cities on the Russian Pacific
Coast.
The Pacific Coast has goods and products that would be inexpensive and efficient to export to the west coast of the U.S. For example,
the Pacific Coast exports 50% of Russian timber, 38% of its fish, 27%
of its canned fish, and 15% of its cement. Compared to the other
regions, the Russian Pacific is selling twice as many goods internally
as it exports.
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Opportunity for American Food Industry
Traditionally, the Pacific Region has imported 37% of its food supply,
the principle portion coming from Kazakstan, and other former central Soviet Asian republics, such as Uzebekistan and Turkmenistan.
The food produced in this region is of very low quality, however, and
contains many chemicals.
Therefore, there is a tremendous opportunity for American foodprocessing companies to export to this region. American plants could
deliver these products to the Russian coast from the west coast of
the U.S. and Alaska. For both Americans and Russians, this will be a
mutually beneficial arrangement.

Natural Resources
The economy of this area is strongly oriented toward the development of natural resources. This region is very rich, particularly in
nonferrous metals, minerals, wood, and fish. The fish industry, nonferrous metals, and timber industries together occupy 50% of regional products. (The fish industry constitutes 19% of this figure.)
In the past, most of these products—for example, 92% of nonferrous
metals and 38% of timber—were sent into the internal regions of
Russia.
The Pacific Coast is responsible for mining 98% of all Russian
diamonds, 80% of its tin, 50% of its wood, 10% of its pulp wood, 6%
of Russian black ore, and 5.2% of its coal. Because of its waterways,
the region supplies 40% of the fish of Russia. In addition, it grows
85% of Russian soybeans and produces 13% of its honey.
The geological forecast of oil reserves for this area is 10 billion
tons. This is more than 10% of all of Russia’s oil reserves. It is reported that there are 14 trillion cubic liters of natural gas and 30
billion tons of oil and liquid natural gas. Because the shortage of
capital for geological research limits exploration, the resources that
are registered document only 302 million tons, and 1.7 trillion cubic
meters of natural gas.
Perhaps the most abundant of the administrative regions is SakhaYakutia, which has diamonds, gold, coal, and natural gas. The Sahalin
region is known for its rich deposits of coal, pulp wood, and fish.
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Industrial Structure
While rich in resources, the region lacks many of the production
capabilities necessary to capitalize on its bounty. Just to maintain
the level of industrial activity of the past few years, many goods are
required that the region itself does not produce. For example, 35%
of the machines and equipment in this region’s plants were delivered
from Russia or imported from abroad. In addition, 40% of the products for light industry were also imported. The region is also desperately in need of chemical products for its industry. This does not
take into account the goods necessary if the region is to develop its
yet untapped resources.

GO EAST, YOUNG MAN
American businessmen and journalists by the planeload are landing in
Moscow. If they are interested in profitable opportunities in Russia’s
future, they should be landing nine time zones away, in Magadan.
America was discovered because Columbus and his backers were
looking for new business opportunities. With similar motives, American businessmen are now pouring into Moscow. But Moscow is not
the only place where the Russian action is. For the real opportunities,
Americans must look east of Moscow—and east of the Lena
River—to the Soviet Far East. There they and other Westerners can
make attractive investments with the fewest dangers, in terms of
political risk.
Russia’s Far East is developing as a new Klondike. Under the radical economic reforms of Boris Yeltsin, 11 free economic zones have
been opened since the Russian parliament approved them on July
14. Five of them are in the Soviet Far East.
In a free economic zone, Westerners are granted tax holidays for
five years. They can own a company, rent land, even use dollars, and
take on Soviet entrepreneurs as partners. Free zones are free not only
for the foreigners but also for the Soviets, who can now own brokerage firms, factories, newspapers. Stalin was not able to liquidate the
entrepreneurial drive. This fact can be readily confirmed by anyone
with some knowledge of the miracles of entrepreneurship Soviet
women pull off every day simply to feed their families.
Speaking of potential partners, new Russian legislation is exploring the possibility of restoring, mainly to former Russian citizens,
some of the property that was taken from their families during the
October (1917) revolution. An example is the family of Yul Brynner,
the late actor, whose father was one of the founders of nonferrous
metallurgy in the Far East and who owned big plants there in the
pre-Lenin days. The Brynners may now claim the property back. The
state is unlikely to give it back, but, as a compromise, it may at least
lease the enterprises to these families indefinitely. This possibility is
Forbes, November 26, 1990, pp. 234–238.
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specifically provided for in the Russian Republic’s new Law on Property, enacted on August 1, 1990.
When they think of investing in Russia, many American businessmen have a common concern: what to do with their rubles. The free
economic zones solve the ruble problem. There you can use your
rubles to buy construction materials, pay wages, rent land, and so
on. You produce for rubles, and export for hard currency, which can
now be paid into your account outside the country. If you want to
be paid inside a free economic zone, the new law allows you to hold
hard currency accounts, and to take your hard currency out of the
country at any time.
It is unbelievable the bargains business people can get for their
money in Russia. If a realistic ruble/dollar exchange rate of 3 rubles
to 1 dollar is used, Russian labor costs are 5% or less what they are
in America. And they may get cheaper. North Korea owes the USSR
about $7 billion. To repay the debt, North Korea may send to the Far
East free economic zones thousands of workers. They are even
cheaper than the Soviet workers.
I think by the year 2000 foreign companies will invest in these
regions no less than $10 billion. Russia plans to invest 3.7 billion
rubles ($1.2 billion at realistic exchange rates) there over ten years;
1.5 billion rubles before 1995. These sums will be used to develop
communications, roads, and other infrastructure.
The Soviet Far East is most attractive to foreign business because
of its unique combination of natural resources and an advantageous
geographical position. The Far East provides the shortest route from
Europe to Asia, via the Arctic Seaway. It costs less than half as much
to deliver cargo from Antwerp to Japan using the Arctic Seaway than
it does using the Suez Canal. Rail? One ton of cargo delivered from
Munich to Japan costs about $215 using the European and TransSiberian Railway, and just $110 by ship along the Arctic Seaway.
In 1984 the Canadians used the Arctic Seaway to ship cargo from
Vancouver to Lithuania. The trip took seven days less than it usually
takes through the Panama Canal.
In 1985 the trip was repeated, this time in winter. Navigation in
the Arctic Ocean throughout the year has become the key to the real
exploitation of the Arctic. The USSR has the world’s largest fleet of
icebreakers. There are about 25 of them, including 3 nuclear vessels.
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There is a need for more icebreakers of different classes, as well as
for specialized transport ships.
While the opportunities in the Soviet Far East are almost unknown to Americans, the Japanese have been quietly pumping investments into the region for the last few years. They are aware of the
area’s treasures: The Soviet Union provides 40% of Japan’s imports of
precious and rare metals, and 70% of the Soviet Far East exports go
to Japan.
One hundred and fifty Japanese companies have already established direct ties with Soviet Far East enterprises to conduct barter
exchange without hard currency, and they are completely ready to
enter the free economic zones.
The Americans are timidly testing the waters. Alaska is in almost
direct physical contact with the northern region of the Soviet Far
East, Chukotskiy. Among the few concrete business results of the
last colorless summit between Bush and Gorbachev was the opening
of several new airports for flights between the U.S. and the Far East.
As part of the negotiations, some Soviet airplanes can now bring 30
tons of cargo per flight to Alaska. There are no regularly scheduled
flights from the West into the new airports, but there soon will be.
One of the new airports is in the major city called ‘‘Sunny’’ Magadan, on the shore of the Okhotskoye Sea.
The city’s name is ironic. In Russian, the word ‘‘zone’’ is indelibly
associated with prison camps, especially those of Stalin’s time. Magadan was the capital of the prison zone, better known as the terrible
‘‘gulag.’’ That is why the Soviets painfully call it ‘‘Sunny’’ Magadan.
With a population of 570,000, Sunny Magadan may become the
capital of a zone of a much more preferable kind, a free economic
zone.
One immediate opportunity for earning hard currency lies with
the region’s huge but underutilized ship repair facilities. The ship
construction market is not very active, but repairs are always necessary. The facilities already exist in the modern port cities of Vladivostok, Vostochnyy, Slavyanka, Soviet Gavan, and Nakhodka, which
handle the bulk of trade between the USSR and its Pacific partners.
This can bring immediate hard currency revenues. It is possible to
lease port space for 50 years. Japan’s Mitsubishi Corp. has already
proposed to lease space and equipment, and pay hard currency.
Proximity to the Pacific Ocean also means fish and tremendous
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biological resources. The Far East accounts for 40% of the Soviet
Union’s fish harvest. By our estimates, $1 invested in fish farming—
there are more than 20 such fish factories in the Far East—brings
about $12 of profit.
Or consider logging. Thirty percent of Soviet forests accounts for
40% of Soviet lumber exports to such markets as Japan, Australia,
and South Korea. The lumber industry of the Far East cries for Western capital and know-how. The waste is sickening. Forty percent of
Soviet timber remains in the forest, rotting on the forest floor. Workers fell timber and raft it down the rivers. Ten percent of the timber
they put into the water is lost during this trip. A Norwegian company
has been catching this lost timber and selling it for hard currency,
illegally, for years.
In the Soviet lumber mills, 55% of the raw logs processed are scrap.
This scrap is uselessly burned. As a whole, only 15% or so of the cut
trees are really used in the timber industry of the Soviet Far East.
The other 85% is wasted.
Confronted with evidence of such waste, many Westerners believe
that Russians, like Brazilians, would rather decimate their forests
today and worry about nature tomorrow. This is not true. A huge
national preserve, Terney, has been set aside in the Far East; larger
than some of the smaller European countries, it is recognized by the
United Nations as a symbol of purity. Hunting, fishing, even drinking
from the river is prohibited there. When I got permission to enter
this territory, I had to bring my own drinking water. Precautions are
such that to enter this heavily guarded land, I received special plastic
shoes and a disinfected coat.
My point is that responsible environmentalism is a force inside
the Soviet Union today, and Western companies that can reduce
waste while still making money will find a warm welcome.
Most Soviet gold and precious stones are mined in the Far East,
in the basins of the Kolyma, Indigirka, and upper Amur rivers. While
I was studying the mines of the Far East, I held in my hands heavy
pieces of greenish gold and pale unpolished diamonds. This wealth
contrasted terribly with the poor living and working conditions there.
Gold is mined using the most archaic methods.
More than 90% of Soviet diamonds—the USSR is the world’s
fifth-largest diamond producer—are mined in the Far East, in Yakutia. Diamond mining is a good area for joint ventures. By my cal-
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culations, if $2 billion is invested in modern mining technologies,
diamond production will increase by about 20% to 25%.
I have written before about prospects for Western investment in
Soviet oil and natural gas exploration and production (Forbes, September 17). I should add that in the Soviet Far East significant gas
and oilfields are being discovered between the Lena and Vilyuy rivers. Offshore Kamchatka, on the Pacific, is also very rich in oil, as is
the eastern coast of the Okhotskoye.
The coal mining industry, too, has a big future. The Far East,
which equals more than 60% of the territory of the U.S., has 30% of
Soviet coal. Its proven coal stocks are estimated at almost 13 billion
tons. Soviet geologists believe probable recoverable reserves are at
least 15 times the official proven figure. Half these immense stocks
can be mined by the open pit method, the cheapest and most efficient way.
Another important task of the Far East is building its own iron
and steel industry. Vast deposits of iron ore have been discovered
there, quite enough to develop an integrated steel works with an
annual capacity of up to 10 million tons for almost 90 years.
Shikotan Island, one of the closest islands to Japan, now belongs
to the Soviet Union, but sooner or later it will become a free economic zone for joint investments with Japan. I expect a big tourism
industry to develop in the south of the Soviet Far East. The waters
are wonderful—clear and pure. Today, on the shores of this island
facing Japan is a Soviet military base. South Kuril Islands is called
‘‘The Emperor’s Beach,’’ because Japanese emperors used to come
to the unit; even the Soviets have to obtain special permission to go
there. But as the area’s economy develops, economic interest will
make Soviet leaders move the military out and open the island to
tourists.
No one comes away with the impression that the Far East is a
virgin land. It already has powerful, if not very efficient, industry.
There is significant infrastructure, especially railroads. The industrial
products of the Far East territory are exported to 50 countries, including 15 along the states of the Pacific Rim. The area’s main partner is Japan. Altogether, the Far East territory accounts for 50% of
all Soviet trade with the Pacific Rim countries. As trade among Asia’s
rapidly growing countries increases, the Soviet Far East’s economy
will become more and more active.
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In the Far East there is only one person per square kilometer. Will
there be a lack of labor resources? No. The overmanned factories of
western Russia will soon have to slash their payrolls if the economy
is to be made competitive, or simply productive. Large-scale unemployment is on the threshold. For jobs and for freedom, the best
Russians will move east.
In the USSR’s territory there are 11 time zones: The Far East is
11 hours ahead of Moscow. Economically, too, the Far East, not only
Moscow, is Russia’s future.

FAR EAST: A LOOK INTO THE
FUTURE
The Far Eastern economic region takes up more than a quarter of the
USSR territory or more than four percent of all the land on earth.
It has five time zones; the pole of cold of the Northern Hemisphere;
the Pacific coast; such great rivers as the Amur, Lena, Kolyma, and
Indigirka; volcanoes; geysers; nonferrous, rare, and precious metals;
diamonds; carbohydrates; forests; tundra; an ocean of wealth; and a
sea of problems.
To Control the Situation Rather than Follow in Its Wake
Correspondent: A large group of prominent scientists, who are obviously rather busy, spent a month and a half working on the expedition. You spent nearly half that time traveling on the sea. Would it
not be simpler to generalize and analyze the results of the research
already done on many problems without traveling there altogether?
Kvint: We were not the first to invent economic expeditions. Russian scientists resorted to them already at the beginning of the century. The Academy of Sciences arranged many of them in the ’30s
and the ’50s. Development needs made us resort to them once again.
It is not only the comparatively poorly studied regions that need
such expeditions. Judging by everything, very soon we shall apply
such a research method to one of the oldest industrialized regions in
the country—the Don-Dnieper area. It will be radically reconstructed.
What Are Hindrances?
Correspondent: What has hindered the industrial development of
the Far East?
Interview in Moscow News, Weekly edition, 1 (1983).
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Kvint: The scarcity of transport means that can operate without
roads; the relative weakness of the social infrastructure; the departmental disunity that hasn’t yet been completely overcome; and the
scarcity of manpower. Roughly, there is one person per square kilometer in the region.

Kamchatka—The Black Sea and Back
Correspondent: We were talking about labor-saving machinery and
processes. Which industry does it involve first of all?
Kvint: All of them, without exception. This is especially true of the
areas where the natural conditions are extremely harsh. Minerals
have to be mined where they are found. But if life conditions there
are unfavorable, then there should be a minimum number of people
working there. There is no reason to develop enterprises there that
would be able to operate in more favorable climatic conditions.
Therefore, in these areas people should do only whatever it is absolutely necessary to do there and, while doing this, use the technology
that calls for the least possible amount of human participation.

Expenditures and Results
Correspondent: How interested is the entire country in the accelerated development of the Far East, where literally each and every step
calls for heavier spending than in other regions?
Kvint: As I see it, we should put agricultural land and timber resources into the same category in, for example, the Amur Region
and some areas of the Khabarovsk Territory, which very well could
become the most important source for our country’s raising soybeans
and other valuable crops.

SIBERIA: EXPERIMENT
WITHOUT COUNTERPART
History knows quite a few cases of barren expanses being transformed
into blooming oases. However, the tremendous scale on which this is
being done today in Siberia is awesome.
While on a tour of Siberia in 1913, the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof
Nansen observed: ‘‘The day will come when Siberia will awaken, display its natural potential, and say its word.’’ In those days, with the
exception of a narrow strip running alongside the Trans-Siberian
Railway in the south, the entire boundless territory, with incalculable
natural wealth, was literally a blank spot on the economic map of
Russia.
The great Norwegian made a realistic assessment of the difficulties
involved in the development of Siberia. This led him to believe that
it would not happen for a long time to come. But 20 years later
Siberia had the Russian Federation’s largest centers of coal mining
(the Kuzbas) and ferrous metal industry (the Kuznetsk Integrated
Metallurgical Plant). And on the 70th latitude the Norilsk Integrating Mining and Metallurgical Plant sprang up smelting nickel, cobalt, and copper from ores which were mined out of the permafrost
ground of the Taymyr Peninsula.
Many people abroad at first thought it was a ‘‘prestige’’ project.
However, when the problem of raw materials became acute in the
rest of the world and the Soviet Union remained the sole industrial
country to depend exclusively on its own resources, the attitude to
tapping hard-to-reach areas abruptly changed. While on a visit to
Norilsk, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the prime minister of Canada, noted
that the Soviet experience was of a planetwide significance.
Particularly impressive growth has been registered by oil and gasmining (including gas condensate) in Western Siberia. In the
1965–80 period the output of crude oil increased more than 300-fold
and that of the gas more than 150-fold. In 1985, according to plan,
it will reach 390 million tons and 350 cubic meters, respectively.
Sputnik (Digest of the Soviet Press) (Moscow), 11 (1982), 42–51.
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The Riches and Problems of the Yenisei Area
In terms of climate, landscape, and the presence of various natural
resources, Siberia is not uniform. Nor have its different parts been
developed to an equal extent. However, in the very center there is a
territory which can safely be called ‘‘Siberia in microcosm.’’ Claiming
one-seventh of the surface area of the Russian Federation, it embraces parts of the Arctic tundra, the taiga, and fertile land with a
moderate climate. The territory shares with the rest of Siberia almost
everything to which it owes its fame, but it shares its problems as
well. Because its main city is Krasnoyarsk, this part of Siberia is called
the Krasnoyarsk Territory.
The Yenisei, one of the largest rivers in the world, has bound this
immense, multifaceted expanse into a single administrative whole.
Until recently the river, with its tributaries, was the only traffic artery
along which civilization could reach into the virgin taiga and the
wild tundra.
In Siberia laying a road is a greater challenge than, for instance,
in the Pamirs or in the Amazon Valley. Apart from the forbidding
mountains and swamplands, the work is compounded by the caprices
of the soil, which has been almost forever bound by ice, and by notorious Siberian cold, which makes steel as brittle as glass and freezes
machine oil. This is why, per unit of area, the network of roads in
the Krasnoyarsk Territory is one-eighth of that in the Russian Federation as a whole.
Help comes from Aeroflot, although the delivery of freight and
passengers by air requires expenditures from the state a hundred
times greater than for motor transport and almost a thousand times
greater than transport by rail. But what is to be done if the Yenisei
area contains resources which have either become depleted or are
simply nonexistent in old areas?
Siberian scientists believe that the Krasnoyarsk Territory will
someday share the fame of the 18th-century Urals as the mineral
treasure-house of Russia, the pioneer of the Russian industry in the
19th century and the leading center of the heavy and manufacturing
industries in our day. In fact, this day is already dawning. True, the
Krasnoyarsk people are introducing corrections in the Ural experience and intend to traverse the three-centuries-long path of ‘‘Russia’s smithy’’ in two or three decades. While shipping various raw
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materials to other parts of the country, they at the same time are
developing their heavy and manufacturing industries, producing everything from the highly efficient harvester combine Sibiryak and
container-trucks, to the domestic refrigerator Biryusa.
The abundance of raw materials in the Urals has never been
matched by the presence of its own energy base. The industrial development of the Yenisei area began with the creation of the power
industry. The Krasnoyarsk hydropower station, the world’s largest, of
six million kilowatts, and the future still larger Sayan-Shushenskoye
hydropower station, of 6.5 million kilowatts, which has already partly
become operational, are located here. In the vicinity of the KanskAchinsk Fuel and Energy Complex (KAFEC) project, two thermal
electric power stations of 10 million kilowatts each are being built.
In the per capita generation of electric energy the Krasnoyarsk
Territory is already 50% ahead of the United States, although the
Soviet Union as a whole still lags behind it in this indicator. Nevertheless, electricity cannot wholly replace man, even in highly automated production. The Krasnoyarsk people know this from their own
experience: a shortage of labor slows the territory’s development.
The problem of settling areas with people from the mid-latitudes,
unaccustomed to such hard conditions, is a global one. In addition
to the differences presented by the harsh climate, there are economic and social factors. The cash nexus, which has driven people
north at all times, in the final analysis, does not solve the problem.
A case in point is Alaska, which witnessed the ‘‘gold rush’’ of the
early 20th century and a recent ‘‘oil boom,’’ but, despite this, has
remained one of the most sparsely populated areas of the world. In
contrast, Siberia is being settled for good. It seems as if the key to
the problem of peopling the northern latitudes has been found here.

Experiment Within Experiment
In the early 1970s in a plant of low-voltage electrical equipment in
the town of Divnogorsk near Krasnoyarsk, at best one-fifth of the
machine-tools functioned; the rest awaited operators.
The terrain here is extremely scenic, with a mild—by Siberian
standards—climate, cedar forests, and rich hunting and fishing
grounds. However, the people left—paradoxically enough, for the
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northern city of Norilsk, where the population has been steadily
growing since the mid-1960s. Between 1965 and 1980 it almost doubled.
‘‘The secret is simple,’’ explained Boris Kolesnikov, manager of
the Norilsk Integrated Mining and Metallurgical Plant. ‘‘In the given
period the floor space of well-appointed flats specially adapted to
northern conditions expanded more than twofold and dozens of general and vocational/technical schools and medical and childcare institutions have sprung up. The city has six sport complexes, and the
plant has its own sanatorium near Moscow and a children’s holiday
center in the south of the Krasnoyarsk Territory.’’
Meanwhile, in Divnogorsk and several other industrial centers of
the territory, where there was a constant shortage of workers, civil
engineering projects lagged far behind industrial. Workers did not
stay long in spite of high wages, longer holidays than the country’s
average, and advantages in pension schemes. The conclusion was
obvious: man can be attracted to Siberia by various benefits, but he
can be kept only by good conditions.
The development of Siberia is an experiment without counterpart
anywhere in the world, either in the scale of allocations or in that
of construction. Incidentally, this explains some miscalculations in
economic and social planning.
Without an integral economic and social program there is no way
to avoid miscalculations in the future when seeking optimum interlinked solutions to hundreds of problems. The choice for evolving
and testing it fell to the Krasnoyarsk Territory. Why? Because it was
the focus of the fuel, power, nonferrous and ferrous metal, timber,
chemical, electrical, and transport-engineering industries.
The program was scheduled to cover a period of 10 years. The
program was compiled by more than 30 organizations, leading Soviet
scientists, and economic managers. What has been shown by these
10 years in the Krasnoyarsk Territory?
Of the many figures that characterize the results of the experiment, I will single out the most important ones. From 1971 to 1980
the territory’s industrial output rose 2.3-fold. Labor productivity increased by 170%. In the per capita output of coal, nonferrous metals,
and timber materials, the territory is now in advance of any developed country. In that of fabrics it is next only to the United States
and Japan.
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New towns—Lesosibirsk, Sayanogorsk, Sosnovoborsk, Svetlogorsk—have appeared on the map, and, like Divnogorsk, already
have more arrivals than leavers. Almost 350,000 families have moved
to new flats in these 10 years. Krasnlyarsk has opened its eighth
higher educational institution.
Today, its people work under the Second Integral 10-year Program,
which has been compiled for the period ending in 1990. It provides
for completion of the Sayan-Shushenskoye hydropower project and
for the launching of Turukhansk, whose capacity—20 million kilowatts—will exceed the total energy potential of all the hydropower
projects currently in operation or under construction in the territory.
In Krasnoyarsk a plant of heavy excavators, which in terms of technical equipment will be as good as the famous Kamatsu and Caterpillar
plants, will go on line. The KAFEC will increase its contribution to
the country’s fuel and energy balance severalfold.
Siberia breeds in its people courage, stamina, and purposefulness.
The only thing they cannot tolerate is an absence of prospects. However, according to all indications, this does not threaten people in
Krasnoyarsk or anywhere else in Siberia.

SIBERIA SAYS NO TO CASTRO
Russian economist Vladimir Kvint visited Siberian coal mines some
years ago. He and his associates were questioned by coal miners annoyed that their government was lavishing money on foreign adventures when its own people lacked essentials. ‘‘Who needs that hairy
fellow, Fidel?’’ was the way one miner put it. Now that the authorities in Russia are starting to listen to ordinary folk, we’d say Fidel
Castro’s days are numbered.
Who would have thought that a Soviet economist would be a
contributor to The Capitalist Tool?

Forbes, September 17, 1990.

EASTERN SIBERIA COULD
BECOME ANOTHER SAUDI
ARABIA
Those who interpreted invasion of Kuwait as the start of a new era of
high oil prices weren’t paying attention to events in Russia.
When Saddam Hussein brutally annexed Kuwait, the price of oil took
off. Here was an Arab ruler who was threatening to hold the industrial
world hostage for its oil. It was not so much Saddam Hussein’s tanks
and his missiles and poison gas that frightened the West as his possible
use of the oil weapon.
In fact, the Kuwait invasion was a sign of weakness on Saddam’s
part, not strength. Saddam could not finance his imperial ambitions
on $17 oil, so he sought to drive prices higher at the point of a gun. A
primitive man’s primitive solution to a complex modern problem.
It won’t work. What’s more, most of the other Arabs know it won’t
work. That’s one reason they are not backing Saddam.
Demand and supply will set the price of oil, not guns and embargoes.
Demand is growing, but supply may be growing faster. By the beginning of the next century, Russia may be exporting more oil than Saudi
Arabia is today.
Time is running out on the use of oil as a political weapon. Those
who have tried to wield the weapon, Saddam Hussein and his predecessors, have counted on the fact that the Middle East sits on the
world’s largest proven reserves of oil. But we now know that there
are even bigger reserves in Russia’s Siberia.
Not tomorrow, but in the years ahead, more and more of this oil
will reach world markets, ensuring that world oil prices will remain
under pressure and making it virtually impossible for any Arab ruler
to hold the world for ransom.
So, whatever happens to Saddam Hussein, the current level of
world oil prices will prove to be unsustainable.
Forbes, September 17, 1990, pp. 130–133.
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The Japanese seem to understand this better than the Americans
do. Without doubt, their understanding of Siberia’s potential helped
persuade the cautious Japanese that they could afford to antagonize
Iraq by participating in the blockade. As far back as 1975, Japanese
interests launched their exploration for oil and gas off Sakhalin, the
Pacific island just north of Japan.
Even now, with its economy in tatters, the USSR remains the
world’s absolute leader in oil production. Last year, production, according to official Moscow sources, was 12 million barrels a day. My
own evaluation for the USSR is somewhat higher—12.5 million barrels. By comparison, Iraq and Kuwait combined produce just over 4
million barrels a day; Saudi Arabia produces 5 million barrels; all of
OPEC produces 24 million.
Yes, the Russians need a lot of that oil at home—less than 20% of
their production goes for export. Russia also desperately needs foreign exchange to buy other things, and their easiest way of getting
that exchange is by boosting oil exports. With Western help, eastern
Siberia could become another Saudi Arabia—although not, of
course, with Saudi Arabia’s low recovery costs.
A whole new source of oil is about to burst upon the world scene:
eastern Siberia and the Arctic zone of the USSR.
From their magazines and newspapers, most Americans have gotten the idea that the Soviet Union’s oil production is centered in
the republics of Kazakstan and Azerbaijan—in the oilfields of Baku,
Astrakhan, and Shevchenko along the Caspian Sea—and in the fields
of western Siberia, which are fast being depleted. This is misleading.
The Central Asia republics’ reserves have been running out for decades; they now account for just 6% of Soviet production.
Nearly all the rest of Soviet production comes from the Russian
Socialist Republic, primarily from the western Siberian fields tapped
in the 1960s and 1970s. They are closer to population centers and
enjoy milder climate conditions than the eastern areas. But thanks
to mismanagement and abysmally low worker incentives and productivity, yields from western Siberia have been steadily falling.
These are old fields. To get the same amount of oil, one must now
drill six times as many wells. And the cost of the ecological damage
in these regions is bigger than the costs of the facilities for waste
processing.
Yet with help from capitalist countries, western Siberia can sig-
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nificantly increase its oil exports based on its northern and deeper
oilfields: On average in the USSR, only 7% of oil is extracted from
the oilfield, about a fifth the level in U.S. fields. Especially promising
are the Sea of Okhotsk shelf and formations near the Pechora River
region, 1,000 miles northeast of Moscow.
But all this is small change compared with the exciting prospects
for eastern Siberia. According to geologists of the Soviet Union’s
Academy of Sciences, the oil reserves of eastern Siberia are even
bigger than those forecast for OPEC.
As long ago as 1978 it was clear to Siberian geologists and economists that western Siberia’s oil production peak was rapidly approaching and that new fields must be sought farther east. By this
time very promising geological forecasts had appeared, announcing
secretly, as always, unheard-of oil and gas fields in eastern Siberia, in
the Arctic offshore, and in the Pacific coastal regions of the Soviet
Far East.
As the economic knowledge of these regions was practically nonexistent, I proposed a series of economic expeditions to evaluate the
treasures locked beyond the Urals. These missions, similar in some
ways to America’s Lewis and Clark expeditions, included geologists,
engineers, and physicians. I was one of them.
In 1979–81 we explored the Arctic regions of the USSR, the Far
East, and various territories of Siberia. The geologists discovered tremendous potential between the eastern shore of the Yenisey River
and the Lena, especially the oil belt dividing the Taymyr peninsula
from the mainland.
A slow start has been made on development. East Siberian fields
will produce only around 20 million barrels this year. Not much in
global terms. But I think we’ll see the same kind of growth in east
Siberia as we saw in west Siberia: from 7 million barrels a year in
1965, to 7 million barrels of oil every day. By the year 2000, eastern
Siberia will be yielding more than 140 million barrels of oil each year,
as well as billions of cubic feet of natural gas.
But these are minimal figures for the year 2000. They assume little
help from abroad in either technology or capital. If the capital and
expertise of companies like Exxon, Royal Dutch/Shell, and British
Petroleum could be turned loose on the region, there is no telling
how high production might go. Straw in the wind: Chevron Corp.
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has announced it is beginning exploration in Kazakstan, prologue,
perhaps, to the oil fever to come.
Eastern Siberia may sound like another planet to Americans. In
fact it is America’s next-door neighbor, four hours’ flying time from
Anchorage and about seven hours’ from Seattle. Harsh as it is, it is a
much pleasanter place to live and work than the barren deserts of
Arabia.
Alaska, until 1867 a Russian province, is separated from some Siberian oilfields by only several dozens of miles across the Bering
Strait. There are some oilfields in the far eastern USSR—principally
off Sakhalin Island and the Kamchatka Peninsula, for example—
from which an overnight oil delivery to Alaska could be organized.
U.S. consumers would benefit directly from this proximity. I have
calculated that total transportation costs to the U.S. west coast from
eastern Siberian oilfields would be a fraction of the costs of importing oil from the Middle East. Russian oil may even be pumped from
tankers into the Aleyeska pipeline. Within ten years this natural geographic proximity will become a new factor in economic growth.
The world’s energy transportation routes and economics are going
to be changed. The Arctic Seaway, linking all the northern USSR to
the warm-water Pacific, is to become a very busy route indeed. And
an extremely efficient one. Foreign companies began experimenting
with this route back in 1980. I watched the unloading of the Mannesmann pipes from West Germany sent for the gas pipeline to the icy,
unequipped shore of the northern point of the Yamal Peninsula.
In addition, the great eastern Siberian rivers, including the Yenisey, the Indigirka, and the Lena, create a natural transportation system for oil and other resources. And the 2,000-mile–long
Baykal–Amur railroad, begun in the 1970s, runs through the middle
north of Siberia and the Far East, connecting the oilfields with the
already existing ports on the Pacific Ocean. From there, it is a oneday tanker run to Japan, and another day or two to Alaska.
Beyond oil and gas there are other Siberian treasures to harvest—
nonferrous metals, coal (next door to one oilfield is the world’s biggest brown coal field, estimated at more than a trillion tons), gold,
and lumber. And while extracting oil you do not want to throw away
diamonds, just because they are in the way.
Development in eastern Siberia will be somewhat slowed by environmental concerns. While Soviet environmentalists are not as
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anticapitalistic as their American counterparts and do not enjoy the
weapons provided by the U.S. legal system, Soviet environmentalists
will put pressure on the authorities to make sure that the eastern
Siberian wilderness is not ravaged. In former years many big Siberian
projects were facilitated by bribes to Soviet bureaucrats.
But Siberians will not allow the rape of nature and their lives anymore. Eastern Siberia is a beautiful wasteland, with huge forests and
severe mountains. It has cold winters, but hot and bright summers.
Several attractive cities exist in these regions, such as Norilsk and
Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk.
Under Soviet rule, development in Siberia has been tremendously
damaging to the environment. With exploitation comes the same
sad picture. All the trees are cut. Near the mines and oilfields, workers endure terribly shabby housing—one room for four people in a
hostel, furnished with an old wardrobe, table, and TV set. For 4,000
to 5,000 oil workers, there is one club, usually painted Party red,
where the entertainment is amateurish. No wonder the workers drink
so much. The fatigue gradually accumulates; the productivity of
labor falls.
If Western companies are to go to the USSR, they’ll have to invest
something. But at an estimated $8,000 per worker, it will still cost
less for these companies to upgrade Siberian facilities than it now
costs to house and feed workers in Alaska or on North Sea oil rigs.
Employers will also have to invest in social infrastructure, and pay
decent wages.
But to whom should interested foreign businesses apply? The
USSR, led by Mikhail Gorbachev? Or the Russian Republic, led by
Boris Yeltsin? The parliament of the Russian Socialist Republic has
already declared its property rights for all of Russia’s natural resources, including areas that currently produce 92% of the USSR’s
oil. Foreign oil entrepreneurs should find a willing ear in the new
Russian government, which would far prefer to sell oil for hard currency than to other Soviet republics.
It is clear that the Russian Republic’s market-oriented young
economists will try to sell not just the crude oil but also higher,
value-added refined petroleum products. That is why eastern Siberia
may be of the greatest interest to petrochemical processors; the former will certainly be favored over those seeking purely extractive
investments.

eastern siberia could become another saudi arabia

403

It is time for American business people to start thinking in terms
of the Pacific Century, and of America and Russia as neighbors
across that shrinking pond. It is also time to stop worrying about
Arab oil embargoes and start thinking about how to bring all that
Russian oil to world markets. Some Arab nations may be able to
withhold their oil for a while to punish the West, but Russia, hungry
for development, cannot.

THE ARCTIC COMES NEXT
With every year the ‘‘accent’’ on Siberia is being felt with increasing
strength in the Soviet Union’s economy.
The realization in Siberia of programs of nationwide importance
have led to the establishment of its first economic belt, which has taken
shape in the south, along the Trans-Siberian Railway. It accounts for
the major share of the industrial output and more than 90% of the
area’s population.
At the end of the 11th five-year period (1981–1985) the lines will
open on the Balkal-Amur Railway, which will pass across the Near
North territory. The area of the BAM reclamation zone is comparable
in size to Western Europe. Siberia’s second economic belt is beginning
to take shape there. The full implementation of the BAM Program will
take more than just one decade and is projected into the 21st century.
Stage-by-stage development of the economy of the Soviet Union’s
eastern regions envisages a further advance northward. To this end
investigations are carried out by more than 700 research and design
organizations, as well as by institutes of higher learning.
A special place is held among them by the economic expedition of the
Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, under the scientific
direction of Academician Abel Aganbegyan. The coming summer will
be their fourth summer in the polar regions.
A Moscow News correspondent interviewed the chief of the expedition, Vladimir Kvint, Cand. Sc. (Econ.).
‘‘The North zone occupies nearly half the territory of the Soviet
Union and in area is comparable to the United States,’’ he said.
‘‘Today it accounts for half the Soviet oil production, more than a
third of our natural gas and timber, and a large share of nonferrous,
rare, and precious metal ores. But a great proportion of this comes
from the so-called Near North, where the habitat and climate are
quite suitable for human life.
‘‘However, it is already clear that we have to advance farther, to
the high latitudes. In the opinion of the director of our expedition,
Interview by Georgi Bogdanovsky, Moscow News Weekly, No. 6 (1982).
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Academician Abel Aganbegyan, the development of the Arctic
wealth, which depends on navigation along the Northern Sea Route
all the year round, is the greatest economic program for the future.
That is why it is so important to lay the scientific foundations for
it.’’
Correspondent: At the mere mention of the Arctic a person with no
first-hand knowledge of it tends to feel uncomfortable, to say the
least.
Kvint: Let us be frank: many of those who do know it at first hand
feel the same. These are very severe parts. One criterion for checking
an area’s harshness is the index of climatic severity. In Moscow, for
instance, it is 1.9, but on Dickson Island in the Kara Sea it is 7.
Correspondent: One doesn’t often hear economists saying that
they’re actually going on an expedition.
Kvint: That is true. But although ours is called an economic expedition, its composition is closer to that of those scientific centers that
conduct research into global problems affecting the whole of mankind.
Our expedition includes leading Soviet specialists in diverse
branches of the economy, geology, ecology, medicine, modern technological systems, and agriculture.
Besides which, at different stages of the research we are joined by
other scientists, officials of the USSR State Planning Committee,
local economic executives, state and party functionaries.
This enables us to examine the strategic problems in developing
the polar regions, and make a comprehensive assessment of both the
benefits for the country and what expenditure of resources this will
require.
Correspondent: What parts has the expedition visited?
Kvint: We began by studying the basins of the Yenisei and the Angara. Then we went along the Northern Sea Route and the Pacific
coast of the country. This summer we shall head toward the lower
reaches of the Irtysh and the Ob. In the future we’ll study the economic areas along the Lena, the Northern Dvina, and the Pechora.
The Northern Sea Route was certainly the most difficult and the
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most important one. That expedition lasted nearly two months. Our
ships travelled 4,100 miles. We flew 11,000 kilometers in planes and
helicopters, visiting nearly 60 population centers and studying the
work of more than 20 enterprises and organizations.
Correspondent: There is an axiom that fits the situation in Siberia
perfectly: ‘‘natural wealth is within the reach of those who have reduced distances.’’
Kvint: In the area beyond the polar circle this demand is even more
rigid. Transport expenditures here amount to 60%–70% of all the
costs.
Navigation in the Arctic Ocean throughout the year has become
the key to the real discovery of the Arctic. The Soviet Union possesses the world’s largest fleet of marine icebreakers. There are about
25 of them, including three nuclear-powered vessels. But even they
are already finding it hard to cope with the increasing number of
assignments. There is a need for more icebreakers of different
classes, as well as for specialized transport ships. It is also necessary
to develop port facilities. Shipments along the Northern Sea Route
even now can compete with other kinds of cargo transportation. Despite the considerable transport expenses, northern products prove
highly valuable, provided their production is properly organized. The
nickel and copper of Norilsk, for instance, are the cheapest in the
country.
Work is under way to increase the navigability of the Siberian
rivers. Railway tracks and pipelines are being extended into the Far
North. The air fleet there is waiting for dirigibles and similar items.
There is a considerable need of transport vehicles that can negotiate
any sort of terrain.
Correspondent: Doesn’t this, in turn, form part of another problem:
creating special machinery and technology for the North?
Kvint: Indeed, the regional technical policy determines many things
here. Any kind of work in the Arctic is at least three times more
expensive. Losses caused by the inadaptability of the machinery to
the harsh conditions exceed its initial cost by between three and
seven times. On the other hand, one ruble of additional expense for
manufacturing machines in a northern variant saves seven to eight
rubles on their operation.
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Adaptability, however, is only part of the regional technical policy.
The main thing, to put it in the classical language of economics, is
the correlation between live and materialized labor. We need to
achieve maximum productivity with the minimum number of workers. This is done, for example, by using the prefab method in construction, widely applied when developing oil and gas deposits in
Western Siberia. Industrial and other installations of any type are
assembled from units which have already been ‘‘stuffed’’ with all
necessary outfits at the factories.
About 40 organizations deal with developing technology for the
North. So far demand is ahead of supply. However, it can be hoped
that this problem will be gradually resolved, although for complexity
it is similar to designing space systems. For instance, the working
parts of the extracting mechanisms, used in the underwater tin
mines on the shelf of the Laptev Sea, had to be created on the principles of bionics.
Correspondent: What will bring life into the future enterprises and
towns beyond the polar circle?
Kvint: The North is by no means short of energy resources. The
whole of the Arctic is highly promising as far as oil and gas are concerned, and its coal and hydropower reserves are large. Most of the
methods for obtaining energy are already being utilized there. There
are atomic, tidal, and geothermal power plants, and plans are under
way to use wind power.
Correspondent: Could you say a few words about the ecological aspect of the situation?
Kvint: Today we do not always realize the meaning of environmental
protection for the Far North. Nature is easily injured there. Even the
reindeer, that embodiment of the tundra, can inflict tangible damage on it unless pasturage rules are observed. The ecosystem of our
planet cannot be conceived without the Arctic, which is why the
actual task must be to reduce to the minimum any harm inflicted
on its nature.
Correspondent: To all appearances, the old notion that we shall go
to the Arctic only to work is being reconsidered, isn’t it?
Kvint: Indeed, the strategy of shift and site development is gradually
losing ground. The rapid growth of the prices of raw materials and
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fuel everywhere inclines us to the trend of extracting and processing
everything we can from beneath the earth’s surface, wholly and utterly. This is only possible provided large territorial–industrial complexes are formed, in which enterprises of different branches make
up a consecutive technological chain. In this case the expenses are
cut by 10%–15% and the social issues are easier to solve.
On the whole, the projected Arktika Program considerably surpasses the BAM Program in volume of work and investment. Five
large territorial–industrial complexes are already discernible in the
Far North: the Timano-Pechorsky, North Ob, North Krasnoyarsk,
North Yakutsk, and Chukotsky complexes. They will include dozens
of production enterprises. And, as we know, leading enterprises in
the east of the country each have a capacity as great as, and often
greater than, that of entire industries in developed West European
countries—for instance, the mining-and-smelting combine in Norilsk, or the Angara hydrocascade in the Near North, or the aluminium
works in Bratsk.
Correspondent: Who is to implement the Arktika Program?
Kvint: During Soviet years the population of the North has increased
sixfold. However, on the scale of the whole country its share amounts
to a mere three percent. As to the Arctic, its population is about two
million.
The high latitudes have always attracted enthusiasts. And enthusiasts are still there. But let us be objective: such spiritual élan is, as a
rule, of a short duration and quickly comes into conflict with reality.
Today we know something about the human organism’s capability
to adjust to life in the North. First, not everyone, not even a perfectly
healthy person, can adapt to the Arctic. Some people can live there
for years; others, for only months. Second, northerners are in special
need of a well-thought-out recreation system.
Correspondent: How can the impact of the severe climate be alleviated?
Kvint: First and foremost, by the provision of comfortable living conditions. An example of this is Norilsk, on the 69th parallel. In the
past ten years its population has grown by 80,000—to the present
240,000 plus. For the level of public services and amenities Norilsk
is in no way inferior to any of the best cities on the planet.
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Big problems will also have to be solved in the field of labor in the
North. There is a need for professional selection. Working schedules
must be determined and controlled by medical personnel, with special attention to disease prevention.
All this is being done in Norilsk. Along with the economic fiveyear plan, there is also a health five-year plan there. The time is
approaching when data on the state of health of every inhabitant of
the city will be fed into a computer, and it will be possible to control
man’s health from day to day.

‘‘THE POLAR STAR ABOVE US’’
The Exploit—Long as a Life
Mankind is meant to attempt to solve the secrets and puzzles of the
Unknown.
There were, and always will be, explorers and prospectors whose
deeds, at first, seem reckless, but then make the whole world admire
them.
Journeys to unknown countries have always been believed to be
dangerous. Therefore, it was the destiny of a few courageous people
to paint over the white spots on the pictures with new colors; and
the pictures of distant countries came out as if from a brush of a
painter.
One of these courageous people was William Barents, who made
three journeys on the Arctic Ocean from 1594 to 1597 with the purpose of finding the northeastern pass from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Pacific Ocean. The expedition of 1596–1597 for the second time
discovered Medvegiy and Shpitsbergen islands. The impassable ice
forced the expedition to spend a winter on the northeastern coast of
the island called Novaya Zemlya.
On the basis of his observations, Barents designed the map of
Novaya Zemlya, conducted an annual cycle of meteorological observations for the first time, and measured the depths along the course
of a ship in the sea which soon afterward would be called by his
name. The island in the archipelago Spitsbergen and the colony in
the seaport Barentsburg on the islands of Western Spitsbergen were
also named in Barents’s honor.
William Barents died on June 20, 1597, near the northern end of
Novaya Zemlya. He was buried on Novaya Zemlya.
Different things were said about northern lands. In 1246, Plano
Karpiny, an envoy of Pope Innocent IV, went to the capital of the
Tatar-Mongol kingdom for the purpose of exploration. On his way,
Karpiny reported to the pope very ‘‘accurate’’ and ‘‘precise’’ facts:
Excerpt from V. L. Kvint and N. M. Syngur’s The Polar Star Above Us (Moscow:
Soviet Russia Publishing House, 1984).
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beyond the country of self-eating people, he wrote, there is an ocean;
across the ocean, there is a land where people-beasts live. The inhabitants of this land have a human look, but their extremities resemble
those of bulls. They say two words in a human language, and they
bark the third word like dogs. . . .
Of course, contemporaries had every reason to believe the report
of the pope’s honorable messenger; however, such reports did not
deter the courageous. The courageous did not succeed very often;
many of them did not see their homes again; but, year after year,
more and more ships left moorings, going to the north, to the severe
embraces of icy winds, snowstorms, and the everlasting darkness of
polar nights. Sometimes it is hard to understand what force drove
them there, and what tempted them to risk their lives every minute.
Twenty-two-year-old Fritjof Nantsen wrote to his father: ‘‘I feel
bored; and a hunger to experience something new does not leave me
in peace. This hunger thrills me, and it is so difficult to restrain.’’
Perhaps each of the early polar explorers had his own beckoning
dream and desire to conquer nature and help people.
Grateful mankind forever remembers the names sketched on a
geographic map: Barents Sea, Laptev Sea, Bering Strait, Vilkits
Strait, Shokalskiy Strait, Dejznev Cape, Litke Island, Ushakov Island,
Vrangel Island, Sedov Archipelagos, Nantsen Island, Siberyak Island,
Cheluskin Cape, Toll Bay, and Rusanov Bay.
The designations on geographic maps reveal a lot of things. The
triumph of discovery resounds in such now-familiar words as Novaya
Zemlya (New Land); the name of Nadejzda (Hope) Island speaks of
faith and expectation; Slojzniy (Difficult) Island recalls the difficulties and dangers of the northern roads; humor, the reliable help in
any journey, is reflected in the name of Domashniy (Home) Island,
the severe span of the Arctic desert.
The famous polar explorer Fritjof Nantsen wrote: ‘‘One who wants
to see human genius in its noble struggle against superstitions and
darkness should read the history of Arctic journeys, should read
about seas, and about the sailors who, when spending a winter during
the polar night terrified with inevitable death, were going toward the
unknown with streaming banners. Nowhere, perhaps, has knowledge
cost more difficulties, troubles, and sufferings than there. But man’s
curiosity does not rest until there is no span where there is no man’s
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footprint even in those areas, and until all mysteries are uncovered
in the North.’’
Mankind has been proud of the polar explorers for a very long
time. But there are people, entire ethnic groups, who live all their
lives in the Far North, in the highest latitudes!
Century after century, generation after generation, the Saams, the
Nents, the Nganasans, the Selkups, the Hunts, the Kets, the Evenks,
the Nanayts, and the Dolgans were appearing in the world in the
built-from-deer-hide chumes and yarangs and under the snowstorm’s howl. Together with the adults, the young ones were learning
how to find food; then, they were forming their own families, and
were having children; however, while closing their eyes forever, they
knew that the frozen land would let them in at the end and would
give them the final shelter from the snowstorms. . . .
What is it like, not to come here for a year or two, but to always
live here from birth to death? The exploit long as a life?
One may not necessarily agree, because everything is learned in
comparison: if all one’s life one sleeps on the floor, the floor does not
seem that rough; if one has never seen bananas in his life, he does
not lack them.
However, the northern nations knew that there are southern lands
where the sun shines, where the cold is not as severe, and where the
night does not last for half a year. They knew, and, yet, did not go to
the South.
When, many thousands of years ago, in the beginning of the quaternion period in the geologic history of our planet, the ice was moving from the North, people rushed to retreat to the South as if they
were running away from enemy forces. The majority left, but some
stayed. And who knows, maybe the most courageous ones, those who
did not want to abandon the land of their fathers, stayed in the
North. . . .
Jack London called the northern lands a dominion of white silence. It is a poetic, accurate, and beautiful name; but only an outsider, in whose heart the memory of a little too clamorous motley of
the southern nature is still alive, and in whose ears the din of the
narrow streets of loud and fussy cities still sounds, could have chosen
this name.
However, for a native inhabitant of the North, his land is not an
icy desert, but an immense world that is, given the multitude of
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various flowers, senses, traces, and signs, a world where life overflows
as in a big city. Regardless of how severe the North is, it is the motherland for the northern nations.
Yes, the North is the motherland for the northern nations, and life
there is full of worries, events, and nuances which an outsider’s eye
sometimes is not able to see.
For the majority, the North is a synonym of the poverty of colors,
and of severe and uninventive simplicity. However, many people forget that during its short summer the tundra flourishes with thousands of colors and jingles with running brooks and birds’ voices.
Butterflies are flitting; bumblebees are buzzing industriously; the
mild greenish and grayish lichen, the yagel, which is the favorite
dainty of the northern deer, is covering the land, which is tired of
winter cold. Green leaves, like bright touches on a painting, are appearing on the thin branches of the dwarfish birches; polar poppies
are reddening; and delicate flowers of the blueberries are softening
the poppies’ haughty beauty.
Even in wintertime, there are flowers in the North—the icy flowers. They grow on the surface of the sea ice from the crystals of salt
and water, forming sophisticated and elegant, fragile and light twigs,
which can be taken only by a delicate hand—they shatter from a
crude touch.
However, the northern nature has always been a severe mother to
its children. Constantly fighting nature’s whims, the northern nations have been perfecting numerous skills.
The closeness to nature and constant dependence on it allowed
the northern nations to accumulate a rich reserve of knowledge
about the life of tundra and taiga, of northern rivers and seas. The
experience was handed down from one generation to another. The
northern nations unsurpassingy know the vegetative and animal
worlds of their area. They can predict the weather, and can precisely
orient themselves by the sun and the stars. It is amazing how deer
guides faultlessly find the right direction during snowstorms in the
plain and boundless tundra. The guides also know the taiga perfectly.
Many researchers asked the native population to help gather information about the geography of the regions of study.
Practical knowledge of the nature and great creative potentials
helped the northern nations to accustom themselves to the severe
conditions while forming their material culture. They were very
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sharp-witted in assembling their dwellings and clothing. The dwelling of the nomads is easy to assemble and to transport on deer. Its
conic shape withstands the wind pressure; deer hides preserve the
heat; and warm clothing, soft and impenetrable by wind, and moist
footwear protect against any frost. The Eskimos learned how to use
even snow as a construction material. Everything needed for hunting
and fishing was made innovatively from available materials—wood,
deer hides, animal bones, and stones. In fact, the different methods
of fishing were always adjusted according to the season, type of reservoir, and type of fish. Constructing clever traps for animals and birds
was also strictly adjusted to their types and behaviors, to the conditions and landscape of the area.
Men, generally, worked with wood, bones, and metal, and manufactured tools; women worked with hides, sewed clothing, footwear,
and covers for dwellings, and knitted. They loved to decorate clothing with glass beads, embroidery, and pieces of metal. They decorated their dwellings, kitchenware, and hunting tools with strange
carvings as well. The northern wood- and bone-carvers and engravers
are famous throughout the world.
The northern nations created their own fine writing. In their
scheme-sketches the hunters relayed different information about
their area, destinations, and the closest dwelling, and warned about
nearby falling rocks or scattered poison.
All these amazing skills and talents were necessary conditions, the
surviving conditions, for the northern nations. Their lives were
passed in constant struggle with nature. Dangers and diseases
awaited them at every step.
For example, the frequent use of raw meat or fish that was not
sufficiently preserved—or, sometimes, even rotten—and the absence
of vegetables caused a large number of gastric and intestinal diseases.
There were neither doctors nor medicines; and sometimes whole
communities perished.
Even the food supply was not always sufficient. In the years of
successful hunting people would eat to satiety. However, by the end
of the year, the reserves would be exhausted; and starvation would
follow. People then would eat bark and grass, and soaked animal
hides.
In 1581 Siberia was incorporated into Russia. Explorers of the
North and industrialists not once reported to the czar’s government
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about the difficult life of the northern nations, about the troubles of
which theft and violence from the traders, not only domestic, but
foreign as well, had added. Explorers spoke of the difficulties and
conditions of the northern nations; but they spoke even more about
the resources of the Siberian and northern lands awaiting exploitation.
Fearless explorers of the North, relying on the centuries-old experience of the northern nations and using their knowledge and skills,
created a basis for steadily conquering the North. What does ‘‘to
conquer the North’’ mean? It means to manage to make the North
the home that it has always been for the northern nations; but it also
means to live in the North in a new way and to raise the North to
the level of more developed regions of the world.
The Soviet North is about 50% of the territory of the country.
There are many arguments even now about the borders of the North
and Arctic regions. Some restrict it to the Polar circle; others, to
the line of zero-degree temperature; still others, to the presence of
perpetual freezes (in our country, by the Amur River it goes down to
the southern borders). We are not entering this argument, but we
are talking about regions of the settlements of the nations of the
Soviet North. In Russia, there are 108 such administrative regions
and 7 such autonomous areas.
In the West, for a long time, the Soviet North has been called ‘‘the
eastern Eldorado’’—flattering, perhaps, not the North, but Eldorado.
The North is the richest reserve of natural resources and an ideal
place to apply human potential and talents.
The Caucasians are proud of their land. They say: ‘‘Stab a stick
into the land, and a vineyard will grow.’’
The northern land, unlike the Caucasian, is cheap and severe;
however, dig a hole there, and, almost certainly, either a fountain of
dark and thick oil or a blue stream of gas will escape the land, or
grains of gold will appear. . . .
However, the northern nature hides its wealth well. The higher
the latitude, the more severe the climate; the farther to the north
from the Polar Circle, the greater the natural resources held by the
frozen land.
It is obvious now that Timano-Pechorskiy oil province, located in
the shore area of Barents and Pechorsliy seas, not only will become
the fuel and energy source of the European part of the USSR, but
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also will actively influence the development of the entire Soviet mining industry for a significantly long time.
The oil and gas provinces of north Siberia and the Far East extend
for many miles. These are Leno-Tungusskiy province, almost the
whole of west Siberia, the Anadirskiy oil and gas region, East Arctic
region, and Chukotka.
Explorers progress farther and farther north. One after another,
like genies from bottles, blue torches explode and hit the sky with
their powerful streams. While the whole is not bound with compliance with all the standards, the gas escaping from the land ought to
be burned; and the bright stream of fire rises to the northern sky as
if it wants to compete with the northern radiance. . . .
Science is not unchanging. In the 21st century, one of the main
sources of energy will be various sorts of artificial fuel that will be
developed from coal. Today, the northern regions give the country
about 44 million tons of coal. The whole world knows the Taimirskiy,
Tungusskiy, Lenskiy, and Pechorskiy coal regions. Many of the northern fields are so close to the northern sea path that they can be used
for open mining and opening up from the sea.
Various uses of oil and gas began only relatively recently. Gold was
appreciated a long time ago. Now, however, it is used not only as a
basis of currency and financial system or, say, as a raw material for
jewelry. Scientists are finding more and more uses for it. Today, some
electric and technical manufacturers and the contemporary chemical
industry cannot operate without this valuable metal.
There is also gold in the north of our country. There is fundamental and scattered gold in Kolima, Chukotka, and Yakutia.
The North is also rich in copper, mercury, wolframite, and tin.
The salt resources in Taymyr are practically unlimited; the presence of salt in one economic region and of apatits in the MaimechaKoituiskiy region, commingled with the waste of the mining industry
in Norilsk, creates a marvelous material basis for the development of
enterprises in the chemical industry and in fertilizer production.
In the 20th century, people look at many things differently. Thus,
what were rivers and lakes in the past have now become the sources
of water, the hydro resources.
Unpolluted fresh water is needed not only by people, but also by
plants and fabrics. In order to bring life to thousands of machines,
water is needed. Hence, on the mighty northern rivers, one hydro-
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electric station after another—Irkutskiy, Bratskiy, Ust-Ilimskiy, Krasnoyarskiy, Ust-Hantaiskiy, and Kolimskiy—grows. The construction
of Boguchaiskiy HES has begun; the stations on the guileful Kureika
River are under way; and preparatory works are being conducted on
the Low Tungusskiy River.
Timber resources are enormous in the North; the northern regions
now produce more than one-third of all timber in the country.
There is also a large amount of gypsum, limestone, sand, and
gravel there—all very important for construction, which, year after
year, develops in wider and wider areas in the North.
Like a crown, the Yakutia’s diamonds wreathe the northern treasure.
The North is full of paradoxes. In most of its territory, there is
almost nothing for the normal living of a contemporary person; at
the same time, however, the North is enormously rich in everything
necessary for the normal living of a contemporary person.
How can we eliminate the paradox? A contemporary person is not
self-sufficient enough. Inhabiting and mastering the North is today’s
task.
A lot has been already accomplished.
All means of transportation—by river, by sea, by air, by cars, and
by trains—are rapidly developing. New industrial centers have been
created in regions said to be unfit for economic development. The
emergence of new colonies on the Kolskiy Peninsula is connected
with the building of a seaport, developing the sea industry in Murmansk, and mining apatits in the Hibinskiy Mountains. In the Far
North, Komy Autonomous Republic has acquired new cities of miners and oil miners. In Enisey’s North, seaports such as Igarka, Dudinka, and Dikson, and, in the area of mining copper and nickel
metals, a seaport such as Norilsk, have appeared. In the northeast,
on the shore of the Kolima River, colonies of gold miners and the
city of Magadan and, in Chulkotka and Kamchatka, industrial plants
and others have emerged.
If, in 1939, in these vast territories, there were only three cities
with a total population of about 50,000 people, at the beginning of
1983 there were now 28 cities. As if by magic, Norilsk has grown to
a population of 200,000; Bratsk and Severodvinsk have arisen to a
population of 200,000, and Vorkuta and Magadan, to a population of
100,000. Nizjnevartovsk and Surgut are developing rapidly. Mur-
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mansk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Yakutsk, and Anadir have
changed significantly. In total, there are 90 cities and 358 colonies of
a city-type in the Far North of Russia.
Since 1961, the population of the northern cities has doubled. In
1980, the average annual growth rate of the northern population
surpassed this measure of population in Russia as a whole by 2%.
Today, 8.2 million of our country’s residents live in the North;
158,000 of them are members of northern nations.
The severe North continues to attract more and more people every
year. Not only do the adventurous ones, the enthusiasts who like it
more when it’s more difficult and more interesting, go there, but
also those who, with their families and with all their possessions, go
there in the hope that the North will become their home.
A lot has been and will be accomplished by these people. However,
it is impossible to overestimate the role of the northern nations in
conquering their territories, the role of the northern nations who not
only have lived there for many years, but also know and love their
land, feel the special living rhythm of its nature, and know how sensitive it is and how much more should be accomplished for its safety.
Since long ago, there have been 26 nations in the North of our
country: the Saams, Nents, Ents, Inganasans, Selkups, Hunts,
Mancy, Kets, Evenks, Evens, Nanaits, Nivhs, Itelmens, Chukchs, Koriaks, Ulchs, Udegeits, Oroks, Orochs, Yukagirs, Chuvans, Dolgans,
Negidalts, Eskimos, Aleuts, and Tofalars.
Russian chronicles, in the 11th century, already noted that the
Nents lived in tundra and engaged in deer breeding and hunting.
Not only did people from Novgorod at one time go to the North to
trade with ‘‘self-eating people’’; attracted by valuable furs, Novgorod’s merchants, along with other trading people, progressed to the
North, to the areas of the Nents’ settlements. In the 16th century,
the Nents were taxed with yasac; and, for successful collecting of
furs, from the Mezen River to the Enisey River, a number of colonies
were created: Okladnikov, Pustozersk, Ust-Tzilma, Berezov, Obdorsk, and others. A little to the south, in the Berezov region, along
the Sosve River and its tributaries—Lianinu and Small Sosve—along
the Obb River and in the Kondinskiy region, the Hunts and the
Mancy live. Nowadays, these nations include almost 30,000 people.
Some Mancy have settled in the annually growing Salehard and
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Hanti-Manciysk cities. The Hunts mostly live along the middle part
of the Obb River and along the Irtish River.
Moving toward the east, in the vast territories of the Enisey North,
in Tuhanskiy county of the Krasnoyarskiy region, along the left bank
of the Enisey River, and in the lowlands of the Podkamennaya Tungusska River, the Kets live. The Dolgans constitute the main population of Taymyr, which is located far above the Polar Circle, in the
frozen region of Siberian land. In the bosom of the eternal freezes of
Taymyr, which extends for 1,000 kilometers of latitude and 1,000
kilometers of longitude, the richest fields of nonferrous metals, coal,
and other natural resources are hidden.
The Evenks and Evens have settled in the vast territory from the
Enisey River to the Ohotskiy Sea: in the Tomskiy, Irkutskiy, Chitinskiy, Amurskiy, Sahalinskiy, and Krasnoyarskiy regions, in Yakutia,
and in the Magadanskiy and Kamchatskiy regions.
In the northeast regions of the Yakut Autonomous Republic, the
Yukagirs live.
In Chukotka—in Ust-Beliy, Anadir, in the region of the upper
course of the Anuy and Yablonia rivers, in Kamchatka, and in Koriakskiy autonomous region—the Chuvans, Chukchs, Eskimos, Koriaks,
and Itelmens live.
The Saams and the Chukchs inhabit two continents. Each of the
northern nations has its own history, culture, traditions, rites, and
national costumes.

THE ROLE OF THE BUDGET IN
THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE
ECONOMY OF THE
AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC
(with Z. Uzbekov)
The major changes under way, including the transition of the economy toward large-scale, intensive production, can hardly be conceived without a radical and general democratization of
management and an enhanced role for and involvement of Soviet
agencies in economic districts, republics, territories and regions.
The study of the methods and means to accelerate socioeconomic
development in any region (whether an economic area, Union or
Autonomous Republic, territory, region, or big city) must be based
on a general analysis and estimate of the initial and achieved level of
economic development. Regional programs, among them ‘‘Siberia,’’
‘‘Far East,’’ ‘‘Donbass,’’ and the like, reflect the achieved level, and
provide indices of the region’s specialization and the effectiveness of
its production, the existing proportions and rates of its economic
development, and the state of its natural resources. To bring out the
key problems in regional development for a specified period, particular attention is concentrated in these programs on the nature of the
existing social and economic disproportions.
In past analyses of these disproportions in the process of developing and implementing programs, little consideration has been given
to regional financial balances, and poor use made of their potentials.
The intensification of the economy, with the growing deficit of resources, highlights the importance of a region’s financial system in
achieving the distribution and redistribution of resources. In turn,
the monetary aspects of the regional economy have an increasing
influence on the social demands for economic and scientific-technoIn Economic Sciences (Moscow) 11 (1987), 27–34.
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logical progress. The studies of these problems are well known in
several republics, among them Latvia. There, methods have been
worked out for using a multisectoral industrial-financial model;
along with methodological provisions for forecasting economic and
social development in a union republic, a full outline has been made
of industrial proportions, distribution, exchange, and consumption
in interaction with the republic’s system of finances and credit.
It would be expedient, in our view, to regard Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republics and administrative-territorial units of a regional
level—territories, regions—as basic regional objects of financial planning in the development of the current economic program. Although
the value and material structures of the reproductive cycle viewed
within a single economic region are still to be worked out, and there
is a discrepancy between the volumes of the produced and realized
turnover tax and the volumes of capital and market turnovers, comprehensive long-term economic planning in any territorial-adminstrative unit acquires exceptional political, social, and economic
significance.
Here, the objects of study are the Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republics (ASSR). The specifics of an autonomous republic which
distinguish it from a territory or region are that it (a) has the status
of a state and (b) enjoys a somewhat autonomous position within the
framework of a single national-economic complex as far as economic
management and the guidance of social and political activity in its
territory is concerned. The decisions of the ASSR government are
binding on all facilities located in its territory.
Analysis of both the financial resources and the financial situation
in a regional economic complex is necessary in order to maintain its
comprehensive, balanced, and dynamic development, providing
local government bodies with information on the implementation of
the State budget (with the objective of controlling the growth of
fixed sources of income, making regular and correct payments to the
budget, using properly allocations from the budget and the funds of
economic units located in the given territory).
The absence of regional financial-industrial models of balances
and plans accounts for the lack of scientific justification and balance
in the territory’s planning system, and for the disparity between the
forecasted and the actual indices of economic growth. This lack affects in particular the imbalance between forecasted and achieved
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volumes of financing capital investments. The gap between the latter
volumes is always larger than between the respective volumes of regional production. The higher volumes of the expected capital investments stem from the fact that forecasts do not take into
consideration the impact of all external and internal factors affecting
the formation of allocations for the region’s economic development.
Analyses of forecasts of the socioeconomic development for separate
republics, territories, regions, and economic regions for 1959–1970,
1971–1980, 1981–1990, carried out by the Institute of Economic
Studies of the Far Eastern Scientific Center of the USSR Academy
of Sciences confirm this. In territorial planning this results in an
unbalanced budget for the specific republic. To maintain the balance, benefits and additional allocations from the Union Budget are
often envisaged, the share of these allocations going up to 10%. Considerable funding is singled out for this purpose to autonomous republics from the Union and Union Republic budgets, and this will
be discussed below.
At different stages of developing its potential, socialist society
made effective use of levers of mutual assistance in order to even out
(whenever it was necessary) the levels of economic development in
the republics. This is clear from USSR State Plans and Budgets, the
system of territorial allocations to the budgets of Union and Autonomous Republics, and allocations from the Union Budget of significant sums to regions with a relatively low level of economic
development. In the Russian Federation (RSFSR), areas of this kind,
characterized by the respective social and economic indices, included the Tuva, Daghestan, and Kalmyk Autonomous Republics.
In 1984 there were allocated from the Russian budget for the financing of planned measures: more than 31 million rubles for Kalmyk ASSR; 24 million rubles for Tuva ASSR (in 1985 the figures
were, respectively, 39.2 million and 39.7 million rubles). In 1985
there were allocated from the Russian budget to the state budget of
Yakut ASSR 31.9 million rubles; to the budget of Kamchatka Region,
22.1 million rubles; to Magadan Region 53.2 million rubles. To help
finance measures outlined in the State Plan for the Economic and
Social Development of Russia in 1985, these regions were allocated
receipts from income taxes. In Daghestan ASSR for many years the
share of allocations from collective farm tax revenues to the local
budget stood at 100%. In 1986 allocations from income tax revenues
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were envisaged at 100% and from turnover taxes, at 63.9%; that is,
they stood above allocations to the budgets of other autonomous
republics, territories, and regions of the North Caucasus economic
region (60% and 32.6%, respectively, for Kabardino-Balkar ASSR;
50% and 18.4%, respectively, for North Ossetiyan ASSR; and 55%
and 30.5% for Chechen-Ingush ASSR.).
All this is conducive to the further evening out of certain negative
discrepancies in the levels of economic and, particularly, social development in various parts of the country, more rational interregional
ties, and the optimization and balancing of the single national economic complex.
With the transition to new methods of economic management
and the use of specifications in the system of economic relations, the
forms of sources of income for local budgets will become more flexible and diversified. This calls for a general in-depth analysis of all
the sources and reserves that go into the making of the state budget
of an autonomous republic and a system of target funds for major
regional socioeconomic and scientific-technological programs. This
accounts for the substantiated and up-to-date character of the proposals from the Research Institute of Finances of the USSR Ministry
of Finances on employing the target principle in drawing up longterm consolidated balance sheets which single out data from the
basic comprehensive programs envisaged for realization in the
planned period.
It is also expedient to discuss budget revenues in connection with
comprehensive regional STP programs, due to the fact that in some
regions with excessive manpower there is a trend to boost local budget expenditures while decreasing the rates of growth of fixed sources
of income and a general lag with regard to per capita budget revenues. Thus, in Daghestan ASSR the latter is 180 rubles against 190
rubles in Kabardino-Balkar ASSR, with 220 rubles for Northern Ossetian ASSR and 312 rubles for Kalmyk ASSR. The composition and
level of expenditure for the social infrastructure need to be improved. The planned scope of new industrial construction in these
republics, which puts additional pressure on the social and industrial
infrastructure, demands that the State Planning Committees of
ASSR establish strict territorial control to ensure that ministries and
departments observe the balance between capital investments in
production and capital investments in the infrastructure (specifica-
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tion of funds earmarked for the development of the latter stands at
35 to 40 kopeks per ruble of production investments).
Due to the acute need for a radical renewal of the production
apparatus along the lines of updated technology, improving the investment structure, and the scientific-technological policy, nearly all
regions of the country have been almost simultaneously confronted
with immediate tasks demanding considerable funding. It can be
expected that under these conditions the share of additional allocations and financial aid from centralized funds and other regions is
liable to decrease. As experience with large-scale economic experiments shows, regional development will be boosted by internal
sources of capital accumulation, more fixed sources of revenue for
local budgets, observing a regime of economy while making a rational use of all resources, and raising the effectiveness of economic
management. It becomes an objective necessity to achieve greater
independence in managing the resources of local budgets. The point
here is the development of a system of regional self-financing. This
raises the question of introducing full cost-accounting in the region,
ensuring its essential independence from the single national economy. The results of our studies indicate a need to develop specific
cost-accounting relations.
Working out plans and programs in keeping with the needs of
regional development should be the priority of territorial departments in the planning bodies of autonomous republics, territories,
and regions. Under the new conditions, major interaction between
budgets at different levels will be achieved not so much by the system of annual allocations of funds as by the balancing of local budgets through long-term allocation programs.
The diversity and dynamics of factors having an impact on the
effectiveness of regional production account for the complex character and inexperience in shaping the local budgets along centralized
lines. It is necessary to expand considerably the financial and economic independence of the local Soviets of Peoples Deputies.
However, the scope of territorial financial planning is much
broader and needs to balance the entire regional mullet-branch system.The plan embraces not only structures under the jurisdiction of
local Soviets but the territory’s entire economy, including economies
with both Union and Union–Republic significance. For that reason,
a scientifically substantiated regional financial-distribution program
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is possible only with consideration for all the above-mentioned factors.
Radical changes in economic management methods call for an increase in the revenues of local budgets through the establishment of
more flexible links between the local budgets and the financial systems
of enterprises under Union and Union–Republic jurisdiction. Studies
show the expediency of transfering to local budgets not only the
revenues from gains and turnover tax from enterprises under local
and republican jurisdiction, but also a part of the pure profit of enterprises under Union jurisdiction and their payments for the attraction of manpower and introduction of new natural resources.
Different forms are suggested for connecting the local budgets with
the economic results obtained by enterprises under higher jurisdiction. In several experimental regions, it has been decided to transfer
to the local budgets 10% of pure profit from facilities under Union
jurisdiction—chiefly, profit from implementation of STP.
The importance of expanding the role of local Soviets in regulating financial-economic relations of industries under higher jurisdiction can be gathered from the example of Poti (Georgia). The
interbranch association established there collected in its 1984–1985
account 10% of the envisaged gains in the balances of enterprises
and 50% of those over and above the respective planned figures, 50%
of payments for the use of water supplies from the Rioni River, and
10% of surplus gains from the realization of new, highly effective
production.1 The experiment studying the use of funds of enterprises
under Union jurisdiction by local budgets in several regions of the
RSFSR has been modeled in many urban and rural areas in other
republics.
To ensure the overall, integral development of a region, it is necessary to enhance the territorial approach and the influence of planning, financial, and statistics bodies in the Autonomous Republics
both on current and long-term development and on the management of economic and financial operations of enterprises and organizations under higher jurisdiction. This obviously calls for a largescale regional experiment whose concept is now being developed at
the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, along
with the USSR State Planning Committee and other interested organizations.
Turnover tax plays an important part in the formation of the local
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budget. Under this taxation system, financial bodies deal only with
that portion which comes from sales in the territory under their jurisdiction. Meanwhile, there can be a wide margin between sales taxes
and taxes from the sales of goods produced in the region. Although,
for objective reasons, these figures can never coincide, a wide gap
between them leads to unaccounted-for growth of national income
in some regions at the expense of others, as well as to distortion of
the actual part regions play in the system of enlarged reproduction.
Today, the prevailing trend is for the total volume of turnover
tax to decrease. In regard to this, it is necessary to first raise the
responsibility of managers of trade and other ministries and departments for the fulfillment of exacting plans for turnover taxes. The
implementation of these plans is facilitated by the interbranch and
intrabranch structural changes in production and turnover.
Second, to mitigate the negative impact of the failure by a number
of enterprises to fulfill the plan for gains and turnover taxes, ministries and departments should, in our view, compensate the difference along central lines. This would promote the development of
cost-accounting relations between ministries and their facilities and
the region. However, the enterprises have the task of introducing,
during the term of compensation through bank credit and by other
funding, scientific-technological measures aimed at renovating, updating, and technologically reequipping the production apparatus,
and of developing nomenclature and production quality that would
provide conditions for profitable operation.
The trend toward enhancing the part played by turnover tax is
in keeping with increased production in autonomous republics, the
formation and use of interregional accumulations, and the development of relations between state-owned companies and budgets
under the existing system of distribution. This trend does not contradict that of the diminishing share of turnover tax in accumulations of statewide significance, which should eliminate factors
dampening the reflection of labor expenditure in prices. The point
here is the diverse functional manifestations of the economic content of turnover tax as a form of the states’ centralized net income.
The territorial aspect of improving the use of turnover tax is displayed not through pricing but through interaction with the budget
to use a part of the net income primarily in areas of its production
and realization. The provision on introducing, as of 1988, the chan-
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neling of allocations from turnover tax to the local budgets in fixed
amounts to the volume of retail trade turnover in state and cooperative trade.
An essentially new and positive element of regional significance is
the decentralized order of making allocations to the budget, ensuring
systematic control by local bodies over the financial-economic activities of associations (enterprises).
The decentralized order is of interest when branches of large-scale
industrial associations and enterprises are set up, among them those
outside the bounds of autonomous republics. Were the branches to
have independent balances, with the practice of decentralized payments (through budgets of local Soviets in whose territories the enterprises are situated), the republics’ budgets could be receiving
incomes. In these conditions it is necessary for the head enterprise
(association) to issue orders to banks to transfer the required funds
to the budgets of the local Soviets. The size of these allocations can
be fixed at between 5% and 6% of the branches’ pure profit, or be in
proportion to the share of the branches’ gains in the total volume of
the association’s gains or in the association’s production plan.
The new conditions of industrial management have opened up
broad vistas for the comprehensive development of regions. The effect of using specifications in distribution of gains is enhanced and
extended. Previously, the gains of advanced enterprises made up for
its shortages in their low-profit counterparts in the same industry,
with no regard for the regional factor as such.
It would be expedient to give regional pricing bodies the right to
set wholesale and retail prices not only on commodities but also on
semi-finished goods and items for engineering needs inside the region in relation to demand and consumption, as well as the right to
authorize additional charges to wholesale prices for export products
manufactured by industries under local jurisdiction. This will help
turn pricing into a flexible regional lever of the economic mechanism
and ensure the quickest and most interested participation of the
consumer in its coordination and approval. The aforesaid measures
would ensure unity of prices for standard production and would put
an end to unlawful overcharging by the producer and, thus, on their
growth.
Price determination for exports would benefit from the proposal
by the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences on

428

the emerging market of russia

the need, in calculating the surcharges to prices, to foresee not only
the reimbursement of additional costs but also the size of additional
gains earmarked as material incentive for cost-accounting teams, and
to single out, along with wholesale prices for the domestic market,
the surcharge on exports.
Payments for funds is a promising source for ensuring stable income for the local budget and attracting the interest of local Soviets
in achieving a timely and most complete realization of capital investments. Under the new conditions of economic management local
budgets will receive payments from the gains of enterprises under
higher jurisdiction located in the region. However, until now the
financial activities of ASSR have been insufficiently reflected in statistical data, and this hinders the rational use of the financial possibilities now available to the region. For instance, the ‘‘Finances’’
section of the monthly bulletins of the ASSR Statistics Board is represented by a single table. In its turn, the summary report of the
ASSR Ministry of Finances on the fulfillment of plans on state incomes aggregates payments from gains in a form with no breakdowns
according to enterprises and industrial branches or the national
economy as a whole.
The financial, planning, and statistical bodies in the various autonomous republics have no unity in their methods of determining
payments from gains (or in calculating turnover taxes). The result is
that many of the auditing and planning forms from statistics boards
and ministries of finances are difficult to use and compare. Different
readings often stem from the fact that statistical materials do not
always single out enterprises and organizations under local jurisdiction whose payments from gains make up a considerable part of the
local budget’s fixed income. Statistical audits mainly indicate enterprises of local food and forestry industries whose share of gains in
the total balance of industrial gains of in, for example, Daghestan
ASSR is in our estimate only 3% for 1985.
At present, money circulation in ASSR depends on the work of
enterprises under higher jurisdiction, and those mainly concerned
with producer goods. Under the new conditions enterprises under
Union and Union–republic jurisdiction will determine the effective
demand of the population for consumer goods. A balance between
effective demand (including that for specific types of products classified as Subdivision 1 consumed inside the region) and the actual
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possibilities of achieving this balance in conditions of self-financing
can be attained only along the lines of developing cost-accounting
relations between the region and the enterprises under higher jurisdiction.
Starting in 1988 the development of social infrastructure will, to a
greater extent, be carried out at the expense of the local budget. In
keeping with the USSR Law on State Enterprises, taxes from the
gains of enterprises under higher jurisdiction will constitute a significant share of this budget. In our view, its income should depend
not only on the net income of the regional economy and the gains
of enterprises under higher jurisdiction. With regard to the radical
distinctions in the economic development of regions, it would be
expedient to make it binding on enterprises to allocate to the local
budget funds in direct proportion to the numerical size of employment in industry and the extent to which natural and technological
resources are used in the region. At the same time regional bodies
should take into consideration the fact that economic benefits are
envisaged for enterprises located in promising areas. In this connection regional management bodies will be able to influence many key
aspects of the regional economy.

Notes
1. For details see Vladimir Kvint, ‘‘The Harmony of National, Regional
and Industrial Management in the Economy,’’ Voprosy Ekonomiky [The
problems of economics] (Moscow, 1985), No. 7, pp. 68–77.

DAGHESTAN–MANGYSHLAK:
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERREGIONAL
COLLABORATION
(with Z. Uzbekov)
The Caspian Sea has a substantial ecological and economic impact
on the social and economic development of the Northern Caucasus
and western regions of Kazakstan. This is due to the mineral resources in the pre-Caspian zone which are of countrywide significance. Suffice it to say that the oil and gas deposits in Mangyshlak,
and the development of the mineral resources in the pre-Caspian
mining areas in Zhetybai and Uzen in Kazakstan, the greater part of
which is already under way, and others will be industrially mined.
This zone supplies most of the country’s needs for sulfate sodium,
potassium, magnesium, table salt, and other valuable raw materials.
Here one finds virtually boundless reserves of limes and brines.
The planned, consistent development of the area’s mineral resources has led to the emergence of a regional industrial area around
the Caspian Sea. Its centers are Shevchenko and Guryev in Kazakstan, Astrakhan and Makhachkala in RSFSR (Russian Federation),
Baku, and Krasnovodsk in Turkmenia. Daghestan and Chechen-Ingush, the western regions of this area, with a population of more
than 5 million, have a relatively abundant workforce, something extremely unusual for the country. But these regions are far from the
main centers of intensive economic development in the Caspian Sea
area. The Caspian separates these regions from the rich Astrakhan
condensed gas deposits. On its eastern shores are the starting points
of such large infrastructure connections as the Uzen–Kulsary–
Guryev–Kuibyshev oil main and the Uzen–Beinau gas main. The
In The Socioeconomic Regional Development on the Basis of Increased Scientific
and Technological Progress (STP) (Moscow: The Institute of the Economy of the
USSR Academy of Sciences, 1987), pp. 75–82.
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latter brings natural gas to the oil main linking Central Asia with the
central areas.
Nevertheless, the key economic benefit of the Caspian Sea, its
transport potential, is inadequately exploited. Currently, only ferry
services exist, and these are much located more to the south, away
from the mutually attractive regions: Daghestan with its excessive
workforce and western Kazakstan where manpower is at a deficit.
Running parallel to the Baku–Krasnovodsk ferry line is another line
linking Baku with the Turkmen town of Bektash, which is only a
short way from Krasnovodsk. Investment in this transport complex
was, in our opinion, unjustified.
As a result, the development of mineral deposits in the area has
declined. According to scientists and other specialists, these and
other processes are irreversible, and this poses a threat to the very
existence of ‘‘Karabogazsulfat’’ and Bektash, the town of chemical
workers. Given the present economic situation in the area and the
prospects for the development of its industry, the Krasnovodsk–Baku
ferry line has no future. This is due, no doubt, to the surplus of
railway transportation in Central Asia. At present, there is a risk that
less than fully loaded high-capacity ships will be used on a regular
basis. In the first half of 1985 alone, 43 runs from Krasnovodsk were
made without a single car on board, and 27 runs were made with
only half a load. Nevertheless, new, well-equipped ferries were delivered to the area. The ineffective Baku–Bektash ferry line mirrors a
larger countrywide economic problem, namely, the inadequate justification for large-scale economic projects and decisions.
Estimates show that, from the point of view of regional effectiveness and national economic significance, this ferry line should yield
to a line linking Makhachkala with Aktau, the seaport of Shevchenko. In the next five-year period the importance of the Schevchenko–Makhachkala ferry line will increase dramatically. Moreover,
the construction of a railway line from Krasnovodsk to Nizhny Uzen
is a vital need, ensuring a link with Shevchenko along the eastern
coast of the Caspian. This ferry line would provide the shortest route
for trains hauling coal and other freight from Karaganda to Siberia
and the industrial centers in Trans-Caucasia and the south of European Russia. Hence, economic priorities demand it. The sooner the
line finds its way onto the country’s national economic plan, the
greater the economic effect for the country, and the greater the pas-
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senger comfort. To organize the work of regular ferry transport for
railway freight cars, construction of a pier in Makhachkala is essential. This would permit the transportation of vegetables and fruit
from the Northern Caucasus to residents of Mangyshlak Region in
Kazakstan. Even more important is the opportunity offered those in
Daghestan ASSR, the area with the largest workforce and closest to
Mangyshlak Region, to live and work in Kazakstan. Currently, airlines linking Makhachkala with Shevchenko and Makhachkala with
Novy Uzen serve these people, though the number of passengers
accommodated falls well below the demand. Such is the situation in
the proximity of two large seaport cities, Shevchenko and Makhachkala, located across from each other and separated by less than 300
kilometers.
At the same time, the ferry line cannot be viewed solely as a transport system. Its role should be estimated only in the context of the
overall economic development of Daghestan ASSR and the Mangyshlak Region. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to scientific investigation of the problem, particularly by the economic
institutes of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakstan.
The Comprehensive Program for the scientific and technological
progress of Kazak SSR foresees the development of transportation
facilities in these ports, high-tech transportation processes that
would substantially increase the volume of freight delivered from
Kazak ports along the Caspian. To ensure uninterrupted and direct
transportation of crude oil and oil products, tankers of the ‘‘riversea’’ type will be introduced, and a second oil-loading pier, with two
wharves, will be built in the port of Aktau. To carry fish products,
vegetables, and fruit from the Northern Caucasus, the construction
of new refrigerators is being planned. But to achieve all this, the
preparation of an industrial base for receiving centers and ports in
Mangyshlak region and Kazakstan alone is insufficient. Equally important are the more extensive infrastructure and industrial projects
in Daghestan ASSR, particularly in the port of Makhachkala. It is
obvious that local efforts in the autonomous republic to deal with
these problems are also insufficient, given the lack of proper financing, capacities, and equipment.
Northern Caucasus in general, and Daghestan ASSR in particular,
can be a reliable and promising provider for Mangyshlak Region, the
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entire pre-Caspian zone, and the regional economic area emerging
here. Within this area the functions of Daghestan will not be restricted to delivery of fruits and vegetables to the cities in Mangyshlak Region. Given the steadily growing population, Daghestan’s
interregional functions must be linked with its reserves of drinking
water, great recreational potential, and, in particular, the workforce
in the autonomous republic. Daghestan is 6 to 7 times closer to
Mangyshlak than the more heavily populated areas of Kazakstan.
Hence, in the event that a ferry line is established, the activating of
these factors only through the transport factor will provide the national economy with annual savings of almost 10 million rubles.
There are a host of other favorable conditions conducive to the
emergence of an integrated area: Mangyshlak–Daghestan–Northern
Caucasus, First, the concentration of increased regional transportation facilities in Daghestan, with the accompanying reduction in
their growth in the northern part of the pre-Caspian zone. This is
heightened by the factor of natural conditions and resources characterizing the ever more complex nature of mining, increasing costs,
and the labor-intensive nature of raw materials in Mangyshlak. Second, the transportation factor and the proximity of processing capacities, among them the oil-processing complexes in Grozny. Third,
the rational use of capital investments in Mangyshlak emerges as a
condition and source of investing resources in the development of
interregional entities (construction of a ferry pier in Makhachkala).
There is no single answer to this problem. The transport line in
question is a bottleneck in the region, the cause of distinct imbalances: disproportionate money circulation plans in Daghestan and
other autonomous republics as people are relocated to the eastern
Caspian coast. In Daghestan ASSR, for instance, this leads to instability in forming the local income base, with all the attendant consequences. There are tens of thousands of skilled workers and
specialists from Daghestan working in Mangyshlak Region. For every
thousand workers, the annual production is 3.5 to 4 million rubles
above that produced in the republic. A part of this returns in the
form of wages.
This gives rise to a situation in which the growth of consumers
and services in the republic breaks away from the monetary incomes
at the expense of money migrating from Kazakstan. On the other
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hand, given certain types of merchandise, building materials, and
turnover funds, there are reserves over and above fixed norms.
The social consequences of isolated formation of money income
are well known. Here, it should be noted, intensification of passenger
and freight sea transportation in the defined area in general, and
between Makhachkala and Shevchenko in particular, is a major factor for leveling out baneful trends in the economy of a North Caucasus region with excess manpower resources.
The fourth prerequisite for the formation of the pre-Caspian industrial area is the high effectiveness of joint nature conservation
undertakings, and the problems of rational use of natural resources
in the northern part of the Caspian Sea in raising its fish yields.
The time has long past for the interregional social and economic
integration of Daghestan and Mangyshlak, both in setting up a network of vocational and technical schools, secondary schools, and in
the development of science and technology.
To achieve effective results in the proposed interregional interaction, it is necessary to develop the respective organizational and
management structures. In the vertical management structures,
overloaded by industrial functions, the interregional aspect of management is not fully reflected. This fact underlies the importance of
horizontal economic relations and contacts between the interested
parties, and characterizes the significance of the interregional economic mechanism of regulating production relations and relations
of exchange between Daghestan ASSR and Mangyshlak Region on
an equal self-supporting basis. In this respect, highly expedient is the
issue of payment for labor resources in the form of demographic
investments in the region serving as a base for the migrating population. In our case, Daghestan ASSR.
It is also expedient to work out a decision on the regional program
‘‘Daghestan–Mangyshlak.’’ At present, narrow departmental and
local-rule trends can be observed in the work of ministries and territorial organizations in the region. Evidence of this is the situation
around the laying of the ferry line Makhachkala–Aktau.
The line Aktau–Makhachkala–Aktau is more attractive for passenger transportation and more expedient for freight transportation, reducing the distance covered by trucks, automobiles, and freight cars
between Baku–Makhachkala and Makhachkala–Baku by more than
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800 kilometers. Considering the shortening of the ferry line (158 x
2), there will be a total economy of over 1116 kilometers.
Now yearly tens of thousands of freight cars and trucks cover the
extra distance of more than 1000 kilometers, inasmuch as they are
ferried 468 kilometers from Aktau south to Baku, and, from there,
375 kilometers north to Makhachkala.
The Caspian shipping company had long disregarded the fact that
Aktau and Makhachkala have the same latitude and the distance
between them is the shortest, that Makhachkala is 375 kilometers
closer to the country’s economic regions where freight is dispatched
to the republics of Central Asia, its volume making up the bulk of
the freight channeled through the Baku ferry line.
An identical situation obtains with the other ferry ports on the
Caspian. A national economic approach shows that neither the Baku
nor the Sumgait ferry line can compete with their Makhachkala
counterpart as regards economic expediency in transporting freight
along the Caspian.
According to assessments of the functioning ferry lines, between
1962 and 1983 freight turnover went up threefold, but in the years
that followed it fell to the 1970 level. This was due to the fact that
there had been no increase in the number of ferries and freight cars
were conveyed by railroad, bypassing the ferry, around the northern
Caspian coast with excess runs increasing 1.5–2-fold.
In our estimates the economic and geographical location of Makhachkala port calls for the extensive transportation ties running from
east to west and back through the Caspian Sea.
Regions adjacent to Makhachkala port are: Northern Caucasus,
Donetsk-Dniepr economic areas from the west, the Central Asian
republics and southern part of Kazakstan, and Siberia.
The envisaged pattern for transporting freight and passengers
along the lines: Baku–Aktau–Makhachkala and Makhachkala–Aktau–
Baku, is inexpedient economically, given the high balance costs of
the ferry, and is far from realistic, because it does not take care of
return transportation of freight in cars and aboard ferries.
The construction in the 12th five-year period (1986–1990) of a
ferry line in Makhachkala would comply with national economic interests and ensure a high economic effect by
• eliminating the artificially created system of return deliveries of national economic freight shipments thereby vacating more than
300,000 cars;
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• achieving a balance between the transportation load on western and
eastern ferry lines;
• bringing down the load on the Makhachkala-Baku railway line and
increasing its flexibility, raising maneuverability and optimization
of ferry lines in the Caspian basin, ensuring self-supporting effectiveness of the Caspian shipping company and its profitability.

REGION AND INDUSTRY:
MODES OF INTERACTION
Routes of Technical Progress
The electrotechnical complex in Minusinsk, Siberia, is growing rapidly. One of its plants produces automatic lathes for the plasma cutting of metal as well as components for warehouse technologies.
Both automatic lathes and warehouse components are labor-saving.
The costs of manufacturing this equipment are higher in this region
than they would be, for example, in Ukraine. But there is a consumer
is nearby, namely, a Siberian manufacturing plant. Nonetheless,
most of the product is being shipped to the European parts of the
country because industrial concerns prevail over economic reasoning.
In the current period of qualitative changes in the country’s productive forces, a unified policy in science and technology is gaining
in importance. The main goals of this policy are to determine the
directions and priorities in the development of science and technology and initiate the large-scale introduction of the latest achievements in this area.
Experience has proven that solving these problems requires the
joint efforts of experts in economics, sociology, technology, political
science, and law. At the same time, a unified policy in science and
technology is most effective when it is thoroughly worked out from
the perspective both of the state and of specific industries and regions. Scientific and technological policy should be integrated into
the overall management mechanism of the national economy.
The management of the national economy is being improved in
all respects. As the search for new forms and structures of economic
activity continues, it is very important to rationalize not only the
state’s and industries’ management systems but also regional systems. The management of scientific and technical progress should
take into account differences in the levels of economic progress in
Pravda, October 22, 1984, p. 3.
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various regions and their social and climatic character, among other
factors.
The system of planned and projected indicators of efficiency of
scientific and technological progress should also take into consideration the use of new technologies and the exploitation of machinery
in various regions of the country. That will promote the growth of
the actual (instead of conditional) efficiency of new technologies
and create an economic shield against those technologies that
threaten the region’s environment.
As is well known, the USSR is conducting large-scale experiments
aimed at increasing the possibilities for plants and production associations to plan and manage their economic activities and strengthen
their responsibility for the results. Such an approach offers new possibilities for cooperation between plants in different industries located at the same industrial center. Under such conditions, the role
of regional bodies in coordinating the activities of these companies
is expected to grow significantly.
In this regard, the activity of regional scientific centers of the
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine is of growing interest. These centers
coordinate activities not only of the Academy’s institutes but also of
industrial R & D centers in the region.
The same approach has been used by the Leningrad Scientific
Center of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The Leningrad
Scientific Center is responsible for scientific leadership over the territorial and industrial program for the intensification of economic
development in 1985 and for the Twelfth 5-year plan. The government has approved an initiative by Leningrad to launch a program
called Intensification ’90. This initiative was recommended for consideration and support by a number of the State committees and
ministries.
Several years ago, the Siberian division of the Academy of Sciences
of the USSR prepared a large-scale regional R & D program entitled
‘‘Siberia.’’ This year the program has been qualitatively changed. Its
assignments were approved by the State Committee for Planning,
the Cabinet of Ministers, sixty ministries, and 350 R & D organizations participating in the program. Following that series of approvals,
the State Committee for Science and Technology, together with the
Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, adopted a provision that gave the ‘‘Siberia’’ program the status of law.
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However, not every Center of the Academy of Sciences has become a regional scientific center coordinating and integratng the
work of all R & D institutions in its region. regardless of their industrial subordination. In Lithuania, for example, a substantial share of
the scientific and technical potential belongs to the R & D institutes
of a number of industrial ministries. In some instances, even when
institutes are located on the same street, they are poorly informed
about each other’s activities, sometimes conducting the same research. Obviously, in such cases there is not enough cooperation between them. Also, reliable contacts with corresponding institutes of
the All-Union Academy of Sciences are lacking.
The Soviets play an important role in economic development and
in achieving the goals of 5-year plans. This presupposes strengthening the role of regional authorities in the management of scientific
and technical progress. However, the issues of management in science and technology are missing from the list of functions of regional
authorities, a list that has been prepared by the State Committee for
Planning. In the meantime, the need for such provisions empowering regional authorities with responsibility for management in science and technology is urgent.
For example, in Krasnoyarsk there are two neighboring companies
that are subordinates of the same ministry, namely, the Ministry of
Nonferrous Metals. The first one is Sibtsvetmetavtomatika; the second is a branch of Soyuztsvetmetavtomatika. As a result, the complete use of production capacities is not being utilized There simply
are too many administrative and management personnel. This would
be the right time for regional authorities to intervene. However, they
do not have the proper tools to influence the situation.
In our opinion, it would be prudent to complement the economic
experiments that are currently taking place throughout the USSR
with the following practices:
• to estimate and analyze the advantages and disadvantages of establishing structures for management in science and technology in the
regions
• to elaborate their rational organizational structure
• to outline their economic functions and responsibilities.

Later, by relying on the results of such assessments, it would be
possible to prepare recommendations aimed at a more efficient com-
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bination of territorial and industrial approaches to the management
of the national economy as a whole.
The state policy in science and technology is dynamic. Changes
and improvement of its individual components and their shape reflect its permanent evolution, which is a result of the progressive
development of socioeconomic relations in a mature socialist society.

REGIONALISM AS THE KEY
TREND IN SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
The scientific and technological revolution of our time has led to
radical structural shifts in the world economy and its industrialization, and to a growth of GNP in individual countries and groups of
countries that could not be provided for by the available raw material
and power resources in those parts of the developed world that were
already at a high level of economic maturity. The radically new economic and technological level of development of the production
forces called for a new territorial division of social labor. There began
a large-scale transfer of natural resources from areas undergoing industrialization, leading to a new form of interaction between scientific progress and technology, society, and the natural environment.
Mankind is now faced with problems whose traditional solution in
these areas has proved ineffective and, more often than not, unrealizable. The extraction of hydrocarbon raw materials in the deserts of
the Arabian peninsula and Central Asia and from the shelf of the
world’s oceans, the development of deposits of nonferrous metals,
diamonds, and coal in the North, the forests in the tropical zone and
the arctic taiga, and the development of fallow and virgin lands in
the zone of experimental agriculture has required new machinery
and technologies, suitable for areas with extremes in natural and
climatic conditions. The fact that these processes are occurring in
the newly developing territories, with their insufficient transportation systems, poorly studied geological features, low population density, and shortage of skilled workers, has led to the development of a
specific approach, namely, the regionalization of the scientific and
technological solutions implemented there.
The extent of the extracting and primary processing industries
operating in these areas has essentially changed the nature of applied
In Economic Problems of Regional Scientific-Technical Complexes (Moscow: Institute of the Economy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1983), pp. 41–66.
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technologies. The gigantic growth of mining operations, ore concentration, and metallurgy has brought about regionalization of technologies. Those developed for these areas are usually ineffective when
applied in the ‘‘old’’ areas.
For instance, coal deposits in the eastern part of Russia—in the
Kansko-Achinsky and Ekibastuz basins—are worked on the basis of
radically new line technologies that ensure labor productivity that is
25 to 35 times above the average for the industry. However, if the
rotary extraction complexes, with an hourly yield of 12,500 tons (a
freight-train load), were to be used at any mine in the European part
of the country or abroad, they would not be working at their full
capacity. Thus, geological conditions in the area—the reserves of
natural resources, especially mineral, timber, and power resources—
have a decided impact on the regionalization of scientific and technological progress. In areas of new development, the processes for
regenerating an environment affected by technological developments take a different turn.
Thus, while the technical division of labor brought about technologization, regionalization is the result of its territorial division.
Today, scientific economics deals primarily with the applied aspect
of regionalization. Particular consideration is given to problems of
regional land use, the designing of machinery for use in the northern
areas, and the creating of technology for implementation in permafrost conditions. These problems are still insufficiently developed for
other areas with extreme natural conditions.
It must be noted, however, that regionalization first surfaced in
the development of science, not technology, and was connected with
the step-by-step procedures in developing new areas. Industrialization there was preceded by pioneering expeditions by specialists in
geography, botany, zoology, geology, and engineering surveying.
Studies carried out in these areas provided new data and registered
phenomena that did not fit into the existing theoretical patterns and
were regarded initially as exceptions. A study of these ‘‘anomalies’’
has begun, but it has not been concentrated enough. The industrial
development of natural resources in new areas has begun to outstrip
scientific attention to regional problems, which has been lagging for
some time.
The economic issues that came up in industry could not, in many
cases, be solved by the existing technology, which had been oriented
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toward use in areas with moderate natural and climatic conditions.
Thus, for a long time the demands that society put to science remained unrealized. But gradually scientific knowledge has begun to
make headway in the study of regional problems.
These studies have showed that the peculiarities and exceptions
noted not only were typical of a specific area but also had applications in different areas and in diverse parts of the world. The exceptions studied along single methodological lines often turned out to
be previously unknown regularities responsible for the functioning
of natural, simulated, and social systems in respective regional conditions.
In-depth studies of regional peculiarities, separate regions as a
whole, and elements of their noosphere called for specific development of the already known methods of research and the development of new, original combinations. Theoretical systematization of
the data obtained not only helped realize the basic function of all
sciences—development and organization of information on the phenomenon studied—but also prompted the intensive study of the
subject of the particular science. Research teams that were set up
initially to study regional peculiarities of a particular respective science gradually led to the emergence of new, specialized sciences.
Thus, geological science spawned regional geology and regional geomorphology (the study of the reliefs of sections of the land surface
and the sea bottom); from geography there emerged regional geography; and economic sciences led to the emergence of regional economics. Medical sciences gave rise to a large group of new scientific
trends: medical geography, recreational geography, nosogeography,
physiology of the northern mountain regions—all the result of science regionalization.
One can say that, all in all, the regionalization of science initially
adhered to the subject principle. This stage was noted for the transition of regional sciences from the analysis of practical data and observation results to synthesis, developing, new meaningful
subjects—a transition of these sciences from the empirical to the
theoretical.
Regional sciences dealing with the initial study and economic development of newly emerging areas were taking their first steps.
Among these sciences were the aforementioned regional geology, regional geography, regional economics, and regional medicine.
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Their relatively extended development period brought these sciences to high scientific levels. Among their researchers were full and
associate members of the countries’ Academies of Sciences, and
their works received high scientific and government recognition.
Thus, by decree of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences,
the A. E. Fersman prize for 1979 was awarded to Dr. I. N. Govorov,
Ph.D (Geology-Mineralogy), for a series of works on regional chemistry and the genetic mineralogy of hydrothermal sources.
The USSR State Prize for 1982 was awarded for achievements in
the field of regional medicine to twelve medical researchers, all of
them well-known specialists, for a series of works in geographical
pathology and the epidemiology of cardiovascular, oncological, and
nervous diseases.1
Technical sciences were regionalized much later, and the nature
of the process was different. Inasmuch as the intensive development
of natural resources in the new areas outstripped the process of regionalization in all sciences, among them the technical sciences,
hands-on work brought significant results in the adapting of machinery and technology to regional conditions.
The problems uncovered in achieving interaction between machinery and the environment, and the quest for their solution led to
regionalization of several sciences. This was attempted not by expanding the subject of a particular science but by changing the range
of its problematic orientation. Thus, regional trends manifested
themselves in engineering, construction mechanics, geophysics and
the physics of metals, and geological sciences.
The regionalization of the technical sciences differed from the
same process in the other sciences in its focus on dealing with problems of economic development; at the same time it was falling behind the demands of practical work, which were especially acute.
From the mid-1960s large-scale construction work had been going
on in the northern areas. The power plants of Vilyuiskaya, Ust-Khantayskaya, and Kolymskaya were built on permafrost soils, and their
dams and roadways consumed hundreds of thousands of tons of hydrotechnical concrete; and oil and gas mains were laid in the Arctic
and adjacent regions. Yet only recently were the scientific foundations created for developing durable, frost-resistant concrete for the
construction of roads and hydroelectric facilities. This major
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achievement of regional technical sciences with huge economic prospects was honored with the USSR State Prize for 1982 in science.2
Guided by the needs of the economy, science expanded the scope
of its work, making its way into new areas and developing new guidelines whose practical use would be obvious only in the future. An
example of this type of specialization is regional biology. Its provisions are finding wholesale application only in our time, when biotechnology is achieving ever wider application, and its adaptability
to the environment calls for in-depth studies of regional problems.
Professor V. G. Kirillov-Ugryumov, chairman of the Higher Certification Board of the USSR Council of Ministers, while emphasizing
vital guidelines of research, quoted the opinion of the Council of
Experts in Biological Sciences that ‘‘regional problems have been
insufficiently reflected in the theses of recent years. . . .’’3
It is obvious that not all sciences have a pronounced regional
aspect, not all can be ‘‘regionalized.’’ The fundamental sciences—
mathematics and philosophy—do not have any regional applications. Similarly, regionalization is ill-suited to astronomy. Its regional
aspect emerges in connection with the effect of the location of its
facilities on its results. This factor, for example, was decisive in placing the special astrophysical observatory of the USSR Academy of
Sciences in the remote township of Nyzhny Arkhyz in KarachayevoCherkessk Autyonomous Region.
On the rise are sciences whose subject of investigation is of a regional nature. Among these is glaciology, which is concerned with
the spreading of ice on the earth’s surface (glaciers, snow blanket,
permafrost, etc.), and its structure and physical-chemical properties,
the study of deserts, seismology, ethnography.
It is reasonable to classify sciences by the extent and factors of
their regionalization. Among the primary factors one can single out
are location, technical means of investigation, scientific potential,
and research methodology. The extent of regionalization ranges from
regional sciences to those that are easily, moderately, or poorly regionalized and those that are non-regionalized.4
Regionalization of another integral part of the productive forces—
the means of production—emerged against a background of their
growing technologization. Initially, regionalization embraced separate mechanical tools. This was a rather long period, but by the mid1970s more than 100 models of machines and materials intended for
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use in the North were being produced in the country.5 Machines
were in operation for mountainous and arid areas. The level of technological and territorial industrial specialization attained at the time
enhanced the emergence of the new trend toward scientific and
technological progress (STP)—regionalization. The regionalization
of STP, its technologization, and the need to increase the economic
effectiveness in developing new areas and conducting intensive reconstruction of developed regions led to the emergence of regional
technologies. Today, they are effective in the agro-industrial complex, in most industries—construction, transportation, and communications—and in other branches of the economy.
Regional technologies, the result of the interaction of two components of STP—technologization and regionalization—are multi-aspect phenomena. While reflecting current economic trends brought
on by the new level of development of the productive forces, regional
technologies are a supplement to all the elements of the ‘‘science–
technology–society’’ and ‘‘science–technology–environment’’ systems. These technologies, being, as it were, the material element of
the means of production, are also the subject of scientific research.
Regionalization and technologization of STP are worldwide
trends, yet in analyzing the interaction of regional technologies, society, and the environment it is useful to study the influence of production relations on the nature of the process.
The political science and political economy theories of technological determinism that emerged in the early 1940s did their best to
deny the importance of the relations between production and society’s sociopolitical goals in developing science and technology, exaggerating their role in any existing socioeconomic system. By this they
excluded production relations from the subject of STP economics.
But one cannot accept this in determining the subject of economic
studies dealing with regional technologies. Consideration should be
given to the fact that ‘‘the objective laws of development of production relations and their interaction with the productive forces are the
subject of all the economic sciences.’’6 As L. M. Gatovsky notes, this
should be the starting point for investigating the interaction between
economics and technology.
This scientific trend, while developing its particular methodology,
stems naturally from the general methodology of dialectical materialism underlying our knowledge of production relations and the pro-
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ductive forces of society. In conformity with the view of dialectical
materialism on the interaction of STP and the regional economy, it
is important both to study the impact of STP on the economy of a
region and the impact of the economy on the emerging, implemented, and operating technologies and to bring out the main aspects of this interaction. The solution of these tasks is of an
analytical character. It is also very important not to restrict oneself
to methods of analysis, but to study in their integrity regional technologies, production relations, and the environment in which they
function.
As Isaac Newton emphasized, ‘‘. . . the study of difficult subjects
by the method of analysis must always precede the method of synthesis.’’7 Analysis and synthesis, together with induction and deduction, the historical and the logical, are integral parts of the
methodology of political economy, the theoretical foundation of all
economic sciences.8
As already mentioned above, the study of the economics of regional technologies initially lagged behind hands-on experience. The
problem was handled by beginning with a technical-economic analysis of the experience of implementing technology in extreme conditions, leading in the late 1970s to the first regional economic and
scientific-technological programs, based on the general concepts of
goal orientation but without sufficient links with the principles of
territorial planning, management, and regional economics. ‘‘Yet, first
of all, there must be a special registering and systematizing of phenomena already known to science, the facts that have already been
given their place in science as its primary material.’’9 The information obtained in the course of this work conformed to the first stage
of cognition in Lenin’s well-known formula: ‘‘From live visualization
to abstract thought and from there on to practical work—such are
the dialectics of cognizing the truth.’’ Today, the basic task of studying regional technologies from the point of view of methodology is
to cover the other two stages of the quoted formula.
This brings to the forefront the vital task of studying the basic
trends in the interaction of STP with the regional economy and
working out the key principles of economic influence on this interaction, with the objective of increasing the economic effectiveness of
STP in the country as a whole.
By defining the methodological approaches to the development of
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this scientific line, its problems can be broken down into three
groups. These studies should begin with analysis of the interaction
of regional technologies and the economics of the region.
In each interaction there is a steering party. In the interaction
under study, this party is STP, and, at repetitive stages, regional
technology. That is why problems dealing with the study of the influence of STP on the economics of a region are concentrated in
group one.
This process, in its turn, gives rise to a entire range of new problems.
Thus, the functioning of a branch in a certain region is determined by a system of indices that currently do not take into account
the impact of STP on the criteria of the optimum. Under the new
conditions, new methods are required to take into account the diverse influence of STP on a region’s economy. This accounting calls
for a more in-depth study of the political economy aspects in the
interaction of natural and value indices of STP and the way its results materialize in production.
The mechanism of STP influence on the levels and forms of organization of social production on a regional basis still lacks requisite
study. The mandatory decisions of the last few years bring up as
a key task of economic development the policy of conserving fuel
resources, raw materials, and manpower. Thus, a vital question is
what part is to be played by STP in pursuing this policy on a regional
scale.
Today, the scientific and technological policy of the State determines the policy of industrial branches and the country’s regions.
Yet, while it is possible to analyze a wide range of means and levers
to realize statewide and branch technological policies, the mechanism for analyzing regional scientific and technological policies is
only in the beginning stages.
This brings to center stage problems listed under group two, dealing with the study of the demands of a regional economy for the
realization of STP. The economic, social, climatic, and ecological
conditions in the various regions set the requirements for an increase
in the effectiveness of STP. These terms can be either of a negative
nature, calling for increasing expenditure (low temperatures, permafrost soils, etc.), or of a positive nature, reducing costs (concentration
of rich natural resources in the area, convenient geological condi-
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tions for extraction of mineral deposits, an effective branch structure
in the economy of a region, etc.). It is important to single out and
classify the basic indices that affect the regional specifics of STP and
give them consideration in drawing up regional scientific-technological policies.
In addition to the analysis of the interaction between STP and the
regional economic system, a synthesis is necessary. In studying the
questions in group three, the prime task is to investigate the general
economic aspects of STP in the region, to see how the economic laws
of social development are interpreted in the economics of regional
technologies. The solution to these problems can be affected by the
conditions of economic organization of production and the sociopolitical orientation of society. At the same time, it must be noted
that, even within a single country, the specific natural and climatic
conditions and socioeconomic factors introduce distinctions into the
progress and effectiveness of STP in its different regions.
Attention must also be paid to the economic trends governing the
development of regional technologies, so that the regional resources
for increasing the effectiveness of STP can be effectively tapped. The
degree to which new technologies and the region’s scientific and
technological potential are utilized depends basically on the degree
of implementation given to regional scientific and technological policy. Due to the fact that, at the present moment, long-term, scientifically grounded regional scientific-technological policy is far from
being implemented in all of the country’s regions, the regional resources of STP are only on their way to being effectively utilized.
An effective scientific-technological policy requires making a
choice in favor of the more effective lines of development for STP
and planning for their implementation.
Regional engineering and technology emerge as proof of the region’s readiness for STP and is a key factor in increasing the effectiveness of production. At present the cognitive apparatus of the
economy of regional technologies is at its initial stage. This apparatus should be developed on the basis of theoretical studies and generalizations from accumulated practical materials. To this effect, it
is important to make a classification of regions (from the standpoint
of using and introducing new technologies) and the types of regional
technologies. This will make it possible, eventually, to define optimal
technological solutions and standardize them.
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Of substantial methodological importance here is considering the
structural changes in the territorial-production complexes (TPC)
under the impact of progress in engineering and technology, as well
as its influence on enhancing the complex nature of the emerging
TPC.
As an integral element of a unified system of national economic
planning, the planning of science and technology has its distinctive
features. Unfortunately, these features are mostly of a negative character. While, on the whole, planning in the USSR is based on a
combination of industrial and territorial approaches, the plans for
developing science and technology have, until now, developed along
industrial lines.
The interests of both regional and statewide development call for
the planning of STP along regional lines. At the present moment,
however, this question is not being developed to its full advantage
along either theoretical or methodological lines.
The development of comprehensive economic forecasting and
planning of regional technologies should encompass the following
aspects: industrial, inter-branch, territorial, and regional, integrating
the three preceding aspects on a regional basis. The comprehensive
forecast and plan must embrace all stages, from scientific research
to the final result: the fullest effect of the achievements of STP introduced in the region.
On this basis it is useful to regard the forms and methods that are
molded by experience, in different areas, for accelerating the implementation and increasing the effectiveness of regional technologies:
regional STP programs, governmental bodies for STP in regions, and
industrial scientific-production complexes organized along the lines
of functional specialization for regional technological development
of regions. These questions are all influenced by the correlation between statewide and regional approaches to the management of
STP, and in their turn should be solved with the ultimate economic
effect in mind. Under the conditions of intensive development of
new territories and the deficit of manpower, coupled with the effects
of the other above-mentioned factors, greater significance is
attached to the regional aspects of STP effectiveness, which have
not been reflected in the operating methods in calculating economic
effectiveness, new technology, and capital investments.
The insufficient development of this regional aspect is already af-
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fecting the rates of introduction of several progressive technologies,
such as technology ‘‘for application in the North,’’ automation systems, and industrial robots. One must decide in which region this
technology will be produced, and which regions will benefit from its
implementation through manpower reductions and raising output.
This includes evaluating the substitution of automated labor for live
labor on the basis of introducing regional technologies.
The Basic Guidelines for Economic and Social Development of
the USSR for 1981–1985 and for the period up to 1990 formulate
the task of developing and implementing comprehensive programs
for the solution of key scientific-technological problems. The solution should be approached from the positions given in the section
dealing with improvement of economic management. Above all, it is
the necessary to achieve an effective combination of industrial and
territorial management, which calls for the development of a respective legal and methodological apparatus.
Regional programs of STP, properly developed and consistently
implemented, will serve as a reliable basis and a stage of realization
for countrywide, industrial STP programs and a comprehensive plan
for the economic and social development of the region.
Proceeding from the existing problems and the substantiated
methodology, the methodological apparatus for studying the economics of the regional aspects of STP should include methods that
have been worked out in detail and tested by economic science—
methods of systems analysis, program/object planning and management, and economic-mathematical simulation modified to regional
needs—and be supplemented by new private methods applicable to
the specific scientific aspect. Estimates have been made primarily for
methods of inter-branch balance with elements of optimization to
determine the effect of regional technologies on the indices of reproduction in the region, and dynamic programming and network
graphs for simulation of the interaction of organizations taking part
in programs for developing and implementing regional technologies,
distributing capital investments, labor, and material resources for
effective realization of STP regional programs.
Methods are emerging for the regionalization of technical-economic and social indices of STP, working out a technological characteristic of the region, conducting expedition observations,
classifications, and grouping, and their results, along with mathemat-
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ical models of scientific and technological development of different
regional combinations and evaluation units.
Regional economics, which emerged in the late 1960s for the
study of economic problems in different areas and served, along with
the economics of STP, as a concrete theoretical basis for the economics of regional technologies, ‘‘has its own methods of research
some of which are still at a stage of quests and experimental testing.’’10 There is a major need for the development of adequate research methods in the economics of regional technologies and their
coordination.
The present-day realities of STP—regionalization and technologization and the formulated and systematized group of problems
emerging under their impact and in relation to them—are evidence
of the vital importance of the process now under way, in which economics is becoming concerned with studies dealing with regional
problems of scientific and technological development. These studies
have been necessitated by the objective requirements of the socialist
socialization of production and its territorial organization, the fuller
and more comprehensive implementation of economic factors, and
the trends of developed socialism, the growing significance of STP,
and the above-mentioned factors, along with the need for the further
development of economic theory.
K. V. Ostrovityanov, examining the theory of the development of
economic sciences, wrote, ‘‘One of the trends in the development of
the natural and social sciences is their differentiation. With the
growth of the social division of labor and technological progress, new
branches of science emerge which concentrate on ever-more-narrow
areas of nature and society.’’11
As regional problems of STP, with their major impact on the development of productive forces and production relations, become
areas of special economic research with a specific methodology and
emerging methods-apparatus for their study, one can speak of the
emergence of a special scientific trend in economics which can be
defined as the economics of regional technologies.
Inasmuch as the object of the economics of regional technologies
is to develop economic problems dealing with the designing, functioning, and effectiveness of technological systems in their regional
execution, and to substantiate regional scientific and technological
policies, develop theory and methods for optimizing management,
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planning and economic programming of science and technology by
integrating territorial and industrial approaches to STP in regions,
this scientific trend may be classified as having an applied character.
In substantiation of the need for constant analysis of the system
of economic sciences to single out the newly emergent industrial and
specialized subject, one can quote A. M. Yeremin: ‘‘In science, the
division of labor denotes growth of productive (cognitive, heuristic)
force. However, the specifics of science, as compared with, for example, the sphere of direct material production, are that, as a form of
peculiar intellectual production, it does not wait for a new stage of
labor division to emerge spontaneously, but registers actively this
aspect of its development, thereby applying conscious effort to multiply its productive capacity.’’12
The fact that the economics of regional technologies emerged at
the stage when STP enhanced its impact on the territorial development of productive forces and production relations can be explained
by reference to V. I. Lenin’s idea that, ‘‘only when social relations
were reduced to relations of production and the latter to the heights
of productive forces did it become possible to regard the development of social systems as a natural historical process. It goes without
saying that without this view there can be no social science’’13
The economics of regional technologies encompasses all the economic aspects of STP regional problems. This stems from understanding technologization as a universal trend of present-day STP, a
view shared by scientists in the USSR and abroad. Today, technologization influences virtually all the spheres of social development, and
the concept of ‘‘technology,’’ taken in its broad sense, incorporates
any technical system as a whole, the genesis and functioning of any
natural or simulated social system. In our opinion the concept of
technology is best defined in the work of the American scientist E.
Yanych: ‘‘Technology . . . denotes a broad sphere of purposeful application of the physical, life, and behavioral sciences. This includes
the overall concept of engineering, as well as medicine, agriculture,
organization of management and other spheres of knowledge with
their material stock and theoretical principles.’’14 Such an understanding of technology includes all the elements of STP, while their
regionalization along with technologization makes it possible to develop regional economic problems of STP in their systematized form
as the economics of regional technologies.
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The technological approach to STP in regions promotes the practical application of this trend in economic sciences. Inasmuch as the
‘‘technological means of production is to the best of knowledge an
essential form of existence of production forces,’’15 the degree of regionalization of technology reflects the extent to which society has
managed to master the process of controlling natural forces, the
processes of rational development of natural resources.
The emergence and development of the economics of regional
technologies were prepared through the development of the systems
of economic, engineering, and natural sciences and the intensification of their interaction.
The regionalization of economic sciences led to the development
of new projects dealing with the territorial and regional aspects in
fundamental economic theories, and to the emergence of regional
economics. The interaction of the latter with STP economics and
both of them with the system of technological sciences, regional natural sciences, against the background of the trends of present-day
social development led to the nascent economics of regional technologies.
The formation process of economics of regional technologies is
not unique to economic sciences. Only under the impact of regionalization (not to mention other present-day trends in economic sciences) are several new scientific trends emerging. An indicative
example is urban economics which, ‘‘as a branch of science, should
be oriented to the study of production development, the distribution
and consumption of material wealth, and the social organization of
labor in the urban community. . . . Urban economics is based on
specialized and branch economics [and] uses research of many other
sciences. . . .’’16
A wide circle of Soviet scientists has dedicated its efforts to developing the theory of regionalizing science and its technological applications.17 A noteworthy contribution to the study of regional
problems of STP was made by a number of economists.18 Considerable effort was applied to the study of these problems by foreign
scientists.19
The development of regional scientific trends by scientists in
many parts of the world has called for cooperation, including a regular exchange of ideas and opinions. With this objective in mind, in
1960 the International Association of Regional Sciences was estab-
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lished, incorporating 600 scientists from more than 30 countries.
Among Soviet representatives who became members in 1967 were
the economists E. F. Baranov, L. N. Karpov, V. A. Mash, N. N. Nekrasov, and E. N. Chetyrkin.20 The Council for International Scientific
Contacts in Regional Studies was established under the Presidium
of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Inasmuch as the economics of STP and regional economics have
the greatest impact on the emergence of the new scientific trends, it
was natural for representatives of these sciences to have a hand in
developing research on regional economic problems of STP.
Economic science, adhering to Marxist premises, started an active
study of regional problems only in the last 15 years. In this field the
accumulated empirical material is way ahead of the progress made
in theoretical research. Many scientists still view the economic problems of STP and their management without taking into account
their regional components.21
Given its relatively low level of development, an increase in scientific research and the number of publications in this field is inevitable. Currently, of the almost 900 books published between 1976 and
1980 by Ekonomika, a publishing house responsible for producing
the bulk of high-priority theoretical and practical economic problems, only 4.5% deal with STP to one extent or another. Until 1982,
there was almost no publication of any in-depth study of the experience and problems of key STP aspects on a regional scale and the
resolution of regional scientific-technological problems.
The country’s economic development has brought up several previously discussed problems whose resolution will be significant for
the progressive development of the economic mechanism of the national economy and that of other countries. What literature has
made the greatest contribution to solving the problems of economics
of regional technology?
In 1975 the prominent Soviet economist N. N. Nekrasov published
a monograph22 dealing with the methodological and methodical
problems of accelerating STP by considering the regional specifics of
economic development. This book, with a second edition in 1978,
was one of the first to deal with these problems. Yet the need for
more rational use of the country’s huge resources, with the objective
of accelerating STP, brings the economics of regional technologies
to the forefront of vital problems integrally linked with their practical
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implementation. Among other things, this acceleration is called for
by the ever-increasing part working people are playing in solving the
problems of enhancing the effectiveness of and increasing STP, the
ever-growing complexity of economic relations, and the ensuing
need to forecast and take into account the socioeconomic consequences of STP in regions, setting up timely control over acceleration of STP plans by local territorial management authorities and
doing away with departmental barriers in deciding technological policies, and the need to increase efforts to combat the negative effects
of technological progress in regions, etc.23
A joint monograph written by specialists from the Council for the
Study of Production Forces under The USSR State Planning Committee is dedicated to regional problems of STP in several industries,
and its impact on the territorial structure of the national economy.24
This may be the first book published by Nauka Publishers which is
wholly dedicated to the development of the regional aspects of STP.
The different aspects of regional technological politics as applied
to problems of developing the North are dealt with in the works of
A. G. Aganbegyan, G. A. Agranat, V. F. Burkhanov, Y. M. Dogayev,
and S. V. Slavin.
V. P. Loginov used the example of the Kansko-Achinsk power-fuel
complex to carry out identical studies along these lines.
S. V. Slavin was among the first of the country’s scientists to formulate the guiding principles of a regional approach to STP reflecting the peculiarities of economic activity in specific natural,
geographical, and economic conditions of the North.25
The works of Y. M. Dogayev study STP problems with a view to
the prospects of developing the country’s northern regions, delving
into the specific problems of improving the methodology for defining the effectiveness of new machinery.26
The shaping of regional technological policy and the reflection of
its aspects in the development of certain elements of the mathematical formula for defining the effectiveness of new technology (after
the example of the mining industry) is discussed in works by V. P.
Loginov.27
In their work on political economy, A. I. Demenev and V. I. Chichkanov make an attempt to bring out the regional peculiarities of
shaping the material and technological base of communism.28 The

regionalization as the key trend

457

authors single out, alongside the functional and industrial structures,
the regional structure of the material and technological base.
Unfortunately, the systemic approach to STP is not yet employed
to its full advantage. Indices used for analyzing STP within the regional framework fail to reflect the unity and organic interaction of
all its aspects and problems.
As has been noted in several scientific works, solving STP problems on a regional scale calls for developing the scientific justification for organizing productive forces along territorial lines at all
stages of planning and management: in pre-plan studies, and in developing plans and programs and guiding their realization. The
monograph by R. I. Shniper29 deals with priority problems of raising
the scientific level of regional pre-planning studies. The author emphasizes the scientific and technological problems of the economic
concept of regional economic development, among them that of
forecasting technological progress for regional industries and developing the scientific and technological potential on a regional basis.
The further development of the economic mechanism envisages
the development of the methodology of territorial planning of STP
and its practical realization. In this connection significance attaches
to singling out STP as an independent object of complex territorial
socioeconomic planning and management, as realized in the Donetsk Scientific Center of the UkSSR Academy of Science under
the guidance of N. G. Chumachenko and N. N. Yermoshenko.30 The
authors suggested a methodology for working out a complex territorial STP plan, the foundations for its programming, and the forecasting of socioeconomic effects of the STP on a regional basis. The
work defines major tasks for developing science and technology, and
the structure of the plan in general. However, plan indices give insufficient attention to regional peculiarities and the use of regional reserves to make STP more effective. Naturally, it is possible to define
and influence the aforesaid indices only by actual methods of STP
planning and management in a given region. Only the first steps
have been taken as yet, and only according to economic experiments
barely covered in the press.
In the monograph by V. Y. Budavey an in-depth study has been
made of the shaping promising comprehensive STP programs and
their economic management. Yet, for all this, the comprehensive nature of the study overlooks the regional aspect. The author quotes
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the experience of a program-oriented approach to scientific and
technological problems on a regional scale,31 yet he examines only
the combination of industrial and inter-branch principles of planning, excluding its territorial aspect.
Individual problems of regional development are presented in the
works of G. B. Tersh,32 V. I. Duzhenkov,33 Y. M. Kanygin,34 and
others.
The works by G. V. Tersh discuss the regional peculiarities of technological progress in the building construction and materials, which
enable him to say that STP studies should be carried out as applied
to concrete economic regions and subregions, thus making it possible to determine in full measure the national economic effectiveness
of STP.
V. I. Duzhenkov studied the formation of the regional scientific
potential in its interaction with the location of production and its
structure and technological level in economic regions. His work defines the trends of STP impact on the siting of several industries
involved in material production and the key scientific tasks stemming from the basic provisions of promising regional socioeconomic
policy.
Republican and regional publishers are producing works that often
deal with the regional aspects of STP, give systematized factors influencing its effectiveness, study questions of STP interaction, and
develop the territorial organization of productive forces.35
The First Practical Science Conference devoted to the economic
problems of regional technological policy,36 held in the fall of 1980
in Krasnoyarsk, consolidated ten years of theoretical and practical
experience in developing the economic mechanism for STP management along regional lines. The conference led to the development of
a strategy for further studies of regional STP problems under the
conditions of developed socialism: the economic mechanism of developing and implementing regional technological policy, and comprehensive planning and organizing the introduction of new
technologies along regional lines. A special place in the materials of
the conference went to the shaping and realization of regional scientific-technological programs.
The All-Union Scientific-Technological Conference, ‘‘Methodological Problems of Developing and Realizing Comprehensive Republican Scientific-Technological Programs,’’ held in December
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1981 in Minsk, was a reflection of the multi-aspect complex of regional STP programs. Its materials give a complex scale of regional
STP programs and show the lack of a single methodology for their
development and actualization, and the priority and significance of
the subject in question. The conference named the growing number
of scientists concerned with economic regional problems of STP.
The rather small number of books and monographs on economics
of regional technology is a temporary phenomenon. Nevertheless,
the number of other forms of publication on this subject (articles,
theses, or reports) has doubled in the last five years. This rate of
growth of publications is typical only of those dealing with the more
intensively growing aspects of science.
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KEY TO THE REGION:
COMPLEX PROGRAMS
Regional technical and R & D programs were first launched in the
USSR during the Tenth 5-year Plan (1976–1980). Among those programs were two well-known projects, ‘‘Siberia’’ and ‘‘Far East.’’
These projects aimed at studying problems of the complex use of
natural resources and the socioeconomic development in those regions. The following are just a few examples proving the efficiency
of these programs.
‘‘Siberia’’ aimed at the possibility of mining brown coal in the
Kansko-Achinsky basin by open mining on a large scale was demonstrated. The productivity of labor in the open mines in the KanskoAchinsky basin could exceed 25 to 35 times the average for the industry if a completely new mining technology were applied and loading and transportation equipment of a very high capacity used. It
was also found that the seismic equipment for oil and gas prospecting used in Tyumen is not suitable for Siberian conditions.
We could give a long list of examples proving the advantages of
equipment specifically designed for certain climatic and geographic
conditions. Actual practice demonstrates the clear necessity of planning programs that take into account the specific conditions in the
various regions.
Planning and management are necessary for maximum rational
use of all the economic resources the country has. The same planned
approach should be applied to science and technology, not only in
terms of specific industries but in terms of specific regions as well.
However, the conceptual basis for the regional aspect of scientific
and technological policy has not yet been created. There is no research conducted on a regular basis in this field. R & D economic
institutes pay insufficient attention to the problems involved in the
regional development of science and technology. The mechanism
for the management of scientific and technical development in the
regions is just forming, a fact that explains the reduction in its effiPravda, March 22, 1983, p. 2.
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ciency. If the general plans for economic development are based on
a combination of industrial and territorial approaches, goals in science and technology are mainly designed only for industries. However, these goals must become an integral part of the overall system
of economic planning.
In the Soviet republics, the planning for scientific and technological development is presented as a list of those set by ministries. The
regional and district planning committees, as well as the planning
committees of autonomous republics, include in their economic
plans only the goals of the companies subject to the local Soviets.
However, it should be noted that in Krasnoyarsk Territory, Tyumen,
Chita and other districts in Siberia, complex plans also include goals
of enterprises subject to the Republican and All-Union authorities.
Recently, in some areas—for example, Leningrad, Irkutsk, and
other districts—regional plans for scientific and technological development have begun to evolve. These plans include measures drawn
up by companies and institutes located in that area, but these measures are usually adjusted for other sections of a complex territorial
plan. Nevertheless, such plans can be useful to authorities in implementing the process of introducing scientific and technological innovations into production.
The Institute of Industrial Economics of the Ukrainian Academy
of Sciences has offered another approach to regional problems of
scientific and technological development. It prepared recommendations for a complex plan for the Donetsk district, which contains
major indicators for costs and the efficiency of companies, for
strengthening scientific potential, and for resolving technical problems in R & D institutes. The plan covers 29 cities and 12 counties.
During the Tenth 5-year Plan, because of scientific and technical
innovations, industrial output increased by 55% and sales by 60% in
the Donetsk district. This plan was therefore also recommended for
Ukraine as well.
Under the Tenth 5-year Plan, several scientific and technical programs were created, and a regular upgrading of the Complex Program for Scientific and Technological Progress for the next 20 years
was introduced. The program, including both its industrial and its
regional aspects, should be revised every 5 years.
The program-and-target approach to planning is used in a number
of Soviet republics. For example, in Byelorussia during the last 5-
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year plan 50 industrial organizations and 21 universities participated
in the realization of 20 complex programs coordinated by the Republic’s Academy of Sciences. The efficiency of introducing results of
research into production exceeded the funds spent on conducting
them 4.3-fold.
There are similar examples in other places. Good results in accomplishing a complex program for increasing the productivity of
labor on the basis of introducing scientific and technological
achievements were achieved in the Sverdlovsky district. The same
programs are under way in Moscow, Leningrad, Tomsk, the Lvov
districts, and Krasnoyarsky region.
We are witnessing the formation of an entire system of regional
programs, programs of different levels, scope, duration, and resources. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to secure by legislation their role in a national system of economic planning and
management.
On the whole, the hierarchy of these programs could appear as a
system of complex programs of the Soviet republics, large economic
regions, districts, autonomous republics, cities, and territorial production complexes (TPKs). Regional programs should reflect the
achievements of the regional science and the prospects for the technical reconstruction of local enterprises. Eventually, all these factors
would benefit the development of productive forces in the regions.
In the Soviet republics, regional programs are created with the
support of the republics’ planning committees, which later provide
specific recommendations. However, there are no such planning
committees on the local level. Usually this function is performed as
an additional duty by a department or an expert in charge of planning in the region. In actuality, this approach leads to the lack of
proper attention to local planning. In this regard, I think, we are
given a good example by the Donetsk district. There, a department
of territorial production planning was established which, together
with the Donetsk Scientific Center, coordinates activities in this
field.
Of course, in some instances, successes in the realization of scientific and technical achievements have come as a result of volunteer
efforts. But when we are dealing with long-term (5- to 10-year) programs, mere enthusiasm is not enough. It is necessary for public
committees (a program’s council) to cooperate with those organiza-
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tions that are in charge of implementing those programs. This practice is spreading throughout the country, for example, in the
Leningrad, Novosibirsk, and Nikolaev districts.
In the republics, economic regions, and districts, regional programs are being prepared. They will be included in the forthcoming
All-Union Complex Program for Scientific and Technical Progress.
Public committees are also participating in this preparatory work.
For this reason, it is so important to create legislation concerning the
methods and legal status of these public committees. The lack of a
legislative basis for their activities brings misunderstanding of their
rights, possibilities, and functions. As a result, not all of these state
organizations respond to the requests of public committees.
It is necessary to define more clearly the role of the regional
branches, centers of All-Union and republics’ Academies of Sciences,
in terms of their relation to industrial R & D institutes. It is a matter
not only of the coordination of efforts of research and production
entities but also of their cooperation in accomplishing regional programs. Until now, the power of the All-Union Academy of Sciences
as well as the State Committee on Science and Technology has not
been supported by legislation that would outline procedures for the
review of their decisions by ministries and industrial departments.
As mentioned above, however, this is very important.
It is urgent to make an obligatory list of indicators for regional
programs and to prepare corresponding recommendations to them.
Results will follow shortly. For example, losses related to the use
in the North, in mountains, or in deserts, of equipment that is not
adjusted to specific climatic conditions are counted in billions of
rubles annually. Meanwhile, each ruble invested in the production
of regionally suitable equipment saves 5 to 8 rubles during its exploitation.
A unified state policy for science and technology must be formulated and must define corresponding policies in the regions. Future
success will depend very much on what place the complex regional
programs for scientific and technical progress take in a planning and
management system.

Privatization and Industrial
Development in Russia

PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA
Total Number of Privatized Companies—86,000
1992
(39 thousand
Companies)
Total
Industries
Industry of
Construction
Materials
Light Industries
Food Industry
Agriculture
Construction
Track Services
Whole Sale
Retail Sale
Public Catering

1993
(47 thousand
Companies)

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

1.5

2.2

2.1

29.3
2.0

29.2
2.0

7.3
3.7
1.8
6.6
1.5
1.3
39.4
8.0

8.2
4.9
1.6
7.9
2.1
1.1
34.8
7.7

8.2
5.5
1.4
8.9
2.7
1.2
33.2
7.1

8.5
5.1
1.6
9.0
3.0

8.3
5.0
1.7
9.1
3.1

34.9*
7.0

34.8*
7.0

18.2

18.1

17.8

From Total
Social Services

23.1

20.6

* whole and retail sales combined

Privatization: Political and Economic Strategy for the
Transition to Capitalism
Privatization in the former Soviet-bloc countries is the most important step toward social, political, and economic changes. Once privatization has taken place, the move to a market economy is
irrevocable.
The reasons for this are quite simple. The process of privatization
is destroying the economic base of dictatorship. In the past, the former so-called ‘‘property of the people’’ was the property of the ruling
communist party. Everything from giant industrial companies to
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 7 (April 1994).
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small dry cleaning establishments was in the hands of the state. Individuals were powerless.
The process of privatization has given people an understanding of
their value as they experience radical political and economic changes
in their own countries. Once individuals are granted ownership they
will do anything to keep from returning it.

The Evolution of Privatization
In 1986, the transition toward privatization began. Slowly, more and
more property continued to move into the hands of the people. Until
1990 in the former Soviet Union, 96% of property was controlled by
the government. The mass process of privatization in Russia began
in earnest only in 1992. In the other former Soviet republics (especially in Ukraine and Belarus) privatization did not take hold until
the last half of 1993.
As of April 1, 1994, almost 26% of all state property in Russia has
been privatized. More than 100,000 companies have become either
totally or partially privately owned. Approximately 7% of this property has been obtained through purchase, and approximately 30%
has been given away. For example, as a form of compensation, employees of many companies received 25% of the shares of formerly
state-owned companies for free.
It appears that private owners know how to make these companies
operate more profitably than the state does. The value of companies
that were privatized in 1992 has already increased by 13%, and those
privatized in 1993 have already increased by 8%. The average privatization price of an enterprise depends on previous ownership. Prices
average 12 million rubles for properties of the regional government,
and 54 million rubles for property of the federal government.

Foreign Opportunity
In January, the new government began encouraging foreign investors
to participate in the privatization of major enterprises. I predict that
by the end of 1994 at least 10% of all privatized property will be in
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the hands of foreign companies or in joint ventures with foreign
capital.
In June of 1994, privatization will become even more attractive to
foreigners. All Russian citizens who were born before September 1,
1992, received one free privatization voucher with a face value of
10,000 rubles. These vouchers are currently very valuable and as of
March 31, 1994, had risen in value to 37,000 rubles. However, the
vouchers expire on June 1, 1994. Those that have not been used will
become worthless. In a meeting last week, the Minister of Finance,
Dr. Sergei Dubinin, told me that it is unlikely that the government
will extend the redemption date. Therefore, after the vouchers expire, there will be less competition in the privatization process and
there will be ways to capitalize on the new Russia.

PRIVATIZATION IN RUSSIA
ENTERS PHASE TWO
Before making an economic forecast, one must first look at the past.
Economists call this extrapolation. To view the progress and prospects for the privatization process in Russia, it is neither necessary,
nor possible, to look before 1991. At that time, only a few initial
steps had been made under the very indecisive leadership of Gorbachev. The USSR did not even have regulations for privatization.
Much has changed since then. Statistics on the Russian economy
in 1994 show that 62% of the GDP was produced by privately held
companies. In 1990, this figure was only 4%. In my mind, this is the
real revolution taking place in Russia. While skeptics think that
other former Soviet-bloc countries have achieved similar results, they
actually pale in comparison. Even in Poland and Hungary, where the
process of privatization began ten years earlier than in Russia, the
percentage of companies in state hands is now higher than in Russia.
Russia’s record on privatization could qualify for the Guinness
Book of World Records. Before one becomes overly excited about
Russia’s record, however, keep in mind that many of its past records
have had a very negative impact on both Russia and the entire world.
Just one example illustrates this point. Remember the socialist revolution in 1917 and the process of ‘‘nationalizing’’ the entire economy? This record was achieved at a price of millions of victims and
the Cold War.

Russia on Sale
On July 3, 1991, the Russian Federation parliament created two entities, the State Committee for Federal Property Management, commonly called the Committee for Privatization, and the Fund for
Federal Property. These two entities put the largest country in the
world on sale. Many think that the privatization process proceeded
The Kvint Newsletter, 2, No. 6 (March 1995).
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along a single path. However, there were four separate branches: the
voucher system (1992 to June 1994); the Moscow City privatization;
Tatar Autonomous Republic privatization, and post-voucher or cash
privatization, which started in July 1994.
Not So Equal
In 1992 the Russian government issued privatization vouchers or
checks, with a 10,000 ruble face value, to anyone who was born before September 1, 1992. These vouchers could be used at privatization auctions of state-owned properties. Foreigners could participate
only in the secondary market. The Russian government made so
many mistakes that it decreased the value of the vouchers to approximately the price of one bottle of vodka or less. As a result, hundreds
of criminals bought millions of vouchers. During 1992–93, about
10%-12% of the Russian economy was privatized into the hands of 1
percent of the population, composed of high-level executives, former
party bosses, and a few hundred crooks.
Millions of Russians who had received the vouchers had practically
nothing to show for it. The government failed to guarantee the underlying value, and 10,000 rubles, even at that time, represented a
small amount of money. Knowing that the vouchers would expire on
December 31, 1993, many tried to sell their vouchers, often receiving
next to nothing. Unexpectedly, the government extended the expiration date until June 30, 1994, which was the end of voucher privatization. People referred to the process as ‘‘prihkvatizatsia,’’ which
roughly translates into ‘‘crooks gain control of property for nothing,
using their connections, power, and money.’’ It was a process of laundering criminal and communist money.
In my opinion, the voucher system was, from the outset, a primitive idea reflecting the communist goal of making everyone equal.
But 74 years of communism in Russia has shown that by trying to
make everyone equal, no one is equal.
Moscow Plays It Straight
The mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, decided to exclude his city
from the corruption related to the voucher system. After a major
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fight with the chairman of the government committee, Anatoly Chubais, Luzhkov used his influence to induce Yeltsin to issue special
regulations for the city of Moscow.
Because of Mayor Luzhkov’s strategy, which strictly limited vouchers and utilized competitive bidding, the Russian state received more
money from the privatization of Moscow City (8.5 million people)
than from the privatization of all other Russian territory (142 million
people). Most of the property was purchased by private companies
and individuals (foreigners were able to participate indirectly).
Within the borders of the Tatar Republic, there was also a strategy
to control the privatization process. Vouchers were limited, and the
privatization process was kept mostly to residents. The result, however, was less successful than in the city of Moscow. In Tatar, bureaucrats were able to retain control of much of the property.
On February 6 of this year, President Yeltsin signed an order entitled ‘‘About the Second Stage of Privatization in the City of Moscow.’’ From the very first paragraph of that document, it is obvious
that the drafters lacked a clear understanding of the privatization
process and the economic issues involved. The decree allows the
Moscow government to establish the initial price of the companies
to be privatized based on their balance sheet. This will cause their
stock to be grossly undervalued and will not allow companies to raise
sufficient capital. However, this situation presents an invaluable opportunity for Western companies with expertise in appraisal and valuation services to assist the Russian government, increasing a
strategy that will maximize the benefits of privatization. The decree
allows investors to lease land under privatized property for 49 years.
This marks a major breakthrough in the Russian legal system.

Russia Enters Stage Two
Before July 1994, 67% of Russian companies had been privatized,
thus successfully destroying the state monopoly. It also created a
false impression for a large part of the population who believed foreigners bought large pieces of property for next to nothing.
In this atmosphere, Russia entered the next stage of post-voucher
privatization. This stage, with President Yeltsin’s decree issued on
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July 22, 1994, has new characteristics. As of January 1, 1995, 111,000
companies have been privatized. In 1994 the rate of privatization
was approximately 2,000 companies a month, and of those, about
65% were profitable.
Only 33% of all Russian companies now remain in the hands of
the government, but, in terms of total revenues, it is 50%. In about
27% of the privatized companies, the Russian Fund of Federal Property holds between 31% and 49% of the voting shares, and they will
soon be available. This new stage provides more opportunity for foreigners, because they can participate in the process directly, including bidding and tenders. Better quality companies will be for sale.
Many think this process will be slow, because the government does
not want to lose control of its best and biggest companies. Privatization did, in fact, slow down in 1994 but is expected to resume its
pace this year.
Even the best companies are not highly profitable; they need international connections to market their products. Additionally, these
companies need modern management skills, high-tech equipment,
and technology, as well as raw materials from abroad. Finally, the
companies need money. Sometimes they are not even able to pay
employees. Because of these problems, the Yeltsin government faces
increasing unemployment, a tremendous shortage of currency, and
growing Russian debt. In 1991, before privatization, Russian debt
was $80 billion. Currently, the debt tally is approximately $120 billion.
Russian industry also continues to decline. In 1994, it was 15%
lower than in 1993 and 40% lower than in 1991. Investment also
continues to decline. There was a 28% decrease in direct capital investment from 1993, and a 62% decline from 1991. At the same
time, unemployment increased in 1994, up 29% to 5.4 million
people.
It is clear from these figures that Russia’s only choice is to put the
best property up for privatization. There is an urgent need to receive
hard currency, service debt, reduce unemployment, stop the decline
of industrial production, and ease social tension.
In the future, privatization will be more profitable for foreign investors, and provide easy access to Russian property (without bribes).
The government began selling foreign companies voting shares, cur-
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rently in state hands, in select industries. These include nonferrous
gas, telecommunications, and some former military plants.

Process on Track
Based on statements made by the new chairman of the State Property Management Committee, Vladimir Polevanov, in January, some
people were afraid that privatization would be delayed. But two
weeks later, he was fired. This sent a clear message to the Russian
bureaucrats.
Early 1996 will be the last time foreigners can buy property directly from the state for relatively small amounts. As of April 1, 1995,
the Russian Federal Property Management Committee established
all the necessary legal regulations for conducting interregional and
nationwide investment auctions. This will signify the start of a free
flow of capital across Russia. After 1996, the government will not be
in the position to offer much for privatization, and almost everything
of value will already have been sold.

Russia Has Competition
It is very important for foreigners to make it clear to the Russians
that they are not the only ones looking for money from the world
business community. China, Latin America, Southeast Asia, South
Africa, and Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe all desperately need
capital.
Romania, in the five years since the fall of communism, has privatized only 1,000 companies out of 7,000. I met with the speaker of
the Romanian parliament, Dr. Adrian Nastase, to discuss the future
of privatization in the country. Two weeks later its parliament passed
a resolution to privatize 3,000 companies in 1995.
To foreigners, Eastern and Central Europe are more attractive
than the former Soviet republics. To Westerners, these appear more
politically stable, and the economies have started to mature. For example, in 1994 Poland’s GDP expanded by 5%; Slovenia’s, by 4.4%;
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Hungary’s, by 3.5%; Czech’s, by 2.5%; and Slovakia’s, by 4%. Even
Bulgaria and Albania showed small economic growth.
Nonetheless, Russia remains an investor’s best option. It is attractive in terms of abundant natural resources, an excellent labor force,
and a huge marketplace.

HOW TO ACCESS BUSINESS
INFORMATION IN RUSSIA:
INFORMATION AND DEMOCRACY
GO HAND-IN-HAND
It is impossible for foreigners, operating in a new business environment, to make any business-related decision without access to accurate information. Currently, access to information is one of the
major barriers to the development of markets in the former Soviet
countries. It is extremely difficult to obtain quality business and economic information for decision-making purposes. As in all things
Russian, an historical perspective is useful in understanding the current situation. The lack of democracy is the root cause of Russia’s
information problems.
For a tyrant to give accurate information to society is tantamount
to relinquishing his grasp of power. This was well known and exercised by Stalin. The communists established censorship immediately. At first, it was directed against foreign capitalist enemies. It
quickly spread to include everything and everybody.
In the 1970s and 1980s, in order to publish any financial or other
information, one had to hand over the document to a special censor.
As a result, virtually all information was kept secret, especially economic information. Each year during the Soviet era the Central Statistic Bureau published what came to be known as the ‘‘Blue Book’’
on the USSR National Economy.
Each of the former Soviet republics published its own Blue Book
as well. But these books really provided very little information. For
example, it was decided to keep even the numbers of trucks produced a secret. The official position was that trucks were very important during wartime, and publishing the production figures could
disclose the military power of the Soviet Union.
In the mid-1980s, these books became statistically worthless in
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 10 (July 1994).
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terms of the data in most industries, businesses, and products. The
Blue Book’s worthlessness was based on the fact that much of the
information it contained was actually misinformation to mislead foreign enemies.
In addition, the information gathered was subject to each bureaucratic level’s efforts to look good, so, ultimately, all information was
abused. At the end of the 1980s, the major secret of the Soviet Union
was that the Soviet Union had no secrets worth keeping. The totalitarian system destroyed the country and almost destroyed its people.

Accurate Information Is Again Difficult to Obtain
After the Soviet and communist failures, by 1992 and 1993, the KGB
and the censors had lost their position in society. But gradually they
have regained some influence, not to the same degree as before,
but in 1994 it is again difficult to publish results of many economic
statistical studies. Information has become a valuable commodity.
Many of those with access to information have come to realize that
they can sell this information, either privately or officially.

Information at a Price
Today many private consulting companies are selling information
that can be received directly from government offices for free. They
will also provide you with additional unpublished information that
is not for foreign eyes. If they have good connections, they can help
you sort out information to determine what is accurate.
Between 1991 and 1994, several electronic data banks appeared
offering their services. In Russia, Dow Jones and Reuters have
opened offices, as well as Dun & Bradstreet and DirectNet. Primarily,
foreign companies are using these services, but Russians are getting
a taste for the electronic databases, and are beginning to become
heavy users. Why have these companies come to Russia? To calm
Russian customers and foreign companies already in Russia. People
are beginning to access reliable information. Bureaucrats from the
highest offices are trying to sell information to anyone. Of course,
they are cautious, but are selling it to fill their own private coffers.
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In Russia, private information networks have already appeared.
One of the owners, Vladimir Gusinski, created a network through the
financing of his private banking group called MOST (which means
‘‘bridge’’ in Russian), and also participated in the creation of two
other private banks, Stolichniy and National Credit. The information
network already includes one of the major television channels and
the newspaper Segodnya (which means ‘‘today’’ in Russian). Network management signed an agreement to exchange information
with Reuters and CNN. Gusinsky tried to create an American-style
news magazine, like Time, and negotiated with Time-Warner.
YAR Communications, Inc., headed by Yuri Radzievski, is another
company working to provide accurate and up-to-date information
to Russian and American clients. Operating since 1975, YAR works
through its network of personal and professional contacts, to act as
a guide and consult its clients interested in establishing themselves
in the Russian marketplace. It also works with the Russian media on
ways to receive more attention from the West.

Public Sources of Information
Of course, companies themselves are a source, although the information will be neither complete nor completely reliable. To verify information, of if you are unsure of the type of company and future
partner you seek, several places offer information, and should all be
utilized. Different federal government ministries and agencies, such
as the Central Statistical Bureau, Committee for State Property
Management (the State Committee for Privatization), and any ministry or committee responsible for the industry or area in which you
are interested, should be contacted.
On the federal level, there is the Russian Federal Social-Economic
and Scientific-Technical Forecast. In 1993, the forecast was developed until the year 2010, and is regularly updated. Each ministry has
its own program for future development of industries and services,
and usually includes a portion on international cooperation for investment and international trade.
One must also consider the regional level, where much information is available. All major regions and autonomous republics have
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regional programs, which are more strongly oriented toward social
programs. A substantial amount of information is included, and you
will understand the direction of the regional government and its future plans, and where it will be supportive of your efforts. All this
information is free.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS A
BOOMING BUSINESS: EVEN
SIBERIA IS WITHIN REACH
Before the fall of communism, the Soviet Union was cut off from
the world community, not just politically and economically, but also
through vital communications links. Telephone connections with the
world were the privilege of very few organizations and people.
Through 1988, the Soviet Union had only 15 telephone channels
available for international use. Furthermore, all operated through
one international telephone station in Moscow, built in 1980 before
the Olympic Games.
Telecommunications companies wanting to do business in Russia
have an ongoing problem: a lack of information about the country’s
development in this area. This is a residual effect of the Soviet system, when communications were under the tight control of the KGB
and the military. As a result, almost all communications information
was secret. To cause further confusion, published statistics were deliberately falsified to mislead Soviet ‘‘imperialist enemies,’’ most notably the United States.

After 1988, the Economic Relationship Between the USSR and
the U.S. Made It Vital for Telecommunications Links Between
the Two Regions to Be Built
Establishing a telecommunications infrastructure became a priority
of Soviet leaders in 1989, and foreign cooperation began. Because of
its lack of capital and investment, as well as the fact that its isolation
had left it trailing behind technological advances, the Soviet Union
did not have the resources to bring about the necessary changes.
Today, more than 80 foreign companies are participating in Russia’s
telecommunications industry.
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 11 (August 1994).
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Competition Is Heating Up
Telecommunications companies immediately recognized the potential, and currently all major worldwide players are participating in
the Russian market. Competition is strong especially in Moscow, St.
Petersburg, and the Tymen region (the richest oil and gas region in
the world).
One of the first successful telecommunications companies to participate was Sprint. It developed a relationship with the telecommunications division of the Russian military-industrial complex and
gained access to its former military satellite. Other companies developed ventures with the Soviet monopoly, the USSR Ministry of
Communication.
Besides Sprint, other American companies currently working in
Russia include: AT&T, Motorola, IDB Communications Group,
GTE, US West, MCI, DirectNet Telecommunications, FGI Wireless, IBCS (International Business Communications Systems), Alaskan Pacific Rim Telecommunications, Andrew Corporation, ABD,
Axis Communications, Inc., Belcom, Inc., Global One, Midcom,
Millicom International Cellular (a subsidiary of Motorola), and Newbridge Networks.
American companies face tremendous competition from foreign
companies, like Cable and Wireless, Italtel, Norwegian Telecom, Alcatel, France Telecom, Korea Teleco, Bosch Group, Duetchebundespos Telecom, PTT Telecom of Netherlands, Telecom Denmark, and
Ericcson of Sweden, to name a few.

The Current State of Infrastructure
In Russia, telecommunications is divided into two sections: companies that manufacture equipment and companies that provide services. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, foreign
telecommunications companies were faced with the breakdown of
the communications systems on a regional basis.
These former Soviet Republics are now trying to work directly with
foreign companies to build the infrastructure to permit services,
rather than depend on Russia for transmission. But the technological
developments have been minimal. Even today, most telecommuni-
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cations signals from abroad go to Moscow before being transmitted
to the Republics.
Most of the Former Soviet Republics Did Not Have Their
Own Satellites and Relied on Russia for Transmission
Rural areas are less developed than the metropolitan areas, have
fewer telephones per capita, and technology is outdated. A major
problem is access to state-of-the-art digital long distance and international connections. Only 5% of long distance telephone stations
operate on a digital level, while the remaining operate on the far less
sophisticated analog level. According to the plan of the Ministry of
Communication, by the year 2000, more than 40% of metropolitan
lines, and more than 70% of international long distance lines, will be
developed digitally.
Obtaining a License
To receive a telecommunications license, companies must apply to
the Ministry of Communication. However, only 70 percent of the
established lines are under the control of the ministry. The other 30
percent is controlled by departments such as the military-industrial
complex, the railroad and forest ministries, and the department of
the sea fleet.
Up to now more than 400 licenses have been issued to domestic
and foreign companies. There are different types of licenses: local
service, long distance, international, fiber optic, cable, mobile telephone systems, cellular, and even satellite. Still others have licenses
for production, or to work on joint ventures with the current major
producers of telecommunications equipment, such as Telecom of
Moscow. This company works with 270 former state-owned producers.
Conversion of Military Systems
In order to estimate how much money is needed to develop Russia’s
communications systems, it is necessary to consider the dozens of
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military satellites that could be converted to civilian use, and the
millions of telecommunications channels not under the control of
the Ministry of Communications. These include radio-relay systems,
Russian-made mobile systems (duplex and simplex-based technologies and fiber optic systems).
Projects in Process
The typical method for participation in the Russian market is a joint
venture with Russian partners. A Russian partner is usually a stateowned company, or a local, long distance, or international telephone
station (there are only three). At the same time, some companies are
creating wholly owned subsidiaries in Russia, joint-venturing with
Western partners, or buying out the shares of their Russian partner.
Several Major Projects Currently in Development Will
Strengthen International Connections with Russia
and the World
One project is called 50/50. It will connect Seoul, South Korea,
Tokyo, and the Russian Pacific Coast. In the south, it will connect
Italy, Istanbul, and Novorossiysk, on the Russian Black Sea Coast.
Another project connecting Copenhagen with St. Petersburg and
Moscow has a fiber-optics line with 15,360 channels. Of this line
1,250 kilometers are underneath the Baltic Sea. This creates three
automated international telephone stations, one in St. Petersburg
and two in Moscow, with the total capacity for 4,800 channels. Telecom Denmark is active in this project, as is the Great Nordic Telegraph Company (GNTC). The Russian partner of this project is the
joint-stock company Intertelecom which spent half a billion rubles.
The total expenses of the foreign partners GNTC and US West for
these projects have been $123 million.
Business Services Improve
All this activity has a positive effect on businesses in the CIS. Just
two years ago, making a telephone call was difficult. Today, the situa-
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tion is greatly improved not only for telephones but for all communications equipment. From more than 50 cities, including Krasnoyarsk,
and Siberia, calls can be placed directly to the United States and
Europe.
This situation will continue to improve and will greatly facilitate
conducting business throughout the CIS and in the world at large.

WRECK THE INFORMATION
FLOW AND THE ECONOMY
COLLAPSES
‘‘It is easier to break the Berlin Wall than the wall of mistrust between
people.’’
Leading Soviet economist Vladimir Kvint believes that the economic
effects of all government decisions must be considered by politicians—apparently a radical concept in the Soviet Union.
‘‘Economic evaluation of all political decisions must, in the future,
be absolutely necessary. Otherwise the politicians are not responsible,’’ he said.
Siberian-born Kvint is one of the reform-minded economists who
have emerged during the glasnost period and are intimately connected with the development of perestroika.
A professor of economics, Kvint is vice chairman of the Academy
of Sciences Council for Regional Economy and is one the editorial
staff of the leading economic journal, Eco. He is now devoting all his
time to seeking out joint ventures and arranging educational facilities for East–West traders.
He is scathing in his condemnation of the ways in which authoritarianism has distorted information flows and crippled economic development.
‘‘We still have such an archaic institution as the main Bureau for
Protection of Secrets in the Media,’’ he said. ‘‘It is practically a ministry of censorship—it is that powerful—and it should have been abolished.’’
Such institutions and a traditional fear of free flows of information
have hampered the introduction of new technology. Kvint says the
Soviets are not lagging in computer theory but are at least 15 years
behind in getting computers into the workplace.
Despite descriptions of far-reaching reform at the top levels, he
says that official data, when they are available, are often misleading.
‘‘From many years of tyranny the people learned to think one
Austrian Business and Economy, 2, No. 3 (January 1990), 54.
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thing, say something else, and do another. The state won the secrecy
battle. But it was a Pyrrhic victory.
‘‘Society was killing itself; it was stagnating. An absence of true
information distorted public opinion and people got used to lying. It
is an awful habit, very difficult to do away with.
‘‘To a great extent this problem still exists. One cannot believe
basic data provided by the government.’’
Compounding these problems is an almost complete lack of information hardware. The lack of computers is just an indicator of the
underlying problem. There are very few telephones installed and
hardly any fax machines.
‘‘We do not make fax machines and, unlike the United States, we
do not have the hard cash to buy them.’’
It is also often difficult or time-consuming to book long-distance
or international telephone calls. The most reliable form of communication is telex, but the machines are few, and there is often considerable demand for them.
Professor Kvint says not only have the barriers to communications
limited the flow of facts; they have also led to misleading and incorrect
theories. The staggering extent of the isolation imposed by the 70 years
of authoritarianism is demonstrated by the country’s academics.
‘‘There are just 900 full professors of economics in all of the Soviet
Union. Ninety percent of them would not know the works of the
Nobel prize winners.’’
Somewhat defensively Kvint points out that Western economists
also know little about Soviet economics and says they often make
odd comments and forecasts.
While he is confident that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will
survive, he says that the economic crisis evolving in that nation will
peak in the first half of this year.
‘‘Economically the next six months are going to be the worst; the
coming year is going to be very difficult,’’ he says.
He will not offer an opinion on whether that survival will be
achieved through commitment to reform or through a retreat to
more traditional Soviet rule.
‘‘He lives in a very complicated time. He continually balances between the wish for reform and the wish for stability,’’ he says. ‘‘But,
it is impossible to go ahead always looking back. People do not understand that, for a new economy to be born, we must say good-bye
to the old.’’

RED MILITARY TIME MACHINE
WORKS FOR CAPITALISM:
SECRET DOORS OPEN ONTO
PRIVATIZATION OF THE RUSSIAN
MILITARY
For 70 years, the largest country in the world spent almost all of its
resources on its military industries. Ostensibly, these expenditures
were to protect the Soviet Union’s communist achievements. In fact,
they funded the most potentially dangerous aggression in the history
of mankind.
When the military prevailed, the Soviet Union was a country of
secrets. Everything was a secret—even the size of cemeteries and the
number of military trucks. Road signs were, and still are, frequently
misleading to guard this secret world against the intrusion of foreigners.
The Soviet Union’s huge, technologically advanced military-industrial complex was known worldwide for its achievements—the
first Sputnik, the first human being in space, the first nuclear power
station, and the first nuclear icebreaker. Imagine, then, how many
less significant secrets are still being kept by this vast, fading complex.
One can compare this military system with that of the United
States to get a sense of its scope. However, while the U.S. maintains
strong military alliances with Germany, the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, and other global powers, the Soviet Union’s strongest
military alliance was with . . . Poland, despite its acknowledged military parity with the U.S. Now, 85% of this military complex belongs
to Russia. And recent legislation in Russia is opening up this military-industrial complex for privatization and investment from the
West.
How much was spent on developing this military? The CIA estiThe Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 3 (1993).
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mated that 7%–11% of the Soviet Union’s annual budget was spent
on the military, but this figure was far from reality. By my evaluation,
Gorbachev, jumping out of his trousers to compete with Reagan’s
and Bush’s military expenditures, actually increased military spending from 35% of the annual budget in 1985 to more than 50% in
1990. Practically speaking, this level of spending would be sufficient
for a country in a state of war. Of course, it was one of the factors
that destroyed the Soviet Union.

Secret Doors Begin to Open
While the military was cloaked in secrecy, the mounting needs of
the people could not be kept secret. Russian leaders are now trying
to sell off parts of the military in order to address more immediate
problems, such as food shortages. By a lucky chance for mankind,
Russia now hopes to convert this vast military-industrial complex to
civilian purposes. However, without cooperation from the West, this
tremendous potential will not be realized.
To facilitate this, President Boris Yeltsin issued decree 噛1267 on
August 19, 1993: ‘‘About Specifies of Privatization and Additional
Measures of State Regulation of Enterprises of the Military Production Industry.’’ It was not meant for press disclosure, and was issued
with a high level of confidentiality. The highlights of the decree are
presented here, exclusively for our readers, because of their importance for Russian and foreign investors. A list of 477 state-owned
companies (military production plants and scientific institutes) that
are slated for privatization was also issued.
The disruption of old connections between state-owned plants, an
early by-product of the transition to a market economy, has increased supply problems and created a surplus of unfinished goods
(work in progress). The present government is trying to stabilize the
situation, but the development of a new economic mechanism will
take time.
Russian officials are clear that in order to maintain the production
level of industrial giants and convert military plants for civilian use,
they need cooperation from the West. With Western managerial
skills and experience, this giant time machine can become the critical instrument in the development of a free market economy.

privatization of the russian military

491

What Does This Decree Mean for Foreigners?
President Yeltsin decreed that at the end of November, the government of Russia would release the list of companies that will undergo
privatization on January 1, 1994. Foreign companies that are interested in investing in particular regions, industries, or companies now
have a list of business possibilities. These companies represent the
military segments of the following industries: aviation, special chemicals for production, arms, telecommunications, hardware, radio,
missiles and space equipment, electronics, and shipbuilding.
1. In point 噛5, the decree states that the executive government
bodies, especially the Committee for Military Industries and the
Committee for State Property Management, must give special incentives to encourage foreign investment.
2. This decree also mandates that all military plants undergoing
the process of privatization must first be converted to joint-stock
companies. The Russian State agrees to take upon itself all responsibility for the debt of these companies. The decree further also mandates that a portion of the shares (approximately 20%) must belong
to the state for at least three years. This means that in three years
foreigners who initially bought stock could purchase additional
shares that belonged to the state.
3. Shares will be sold only at special interregional auctions. The
State Committee for Military Industries will publish information regarding auctions in a special newsletter.
4. Even after the transformation of state-owned military plants to
joint-stock companies, the executive director of the company
(whether Russian or foreign) is the only person who can receive a
special registered certificate from the Russian government which attests to his qualifications.
5. Any Russian plant that wants to produce weapons must receive
a special license to do so from the Committee for Military Industries.
One of the best examples of military plant conversion has been
the creation of the joint-stock company Motek. One of the plants of
this company has been producing missiles (known in the United
States as Ss-20). Now, this plant manufactures the following civilian
products:
• 40-foot refrigeration containers at international quality standards;
• mini-plants for production of fast-frozen vegetables and fruits; and
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• mini-plants for initial processing of flax.

Motek expects that its refrigeration containers will be competitive
with those of the American company SeaCold. Soon Motek’s containers will also be traded in Latin America and the Middle East.
Motek is open to cooperation with Western partners. Its telephone
number in Moscow is 095–209–5474.
To illustrate the crucial importance of military conversion, the Demidov Award, which had not been awarded in 125 years, was recently
reestablished. Named for the famous 18th-century Russian merchant
and entrepreneur, it recognizes achievements in economics and entrepreneurship. The last time it was awarded was in 1867.
In November, the Demidov Award was given to Anatoly Karpov
(no relation to the chess player), the Director-General of a former
military chemical plant. Under his leadership, a conversion strategy
was developed and implemented so that it now produces household
chemicals. (The head of the committee that issues this award is Dr.
Alexander Granberg.)
Here is my conclusion: Military facilities are unusually wellequipped plants with high technology, modern real estate, and
highly educated engineers and workers. Cooperation with these
plants will give foreign businesses numerous opportunities. In 1994,
foreigners will gain new access to the process of privatization and
conversion of the military.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
RUSSIA’S METALLURGY
INDUSTRY
The Soviet Union was, and Russia continues to be, the world’s
largest producer of iron, steel, almost all major heavy nonferrous
metals, and platinum, and one of the leading producers of gold. In
former days, the entire metallurgy industry, including the black and
nonferrous metals, was given special priority because it was a basic
necessity of the military industrial complex.
The Soviet Union’s totalitarian economic mechanism, however,
was not oriented toward the implementation of both scientific and
technical advancements even in the lucrative metals area. During
the 1980s, industrial technology in the Soviet Union fell far behind
modern levels in developed countries throughout the world. Even
the many technological achievements of Soviet scientists were not
put into practice, except abroad. For example, Russian engineers developed continuous casting methods, but in the Russian black metals industry, it is used in only 25% of production and in the United
States in about 80% of production.
With the gradual opening of the Russian market in 1987 and
1988, Russian and foreign investors became interested in working
cooperatively. As the first step, Russian companies began utilizing
the know-how of Western technologists to produce a wider range
and better quality of metals and products.

World Markets Feel the Effect
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the
central authorities started to lose their power over metal producers.
As a result, metallurgy plants started searching for cooperation from
Western partners to market their metals abroad and generate hard
The Kvint Newsletter, 1, No. 12 (September 1994).
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currency flow. Decentralization, along with its positive results, also
created many problems in terms of the non-regulated export of Russian metals, very often at prices that bordered on dumping. This
had a tremendous influence on world markets for steel (especially
technology steel), aluminum, nickel, and many other nonferrous
metals. The world was also concerned about Russia’s policy on platinum exports. Unlike other countries that have only small reserves,
the Russian state owns the world’s largest platinum reserve.

Western Technologies Are Adopted
In the last few years, cooperation between major Russian and foreign
players has taken on more stable forms, such as joint production and
marketing arrangements. Companies throughout the world, such as
Alcoa, ASARCO, Engelhard, Gerald Metals, and Sabin of the United
States; INCO and Falcombridge of Canada; Outokumpu of Finland,
Kwinana of Australia, and many more have become very active in
the Russian market, through buying metal products as well as by
purchasing shares in Russian companies.
Alcoa, one of the world’s largest aluminum companies, has a longterm strategy and several goals with respect to the aluminum market
in Russia. The first is to create favorable conditions for buying aluminum products in Russia. The company is currently purchasing at
least 30% of the output of the three largest aluminum plants in the
world, in Bratsk, Irkutsk, and Krasnoyarsk (all in eastern Siberia).
Alcoa’s second priority is to sell alumina to Russia, the raw material required for aluminum production. With very few natural reserves of its own, Russia needs Alcoa to help regulate its market.
With the help of companies like Alcoa, Alcan, and Trans-World Metals, Russian aluminum will enter the international market at optimal
prices, thus avoiding a flood on the marketplace. Finally, Alcoa is
looking to create joint ventures in Russia—through, for example, its
Norwegian subsidiary, Elceim.
The heavy metals in Russia, such as nickel, cobalt, and copper are
also attracting the attention of the international community. For
example, the Norilsk Mining and Metallurgical Company in Russia,
the world’s largest producer of nickel, cobalt, and platinum, has created a joint venture with Axel Johnson in London for marketing
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nickel. Meanwhile, Engelhard, the platinum producer, user, and
marketer, is also in a position to play an important role in regulating
the flow of platinum from Russia.
Platinum Eases the Deficit
Unlike Russia’s gold reserves, which Gorbachev depleted in an effort
to build up the military complex, Russia has substantial state reserves of platinum. It is in Russia’s best interest to sell platinum on
the world market, to ease the deficits of its budget and acquire hard
currency. Russian executives in the industry know, however, that
once they enter the marketplace, world prices will be driven down
and the platinum and palladium markets destroyed.
One way to avoid this would be to use this metal as collateral to
put in foreign banks; another is to give it to an international bank in
exchange for hard currency. In this way, Russia could use its platinum reserves to buttress its economy without upsetting the balance
of the marketplace.
The unregulated flow of Russian rare metals into the marketplace
decreased their value substantially over the past few years. This is
also true with isotopes of osmium, a very expensive metal used in
the nuclear industry, as well as lead. After the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, Russia’s import of lead increased by 80%, mostly on
the basis of barter and contract trade (from $3 billion), all of which
comes from Kazakstan, which has the good fortune of sitting on one
of the world’s richest lead reserves.
ASARCO is working with Russia, Kazakstan, and Uzbekistan with
regard to copper and lead. In lead there is a net surplus of 120,000
tons (mostly from Kazakstan), and this has had an effect on world
prices.
The republic of Kazakstan also produces large amounts of nonferrous metals such as copper, zinc, and precious metals. Kazakstan is
exporting these resources to countries like China in exchange for
much-needed hard currency. Another republic with major metals is
Uzbekistan, which has the world’s largest gold mine, Murentau.
A Willing Marketplace
Russia desperately needs foreign investors to supply modern technology and know-how, and escalate it into a world contender in the
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metals marketplace. Russia boasts inexpensive facilities to produce
aluminum, but those will lie fallow without the required raw materials.

Lithuania Sets an Example
Another way to participate is to follow Lithuania’s example: In
1992–93 Lithuania was one of the most important exporters of copper, nickel, and rare metals. But Lithuania did not produce any of
these metals. Lithuanian entrepreneurs bought metal from Russian
companies that had high-quality product but no international contracts, and immediately reexported these metals to the world market
at a high price. American entrepreneurs can learn from Lithuania’s
example and approach Russia’s nonferrous metal market.
With the end of privatization’s voucher system in the Russian
economy in July 1994, Western companies were allowed the chance
to privatize Russian state-owned companies for relatively small sums
of money. International metals firms now have new opportunities to
increase profits and their influence on world metal markets.

WILL RUSSIA BE THE CHIEF OIL
SOURCE OF THE FUTURE?
The northern and eastern regions of Russia contain enormous reserves of oil and gas. And they are much closer to the U.S. than the
Middle East is.
The Persian Gulf war demonstrated forcefully how dangerous it is
for the rest of the world to depend on Middle Eastern oil. But there
exists another huge untapped oil reserve that has largely eluded the
attention of the West: Siberia produces more oil than Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, and Iraq combined.
Siberia is a treasure trove of resources: gas, coal, nonferrous metals, timber, and hydroenergy resources abound in Siberia and far
eastern Russia. Production of these resources will, in the not-so-distant future, lead to the formation of important new economic and
business centers. These regions are, in fact, far closer to the U.S.
than the Middle East is—oil could be transported in two nights from
Siberia to the western U.S.
Siberia is the main producer of Russian oil and gas. Today it produces almost 80% of Russian oil and 90% of Russian natural gas. The
European north of Russia, the Urals, and the Volga area produce 11%
of Russian oil, while Eastern Siberia and the Far East together yield
only 1%.
By the year 2000, however, Eastern Siberia and far eastern Russia
will rank second in oil production. By then, the cream will have been
skimmed off the west Siberian oil fields, and production will move
to virgin lands—the northern regions of Yamal, Gydan, and Tazov
peninsulas.
This geographical shift is important because it will change the
nature of investment. Over the years, the central and southern regions of Western Siberia were rendered quite habitable. Living in
most difficult conditions, Soviet workers built railroads, communications, and cities. There is no such infrastructure in northern Siberia;
nearly half the investment made in that area will have to go into
transportation and basic services.
‘‘Siberian Hoard,’’ Institutional Investor (April 1991).
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Western Siberia has different problems, which will necessitate different expenditures. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet administration invested in oil production while completely disregarding the
ecological needs of the region. Only 0.5% of the total investment
went into conservation. Now, in order to repair some of the damage
already done, more than 10% of future investment will have to go to
conserve the ecology of the area. An investment in more sophisticated and less ecologically harmful technologies will, however, pay
back over the long term. In 1990 each oil well yielded only 20% of its
potential production. More sophisticated drilling technologies could
improve that recovery significantly.
The rich oil deposits of eastern Siberia are deeper than those of
west Siberia, which will mean higher drilling costs. In the north, onethird of all oil reserves are in the seas of the Arctic ocean—another
expensive drilling problem.
In spite of all these additional exploration and production expenses, however, according to my calculations, it will be three to five
times cheaper to bring oil and condensed gas from these regions to
the U.S. than from the Middle East to the U.S.
A gradual relocation of oil production to the North and the East
fits in with the overall forecasts for world economic development,
which is shifting its center to the Pacific Rim.
The oil fields in the Arctic Ocean should go into production in
the years 2000 to 2015, at which time the ocean will become an
important transportation artery. Russia will be the only country with
experience with this kind of transportation—a year-round cargo delivery system has been operating for ten years from Arkhangel’sk to
Dudinka with the help of icebreakers.
By the year 2000, Eastern Siberia and the Russian Far East will be
yielding more than 140 million barrels of oil each year, as well as
billions of cubic feet of natural gas. These figures presuppose little
help from abroad. If countries with modern equipment and technologies, such as the U.S., Japan, Canada, and others, were to participate in the development of these fields, production would proceed
at a much greater rate.

PROBLEMS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
NONFERROUS METAL INDUSTRY
IN SIBERIA
(with P. K. Vovk and N. F. Orel)
Siberia has vast raw material resources. In addition to huge resources
of timber, oil, natural gas, nonferrous metals, and other minerals,
85% of the country’s (the USSR) coal deposits, and 60% of all its
water resources are concentrated here.
Developing these resources is a key strategic goal of the state’s
economic policy. In the 10th five-year period alone, Siberia’s industrial output is to go up 1.5-fold.
Siberia’s development on such a large scale has become possible
because of the country’s powerful material and technological base,
which is capable of ensuring high rates of industrial growth and increased labor productivity.
Areas east of the Urals contain 82% of potential water power and
85% of their technical potential.
Siberia and the Far East have the country’s greatest power capacity.
However, the country’s historical background is responsible for Siberia’s imbalances in the field of developing fuel and raw-material
resources, on the one hand, and processing and manufacturing industries, on the other.
Given the current state of geological prospecting, Siberia has the
largest areas with promising reserves of mineral wealth. Of national
significance here are its resources of coal, nickel, cobalt, copper, lead,
rock salt, common mica, graphite, oil, gas, and magnesite.
Siberia’s resources of apatite, zinc, phosphorite, alumina. asbestos,
In Problems in the Development of the Non-Ferrous Metal Industry in Siberia (Novosibirsk, USSR: Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1980), pp.
3–16.
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gold, iron ores, antimony, mercury, and rare metals are of significance for the entire area. The existence of large-scale deposits of
different minerals is an advantage in Siberia’s ore and mineral development, and is the foundation for the emergence of sizable territorial-production complexes, with the power and mining industries
playing a major part.
The basic trend in the siting of nonferrous metal industries is to
site them even further in the country’s eastern regions, with their
highly effective raw-materials and power resources. The development of the aluminum industry in Siberia is a key economic endeavor.
The production of alumina and aluminum is centered mainly in
Eastern Siberia (at the Bratsk, Irkutsk, and Krasnoyarsk aluminum
plants, and the Achinsk alumina plant); the Sayany aluminum plant
is under construction; the Novokuznetsk aluminum plant is currently operating in Western Siberia.
The disproportions in the location of alumina and aluminum
plants necessitates transporting alumina from the European part of
the country to Siberia and the reverse delivery of finished products.
According to VAMI (USSR Aluminum Research Institute) estimates, the production of aluminum in Eastern Siberia reduces the
cost of electricity 4.5 times, compared with the same costs in the
European part of the country, and 2 to 3 times, compared with the
Urals, while the total savings in production costs per ton of aluminum, compared with the average costs for the industry, amounts to
20%. The effectiveness of producing aluminum in Siberia is evident
from the falling share of capital investments and the increasing volume of aluminum production, as compared with that of the country
in general.
While the share of aluminum production in Siberia in the country’s overall volume of production for 1980 increased by 7.3% as
against 1970, the share of capital investments in developing aluminum production in Siberia as against those invested throughout the
country will decrease by 10%.
Aluminum plants in Siberia are working with delivered raw materials and, to an extent, with Achinsk alumina (at the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant). The draft plan for 1975–1980 foresees completion of
construction at the Achinsk alumina combine, and when full opera-
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tion begins, it will provide nearly one-third of the needs of aluminum
plants.
In the last five-year-plan period, the first unit of the Kiya-Shaltyrsky mine for the strip production of nepheline was put into operation
in the Kemerovo region. Its capacities will fully provide the Achinsk
alumina combine with raw material.
Three Siberian aluminum plants, the country’s latest—Bratsk,
Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk—are equipped with state-of-the-art technology.
The Bratsk and Krasnoyark aluminum plants, now in a stage of
initial development, are the world’s largest.
Although the region under consideration has only two plants in
full operation (Novokuznetsk and Irkutsk), it plays a major part in
the country’s overall aluminum production.
In the 10th five-year period the final facilities will be put into
operation at the Bratsk and Krasnoyarsk aluminum plants, and the
Sayany plant will be completed. The Achinsk alumina plant will
begin operating, and an additional unit will be completed at the
Irkutsk aluminum plant.
These new aluminum plants will take their place as integral elements of the regional production complexes, thus showing the advantages of cooperation.
Along with the Sayany plant now under construction and the Chulym aluminum plant in Achinsk-Nazarov industrial center, a new aluminum plant will go up either in the Angara region in Krasnoyarsk
Territory or in the Tomsk region.
With the aim of developing economic integration within the
CMEA framework, the consttruction of an aluminum plant near
Ust-Ilimsk is now under discussion. The project will be financed by
Bulgaria, Hungary, GDR, Poland, and CSSR.
The scope of aluminum production in the region for the 1975–
1995 period will require capital investments way above those allocated in the 9th five-year period. This is due, among other reasons,
to:
• the need to channel substantial means for construction projects
that failed to be started in the 9th five-year period; and
• the growing cost estimates for construction work, with the transition to more capital-consuming production and the setting up at
several plants of rolling-stock production.
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The size of the workforce at factories of the aluminum sub-industry has been determined by VAMI institute, based on the step-bystep introduction of scientific and technical improvements and the
rates of growth in labor productivity, which will are expected to increase 1.7-fold.
The projected growth of aluminum production in the region will
be achieved through the renovation and expansion of the plants currently in operation and the construction of new ones.
Siberia’s aluminum industry has all the resources for increasing
the rates of growth of metal output: economical power sources, redesigned technology, and highly efficient use of metal.
The absence of a reliable raw-material base for the production of
aluminum is an unfortunate shortcoming, and this makes the need
to find effective aluminum raw materials in Siberia a priority.
There are great prospects in store for the development of the copper-nickel and cobalt industry in the area. The greater part of the
country’s nickel and cobalt resources and a considerable part of its
copper resources are concentrated in the Norilsk mine. With the
discovery of the Talnakh deposits, and the October deposits in particular, the country has a unique mining area, rich in copper-nickel
ores, cobalt, and platinum metals, whose economic significance can
readily be compared with the oil–gas region in Western Siberia.
With its reserves of nickel and other metals, the Norilsk region has
acquired unique significance and is unmatched on a world scale. The
mining is carried on by the large-scale Norilsk mining combine
named after Zavenyagin. In its production volume, the combine is
the largest complex in the nonferrous metal industry in Siberia and
the country as a whole.
The development of Talnakh and October mines, the introduction
of more efficient technology at the Norilsk enterprises, and the further development of technology will raise the output in the basic
metals while achieving a high return on capital investments.
The economic effect nationally from the expansion of the Norilsk
combine will increase substantially with the construction at Abakan
of plants for processing nonferrous metals using the products of Norilsk mining combine.
The expediency of locating plants for processing nonferrous metals in Krasnoyarsk is underscored by the need to bring them closer
to the consumers: plants in the Sayany territory production complex,
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which will incorporate a range of plants and industries, as well as in
the Western Siberian and Far East economic regions.
Considerable savings in transportation costs for delivering rolled
stock to consumers will be achieved through the locating of plants
at Abakan, as compared with the cost of rolled-stock deliveries from
the European regions to those in Siberia and the Far East, and
through the lower electricity cost.
The growth in the volume of nonferrous metals at the combine
will be achieved through:
• the comprehensive mechanization and automation of work processes, based on radically new technology and highly efficient machinery adapted to conditions of the North, in open cast mining,
technological transportation, and metallurgy;
• the removal and processing of concentrated raw materials in more
favorable areas using low-cost electricity.

The combine ‘‘Tuvakobalt,’’ located in Tuva ASSR, is Siberia’s second nickel-cobalt plant. It has been working since 1970 on nickelcobalt ores of Khovy-Aksynsky deposits, producing nickel and cobalt
in cobalt concentrate which is transported for further processing to
the Afaleev combine. Because the deposits at Khovu-Aksyn, which
are the sole raw-material base for the combine, have not been confirmed, the combine is no longer under consideration for large-scale
development. But if confirmed, the deposits, projected to be first
rate, may provide the combine with more material.
Great importance has been attached to the development of the
Udokan deposits. Without building the Udokan ore-concentrating
combine, it is absolutely impossible to satisfy the country’s needs for
copper.
Construction work on the Udokan combine will be started only
after the railway line Tynda–Chara–BAM begins to operate, even on
a temporary basis.
To ensure large-scale construction work on the combine, it would
be necessary, beginning in 1985, to lay down every possible prerequisite: to complete detailed prospecting to confirm the existing reserves, study the concentrating properties of the ores, and work out
the technological documentation for the project’s construction work.
The possibility of attracting foreign capital to finance the Udokan
combine has been investigated, with the goal of installing a full min-
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ing-metallurgical production cycle. Loans for financing the project
may be used to achieve the quickest development of the ore deposits.
The lead and zinc industry in Western Siberia is represented by
the Zolotushin and Salair mining boards, and the Belovsky zinc
plant; in Eastern Siberia, by the Nerchinsky and Khancheranginsky
combines.
The capacities of the lead and zinc ore-concentrating combines of
Siberia constitute but a small proportion of the capacities of all the
plants in the industry. The lead and zinc industry of Western Siberia
is concentrated in the Kemerovo region and is represented by Salair
mine, with its ore-concentrating mill, and the Belovsky zinc plant.
The lead concentrates produced at the Salair enterprise are delivered to plants in Kazakstan; the zinc concentrates go to the Belovsky
zinc plant; the baryta concentrate, to the oil-processing industry.
Renovation of the Belovsky zinc plant now in operation can be
regarded as the first step of the new metallurgical complex for the
production of zinc, sulfuric acid, and, eventually, lead.
The existing lead and zinc plants of Eastern Siberia are not too
promising because of the poor quality of their ores and their small
size.
At present, prospecting for new ore deposits is under way in Siberia, though resources may be increased at the existing deposit sites.
The development of a large-scale raw-material base for lead and
zinc is a priority. It calls for extensive prospecting for new deposits
in the areas north of Lake Baikal and in the zone of influence near
the BAM railway now under construction.
The development of Siberia’s lead and zinc industry will be based
on the deposits at Gorevsky (Krasnoyarsk Territory), Kyzyl-Tashtyg
(Tuva ASSR), Ozerny (Buryat ASSR), Novo-Shirokinsky (Chita region), and Zmeinogorsky (Altai region), and further prospecting will
be influenced by the value of these deposits. Though all four will be
of interest in the 1980–2000 period, special emphasis will be placed
on the Gorevskoye deposits of lead and zinc ores, the largest in the
Soviet Union and one of the four largest in the world.
The transport, industrial, and hydroelectric power construction
projects planned for the lower reaches of the Angara River will promote the development of these deposits.
Although the deposits are located under the Angara riverbed,
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studies and estimates show that they are technologically workable
and economically expedient. The enterprise built on the basis of
Gorevskoye deposits will be distinguished for its high technological
and economic results and profitability, the cost of the concentrate
being 2.5–3 times above that at the country’s operating enterprises.
To provide the Gorevskoye enterprise with the most efficient
transportation, the construction of the Abalakovo–Kirgitai–Usovo
railway line, with two bridge crossings at the Strelka Andan extension
along the Tatarka River valley, is a priority. This variant is more conducive to the task of developing the natural resources along the lower
reaches of the Angara River (forests, magnesite, iron ore, talc) and
will contribute to the solution of transportation problems at the Gorevskoye deposits.
Among other large deposits of polymetal ores in the Angara–
Yenisey area is the Kyzyl–Tashtyg site in Tuva ASSR. Technological
and economic estimates testify to the highly beneficial prospects of
working this site.
The reserves of ores at the Gorevskoye, Kyzyl-Tashtyg and Ozerny
(Buryat ASSR) deposits make it possible to set up in Siberia a huge
chemical and metallurgical complex for the production of lead, zinc,
and sulfuric acid, and, on this basis, phosphate fertilizer.
Siberia’s molybdenum industry will be enhanced by the construction of new facilities on the basis of the deposits proapected at Zhirikensky, Orekitkansky, and Bugdainsky, and by expanding those
already in operation: the Sorsky combine, now under renovation and
the Dzhidinsky tungsten combine. Though Siberia’s molybdenum
plants are well provided for by rich ore deposits, they bring in average
economic results.
The new tungsten deposits now being developed will be workable
for a long period of time and are noted for their economic effect.
The country’s tin production is concentrated chiefly in the Far
East. In Eastern Siberia (Chita region) only the Sherlovogorsky combine is in operation, based on the Sherlovgorsky tin deposits. Though
they can be listed among the country’s largest, the practical development of these deposits, has failed to confirm the initially estimated
reserves. In the future Siberia’s tin industry will not be of much
significance for the country’s industry as a whole.
The Tuyim plant for the processing of nonferrous metals, going
up on the base of the Tuyim mining board in Khakass Autonomous
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Region, is the only plant of its kind in Siberia and the Far East. The
placing of the plant in this area favors the marketing of the finished
product (Siberia and the Far East do not have a single plant for the
processing of nonferrous metals), and its convenient location is easily
supplied with the initial raw materials.
The large reserves of nickel and copper in Norilsk ensure stable
deliveries of raw materials for many years to come.
According to estimates made by specialized institutes, with the
placing of plants in Tuva and possibly with time in Abakan, the overall savings in transportation costs for raw materials and finished
product will amount annually to 5 million rubles as compared with
their siting in the European part of the country.
Siberia has insignificant fluorite resources. Fluorite is mined and
dressed at the Kalanguisk mining board (Chita region). The concentrate is transported to metallurgical, cement, chemical, and other
enterprises outside the region.
Besides, the Kyakhtin fluorite mine, which has an unsufficient
raw-material base, is operated in Buryat ASSR.
For the mine’s concentration mill, the basic material is ore imported from the Mongolian People’s Republic.
As the outlook for any significant increase in the volume of fluorite
production in these regions is poor, prospecting for new deposits will
be of special importance.
The projected rates of development for Siberia’s nonferrous metal
industry will be achieved by building a range of new companies on
the basis of developing further the mining facilities in operation and
newly prospected deposits.
However, putting new deposits and enterprises into operation is
linked with the solution of several industry-related problems; among
them are providing transportation and manpower, building industry
bases, and supplying specialized repairs, power, and other servicing
divisions. Prioity should be given to a solution of the transportation
problem which is more critical in Siberia than in other parts of the
country, because of the vastness of its territory and the relatively
poor state of its transportation network. There are considerably fewer
railway lines and roads here per square area unit than in the country
in general.
The insufficient development of roads in the more densely populated parts of Siberia hinders economic development in some of the
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very regions with valuable mineral resources earmarked for development in the upcoming five-year periods. Among them are the areas
along the lower and middle reaches of the Angara River and in the
areas north of Lake Baikal.
Among Siberia’s major transportation projects in the period under
discussion is the completion of the Baikal–Amur railway main to
ensure year-round transportation links with the Norilsk industrial region.
In the BAM area, the Udokan deposits is earmarked for priority
development, and the area around the BAM railway is rich in other
large-scale deposits of raw materials useful in the nonferrous metal
industry.
Despite the insufficient study of the region’s mineral wealth, one
can already speak of its prime importance for the future production
of copper, polymetals, nickel, tin, molybdenum, titanium, and other
metals.
The economic development of the BAM zone will concentrate on
setting up territorial production combines (TPC) there as the basis
of its economic progress, mainly building enterprises specializing in
the production and initial processing of mineral wealth (miningmetallurgical combines), and placing metallurgical and chemicalmetallurgical facilities linked with their work outside the zone, in
areas more favorable to construction and operation.
The limited navigation season on the Yenisey River necessitates
the economic delivery of freight to Norilsk industrial area in onetime volumes covering year-round needs. As a result, storing and
overhead costs here are 4 and 1.5-fold higher. The accumulation of
additional stocks raises the outlays of the main production processes.
Moreover, outlays increase because of losses and the damage to raw
and other materials brought about by long-term storage. All this is
highly detrimental to the national economy.
For this reason, priority is given to the development of a reliable
transportation link with Norilsk.
The successful solution of the transportation problem is the chief
requirement for developing Siberia’s industry, among them non-ferrous metallurgy. Strict accounting of the transportation factor is a
must, along with the placing of production in the territory of the
region.
High growth rates in Siberia’s nonferrous metallurgy will demand
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additional manpower. But providing it will be hard, given the constant shortage of workers. Hence, the prime importance of such intensive factors as the mechanization and automation of production,
the introduction of highly efficient equipment and new processing
technologies, the comprehensive use of raw materials, etc.
In the four years of the 10th five-year period, the mining of ore in
nonferrous metallurgy has increased 1.5 fold through the use of selfpropelled equipment, four times with the use of high-capacity bulldozers, and 1.6-fold with sand-blowing. Considerable advances in
ore processing have been achieved by employing grinding, settling,
separation, and other modern technological methods.
These aspects of mining and ore dressing are constantly being improved.
In the metallurgical industry the basic trends of technological
progress are:
• introducing autogenous processes using heat and sulfur;
• introducing pressure processes; and
• introducing higher-capacity electrolyzers, etc.

A fine initiative in working out scientifically-grounded technological policy has come from the Krasnoyarsk Territory party committee.
Joining efforts with the Siberian branch of the USSR Academy of
Sciences, it outlined a promising program to introduce scientific and
technical improvements in the region’s industry up to 1990.
At nonferrous metal enterprises of Kransoyarsk Territory alone, the
introduction of these measures will effect a savings of 250 million
rubles, with a concomitant reduction of the labor force by 34,000.
Preservation of nature and a rational use of its resources, including
its mineral wealth, has become particularly acute in this time of scientific and technological revolution.
The experiences of a range of enterprises show the existence of
large reserves for raising the economic effect of production through
the comprehensive use of raw materials.
Extensive work to extract useful minerals from waste water and
water circulation supply is making headway.
The experience of Siberia’s nonferrous metal enterprises has enabled them to work out measures for the comprehensive use of raw
materials in the near future.
They envisage the development of drilling operations, ore concen-
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tration schemes, processing of waste from metallurgical and dressing
production, improving dust collectors, construction of waste purifiers, automated processes in hydrometallurgy, technology of extracting raw materials from waste gas, etc.
Waste gases and slag often deprive the plants of up to 90% of the
heat produced by the burning of fuel. The rising absolute consumption of fuel and heat will go hand in hand with the growing volume
of nonferrous metal production. This demands that priority be given
to increasing the yield efficiency of technical processes through reducing the losses and the nonproductive expenditure of fuel and
heat in pyrometallurgy and alumina production.
Among the extensive measures that have been outlined for nonferrous metallurgy plants is reducing the outlet of secondary power
resources. If one considers that the highest yields of secondary resources come from the production of nickel and cobalt, alumina and
copper, which are developed in Siberia, it can rightly be assumed
that the region’s nonferrous metallurgy has great reserves for raising
production effectiveness.
Special importance attaches to the economical use of power resources at mining and dressing enterprises in hard-to-reach regions
in Northern Siberia. There the costs of fuel and electricity are much
higher, presumably because of its rigorous climate, which requires
higher fuel consumption than a milder, more temperate zone, but
also because of the use of local gas and coal, which turn out to be
much more expensive than liquid fuel delivered from other regions.
The high electrical cost is due to the huge consumption of fuel
and the relatively small power plants. The costs for electricity in the
North are 10 to 12 times above those in the temperate zone.
Advanced Soviet and foreign experience shows that excess production costs in Siberia can be brought down 1.5–2 times by optimizing
the location of production sites.
In the main, Northern Siberia’s regional policy will amount to allround economy of manpower and will be based on a comprehensive
account of the region’s natural and economic conditions.
Protection of the environment is a key factor in raising the social
effectiveness of production. Contamination of the atmosphere and
water sources reduces the benefits of all the natural resources: it
lowers worker productivity, increases capital outlays, and affects the
usefulness of natural resources.
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Siberia is noted for intensive but irregular, unstable development
of geological-geomorphological and biological-climatic processes.
The natural restoration of disrupted geosystems moves along at a
much slower course than elsewhere, and breakdowns are often irreversible. This irreversibility is more often affected by the following
factors:
• poor resistance of the atmosphere to disperse harmful substances (4
times under that in the European part of the country);
• slow self-purification of water surfaces after dumping of sewage
(over 10 times);
• slow decomposition of hard waste; and
• poor self-restoring of damaged vegetation.

In designing new nonferrous metallurgy enterprises in Siberia and
renovating those in operation, these factors call for additional study
and development.
The rapid growth of nonferrous metallurgy in this area calls for
the development of auxiliary services, especially those dealing with
repairs. At present repair costs have risen to outstanding proportions
(up to 10% of the basic production assets), while the proportion of
repairmen at some enterprises has reached 40% of the main work
force. The high costs of repairs in the industry are due to the low
level of specialization and the lack of sufficient mechanization.
The development of specialized repair organizations employing
industrial methods is a priority factor in raising the effectiveness of
equipment repairs. Specialized repairs-construction trusts have been
set up have been set up in the Urals, Siberia, Kazakstan, and Ukraine
to improve repairs services in these regions, and the associations
‘‘Soyuztsvetmetremont,’’ ‘‘Soyuzmashtsvetmet,’’ and ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ have also been formed there.
In our opinion the establishing of new, specialized repair organizations must go hand in hand with development of the production
base of the existing trusts in order to provide the equipment under
repair with the required spare parts, mechanisms, and auxiliary
equipment and enhance the quality of repairs.
Similarly, great importance attaches to specializing in the production of spare parts. Today only 30% of all spare parts and units is
produced at specialized enterprises and large-scale repair bases. Most
of them are produced in small workshops and involve high costs.

nonferrous metal industry in siberia

511

This problem should be tackled by concentrating the equipment
stock inside the enterprise, setting up large-scale specialized shops
and facilities housing repair and construction organizations, and renovating and expanding engineering plants within the association
‘‘Soyuzmashtsvetmet.’’
The introduction of these measures will promote the development
of nonferrous metallurgy in Siberia.

ROLE OF AUTOMATION IN
DEVELOPING NONFERROUS
METALLURGY IN SIBERIA
(with M. E. Tsaregorodtsev)
A considerable share of the country’s reserves of nonferrous metals—
among them nickel, cobalt, platinum metals, lead, zinc, copper, molybdenum, gold, and aluminum—are located in Siberia, with its
rigorous climate and exceptionally diverse natural features, which
impede the development of its resources. Here, one feels sharply the
shortage of manpower in most industries but especially in nonferrous
metallurgy, inasmuch as its enterprises, mainly mines and dressing
mills, are located in remote, sparsely populated areas with poorly
developed industrial and social infrastructures. Workers are often
placed in arduous and harmful conditions, and even such a large
enterprise as the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant has the city’s largest
labor turnover, though wages there are considerably above those at
other enterprises. Apparently, material incentive is no longer a decisive factor if working conditions are hazardous and the work is laborconsuming and monotonous.
As regular deposits in more populated areas dry up, work is
switched to deposits located in more remote areas with more complex mining conditions. This transfer necessitates an entire range of
projects to ensure safe labor conditions, removing the workforce
from hazardous zones, raising labor productivity, reducing the number of workers, and, on the whole, radically changing the content of
the work.
A basic way to achieve progress in Siberia’s nonferrous metallurgy
is to introduce automation.
Automation of production and control systems in nonferrous metallurgy leads to a considerable increase in labor productivity, reduces
* Excerpted from ‘‘Problems and Prospects of the Automation of Siberia’s Nonferrous Metallurgy,’’ Problems of the Development of the Nonferrous Metal Industry
in Siberia (Siberia: Siberian Division of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1980).
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the workforce, especially in hazardous and labor-consuming jobs,
and raises the return on capital investments and the volume of production.
Automation at all stages of the mining and metallurgical cycle also
leads to a more complete use of mineral resources. This is particularly important in Siberia where most of the deposits are of a comprehensive nature and there is an abundance of mineral wealth.
Today, for instance, 14 elements are produced from the ores of the
Norilsk and Talnakhsko-Oktyabrsky deposits. Enhancing automation
can raise this index at least 1.5-fold in the next few years.
A particular benefit from automation is that the investment return
is twice that of other technology in a shorter space of time.
On the whole, across the country the return period for investment
in the development of Management Information and Control System is within 3 to 3.5 years, and that of Automatic Process Control
Systems is 1 to1.2 years. Within a relatively short period (1966–978),
the introduction of Management Information Systems into the national economy has brought in more than over 10 billion rubles.
Automation, it should be underscored, promotes progress in nonferrous metallurgy by combining separate operations, enhancing
their interconnection, and turning a multistage process into a nonstop one with fewer operations. It simplifies technology, brings down
labor costs, and enhances the quality of the finished product.
Nonferrous metallurgy in Siberia not only makes additional demands for replacing manpower with automation, but has requirements to this effect involving cheaper electricity, relatively new raw
materials, etc.
In introducing automation into Siberia, special emphasis must be
given to on the training and retraining of the design staff of designers
and the operators of automated systems.
Despite the advantages of automation in the tenth five-year period, the level of mechanization and automation in nonferrous metallurgy increased only 4.9%, to constitute 51.9%, including that of
the work of the basic workforce to 79% and auxiliary work to 30.9%.
The level in mechanizing jobs involving women increased to only
47.3%. Work is performed manually by 78.4% of workers in repair
and construction shops and by 50% of workers in transportation and
loading jobs.
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All in all, 49% of the workers in Siberia’s nonferrous metallurgy
are engaged in manual work.
By the end of 1980 there will be introduced in the industry 60
ASAK systems, 120 Management Information and Control Systems,
and 15 organizational-economy systems for management of enterprises. This will permit cutbacks in both management and service
personnel now employed in manual work in hazardous jobs (up to
10,000) and effect an annual saving in materiel of between 6 million
and 8 million rubles.
The rates of introducing automation in Siberia have fallen behind
those of the country in general. In the 10th five-year period the volume of automation introduced in Siberia’s nonferrous metallurgy
will increase twofold as compared with the respective indices of the
9th five-year period and will constitute 24% of the total effort to
automate the country’s nonferrous metal industry (which is expected to grow threefold in the period under review).
One of the basic indices of the level of automation in an industry
is the share of capital outlays for it in the overall volume of capital
investments in the industry (Table 1).
The above data show that, in the period under review, the share
of expenditures for automation in the overall volume of capital inTable 1: The Share of Capital Investments for Automation in All
Capital Investments Made in the Industry (in percentages)
Period
Country
USSR

USA

1966–1970
Industry
Iron and Steel
Oil Industry
Oil processing
and oil
chemistry
Nonferrous
metallurgy
Industry
Nonferrous
metallurgy

1971–1975

1976–1980

3.3
2.0
1.6
4.0

4.3
4.0
4.3
6.0

5.8
6.0
2.0
8.0

0.6

1.5

3.0

18.0
6.8

29.2
24.0

31.2
30.0
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vestments in nonferrous metallurgy is, as a rule, considerably below
that for the industry in general, for the separate subindustries of the
USSR, and for the U.S. nonferrous metallurgy. At the same time,
the rates of growth of this index in the nonferrous metallurgy of the
USSR are higher.

Current Level of Automation of Siberia’s Nonferrous
Metallurgy
In Siberia enterprises and associations of nonferrous metallurgy are
located on a very uneven basis. Most of them are concentrated in its
eastern areas.
The largest volume of automation work in nonferrous enterprises
falls to the scientific and production association ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika.’’
In the 9th five-year period the expenditures to introduce automation in Eastern Siberia’s nonferrous metallurgy will amount to 46,000
thousand rubles, or 70.5% of the general expenditures for automation in this branch of Siberia’s industry; the annual economic effect
is estimated to be 13,500 thousand rubles, or 67.5%.
Expenses for different administrative units and the respective estimated economic results are distributed unevenly (Table 2) due to
specifics of placing and different power capacities of enterprises.
Krasnoyarsk is the location of several nonferrous metal enterprises
with unique technological capacities, among them the Norilsk mining and metallurgical combine, the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant, the
Achinsk alumina and Sorsky molybdenum combines, the association
‘‘Yeniseizoloto,’’ the Krasnoyarsk nonferrous metal plant, and the
Tuyim nonferrous metal processing plant. The volume of nonferrous
metal production in the Territory accounts for nearly 25% of the
gross output.
Between 1970 and 1979, 140 automated lines were installed in the
Territory, among them 4 lines in nonferrous metallurgy.
The Krasnoyarsk nonferrous metal plant has the largest amount of
nonline automated and semi-automated equipment (651 units, or
6.8% of total equipment, of which 635 units are automated equipment); on the whole, 763 and 646 units, respectively, have been in-
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Table 2: Distribution of Expenditure and Anticipated Economic
Effect from the Introduction of Automation as Broken Down by
Region in Eastern Siberia Between 1976 and 1980
Expenditure
Location

Economic Effect

Thousands of
Thousands of
rubles
Percentage
rubles
Percentage

Krasmoyarsk
Territory
Tuva ASSR

32,500
400

71.0
0.9

10,100
350

74.8
2.6

Irkutsk Region

10,000

21.8

1,500

11.2

Chita Region

2,100

4.5

850

6.2

Buryat ASSR

800

1.8

700

5.2

43,000

100

13,500

100

Total for Eastern
Siberia

troduced into nonferrous metallurgy in the area, 148 of them with
computer control systems.
Automated control systems are in operation at 9 of the territory’s
enterprises, among them the following enterprises of nonferrous
metallurgy: the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant, the association ‘‘Yeniseizoloto,’’ and the Norilsk mining and metallurgical combine.
Industrial enterprises in the territory have 279 comprehensively
mechanized, automated, and comprehensively automated shops,
which make up 13.6% of the total number of shops in the Territory’s
enterprises. The number of workers employed in these shops constitute 15% of the area’s workforce.
The introduction of automated and comprehensively automated
divisions and shops at enterprises of nonferrous metallurgy, as compared with those of the chemical and oil-chemical industries in Krasnoyarsk Territory, is indicated in Table 3 (as of July 1, 1979).
The data show that the average number of workers employed in a
single division shop (Items 2, a, b, c) is higher for nonferrous metallurgy; that is, in the chemical and oil-chemical industries automation
has eliminated a sizable number of workers. The largest volume of
automated divisions to be introduced in divisions and shops of nonferrous metallurgy occurred occurred between 1971 and 1975; in the
10th five-year period the rates of installation decreased.
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Table 3
Nonferrous
Metallurgy
Divisions

Chemical and Oil
Industries

Shops

Divisions

Shops

1. Total of automated
and comprehensively
automated systems

16

7

8

11

2. Number of workers

821

612

284

667

Among them,
Engineers/technicians
Workers

64

87

21

69

752

525

263

553

Of this number
(a) workers operating
machines and
mechanisms

412

239

167

280

(b) workers servicing
machines and
mechanisms

312

220

76

222

(c) workers doing
manual work

28

66

20

51

3. Number of divisions
and shops with no
manual labor

12

1

1

3

Analysis of the results of introducing new technology in Krasnoyarsk Territory shows that the automation of production was much
more effective than its mechanization. The economic effect per
ruble of expenditures for automation amounted to 0.66 rubles; that
for mechanization, 0.34 rubles.
A most effective trend in scientific and technological progress for
the given period is that of introducing state-of-the-art technology
and developing new types of industrial products, which account, respectively, for 0.98 and 1.23 rubles of effect per ruble of expenditure.
The relative cost of dispensing with a single worker at enterprises in
the area through the introduction of automation is 20,000 rubles,
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which is far above the cost of introducing mechanization of production and state-of-the-art technology. However, several new technological processes and units already incorporate elements of
automation.
The draft of the Comprehensive Regional Program for the Accelerated Introduction of the Achievements of Scientific and Technological Progress in Nonferrous Metallurgy of Krasnoyarsk Territory for
1981–1990 calls for the allocation of 97.0 million rubles for automation, making it possible to eliminate 4,000 workers, with the concomitant annual saving of 40.0 million rubles.
In Tuva ASSR the share of comprehensively mechanized and automated shops constitutes a mere 8%, which is 5.6% less than in Krasnoyarsk Territory. For all this, the introduction of automation and
mechanization at its enterprises has resulted in a lower economic
benefit due to smaller reductions in manpower than in Krasnoyarsk
Territory.
In the Tuva republic’s economic development, nonferrous metallurgy is a key industry represented by the combine ‘‘Tuvakobalt’’ and
Terlig-Khainsky prospecting and mining enterprise.
The combine ‘‘Tuvakobalt’’ accounts for one-fifth of all the comprehensively mechanized divisions and shops in the republic. In 1980
there were 480 workers, or 57% of the workforce, employed in fully
mechanized jobs; by 1985 their number will increase to 65.9%.
In the 10th five-year period, expenditures for automation in the
nonferrous metal industry of Western Siberia will make up 29.5%
of the overall expenditures for automation in the industry, and the
expected annual economic effect will be 6.5 million rubles.

Automation of the Gold-Mining Industry
Throughout the country considerable attention is devoted to the
automation of the gold-mining industry. Nevertheless, at most goldextraction factories labor productivity grows at a slow pace, lagging
far behind that of advanced dressing mills of nonferrous metallurgy.
This is due to small-scale production capacities, low productivity,
and the excessive variety of equipment; numerous labor-intensive
and arduous processes operated by hand; a lack of comprehensive
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automation at enterprises, and insufficient use of per-unit automation; and the low level of design and construction and pilot projects.
In setting up management information systems at gold-mining
enterprises, consideration should be given to several aspects of organizational structure and technological development of deposits.
Among these peculiarities are:
• considerable territorial dispersion of enterprises dealing with mining
and processing of the respective mineral (the distance between
mines and management boards can be as great as 500 to 700 kilometers);
• use of several types of mining technology (open-cast dredge, hydraulic, and underground mining);
• use of several types of processing techniques (dredge, hydraulic,
dressing mills, factories for finishing processing cycle, roasting
plants);
• absence, in most cases, of independent communication links between the combine’s management board and the management of
mines; and
• low level of automation of technological processes.

At present, considerable investments are being channeled into development of automation for the gold-mining industry.
In the 10th five-year period 20.0 million rubles were earmarked for
investment in the automation of this sub-industry, including more
than 1 million rubles for Siberian enterprises, with the annual economic effect reaching, respectively, 6 million rubles and 400 thousand roubles. Practical effect, however, is still far from the estimates.
Of the large-scale systems that have brought in effective results,
close to the outlined estimates, one can name only the widely introduced system ‘‘Draga-1.’’
Automated dredges are now operating in the associations ‘‘Yeniseizoloto,’’ ‘‘Zabaikalzoloto,’’ and ‘‘Lenzoloto.’’ The average yearly economic effect from a single system amounts to 120.0 thousand rubles.
Nevertheless, the designing and installation of these systems demand huge initial investments, the means of automation, and cable
products now in short supply. They also require the development of
costly software, algorithms, programs, and special analytical devices,
along with other automation means. Given the limited scope of this
work, the time needed for developing and installing the systems is
protracted. It took nine years (from 1967 to 1975) to develop and
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install the ‘‘Draga-1’’ system on a mass scale. Today the annual economic effect per ruble spent on its development is 3.60 rubles from
each completed project.
At mines and factories the introduction of automatic process control systems (APCS) is slow, because there are as yet no finished
systems for the gold-mining industry and no experience with their
operation.
In 1978, ‘‘Soyuzzoloto’’ introduced 8 APCS. Plans call for the introduction of 3 more APCS by 1980. Between 1976 and 1980 and
1981 and 1985, the share of planned investments by ‘‘Soyuzzoloto’’
in APCS in the sum total of investments will amount to 1.3%–1.8%,
which is 2.6% below the average figures for the USSR Ministry of
Nonferrous Metallurgy (3%–5%).
The development of APCS for factories is more costly than for
mines. In some factories the cost of research, pilot-construction, and
design can exceed one million rubles. Hence, it is more expedient to
develop APCS for several factories simultaneously. The number of
factories scheduled for priority development of these systems should
be reduced. At the same time the amount of local automation and
dispatching controls should be increased.
A comparison of the estimated annual economic effect, per ruble
of outlays, from the introduction of APCS in the gold-mining industry with the index for APCS operating in the mines of Norilsk mining
and metallurgical combine indicates they are almost identical. The
estimated annual economic effect per ruble of outlays for automation of North-Yenisey mines amounts to 0.34 rubles; Taseyevsky
mine, 0.41 rubles; Darasun and Kochkar mines, 0.50 rubles; ‘‘Komsomolsky’’ mine, 0.43 rubles; ‘‘Oktyabrsky’’ mine, 0.26 rubles, ‘‘Zapolyarny’’ mine, 0.39 rubles. The expense is recoved in 2 to 2.5 years,
which is less than the standard rate of 3.1 years.
In the 11th five-year period most of the projects designated for
the gold-mining industry will not be ready for the large-scale installation of APCS and Management Information Systems (MIS).
By 1990 APCS are scheduled for introduction at the mine and
gold concentration mill at North-Yenisey Mine (costs ⳱ 4.0 million
rubles; economic effect ⳱ 600 thousand rubles). In the 11th fiveyear period, work will be undertaken to develop APCS for the Darasunsky mine and the Tasev factory.
Introducing an information-dispatching system for the mining
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shop at Saralinsk mine is envisaged for 1981. Work will be continued
to introduce local automation along with the tested system ‘‘Draga1’’ while updating its separate units and converting to a state-of-theart element base. The work will be done primarily by the scientific
and production association ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika.’’
The system is to be installed at 15 dredges, 6 of which operate in
Siberia, in the 11th five-year period.
The total costs for automation of enterprises of ‘‘Zoyuzzoloto’’ in
Siberia for the discussed period will amount to 10 million rubles, or
18% of the cost of automation in this sub-industry for the entire
country.
The volume of automation earmarked for installation in the 11th
five-year period will be well above that in the previous period. Yet
this still falls short of the needs of gold-mining enterprises.
The designing of projects for automation of the gold-mining industry needs further development. Yet there are prerequisites for its
expansion and intensification in the next 5 to 10 years. Here, priority
should be given to the design and installation of means and systems
of local automation, dispatching, automated systems of analytical
control, and systems of comprehensive mechanization and automation of ‘‘Draga-1’’ type.

Automation of the Nickel and Cobalt Industry
In the 10th five-year period expenditures for automation in the
nickel and cobalt industry were envisaged at 40 million rubles, including 23 million rubles, or 64%, for Siberia. The anticipated total
economic effect from automation is expected to reach 15.3 million
rubles, including 7.4 million rubles, or 47.9%, for Siberia.
In 1979 the transition from designing and introducing individual
technologies, control systems, and local systems of automatic regulation in the nickel and cobalt industry to automated process control
systems was still under way. A high level of automation has been
achieved in hydrometallurgical processing with the comprehensive
introduction of automated technological processing. Automation of
the pyrometallurgical industry is lagging far behind due to the imbalance between the bulk of the equipment and the high-efficiency
automated working regimes.
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The introduction of automation at the Norilsk combine in the
10th five-year period will consume 98.4% of the expenditures for
automation of Siberia’s nickel and cobalt industry. The total annual
economic effect will be 7.0 million rubles. As of July 1, 1979, the
combine had 47 mechanized production and automated lines, and
95 comprehensively mechanized, automated divisions and shops.
Nonetheless, automation at the Norilsk mining and metallurgical
combine is still a far cry from what it should be.
Due to the absence of a material base and mechanization servicing, 51%–60% of all workers are still engaged in manual work.
Sixty percent of its workforce do indirect work, the direct result of
the lag in the rates of automation and mechanization of indirect jobs
as compared with the basic operations.
The best achievements in automation at the Norilsk mining and
metallurgical combine have been made at the Nadezhdinsk metallurgical plant. Most of the automation devices operating there, along
with the basic technological equipment, was installed by Finnish
companies. Specialists note the advantages of the Finnish equipment, which is based on integrated circuits, as compared with their
domestic counterparts, which are based on relay circuits.
APCS and MIS have been set up at the combine’s underground
mines. It took six years for the Kiev Institute of Automation to design MIS ‘‘Rudnik’’ for ‘‘Komsomolsky’’ mine.
The projects were to be completed by the end of 1978, but the
system failed to prove itself in the conditions of the Norilsk mines.
The fixed time limits were disrupted, and the institute failed in its
commitments.
The design of MIS for the ‘‘Oktyabrsky’’ mine is envisaged by 1985;
for the ‘‘Taymyr’’ mine, by 1990; and for the ‘‘Mayak’’ mine, by 1984.
A project to design APCS for the ore-dressing mill is under way.
Preliminary steps have been made in this direction: a mathematical
model of regularities for sintering roasting nickel concentrates with
high sulfuric properties. Several local automation systems have also
been designed and put into operation, among them an automatic
device for controlling and regulating the loading of the charge on
the sintering machine, the humidifying of the charge in the pelletizer drum, and the regulating of the gas temperature in the kiln.
The introduction of automated control systems equipped with integrating devices linked to the control computer complex M 7000
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for the top level APCS at the sintering plant creates the conditions
for their efficient operation.
The basic guidelines for developing mechanization and automation of the Norilsk mining and metallurgical combine to the year
1990 envisages the introduction by 1989 of APCS at the nickel plant.
Questions dealing with management of the combine have become
a project all by themselves. Such specific features of the combine as
its large size, multi-branch character, and its development into the
nidus of the territorial and production complex, among others, calls
for scientific study by employing up-to-date methods and means of
automation.
In this connection the computer center of the Siberian branch of
the USSR Academy of Sciences (Krasnoyarsk) is developing a hierarchic automated optimization system for dressing and metallurgical
processing at the combine.
In 1977–1978 stage 1 was completed—adaptive models were constructed for the sintering plants and dressing mills, the copper and
nickel plants, which makes possible the use of third-generation computers for the timely forecasting of quantitative and qualitative indices of the technological processes.
In 1979 stage 2 was completed. An automated system was designed to calculate the production program of ore dressing and metallurgical processing at the combine, with the view of planning and
management of production in the advisory regime. Actual outlays
amounted to 360 thousand rubles, and, with the introduction of the
results of stage 2, the anticipated annual economic effect fell short
by nearly 10 million rubles.
On the whole the work will be completed in 1988–1989. Its full
implementation will allow the use of developed models to achieve
optimal automatic control in a closed-loop system.
In 1977 the scientific and production association ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ developed the sub-system MIS, ‘‘Repairs servicing of industrial plants,’’ on the basis of the computer system ‘‘Minsk-32.’’
Total outlays stood at 260 thousand rubles, giving an economic effect
of 113 thousand rubles. At present work is under way to develop
programs for the said sub-system for computer system M-4030.
In 1979 a sub-system for calculating the volume, content, and dynamics of the plant was made ready for pilot testing. Outlays stood
at 37 thousand rubles; the economic effect was 33 thousand rubles.
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The development of an integrated MIS for the Norilsk mining and
metallurgical combine is a priority in the designing of automatic
control devices.
The combine ‘‘Tuvakobalt’’ is the pioneer of nonferrous metallurgy in Tuva ASSR and its leading enterprise with regard to introduction of scientific and technological results. At present, 1,050 local
systems of automatic control and regulation have been introduced
at the combine, 160 of which are automatic regulation systems.
In 1970 ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ developed a project for dispatching (1st unit of APCS) power-supplying units on the basis of
teleautomatics ‘‘Obzor,’’ and units in the mining shop. The cost of
equipment stood at 297 thousand rubles. However, the question of
providing all the technological means is still unresolved. The point
is that the responsible organization, ‘‘Soyuzmetallurguglekomplekt,’’
services only enterprises built from scratch, while the organization
‘‘Soyuzsistemkomplekt’’ delivers equipment only after the installation of the computer. The project, however, envisages its installation
only at the second stage.
For the combine ‘‘Tuvakobalt’’ the 10th five-year period envisages
the introduction of a chemical analyzer KRF-18 for analytical control, with an outlay of 400 thousand rubles and the anticipated annual economic effect of 350 thousand rubles.
The plan for the development of the combine up to 1985 envisages the installation of the electronic computer M-6000 and the introduction of APCS.
The Krasnoyarsk nonferrous metallurgical plant will get its APCS
in 1985, with expenditures totaling 5.0 million rubles. Its economic
effect will amount to 2.9 million rubles.

Automation of the Aluminum Industry
According to the 10th five-year plan, 14.5 million rubles will be allocated for automation at enterprises of the aluminum industry, which
is 45% of that spent on automation of the industry in general.
The total annual economic effect will be short of 3 million rubles,
or, as broken down according to enterprises:
Of late, the introduction of MIS for technological processes with
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Annual Economic Effect
in Thousands of Rubles

Outlays in Thousands of Rubles
Achinsk alumina combine
Bratsky aluminum plant
Irkutsk aluminum plant
Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant
Novokuznetsky aluminum plant

800
7,000
3,000
2,800
950

200
600
900
1,000
380

the use of control computer complexes has become a priority for the
automation of alumina production.
The development of an automated control system for the raw materials shop and the carbonizing process for alumina solutions, with
the use of third-generation computers, will be completed in the next
five-year period at the Achinsk alumina combine.
Employing an integrated control system at the combine for the
sintering of nepheline and lime charge will help regulate the correlation between indices of quality production and cost. The plan of
the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy for 1980 calls for the
introduction of APCS ‘‘Shikhta-3A’’ at the combine.
According to the long-term plan for 1990, there will be developed
and introduced at the Achinsk alumina combine APCS for the sintering shop (overall cost, 700 thousand rubles; economic effect, 300
thousand rubles); MIS for repairs of equipment (outlays for research,
70 thousand rubles; effect, 150 thousand rubles); APCS for calcinating shop (outlays, 220 thousand rubles; effect, 300 thousand rubles);
APCS for cement production (outlays, 700 thousand rubles; effect,
250 thousand rubles); APCS for chemical hydrology shop (outlays,
300 thousand rubles; effect, 200 thousand rubles).
Automation of technological processes for the electrolysis of aluminum is performed chiefly by the systems of the ‘‘Aluminum’’ type.
The automated capacities for electrolysis of aluminum now in operation account for 90%. The total annual economic effect is 10 million
rubles.
The experience of developing and installing ‘‘Aluminum’’ systems,
the results of research in the field of MIS, and the development of
the equipment and technology for electrolysis and domestic computer technology—all this formed the base for the development of
new APCS, ‘‘Elektroliz,’’ which are taking the place of ‘‘Aluminum’’
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systems. In 1980 ‘‘Elektroliz’’ will be installed at the Bratsk aluminum plant.
Work is expanded on developing and installing integrated MIS,
embracing. along with electrolysis, other technological processes,
among them casting and rolling, dust suppression, and the processing of fluorides.
The first units of these MIS have already been put into operation
at the Krasnoyarsk and Bratsk aluminum plants. The second units
are planned to start operating by the end of the 10th five-year period,
with the expected economic effect of 1.5 to 2.0 million rubles.
Work is continuing on the comprehensive mechanization and automation of individual labor-consuming processes. For instance, the
object of studying the designing and installation of an automatic
ingot casting line, carried out by ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ at the
Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant was to free a significant part of the
workforce from labor-consuming manual work in hazardous conditions and raise production efficiency. The final index upon implementing the system was the actual eliminating of 144 workers and
improving working conditions for 208 workers (with accounts for the
removed workers).
From 1981 to 1990 the cost of automation work at the Krasnoyarsk
aluminum plant would reach 20 million rubles. The economic effect
would be 10 million dollars; the workforce would be reduced by
1,000; and working conditions would be improved.
At the Sayany aluminum plant now under construction, a standard organization and technology MIS will be introduced in 1990,
with expenses at 900 thousand rubles and the economic effect at 900
thousand rubles.

Automation of Rare Metals Industry
A total of 16 APCS were installed at enterprises of ‘‘Soyuzredmet’’
of the USSR Ministry of Rare Metals by the end of 1976, among
them MIS for power units, repairs, and transportation economies. By
the end of the five-year period 7 more APCS will be introduced.
The plan for designing and installing automated control and management systems in the 1976–1980 period under ‘‘Soyuzredmet’’ en-
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visages expenditures in the amount of 24.8 million rubles, including
3.3 million rubles, or 13.2%, for Siberia. The expected total economic effect at ‘‘Soyuzredmet’’ enterprises will amount to 14.6 million rubles, including 1.9 million rubles, or 12.8%, for Siberia.
Among the largest enterprises in the industry is the Sorsky molybdenum combine.
At present, local automation and the automated control system
‘‘Karier-2,’’ which has brought in high economic results, are widely
used at the combine. With the installation of ‘‘Karier-2’’ MIS, the
productivity of operators of dump trucks has grown nearly 1.5-fold.
In the 10th five-year period MIS for dressing processes, including
MIS using KRF-18, will be introduced.
In 1982 MIS will be installed at the combine for equipment repairs and an automated system for defect-free work (cost of research
work, 130 thousand rubles; economic effect, 220 thousand rubles).

Automation of Polymetallic Industry
Automation at enterprises in the polymetallic industry has not yet
reached a high level of development.
Today the enterprises are installed with 5 APCS. In 1980 one more
APCS will start operating. The plan for the 10th five-year period
calls for the introduction at the Nerchinsk polymetal combine of an
automated system of analytical control (ASAC) using the analyzer
KRF-18, and a similar system at the Novosibirsk tin combine. The
outlays for their introduction come to 400 thousand rubles, with the
economic effect projected at 350 thousand rubles.
In 1988 APCS for the dressing plant will be introduced at the
Gorevsky mining and dressing combine now under construction
(cost, 800 thousand rubles; economic effect, 800 thousand rubles),
designed by the ‘‘Mekhanobr’’ institute. In the 12th five-year period
APCS will be introduced at the combine (cost of designing and installation, 2.5 million rubles; economic effect, 1.1 million rubles).
Here, too, there is a potential for the introduction of robotics,
especially at construction sites of water-conservation development
projects and at mining sites.
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State and Prospects for Locating of Repair Work Facilities and
the Technological Servicing of Automation Means and
Systems
The development and installation of automated systems in Siberia
is closely linked with the problem of organizing their repairs and
technological maintenance.
The location of nonferrous metallurgy enterprises play a decisive
part in the siting of facilities for repair services.
Today, repairs are more frequently done by specialists at the enterprise using automated equipment. In most cases repairs are performed in small shops where there is a constant shortage of spare
parts and workers are lacking in skills.
Developing a network of facilities dealing with repairs and the
technical maintenance of automated means and systems, one that
integrates branch and territorial aspects of management in every specific region and the country as a whole, has become an urgent necessity.
The setting up of a wide network of specialized organizations for
repairing and technological maintenance of automated means and
systems will make it possible to free the maintenance services at
industrial enterprises of repair work, thereby concentrating the spare
parts in a smaller number of units and setting up an exchange stock
of automated devices and units.
The greatest effect in repair work is ensured by specializists serving
enterprises of a single industry or all industries located in the same
area. An example of this is the specialized pilot plant for repairs of
computer technology ‘‘SoyuzEVMkompleks.’’
The scientific production association ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ is
Siberia’s only enterprise performing a complex of operations to automate nonferrous metallurgy from ‘‘A to Z,’’ including the designing
of automated means and systems, repairing and servicing projects in
operation, and checking instrumentation. These functions are executed through a network of sub-divisions located throughout the
region.
Situating large repair bases in territorial and regional centers with
good communication ties with many populated areas is most advisable. Because the weight of automated devices is relatively small,
transportation costs will be recovered, and centralized repairs per-
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formed at a specialized base will prove to be more profitable than
repairs made by amateurs. In areas of industrial concentration (big
cities), it is expedient to resort to inter-branch repairs, for the setting
up of specialized plants capable of doing repairs along industrial
lines, with a high level of automation and mechanization of repair
work, will achieve the highest effect.

Forecasting the Automation of Siberia’s Nonferrous
Metallurgy
The successful development of automation depends on the use of
special forecasting methods. Given the growing manpower shortage,
the significance of working out forecasts for the development of automation at the pre-plan stage increases as the role of automation
increases. Here, special importance attaches to foretelling the socioeconomic consequences of automation.
For such forecasting, using the statistical method of factorial analysis, supplemented with the method of expert evaluation, is possible.
At the first stage of forecasting, the sources of economic effects in
the automation process are singled out. All the factors are presented
as a hierarchic model, showing their ties from the lowest level, where
the automated means and systems to be installed are located, to the
general production target located at the highest level.
The specifications and supplements to the model, as well as the
determinations of the basic sources of effectiveness, are achieved
with the well-known method of expert evaluation ‘‘Delfi.’’
The final variant of the hierarchical model becomes the basis for
subsequent analysis.
Within the bounds of a single company, a near-term estimate of
the economic effect of automation can be made by determining
trends in the changes of factors listed in the hierarchical model, both
with and without consideration of the influence of automation in
identical conditions. In this case, the latter conditions are discarded
and do not affect the ‘‘clear effect’’ of automation.
Subsequent analysis deals with all the production conditions specific to the given enterprise (the state of and prospects for developing
the raw material base, basic technological equipment, etc.), diminishing or raising the ‘‘clear effect’’ of automation.
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The lack of a sufficiently long-term period showing the particular
trend of scientific and technological progress is a significant obstacle
to applying regressive methods of forecasting to the development of
automation.
For this reason, it is advisable to use factorial analysis, in which
each subsequent target is made dependent on the influence of subtargets in the hierarchical model, and the influence of automation is
determined only for the technological and economic factors at the
lowest level.
Because it is difficult determine the extent of the effect of automation on technological and economic factors, using recommendations from the literature which determine the correlative
dependence between the level of automation and technical and economic factors of production at an enterprise—an analogue with sufficiently developed automation—is likewise advisable. By using
specific elasticity factors for each type of dependency curve, it is
possible to determine the percentage (within one percent), of
changes in the considered factor as a result of changes in the level of
automation. Besides, by comparing the elasticity factors, one can
determine which factor is most affected by automation. Analysis of
the levels of relationship makes it possible to bring out the main
trend in the factor’s changes as the level of automation rises. One
can determine the optimal value of the level of automation estimated according to existing methods in regard to each factor.

Scientific and Technological Policy in the Automation of
Nonferrous Metallurgy
At the present stage, scientific and technological policy is a major
instrument for accelerating scientific and technological progress and
raising its effectiveness is scientific and technological policy.
In selecting the trends in automation of nonferrous metallurgy, it
is necessary to take into account the regional peculiarities of different parts of the country. Siberia, for instance, is characterized by
complex land forms, climate, and mining conditions. It is far from
the country’s developed areas and poorly developed economically; it
has high power availability per capita in all industries but a shortage
of manpower. Under these conditions, the problem of cost-reduc-
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tions involving workers is an important topic and has unique aspects.
Among these are the excessive outlays for replacing of workers,
higher wages, more expensive construction work, and improvements
to localities. Hence, here technological policy is chiefly concerned
with protection of labor.
Its basic lines of development deal with comprehensive mechanization of loading and unloading, transportation and warehouse jobs,
accelerated introduction of robotics, automation of hazardous and
dangerous jobs, extensive introduction of specialized (suitable to the
northern climate) technology, reducing pollution, and a more comprehensive use of mineral wealth.
In the last 5 to 10 years, there has been a typical trend in technological policy in the field of production automation, including that
in Siberia, to go from designing and installation of devices and apparatus for the automatic control of different technological parameters,
or for managing different production operations, to the designing
and introducing of comprehensive automated control systems, and,
in the last five-year period, the use of computer technology.
Integrated MIS (IMIS), which combine the solution of organizational-economic problems with technological control of enterprises,
are highly promising.
A new trend of technological policy in automation is to set up the
servicing of complex automated systems and computers.
In keeping with forecasts for the development of automation in
nonferrous metallurgy it is projected that by 1990 automated control
systems will have been installed in all technological systems and
plants. Automated control systems for technological and production
processes with use of computer technology will be operating at 85%–
90% of all companies.
The remaining 10%–15% falls to small enterprises using only local
automated systems.
It is economically expedient to introduce IMIS at dressing mills
and metallurgical plants with comparatively small production cycles.
At large combines, encompassing a complex of mining, dressing, and
metallurgical operations, as well as at plants processing nonferrous
metals and engaged in the production of a wide variety of items for a
large number of customers, it is economically profitable to introduce
management and information control systems and process control
systems.
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At small enterprises it is not advisable economically to install centralized automated systems, but in the areas with manpower shortages local automatic systems can bring effective results.
Of late, much attention has been given to designing and installing
industrial robots as a major means of achieving the comprehensive
automation of production, making it possible to eliminate many
labor-consuming jobs and remove workers from harmful and hazardous jobs.
Because of the above-mentioned peculiarities, nonferrous metallurgy is in dire need of industrial robots in all spheres.
At present, the scientific and production association ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ is conducting studies to determine the best sites for
introducing industrial robots at enterprises in the gold-mining,
nickel-cobalt, and lead-zinc industries of Siberia.
The emergence of SPA ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ in Krasnoyarsk
was prompted by the high concentration of this industry’s enterprises in the area and the availability of the respective scientific and
technological base, which is lacking in, for instance, the Chita region. As the hub of the industry, it does an active and timely job,
with minimal outlays, in developing enterprises and dealing with research and technological problems with consideration for the specifics of each one. As a progressive form of integrating research and
industry, the association promotes the rates of scientific and technological progress not only in its industry but in the area in general.
The progress of mechanization and automation at Siberia’s nonferrous metallurgy enterprises is accompanied by a sharp rise in the
stock of equipment, devices, precision instruments, and automation
systems.
It is now more profitable to have repairs and maintenance services
of automated means and systems handled by specialized organizations, among them SPA ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika.’’ Its territorial network of management boards and units ensures high-quality repairs,
and its stock of equipment helps save time and money.
Due to the complex character and scope of technological, social,
and organizational problems dealing with the automation of Siberia’s nonferrous metallurgy, they require a program-target approach.

IT IS NECESSARY TO INCREASE
FOOD PRODUCTION IN THE
YENISEY NORTH
In the 1950s, I had to sail regularly from Krasnoyarsk to Dudinka.
Such Turukhansk piers as Lebed, Vorogovo, and Alinskoye were eagerly awaited by all passengers, both children and adults. At those
piers local women sold fresh berries, potatoes, and pickles. Vorogovo
was especially famous for sour cream and cottage and farmer’s cheese.
Invoices of the 1950s give us a similar picture: these areas supplied
beef and vegetables to the North, to Norilsk, and to the South, to
Yeniseisk.
In the summer of 1979 I visited those areas again. My ship was
greeted by local people, but this time not to sell but to buy potatoes
and vegetables. . . .
Of course, the needs of the area have increased, because now there
are more consumers. Abundant natural resources were discovered in
these areas, and people arrived here to develop them. Supplying such
promising areas is a serious problem. Nature, primarily the surrounding woods, which are full of berries and wild animals, could help to
resolve it. But there is another problem, caused by the State Committee for Hunting (Glavokhota). In the early 1960s, Glavokhota insisted that prospering collective farms (kolkhoz) would be converted
into three state industrial farms (gospromkhoz) in the local area and
that they would be subject to Glavokhota. But Glavokhota was interested only in hunting wild animals. Cattle breeding and grain producing practically stopped. Other agricultural activities, including
the picking of wild berries, also began to decrease. However, when
the gospromkhozes were originally forming, one of the reasons for
their creation was the hope to increase the picking of wild berries.
Dozens of hamlets and villages appeared in the area: Alinskoye,
Lebed. . . . In one of them I met Alexandra Denisenko, a hunter. She
is 56. We walked together through the village. There are nice houses,
Sovetskaya Torgovly (Soviet Trade), June 17, 1980, p. 2.
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and a school building where more generations of children could
study. But people had left.
How could they stay in the village: the salary of an employee of
the gospromkhoz is less than the one of the sovkhoz. In a sovkhoz,
an employee uses the sovkhoz’s equipment for fishing, but in a gospromkoz he or she must use his or her own, whatever it is. Gospromkhozes do not have any equipment or funds; nor are they willing to
build.
‘‘Before we usually picked 180 centners of potatoes per hectare.
Today we don’t have either the equipment or the desire to work on
the soil,’’ says a local village leader.
That figure, 180 centners per hectare, was confirmed at the Institute of Nature Protection of the Ministry of Agriculture. They said
that those lands are very rich and fruitful, a very favorable area for
developing agriculture.
Once I had to ride on an airplane from Krasnoyarsk to Evenkiya, a
plane that was carrying dried grass. Thousands of miles away! The
pilot was very angry because the airplane was too light and, in the
air, could easily be tossed by the wind. In the meantime, in the
Krasnoyarsk airport products manufactured by local industries went
undelivered for several weeks because there were not enough airplanes. Right there, in those areas, whole grass jungles are being
wasted.
Recently on Taymyr Peninsula, to the north of Turukhansk, an
agro-industrial center ‘‘Arktika’’ was established. Its purpose is to
unite in a single complex all the industries that can function in a
polar zone. ‘‘Arktika’’ united 13 small kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Its
turnover exceeds 10 million rubles.
These are just the first steps. There are some positive changes in
Taymyr villages as well. But, here again, the main obstacles are the
selfish interests of gospromkhozes. They are designed not to produce
but to take from nature. Their ministry, Glavokhota, creates for
them privileged conditions for that activity. Hunting is an inseparable part of agriculture in the North. This is why Glavokhota determines the quantities and quotas for gospromkhozes. ‘‘Arktika’’ is
granted the least. Despite these obstacles, the center performs effectively.
Thus, we are talking about very promising areas. Geologist-prospectors have already come here, and now it is the turn of construc-
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tion workers. The local nature is abundant and generous: it can
provide for everyone. However, a rational economic approach is
needed to use all these resources.
These problems are not just local; they are common for the entire
North. Look at the map: the North covers more than half the USSR.

FOOD FOR PEACE?
OR FOR CIVIL WAR?
If we are not careful, the food we send to feed hungry Soviets will serve
merely to strengthen the socialist hard-liners against the democratic
forces.
Why is the Soviet Union hungry? Why does the biggest and potentially the richest country in the world have empty shelves in the
stores?
The hunger is real. In the United States people consume more
than 53 pounds of meat per capita per year; in the USSR, if you
count the bone and gristle, just 26 pounds. Okay, maybe Americans
eat too much meat. But what about fruit? Americans eat three times
more fruit than people in the USSR do. Even these figures are for
more normal times. These are not normal times. Real hunger looms
in the land that was once the breadbasket of Europe.
So, unless Americans and Europeans want to see Soviet children
on the nightly TV news, they are going to have to ship food to the
Soviet Union. Done the right way, such food aid can help feed the
truly hungry. Done the wrong way, it can hasten a civil war.
Russia has an image as a freezing country where nothing really
grows. But the Soviet Union’s food crisis has nothing to do with
resources. The country has vast and fertile lands—470 million acres
of rich black earth. (Compare that to the approximately 250 million
acres that make up the U.S.’s corn belt.) In the Republic of Georgia,
people say that if you drive a stake into Georgian land, tomorrow
you will see grapes there.
This year the country again had a blessing of a crop and a curse of
a system; 230 million tons of grain were borne by the fields, while
the USSR was buying 30 million tons abroad.
This is not a problem of equipment. The USSR has 200,000 more
grain harvester combines than the U.S. has. Soviet tractors, the Belarus and the Vlamidirets, are of good quality, but the farmer is not
Forbes, January, 12, 1991, pp. 39–41.
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interested in using them. Why bother? The land does not belong to
him.
Are Russians lazy? Not by nature. Only by training—goofing off is
the only way you can beat the system. In such matters one can’t
divorce current events from history. The roots of today’s food problem in the USSR go back to 1917, when the October Revolution
took agriculture from the people and gave it to the state to use for
state purposes.
By 1910, well before the revolution, the reformist Prime Minister
Piotr Stolypin had pushed through a reform to give land and economic freedom to the peasants. Some peasants used their new freedom wisely; some squandered the fruits. The entrepreneurial
peasants got the name ‘‘kulaks’’—literally, ‘‘fists’’—meaning that
they grasped their households firmly in their hands.
By 1913 the kulaks had created solid, strong farms and even small
agro-industrial complexes. Not only did they produce their own
grain, they raised cattle, invested in equipment for cattle raising and
milk production, and developed transportation networks to get their
goods to market. At that time the kulaks, together with well-to-do
peasants, constituted 35% of all peasant households. A full one-third
of Russia’s peasantry was well on its way to middle-class status.
The curtain began to fall on Russian agriculture in the autumn
of 1917. Lenin’s Bolsheviks ignited the hatred of illiterate, shiftless
drunkards against the kulaks. Starting with the October Revolution,
whatever the kulaks earned was taken away. They were murdered;
their farms, created by long labor, were set on fire. Hard workers were
the people’s enemies.
Building on Lenin, Stalin sent trainloads of hungry and naked kulaks, along with their exhausted sick babies, and dumped them in
the depths of the frozen desert. It was one of the worst genocides in
human history—all done in the name of the people. For the Bolsheviks this was sound policy: A prosperous peasant would never make
a good communist. A city, well fed by the state, might.
The Bolsheviks took over from the kulaks, and here are some of
the results as calculated by the Moscow University agrarian specialist
Professor Aleksei Yemelyanov: From 1928 to 1934, cattle and meat
production fell 40%, production of eggs more than 70%. In 1929, 5.8
million tons of meat were produced. In 1934, only 2 million. Agriculture in the Soviet Union never recovered.

538

the emerging market of russia

The Bolsheviks declared this war not only against the kulaks but
also against the very idea of private property, and especially private
ownership of land. In this regard, the right-wingers around Mikhail
Gorbachev are the Bolsheviks’ faithful descendants. They may compromise on accepting elements of a market economy, but on private
ownership of land, never, unless they are made to do it.
Having eliminated the hardest-working part of the peasantry, the
Bolsheviks re-enslaved the rest, and they have remained enslaved in
all but name ever since. Slaves and spongers. With nothing to gain
by working hard, they worked hardly at all. This year, for example,
huge crops of potatoes were left to rot in the fields. Why bother?
The farmers had all the potatoes they could eat, and the produce of
the state farms did not belong to them, so they didn’t bother harvesting it. In the past, a shortage of produce would have been attributed
by the officials to bad weather, but now the truth is out.
What development the communists managed went to the military
and to the cities. Russian villages are strikingly poor and gloomy. The
quality of the roads is such that a Jeep Cherokee would vanish into
the mud and never be seen again. The roads are decrepit, partially
because of poverty and partially on purpose, to hold the people in
the villages. Until Stalin’s death the peasants were so enslaved they
did not even have I.D. papers and permits to go to the cities. The
Stalinist order has long since broken down. With nothing to hold
them in the countryside, the peasants flock to the cities. Today many
villages are deserted.
What about the food that does get into the Soviet distribution
system? The system has a simple feudal character: It is an exchange
of goods, services, and favors. I fix your car, you give me good meat.
Money, the paper ruble, has no purchasing power. People forage and
trade much as they did five centuries ago. A typical example:
Every morning in a Moscow high-level hospital, a nurse takes the
ration cards of all the doctors and all the staff and goes food-hunting.
By the end of the day she arrives with her trophies. A ruler is applied
to a long sausage stick. Everyone gets an equally tiny piece.
Privileged bureaucrats do not measure their sausages in inches.
Rubles in the hands of ordinary people are nearly worthless, because
people with goods to sell want other goods in return; the rubles buy
nothing. But rubles of the regional party boss and rubles of the ordinary peasant in the same region are different rubles. The ruble loses
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its power if you don’t have special permission, in the form of a coupon, to buy specified goods.
Recently in several big cities, such as Leningrad and Chelyabinsk
in the hungry Urals, enormous quantities of meat were discovered
that had been hidden underground and allowed to rot. Was this
sabotage by the right-wingers, who see crisis as their chance to reimpose dictatorship? I cannot prove it, but I certainly suspect this to
be the case. And Gorbachev does not do anything to tame these diehard communists.
Back to the question of food aid to the Soviet Union: Western
support for Gorbachev is one of the cornerstones of his drive for
power. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze’s dramatic, sacrificial
resignation is already being forgotten. Roland Dumas, the French
foreign minister, said, after Shevardnadze’s resignation, that it is
even more important to help Gorbachev now.
If the United States and Western Europe send food to Gorbachev’s centralized Soviet government, here is what will happen: Distributing the food will fall to the KGB, according to Gorbachev’s
order. The KGB will distribute the food to its own people, to the
army, and to the party bureaucrats. The food will show up in neither
the state stores nor the private markets. Rather, part of it will be
distributed through the system of stores known as Raspredilitel—
stores at which only privileged party members are allowed to shop.
Very little of the food will reach ordinary people.
With a satisfied army and KGB, Gorbachev will be ready to send
troops to the rebellious republics. This will be the beginning of a
bloody civil war.
If the West sends food, its distribution should be decentralized.
Food should be earmarked to specific republics, cities, villages, hospitals, and orphanages where the need is greatest. It is possible,
through the local authorities, to get the addresses of those in greatest
need.
Unless the Soviet system is replaced, the country’s 300 million
people cannot be fed. By its very nature, socialism creates corruption
and dishonor. Adam Smith wrote, in effect, that if today a country
is without honor, tomorrow it will be without bread. The Soviet system lacks honor and deprives the people of their bread.

Part IV
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
AND SCIENTIFIC
TECHNICAL PROGRESS

BOARD OF DIRECTOR
MOTIVATION IN RUSSIA AND THE
COMMONWEALTH OF
INDEPENDENT STATES
A Western-style corporate board of directors is a very new concept
in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The
events of the last eight years have influenced and altered the motivation or incentive for company directors to become members of these
boards. To understand the current motivation of members of boards
of directors, one must first consider the previous corporate governance structures in the Soviet Union and the way the present structure has developed.
Before the break-up of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the
government structure included approximately 100 ministries, each
of which had a ‘‘collegium’’ of about 12 appointed board members.
Members of this collegium included the minister, deputy ministers,
and heads of major departments of the ministry. This collegium was
granted many government privileges, such as a country house, two
months’ salary for a thirty-day vacation at a free government spa,
access to better-quality food at discount prices at special distribution
centers, chauffeured limousines, private tailoring, access to books
and publications with limited or no public distribution, free tickets
to performances of the arts, no waiting in lines, etc.
These privileges were the motivation for reaching high-ranking positions within the ministry. Obviously, the incentives for reaching
these high-level positions were different from incentives of board
directors in a Western executive structure. In the Western structure,
the primary motivations are monetary and the desire for long-term
corporate success. Both incentives were missing in the Soviet structure.
Within the former Soviet Union, large companies or consortiums
Directorship, Inc.: Significant Issues Facing Directors, 1996 (Greenwich, Conn:
Directorship, Inc., 1996), pp. 10–7 & 8.
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had ‘‘ruling’’ boards that acted as advisory groups to the heads of the
companies. Unlike members of the collegium of the ministries,
board members did not have any special privileges; nor did they have
any decision-making power. They simply acted as advisers, and were
not given monetary compensation or other incentives.
The company-governing structure in the former Soviet Union
changed drastically in January 1987, when the government made it
possible to create joint ventures with foreign partners, and a Western-style executive structure was adopted for these ventures. Typically, the German structure was utilized in forming the hierarchy
within these companies. The first joint ventures, 23 in total, were
established in 1987. Each company had between five and seven directors on its board, who were nominated by the venture’s owners.
The selection of directors represented a split of company capital, and
each director was responsible for his portion of the capital. Between
the years 1987 and 1989, board members of these joint ventures did
not receive monetary compensation. Again, they were motivated by
the privileges associated with the high-level position. The main incentive for becoming a director was the opportunity to travel abroad
for business, perhaps two or three times per year. This provided the
chance to live in luxury, in a Western lifestyle, and to have contact
with Western executives. Because the Soviet lifestyle still lacked the
comforts and amenities of Western society, this was a welcome contrast to their lives at home.
With the decentralization of the Soviet Union and the development of the CIS, the economy underwent a transformation. For the
most part, Soviet partners of joint ventures privatized their portions
of the venture and became owners. (At the collapse of the Soviet
Union in December 1991, there were more than 4,800 joint ventures.
In comparison, by 1994 there were approximately 47,000 companies
with foreign capital in the CIS.) The privatization of state-owned
companies in 1991 had a big impact on executive motivation. This
period marked a shift in the motivation of members of boards of
directors toward monetary compensation and the goal of company
success. In 1992, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, all
large companies, including banks, retail stores, manufacturing companies, service companies, etc., established boards of directors. Being
only three years old, the history of the board of directors structure in
Russia and the CIS is in its infancy.
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The current situation in Russia and the CIS with respect to compensation is similar to that in other former Soviet-bloc countries,
including Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, etc. Typically, directors, who
are not company employees (except the chairman of the board and
the president), are paid annually, at the close of the fiscal year, December 31. Directors’ salaries are based on company profits for the
year ending. For example, about 15% of Russian companies pay the
equivalent of two months of the CEO’s salary to their directors.
About 27% of Russian companies pay the equivalent of one month
of the CEO’s salary to their directors. The directors’ salaries depend
on company profit, because the CEO’s salary depends on company
profit. The remainder of the companies in Russia and the CIS do
not pay their directors; again, the motivation for obtaining these
positions is the associated privileges. In addition to a yearly compensation package, it is becoming more and more common for public
companies to give their directors common stock for participating on
their board.
Currently, there are no regulations for the method or disclosure of
payment to executives in the CIS, and this has resulted in unethical
activity. In fact, it is typical for directors to be handed an envelope
full of money, and the source of the funds is unknown to the recipient. Privileges also remain a strong motivation for directors. Until
the lifestyle for executives in Russia and the CIS becomes similar to
that of the Western executive, Russian and CIS directors will value
the privilege of international business travel.
A change in the typical structure of a large CIS company is currently evolving. As domestic companies strive to operate abroad, they
have begun to internationalize their board of directors. Domestic
and international executives who contribute to a company’s attaining its goal of expanding global operations are selected as board
members.
In summary, as a result of current events in the former Soviet
Union, the executive structure of Russian and CIS companies has
changed dramatically. Generally, the trend is toward the development of boards of directors, assimilating the Western democratic
executive business structure. Along with this change in company
structure, a change in motivation for the members of the boards of
directors of these companies has emerged. Directors’ incentives have

546

management systems and scientific technical progress

shifted from strictly special privileges toward monetary compensation and the goal of corporate success. However, for Russian and CIS
companies, this newly emerging corporate structure and motivation
of directors is in its infancy, and it is expected that change will continue as companies develop further.

CONFRONTING THE SOVIET
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE:
BUREAUCRATIC, BUT WORKABLE
The Soviet process of making managerial decisions is unusual for a
Western executive to comprehend, because authority often rests in
different hands. Consequently, foreign business people often knock
on the wrong doors, overestimate the influence of ministries, underestimate the strength of enterprises, and cannot find an appropriate
partner for joint ventures.
Now, after the signing of the trade agreement between the United
States and the USSR, and in view of the democratization movement
in the USSR, it is especially important for executives who would like
to do business there to acquaint themselves with the large and complex Soviet management structure.

Lack of Experience
Most firms coming into the USSR have no experience in dealing
with Soviet business-people and the Soviet market. For a Western
businessperson to understand the Soviet management system, he or
she has to be familiar with the various government bodies and the
way they constitute the management system. Management methods
are totally different from the West’s, because for dozens of years
these methods were tuned to administrative tasks rather than to economic incentives. Decision making in Soviet government units and
business enterprises is drastically different from the West’s, as is information gathering, processing, and distribution. Also, Soviet technical equipment lags behind the level of the rest of the world by at
least 15 years.
For foreign firms trying to understand the Soviet management
system, the first elements to become acquainted with are Soviet orThe International Executive (November–December 1990), pp. 3–6.
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ganizational structures. By understanding them, a firm opens the
door to making good strategic decisions and choosing appropriate
partners for their operations in the USSR.

Be on Guard
Too often, foreign companies lose a lot of time and money signing
contracts or joint-venture agreements with Soviet organizations that
are not legal entities and have no legal right to do so.
A legal entity has two special features: one, a stamp with the National Emblem and the name of the enterprise, and, two, a bank
account.
If, for example, you receive a document from a Soviet state enterprise on which the director’s signature is stamped but the National
Emblem does not appear, it is possible that your partner has no right
to sign a deal with you. However, even if the Soviet company meets
all requirements, it is not enough for it to sign a joint-venture agreement or a barter deal with you. A Soviet firm can engage in foreign
business only if it is registered as a ‘‘participant in foreign economic
activity’’ with the Ministry for Foreign Economic Ties. This makes
it a legal entity entitled to do business with foreign firms. Documentation proving this registration should be available to a foreign firm
upon request.
In total, there are more than 1,153,000 legal entities in the USSR,
but only about 17,000 companies of these have the right to deal
internationally.

Three Stages
In looking for a Soviet partner, the first stage of your business research should be to find out whether the firm is a legal entity. The
second stage is to find out whether this legal entity is permitted to
participate in international economic activities.
The same requirements apply to joint ventures. Besides being registered with the Ministry of Finance, joint ventures must have the
same certificate for participation in foreign economic activity that is
issued by the Ministry for Foreign Economic Ties. Many joint ven-
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tures do not have this certificate. This is a harmful restriction that
secures a monopoly for the Ministry for Foreign Economic Ties.
In any case, do not ignore the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures because doing so could have grave business consequences for
your success in the Soviet market. For example, one of the major
Soviet publishing houses, Molodya Gvardia, decided to acquire modern computer equipment for its printing facilities. Because the publishing house had almost no hard currency, it decided to pay for the
computers in waste paper that it had in quantity. An Austrian company that sells computers agreed to supply the publishing house with
computers and take the waste as barter. The agreement was signed
by the director of the publishing house and the chairman of the
Austrian company. The trading company, in turn, signed contracts
to buy the computers and bought them. But the deal didn’t go
through.
The problem was that the Austrian businessman did not check
on a most important detail: whether the Soviet company had the
permission of GOSSNAB, the USSR State Distribution and Supplies
Committee, to sell its waste. Permission is needed from this committee, because it regulates all the waste produced by USSR state enterprises. Each enterprise has a certain quota of waste that it must
submit to this committee every year—whether it be paper, metal, or
food products.
The Austrian businessman’s mistake was largely a result of a different mindset. Of course, it is difficult for a Western executive to
understand that a firm cannot legally dispose of even waste as it
wants.
The third stage of research is to make sure the prospective Soviet
partner is licensed to sell goods abroad.

License to Sell Abroad
In 1989, the USSR was the only country in the world that licensed
exports, not imports. Even if GOSSNAB had allowed the publishing
house to dispose of its waste, for example, the company still would
have had to get a license from the Ministry for Foreign Ties to sell
abroad.
If a foreign firm finds out that its Soviet partner does not have the
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necessary documents, the company should not wait until the Soviet
partner obtains them. Rather, it should look for a strong Soviet partner that already has the necessary documents.
Keep in mind, too, that even if a Soviet partner is armed with
all the necessary permissions, it is of the utmost importance whose
signature is on the contract. It may be invalid according to Soviet
law if it is signed by the wrong person or in the wrong way.

Law of Enterprises
On June 4, 1990, a new Law of Enterprises was adopted. It made the
independence of a Soviet enterprise more viable as compared to the
law adopted at the beginning of perestroika. The new law, effective
in January 1991, has a special section about the management and
self-management of enterprises. At last, an enterprise will become
completely independent in defining its organizational structure. The
new law also refers to joint ventures, defining for the first time the
legal and economic notion of a joint venture according to law.
This law clearly defines the proprietor’s rights in managing the
enterprise independently or through the bodies to which it delegates
its rights. The proprietor, for example, now has a clear right to hire
a manager. This was out of the question in former years. Only the
ministries and the party committees could do it.
In addition, the new Law of Enterprise confirms the rights of the
working collectives to define the main direction of the enterprise’s
development, distribution of profits, and whether it buys or issues
shares if a director recommends such action.

Accounting Problems
To fully understand the huge Soviet management machine, it is necessary to have an idea about the breadth and weaknesses of its structure. Consider: Bookkeepers and accountants make up a huge army
engaged in routine assignments. Yet the Soviet system does not
work, in part because even these people themselves do not know the
modern language of business. This is one of the foremost weaknesses
of the Soviet management system.
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For example, when I became deputy chairman of a major Siberian
company, the organization lacked capital, to such an extent that it
could not meet payroll. Managers tried solving the problem by reducing the stores of raw materials in the warehouses and trimming salaries, but they still could not make ends meet. Surprisingly, none of
the managers thought to check the balance sheet.
After inspecting the balance sheet, I found that the problem
stemmed from the fact that a lot of parts were still being manufactured that were no longer used in the final product. As a result, these
parts sat idle in storage.
The simple solution was to sell those parts to other organizations
that could use them. The point is that 90% of the Soviet managers
could not envision this solution because they have engineering educations, not economic ones.
Ronald Weiner, president of Weiner Associates. a well-established
New York certified public accounting firm, says that the Soviet
Union urgently needs auditing firms that can audit existing companies and advise them on operating in today’s changing business environment. American accounting firms can assist in organizing proper
cooperation between the State and companies, advising firms on
how to maximize after-tax savings, verifying the financial status of
foreign companies willing to sign contracts with Soviet partners, and
checking the validity of financial commitments made by Soviet organizations. Since the Soviet government no longer guarantees the
debts of Soviet companies, it is especially important for a Western
company to have information about the ability of the Soviet partner
to meet its financial commitments.
I think that the very notion of the USSR will disappear rather soon
from the political maps of the world, but organizational problems
will remain for a long time in the new confederation of the former
republics—and in Russia itself, which constitutes 77% of the USSR’s
territory.

Shift of Power
Without question, 1990 was a turning point for the Soviet Union.
First, the Baltic republic declared its independence, then Moldavia
did the same. Finally, on June 12, the Supreme Council of Russia,
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under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin, approved the Declaration of
Sovereignty. The Republic of Uzbekistan went further, saying that it
regards the USSR as a foreign state. In July, Ukraine and Byelsrussia
followed, as did Armenia in August. Yeltsin now has the task of cutting the tentacles of the ministries and the central party machine
from the Russian territory.
Nonetheless, while the critical situations are still ahead, risk-analysis shows a very high reliability and efficiency of investments in some
regions of the USSR. The economic and political crisis in the USSR
does not argue against the advisability of investing there. Indeed,
investments in certain regions within the Russian Federation are no
less reliable and efficient than investments in the United States. It
is just that the factors of risk are different.

MOSCOW LEARNS THE
LANGUAGE OF BUSINESS
Integrating a government-run economy into the global marketplace
takes more than exchangeable currency, stock markets, and commercial
banks. Much more.
Five years ago, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev set in motion the
gears of perestroika, the restructuring initiative aimed at increasing
Soviet productivity. In September he backed a proposal by Republic of
Russia President Boris Yeltsin to implement a free-enterprise economy
within 500 days. One of its goals is to integrate the Soviet economy
into the global marketplace by adjusting Soviet business practices to
mesh with those of the free market. The USSR has made certain strides
toward establishing the systems and institutions necessary to expedite
its full participation in international commerce. The achievements and
shortcomings are explored here.
The focus of the business world has shifted to Moscow. With the
advent of perestroika, the Soviet Union’s industrial infrastructure,
the volume of its products, the extent of its debts, and the inadequacies of its accounting system have fallen under the scrutiny of businesses from Tokyo to New York to Paris. One thing foreign investors
and entrepreneurs are finding is confusion. In a country where an
accounting profession has never existed, financial numbers tend not
to mean much. The valuation of assets, for example, has been so
theoretical that it is, for all practical purposes, useless. In fact, Soviet
accounting is really no more than a bookkeeping system managed by
low-level retired women and inexperienced new graduates of technical schools. In addition, financial and accounting information has, in
the past, been distorted by the government in the pseudo-interest of
national security. Further complicating the situation, prices have
been distorted by the arbitrary introduction into the marketplace of
billions of unbacked rubles—18 billion rubles last year alone—by the
government, which has run the banks.
The Journal of Accountancy (November 1990), pp. 114–119.
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Incorrect or non-existent financial information can mean trouble
for both foreign and Soviet companies that want to invest in the
Soviet Union. The problem must be solved on several fronts.

Creation of Commercial Banks
First, the Soviet economy needs a new, independent national bank
that is subordinate only to the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet parliament) and the law. The current state bank obeys the Council of
Ministers formally but, in fact, responds to pressure from the Central
Committee of the Communist Party. A phone call from this committee is enough to justify printing more rubles. The lack of backing
by any standard or commodity leads inexorably to inflation.
In addition to the circulating of worthless rubles, two other factors
doom attempts at economic reform. One is the fact that banks pay
interest of only 2% to 3% a year—far less than my estimated inflation
rate of 18%. Citizens therefore keep their money at home, ready to
spend should an opportunity arise. The other factor is the scarcity of
products. When consumers have cash in hand, nothing to buy, and
no reason to save, prices will inevitably rise.
Until 1986, there were three Soviet banks, all state-owned. In
1988, three more state banks, also run by the government, were
formed for specific financial purposes: construction of housing,
schools, and hospitals, agricultural investment, and saving.
In that same year, the first commercial banks were also opened.
These cooperative, publicly held banks were not state banks, although industrial ministries were among the founders of some of
them. For example, Tehknobank was created at the initiative of the
city council of Moscow. Capital of 6.2 million rubles was raised in
shares valued at 100,000 rubles. Shareholders received a 5% return
at the end of the first year. Tehknobank already has lent money to
transportation cooperatives, and to support the growth of consumer
goods it plans to lend to military factories that are converting to
civilian production.
The second non–state bank, the new Credobank, is licensed to
open foreign currency accounts for enterprises doing business
abroad. For the first time, hard currency on account in a Russian
commercial bank can be given to bank customers in any country in
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the world or deposited in any foreign bank. This means that Credobank also can pay dividends in foreign currency.
The existence of such banks surprises both Soviet and Western
business people. Westerners are surprised to find that commercial
banks are only now beginning to operate and that there still are no
private banks; Soviets are surprised to see such revolutionary new
banking concepts in their country. These banks are totally commercial enterprises, creating their own financial data. Three hundred
such commercial banks will facilitate the creation of a modern accounting system.
Formulating New Credit and Budget Policies
In all probability, the specialized state banks will be turned into specialized commercial banks, and the central State Bank eventually will
become independent of the prime minister and cease the arbitrary
issuance of paper money. This will bring about the second major
change needed to correct a fundamental problem with the Soviet
economy: a new credit and budget policy. New policies will limit
budgetary spending which, in turn, will limit inflation.
The state budget in 1989 allotted 20.24 billion rubles to the military, but, in newspaper accounts two months later, the Soviet minister of defense said military spending had surpassed 70 billion rubles.
Both these figures are wrong. The problem is that the accounting
and bookkeeping system of the individual ministries (and of enterprises) does not correlate with the methods of the central government budget calculation. This has led to a budget deficit which I
estimate for 1990 at more than 100 billion rubles (the official estimate is 50 billion rubles), which is about 11.5% of the gross national
product.
It would seem that, under such conditions, the government would
restrict credit, but the interest rate on credit remains only 2%. Even
more absurd, credit is granted to enterprises facing bankruptcy. Also,
a number of joint ventures involving foreign companies have taken
advantage of this inexpensive money to increase their cash position.
Establishing Stock Exchanges
In the near future, foreign enterprises in the Soviet Union can expect
higher interest rates. They also can expect some revolutionary new
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avenues of investment on the Soviet scene: stocks, bonds, and other
commercial paper.
In early 1990, a few publicly held companies were created and a
few stocks are circulating. In July, the USSR Council of Ministers
adopted two regulations dealing with stockholding and shares. In the
same month, one of the largest state banks, Zhilsotsbank, was turned
into a stockholding commercial bank by the Kremlin, with foreign
entities and individuals allowed to buy shares in it.
The decentralization of the banking system was accelerated when
the parliament of Russia, the USSR’s largest republic, declared on
July 13 the creation of a state bank in its territory, independent of
the USSR state bank. Such decisions create the necessary elements
for a market economy in the Republic of Russia. Preliminary discussions are under way in the Supreme Council to pass laws that will
enable foreign business people to be among the founders and shareholders of Soviet enterprises.
The Soviet Union has no experience in this area. Cooperation
with the West will be essential in the complex process of issuing,
buying, selling, and overseeing stocks, bonds, and other instruments.
The emergence of a stock exchange depends on two conditions.
One is an agreement among several state banks concerning the operating rules for trading securities. Also, given the totalitarian history
of the Soviet Union, it will be important that exchange operations
and share possession be anonymous.
To develop a free-market economy, it will be necessary to establish
and operate a stock exchange and privatize at least 50% of stateowned companies. Brokers, who do not yet exist in the Soviet Union,
also will be necessary; this means that new training programs will
have to be developed.

Expanding Commodities Exchanges
In May 1990, the first Board of Trade, a commodities exchange, was
created. In September it became operational. The founders of the
Board are a number of Soviet enterprises and cooperatives and a
Soviet–Yugoslavian–Italian joint venture. Initially, the Board of
Trade mostly will carry out barter operations.
In spite of the current scarcity of goods in the Soviet Union, the
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Board of Trade will become the heart pumping blood into the new
arteries of the market. Available goods will come not only from the
allowed inventory levels worth 500 billion rubles but also from another 200 billion rubles’ worth of hoarded goods being stored by
enterprises.
Such inventories during times of inflation and scarcity might surprise some Westerners. One reason for the storage tactic is that the
ruble is all but worthless. Enterprises have little success trying to use
rubles to buy production materials. Domestic bartering proves more
effective, though, of course, more awkward. For example, a company
would more readily procure bricks by proffering, say, telephones than
it would by paying in rubles.

Accounting System
Perhaps one of the most important changes that must take place is
in the field of accounting. The current system does not allow for the
realistic valuation of products or assets. For example, the concepts
of depreciation and current market value do not exist. These gaps
lead to disparities between government and commercial financial
numbers. The inaccuracies also make it difficult for managers and
potential investors to make educated decisions.
Until this summer, there was only one auditing entity in the Soviet Union, IN-AUDIT, which was created by the Ministry of Finance to oversee joint ventures with foreign companies. It did not
audit Soviet enterprises. This summer, two foreign accounting firms,
Ernst & Young and Arthur Andersen & Co., were licensed to practice
in the Soviet Union. More will certainly follow, but, for the time
being, the concept of auditing is quite new to Soviet enterprises.
The presence of accounting firms will lead to the creation of a
genuine accounting profession in the Soviet Union. Currently, the
accountant/bookkeeper has little prestige and earns less than half the
salary of an engineer or economist; but accountants are going to
prove essential in the shift to a free-market economy with international connections. If accounting is the language of business, Soviet
accountants are going to have to learn that language and create a
Soviet dialect.
In June, President Gorbachev signed the Law of Enterprises of the
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USSR. It will take effect on January 1, 1991. The law states that all
companies, whether state-owned or private, have equal rights. (A law
governing foreign investment and joint ventures is being drafted
now.) The Law of Enterprises also protects commercial secrets. No
one—government, union or industrial ministry—can usurp the right
to financial information not specifically required by financial reporting law.
Three articles of the new law deal specifically with accounting:
Article 32 is devoted to the operational accounting and bookkeeping
at enterprises; Article 34 defines the responsibility of enterprises to
follow accounting and tax regulations; Article 35 legalizes government audits for tax purposes but specifies that the government may
request only relevant information.
The law also allows, for the first time in Soviet history, an enterprise to declare bankruptcy. Previously. there was no such term in
Soviet law; enterprises suffering losses got subsidies from the state.
When a Soviet or joint-venture enterprise is being closed, a special
abolition committee has to be created to assess debts and investigate
the creditors’ claims. After all claims are satisfied, the employees and
foreign investors of the enterprise receive their investment in either
currency or securities.
In May 1990, the Soviet Union also adopted its first tax law. It
embraces joint ventures and other organizations created with the
participation of foreign entities and Soviet and foreign citizens. The
law gives official tax inspectors the right to check such an enterprise’s
monetary documents, bookkeeping records, and other documents relating to the payment of taxes; to fine enterprises; and even to shut
down their operations.
By September, 2,060 joint-ventures had been registered in the Soviet Union—1,200 of them in Moscow, where a state tax inspection
office is being created with help from the New York City accounting
firm of Weiner Associates. Overall, Soviet enterprises involved in
foreign economic relations and joint ventures totaled 17,000 as of
September 1. Obviously, there exists tremendous interest in foreign
trade and, necessarily, international accounting practices.
Moving Forward
The establishment of tax audits, the development of a banking system, and the introduction of auditing firms are beginning to create
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opportunities for Western business people who want objective information about the financial status of a potential partner in a trade
deal or a joint venture. They also make it possible, in some cases, for
Soviet organizations to guarantee payment for foreign goods purchased, which has not been possible since the government stopped
backing all foreign trading.
As long as Soviet and international accounting practices differ and
there is no common language for expressing financial information,
Soviet and Western companies will have to be careful when they
deal with one another. Western companies need to understand the
Soviet tax structure and the lack of a coherent system of accounting
for financial transactions. Soviet enterprises, having little or no international business experience, will need the help of auditing firms to
interpret financial information.
One thing is clear. The Soviet Union’s dramatic progress toward a
free-market economy can go only so far before the lack of an adequate accounting system derails all financial dealings. But with private banking controlled by established laws, with financial reporting
overseen by independent auditors, and with modern, internationally
recognized accounting methods, the Soviet Union will quickly join
the world of global commerce.
Executive Summary
• The USSR is poised to enter the global market on a grand scale just
five years after President Mikhail Gorbachev announced perestroika,
his political reform package.
• In reshaping its economic infrastructure to conform with Western
practices, the USSR is creating new and independent commercial
banks that deal in hard currencies.
• A non–state-run banking system is the first step in controlling inflation and the indiscriminate issuance of worthless rubles.
• For an accounting system, the Soviets must look to the West for
help since neither a reliable system nor knowledgeable accountants
are needed in a government-run economy.
• From the West also must come the expertise to establish and maintain stock exchanges and train their traders and brokers.
• New laws protecting the rights of Soviet citizens and foreigners who
invest and operate private businesses were adopted in May 1990.
Also enacted were the USSR’s first tax laws, covering joint ventures
and other transactions involving foreign participation.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INCREASES IN CAPITAL
INVESTMENT AND THE
REDUCTION IN THE DURATION
OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PHASE
The length of time required to put new technological processes and
systems into use can be significantly affected by the application of the
latest scientific and technical research. This application will impact
both the costs of the new technology and a company’s overall expenditures. For this reason, when calculating the effectiveness and annual
economic benefit of the new technology (NT), all aspects of the implementation phase should appear as part of the total costs associated
with its development and introduction. However, by its nature, the
character of these costs is not one-sided. Expenses for NT development appear as expenses in the area of applied research and engineering, that is, as practical expenses associated with scientific and
technological development (STD). Installation costs actualize this
STD. Outlays for installation significantly affect the length of time
between the development phase of the NT and its productive use.
Clearly, there is a direct correlation between the level of installation
expenditure and the length of time—an increase in expenditure effects a reduction in the length of the implementation phase. Indeed,
the costs of putting NT into operation are significant and often are
comparable to the cost of the NT itself. Experience shows that the
manpower involved in the technical preparation of new production
can amount to up to 30% of the overall manpower necessary for STD.
In scientific literature, publications specifically dedicated to questions of determining the economic effectiveness of these processes
of implementation are practically nonexistent. Nor in more general
In Economic Problems of the Implementation of Scientific and Technical Projects
(Moscow: The Institute of the Economy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1987), pp. 21–25.
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works analyzing the economic effectiveness of NT has this problem
been satisfactorily addressed.
Defining the economic effectiveness of the installation phase cannot be done outside the framework of the general question of the
effectiveness of NT. Therefore, the major criteria in calculating the
effectiveness of this initial phase should be the same as that used in
calculating the effectiveness of the NT as a whole, that is, increased
output and improved quality of the company’s product. At the same
time, it is clear that the specific nature of the installation (implementation) process requires a different approach in determining cost
effectiveness at that stage.
The element of time should be a determining factor in calculating
cost effectiveness. In other words, all expenses the company incurs
in technical preparation should be directed toward minimizing the
time required for installing, adjusting, and launching the NT and
achieving planned capacity. Factors preceding preparations—for example, choosing the object of STD, and the like—should function
in the same way.
Considering such, in calculating the economic effect of accelerating the preparation and installation phase, the following sequence
should be observed.
At the first stage, the annual economic effect of creating and implementing the NT is determined:
Eann ⳱

冋

(C ⳮC2)
(Y2ⳮY1)
⳯ P1 Ⳮ 1
⳯ Y2] ⳮ Ec ⳯ Cdi
Y1
100

where:
Eann ⳱ the annual economic effect;
Y1, Y2 ⳱ the volume of goods sold the year before and the year
after NT installation ($1,000);
C1, C2 ⳱ costs per $1.00 of goods sold before and after NT
implementation;
P1
⳱ profits from goods sold before NT implementation
($1,000)
In this case,

冋

(Y2ⳮY1)
(C ⳮC2)
⳯ Y2]
⳯ P1 Ⳮ 1
Y1
100
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is the annual increase in profits ⳱ AP
where
Ec ⳱ standard coefficient of economic effectiveness of capital
investments (0.12);
Cdi ⳱ costs of NT development and implementation ($1,000);
Cdi ⳱ Cd Ⳮ Ci, where Cd ⳱ costs of development
Ci ⳱ costs of implementation
The annual economic effect gives an idea of the extent of NT economic effectiveness, with consideration given to all the costs of NT
development and installation.
The effectiveness of these costs may be defined according to the
formulas:

冋

(C ⳮC2)
(Y2ⳮY1)
⳯ Y2]
⳯ P1 Ⳮ 1
ⳮY1
100
AP
Ee ⳱
⳱
Ee⬎En;
Cdi
CcⳭCi
where:
Ee ⳱ estimated coefficient of cost effectiveness.
At the same time, cost-recovery time will equal:
T ⳱ Cd Ⳮ

Ci
,
P

where
T ⳱ cost-recovery time in terms of years.
If, to reduce the cost-recovery time (T), one minimizes development and implementation costs (Cdi) as much as possible, thereby
making Ee larger than Ei, then the time factor would not be accounted for. The completion time of the cost-recovery (T) period is
then postponed to the implementation period. Meanwhile, it is obvious that the time element is a very significant factor in the economy,
because it strongly affects the rate of economic growth. The overall
economic benefit of NT implementation, which will be realized over
a long period of time, is not proportionate to the benefit gained in
the initial stages, starting from the beginning of the implementation
process.
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In our case, this problem becomes one of considering the time
factor with varying implementation costs. In considering increasing
investment to accelerate the introduction of NT, however, one
should not set as obligatory the condition of increasing the absolute
sum of costs of this process, but rather increase costs in a time unit
of the implementation period that would intensify all operations at
this stage of the research and production cycle. But if increasing
expenses in the time unit will require an increase of total costs and,
therefore, the cost-recovery time, the challenge is to determine the
optimal limits that will make increasing implementation costs economically effective.
Let us consider an example. Y1, Y2 ⳱ $300,000 and $400,000,
respectively; C1, C2 ⳱ $0.90 and $0.75, respectively; P1 ⳱
$1,200,000. In this case, the increase in profit after NT implementation will equal:
P⳱

A

(Y2ⳮY1)
(C ⳮC2)
⳯ Y2 ⳱ $406,000.
⳯ P1 Ⳮ 1
Y1
100

Let us assume that NT development and implementation costs
amount to $1,015,000; concurrently Cdi ⳱ Cd ⳱ Ci ⳱ $675,000 Ⳮ
$340,000. In this case, cost-recovery time will equal:
T1 ⳱

Cdi
⳱ $1,015,000/$406,000 ⳱ 2.5 years.
AP

Let us further assume that NT implementation costs (Ci) increase
by $160,000; that is,
Cdi ⳱ Cd Ⳮ C1I ⳱ $675,000 Ⳮ $500,000 ⳱ $1,175,000.
Meanwhile, cost-recovery time gets longer:
T2 ⳱

C1ai
⳱ 2.9 years.
P

At the same time, NT implementation time decreases to 0.5 years
because of intensification of the implementation process at the expense of increasing costs.
By increasing the cost-recovery period, according to the second
version, by 0.4 years, we will reduce the economic effectiveness of
the implemented NT. However, by increasing the cost-recovery period, we have reduced the implementation period; and at the ex-
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pense of this, we began to obtain the effect from NT
implementation 0.6 years earlier. The sum of the effect equals:
Eadd ⳱ P ⳯ T ⳱ $406,000 ⳯ 0.6 ⳱ $243,600,
where:
T ⳱ (T1 Ⳮ Tp1)ⳮ(T2 Ⳮ Tp2).
Despite increasing costs and increasing the cost-recovery period in
the second version, additional profits, which will be obtained by the
end of the six-year period, equal:
P2 ⳱ EaddⳮCi⬘ ⳱ $243,000ⳮ$160,000 ⳱ $83,600
where:
Ci⬘ ⳱ C1iⳮCi.
Thus, in some instances it is useful to increase implementation costs
on the condition that, as the result of this increase, there will be a
decrease in the implementation period, and the total amount of this
decrease will exceed the decrease of the cost-recovery period.

THE PROCESS OF FORMING A
REGIONAL POLICY ON SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY
Paramount among the goals of a regional policy on science and technology is the creation of conditions, through advances in research
and technology, for bolstering the health of current and future populations. By nature, it is a social goal; its success will be manifested in
the sphere of economic policy and measured by the increased efficiency of regional work groups. This goal corresponds with the ultimate goal of socialist production and is perceived, at the regionalcomplex level, as a subsystem of the overall economic system.
In my opinion, analysis, based on scientific and technological
progress, of the ultimate goal of regional-level production also contributes to resolving the issue. First, the most significant potential
combinations of socialist advantages and achievements of the scientific and technological revolution are realized; and, second, on a regional level, the practical significance of the most important
principle of the whole economic system is fully revealed: democratic
centralism’s role in the scope of the ultimate goal of production (in
its structure) and in reflecting people’s interests and demands for
greater satisfaction, with consideration of real opportunities at every
level of social development.
Specifying regional scientific and technological policy goals in a
new period of political forecasting, and creating a hierarchical system
of subgoals and subtasks, are linked to conducting a resource analysis
of the major factors forming a given policy. At the same time, the
collective significance of interregional factors is also being determined, based on the selection of priorities of policy goals, and, further, on the basis of priorities for predicting the scientific and
technological development of the labor and production forces in the
region.
Excerpt from The Management of Scientific and Technical Progress: A Regional
Aspect (Moscow: Science Publishing House, 1986).
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In analyzing research and development (R&D) problems of the
regional program of scientific and technological progress in the Sverdlovsk region, V. Manukhin highlighted the fact that ‘‘the question
of priorities is one of the most important. Therefore, it is necessary
to choose those sectors that should be mechanized first and correlate
them with our capabilities.’’
The basis for forming a regional scientific and technical policy is,
by its very definition, to form a comparable national policy on science and technology. The conception of a ranking national institutional policy serves as the launching point for forming the lower
levels of a hierarchical policy. A consolidated national policy for advancement in science and technology is reflected in the complex
programs for resolving the most important scientific and technological problems, and in the five-year plan’s ‘‘Scientific and Technological Research and Development’’ sector. On a regional level, the
content of these documents is considered from the vantage point of
state specialization, in the light of a region’s social and economic
orientation, and with consideration of the actual regional resources
and opportunities for their inclusion in the state’s economic turnover. At higher levels of authority, a scientific and technological policy has a specifying influence on that policy in the given region.
The policy of enterprises that function in, or are destined for, a
regional territory in accordance with planning or preliminary R&D
significantly influences the regional scientific and technological policy. First, the enterprises’ policy on science and technology impacts
the regional policy through the complex program of scientific research and development of the district. These programs anticipate
increasing the scientific and technological level of operating unions
and enterprises in a district, major changes in their technology, and
implementation of new production capabilities based on utilization
of advances in science and technology. Second, the ministries’ influence is carried out through the district’s scientific and technological programs for mastering the production of new commodities and
through the district’s efforts to realize the national goals of the science and technology programs. Third, there should be interaction
between planned execution of the regional scientific and technology
policy and the ministries’ district plans (in the ‘‘Scientific and Technological Research and Development’’ section of the 5-year plan).
Furthermore, factors inherent in the system of the nation’s collec-
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tive science and technology policy, the social and economic policy of
the region, and the concept of developing its production capabilities
in accordance with the general scheme of developing and allocating
production capacity influence regional scientific and technological
policy. In other words, in predictive scenarios of the scientific and
technological development of the regional economic complex, the
main goals of social and economic scenarios are reflected. Such is
the beginning of the scientific and technological attainment of the
economic and social policy goals. For instance, the strategies of the
agrarian regional policy, as a subsystem of an economic policy, may
obtain agricultural resources and time characteristics only after specifying the material and technological basis and the scientific aspects
of the strategic actions. However, this requires development of the
scientific and technological regional policy in order to correlate all
district policies on science and technology. Out of such regional and
district forecasting scenarios, a major portion of the scientific and
technological development scenario of the country’s economy gradually develops.
The regional resource opportunities are significant interregional
factors of a regional science and technology policy. Also, though located in the regions of pioneering economic development, natural
resource factors play a major role in economically mature regions, in
the resources of production capability, in the scientific and technological possibilities, etc. Currently the relative deficit in the labor
force has significantly increased as a factor in the resource balance
of most regions of the country. Even for labor-rich regions of Central
Asia, Azerbaijan, and Daghestan, this factor is a defining one, because priorities of the science and technology policy in those regions
should contribute to involving the able-bodied population of the region in national production. As such, resource analysis should continually be targeted as a chief goal. Concurrently, the traditional
approach to estimating the economic effectiveness of involving regional resources in the economic turnover of the country can be
augmented by estimating the impact of this process on the ecology
of the natural environment and the population of the region.
As our research shows, the results of the resource analysis should
be reflected in the projected scenario of the scientific and technological development of the productive forces of the region and, thus,
should influence the setting of priority goals. In the process of re-
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source analysis, there should be considered a defining sense of setting a shared science and technology policy, as well as the social and
economic strategy of the region. That is why, at this stage, it is already important to define the scientific and technological opportunities when allocating resource obligations of a given region to other
regions of the country in accordance with nationwide planning.
Then, the preliminary resource balance of the regional scientific and
technological policy goals will indicate the respective perspectives.
Thereupon, the resources that need be obtained from other regions
in order to realize these goals can be defined. Once priority goals are
established, the resource balance should be determined.
The priority goals of a rational scientific and technological policy
should be defined in four dimensions: territory, common-district,
inter-district, and district.
The territorial dimension permits defining the priorities of regional scientific and technological development as a whole, in connection with the ecology and the complex use of land, water, wood,
energy resources, etc. Setting territorial priorities is connected to the
participation and obligations of a given region in interregional labor
specialization and in interregional cooperation vis-à-vis scientific and
technological potentials.
Common-district priorities permit resource concentration in the
goals common to the majority or to all districts of the regional economic complex. This might be the development and production of
equipment for the execution of regional policy. Thus, to illustrate,
practically all enterprises functioning in the north and northeastern
parts of the country require equipment designed for use in extremely
cold climates (CC). In total, during the 10th 5-year plan, 30,000
pieces of construction machinery and equipment and 17,500 cars
were produced for such use. The 11th 5-year plan designates production of 45,000 CC pieces of construction machinery of 30 types.
Given projected increases in industry and transport development in
the northern regions, this volume of CC equipment is insufficient.
For this reason, in several regions of Siberia and the Far East, programs are being developed to design, produce, refurbish, and implement CC machinery. In other words, we are talking about a
prioritized common-district task for these regions; executing this
task is possible with the use of a common-district program, and a
regional program for scientific and technological advancement as
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well. Common-district, as well as inter-district, priorities include
mechanization, automation, robotization of production, utilization
of laser technologies, etc.
The inter-district dimension of defining goal priorities shows
those trends of scientific and technological development that, in a
number of regions, secures an effect that results from the interaction
of several regional district complexes. The resources and efforts of
scientific and technological potential should be concentrated on
these trends. To successfully clarify the priority tasks, regional interdistrict programs may be developed, and multi-district regional scientific and technological unions and complementary industrial
plants may be created.
An example of such a scientific and technological task may be the
various electronic and chemical multi-product technological complexes that are being created in a number of regions. Thus, in connection with the imminent mastering and exploitation of the apatit
(a calcium phosphate mineral) fields in Maymecha-Koltuy province,
it is possible to extract the chemical- and metallurgy-enriching copper-nickel ores (concentrates) of the Norilsk ore area through the use
of phosphorus acid, which is derived from the apatits of the given
province, and, thus, realize the simultaneous production, in the
common technological cycle, of the nonferrous metals and phosphorus fertilizers as well. Priority realization of such inter-district programs will allow the attainment of economic benefits not only in a
few industrial districts, but also in agriculture and the entire agroindustrial complex as well.
In particular, in nonferrous metallurgy, this will allow the avoidance of less productive physical methods of enrichment and secure
the production of additional commodity products, with overall costs
diminished by 35% to 40%. In agriculture, increased efficiency of
farming based on the large-scale use of phosphorus fertilizers is being
secured.
On the whole, the described technology is an example of rational
technologies developed on the basis of the interconnection of technological links of enterprises in a couple of districts in the region.
This interconnection may be (as in this case) a result of solving tasks
through a more complex use of regional natural resources. Regional
technologies are also being developed for the purpose of the further
processing of raw materials and byproducts of enterprises in different
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regional districts, and organizing technological complexes for collective inter-district use, etc.
Thus, in choosing the priority goals in the scientific and technological development of regional district complexes, the resource aspect of the problem obtains top priority. If there is a labor shortage
in the region, then it is necessary to develop new non-human production methods, and reconstruct and modernize the old ones based
on implementing labor-saving scientific and technological solutions.
The scientific and technological policy of corresponding economic
districts in the country significantly influences the formation of the
regional district priorities. However, the district and regional interests may not be consistent.
A narrow-district approach to estimating effectiveness may show
that creating new enterprises on the basis of new technologies—
powder metallurgy and biotechnological complexes—is more economical in the developed regions, which have a mature social and
living infrastructure. However, the regional aspect of a common national scientific and technological policy is oriented, for example,
toward building such enterprises in the regions of pioneering mastering with the low total volume of the old main production funds. At
the same time, the priorities of the scientific and technological policy of the developed region may show higher effectiveness through
the reconstruction of old enterprises on a principally new technological basis.
At the stage of setting the priorities of the scientific and technological policy of the region, the directions of optimization of its industrial structure are defined. For example, the structure of the
regional energy balance may be regulated; here the district aspect or
the regional scientific and technological policy specifies and adds
propositions from the perspective of ministries and administrations
of the fuel and energy complex in the country. The regional scientific
and technological policy in the end should always be oriented to
the regional human population ecology. Setting the priorities of this
policy, balanced with the resource potentials of the region, leads to
individualization, in various regions, of the cost structure in the
sphere of scientific and technological progress. Priorities should implement achievements from scientific and technological progress in
those particular regional economic complexes that disturb its balance.
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The resource analysis of the goals and prognoses of regional development allows the defining of which resources are correspondent
with the level of interregional needs, and which resources are correspondent with the regional goals in the overall state specialization.
However, only those resources obtain scientific and technological
priority that either are insufficient to allow the region to solve its
tasks, or are so significant and multi-complex that a developed technological level does not secure their full and complex utilization.
Forming the strategy of the regional scientific and technological
policy on the basis of chosen priorities allows securing the proportionate development of the region in accordance with orientation of
the common state policy in this sphere, that is, securing the regional
economic balance. This opportunity is reached through the use of a
tactical block of the regional scientific and technological policy and
effective functioning of the mechanism for its realization. Consistent realization of the strategy and continual orientation toward the
main goal free this policy from the entry of elements that reflect
subjective interests of separate links in the regional economic system. We are talking about those interests that disturb the economic
balance and the regional scientific and technological development as
a subsystem of the common economic complex of the country.
Setting the priority goals and prognoses and conducting the resource balance create conditions for the interactive macro-aggregate
modeling of the district and territory proportions of scientific and
technological contributions to the enlargement of regional reproduction.
At this stage, the first interaction of conceptual modeling is carried out, and it is expedient to use the exponents of modeling in
the inter-district and inter-regional optimization of the model. This
allows for coordinating more accurately the regional scientific and
technological development with the goals of the common state scientific and technological policy, with its district subsystems, and
with the scientific and technological policy in the higher hierarchy
regions. The problem of modeling the regional scientific and technological policy is not sufficiently developed. With this goal, the utilization of the mechanism of multilevel (depending on the regional
hierarchy, the scientific and technological policy of which is being
developed) imitation modeling seems effective. It is important to
emphasize that the absence of adequate models and their systems
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for managing regional scientific and technological development on a
strategic level decreases the effectiveness of regional and state governance of scientific and technological progress as a whole. In large
part, the development of a model level of managing the scientific
and technological progress is bogged down by an insufficient level of
theoretical understanding of the regional scientific and technological
policy as an economic category.
As a result of realizing the described steps in developing the regional scientific and technological policy, its concept is formed. The
concept must take into consideration the scientific and technological level of the regional economic complex and the level and perspective trends of the regional scientific and technological development
potential. The concept should include the extended estimation of
the effectiveness of the accepted version of the scientific and technological policy. By representing the basis for forming the complex regional scientific and technological program, the concept reflects a
thesis of a collective national policy in the scientific and technological progress sphere, and the concept, in turn, influences the formation of the schemes for developing and allocating the regional labor
force on the basis of directing the regional economic and social development.
The process of forming the strategy for the regional scientific and
technological policy concludes by preparing the complex regional
scientific and technological program. This document is implemented not only by means of all elements of the tactical block, but
also through the subregional levels of science and technology policy
(regarding economic regions, these are province, industrial complex,
etc.) and the major economic structures, that is, production unions
and enterprises.
In previous works, we studied the problem of forming the scientific and technological policy of enterprises and unions; here we will
present only the formalized structure of this process (see the scheme
below), which is specified in the given study.
It is necessary to begin developing the tactical block of the regional scientific and technological policy on the basis of an analysis
of the region.
The resources of the accepted version of the strategy are secured.
The especially important question in the tactical block is perfecting
the structure of the administrations that govern the scientific and
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technological progress in the region. First of all, this is the least developed element in the entire organizational structure governing the
economy. Second, in connection with the objective necessity of
strengthening the combination of state, district, and territory approaches toward governing, the significance of effectively managing
the scientific and technological progress in the region increases immensely.
The factual absence of the independent administrations of the
state in governing scientific and technological progress in the regional organization structures (first, in the composition of the regional deputy committees) led to forming a broad and differentiated
chain of public organizations for managing this sphere in many regions of the country. Therefore, at the stage of forming policy tactics,
it is even more important to define those regional public-organizing
forms of integrating research projecting the production, and implementing and exploiting new equipment, that showed their effectiveness in the process of experimental use in a few regions during the
preceding planned period. On the whole, at this stage, the necessary
regional economic experiments are planned, as are those actions of
the regional scientific and technological policy which are to be tested
in the course of the experiment.
The tactical block has a more developed plan and program dimension than the strategic block. At a given stage, the major regional
goal of the scientific and technological program, the list of the most
significant regional scientific and technological problems, and actions of the section ‘‘The development of science and technology’’
of the plan for the complex economic and social development of the
region are defined. In forming these materials, consideration is given
to corresponding state and district programs and plans, the complex
regional program of scientific and technological progress for a 20year period, and the suggestions for scientific and technological development received from regional research and manufacturing organizations. The system of interconnection of the major program and
plan documents, which develops on the state, district, and region
levels in the process of forming and implementing the regional scientific and technological policy, is presented in scheme 4.
In the process of the tactical development of the policy, the methodical recommendations for organizing and managing regional scientific and technological progress should be viewed and accepted.
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The success of the policy in the sphere of scientific and technological progress is defined, in large part, by the speed with which
scientific thought passes through every stage of the ‘‘science–
technology–production’’ cycle. It is important to secure the clear and
reliable interconnection between the organizational economic links
that implement each step of the cycle. Here, the impact of such an
economic law as the law of the time economy fully manifests itself.
During the years of the 11th 5-year plan in the country, along
with the district forms, various regional forms were developed for
integrating, constructing, projecting, producing, and implementing
organizations, which accelerate the processing of scientific thought
to the degree of their broad use in the regional economic complex.
In a number of regions in the country, the regional scientific and
productive unions, institutions, and constructive and productive organizations of districts are functioning. Also, they are operating not
only as public structures (as in the experience of the Lvov region),
but also as double- or triple-subjection structures (as with the scientific and productive union of powder metallurgy to the Board of Ministers in Belorussia and others).
The tactical development of the regional scientific and technological policy should take into consideration the progressive experience
of the functioning of these unions of scientific, technological, and
productive potentials of the regions, should recommend the broad
disbursement of their most effective forms, and should contribute
to the acceleration of their normative and legal appropriation and
formation.
After initially choosing a tactical version of the substantial strategy
(during the process of the first interaction of conceptual modeling),
it is expedient to conduct the next step of conceptual modeling,
which will allow one the selection of a version of the regional scientific and technological policy that will maximize the regional economic benefit and take into account the main goal of the region.
The concrete version of the regional scientific and technological P
policy in k region may be implemented by means of numerous strategies and the numerous corresponding tactics. Assume that:
Pk ⳱ a multitude of possible scenarios of the regional scientific
and technological policy in k region;
Pkj ⳱ j scenario of the regional scientific and technological policy
in k region;
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Qkj ⳱ a multitude of scenarios in k region according to j regional
scientific and technological policy;
qikj ⳱ i strategy in k region according to j policy;
Zikj ⳱ a multitude of tactics according to i strategy, j policy in k
region;
zsikj ⳱s scenario of tactic according to i strategy, j policy, in k
region.
As a result we can write the following hierarchy system of
correlation:
zsikj僐Zikj<=qikj僐Qikj<=Pkj僐Pk
where
k ⳱ index of the region;
j ⳱ index of the regional scientific and technological policy;
i ⳱ index of the strategy of the given policy;
s ⳱ index of the tactic of the given policy.
Obviously, every version of the strategy of the regional scientific
and technological policy generates its multitude of versions.
On the basis of this scheme, the system of the optimization
modes, with the purpose of maximizing the economic effect with
the corresponding system of the technology, ecology, and resource
limits in the scenario of the policy, with the corresponding versions
of the strategy and tactic, may be formed.
The model of choosing the optimal tactic may look like:
max兺
f(zsikj)Nsikj
s
where
f(Zsikj) ⳱ the integral social and economic effect from implementation of s scenario of tactic, according to i strategy, j policy, in k
region. The effect is oriented to the main goal of the regional
scientific and technological policy;
Nsikj ⳱ Boole variable, value of which describes choice according
to tactic: 1 if s tactic was selected, 0 in all other cases.
In the view of interchangeability of the versions, limits are needed:
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兺s nsikj ⳱ 1i, j, k.
Besides that, various types of additional limits may be needed—
for instance, limits:
兺e(Zsikj)nsikj⬍⳱Re l
where
e(Zsikj) ⳱ the resource expenditure of l type in implementation s scenario of tactic; Re ⳱ the permissible expenditure of the l-type resource; here, the concept of ‘‘resource’’ may be understood broadly,
including the impact of scientific and technological progress on the
environment and human ecology of the region.
The analogical choice of the optimal strategy is made according
to the following model:
max兺i u(qikj)yikj
where
u(qikj) ⳱ the integral social and economic effect with the single
intensive exploitation of i scenario of strategy with j scenario of
the regional scientific and technological policy;
yikj:1 if i strategy was selected, 0 in all other cases.
兺yikj⳱ 1
兺he(qikj)yikj⬍⳱De
After that, scientific and technological policy is conducted according to the following model:
maz兺j c(Pkj)Xkj,
where
c(Pkj) ⳱ the integral social and economic effect from
implementing j scientific and technological policy in k region;
Xkj: 1 if the policy was selected, 0 in all other cases.
兺j xkj ⳱ 1;

兺j me(Xkj)Xkj⬍⳱Ne.

The given scheme is accordant to the simplified case when there
is a rigid hierarchical order in the scheme ‘‘regional scientific and
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technological policy ⳱⬎ strategy ⳱⬎ tactic.’’ In other words, one
tactic, one strategy, and one scenario of tactic may be implemented
simultaneously. Besides that, the same tactic may be accordant only
to one strategy, and the same strategy may be accordant only to one
scenario of the policy. In reality, more sophisticated cases may take
place. Then, the given models should be a corresponding way of
modification.
However, even this simplified formulation allows one to proceed
to executing the concrete calculations for choosing the most profitable version of the regional scientific and technological policy (after
formulating all necessary normative information, describing all versions of the multitudes of scenarios of regional policy tactics and
strategies, and defining the type of functions of the effect of f, u, c,
functions of e, h, m resource expenditure and of R, D, N limits).
For example, the choice of corresponding scenarios of strategy and
tactic for two different regions may be written by means of the following indexes.
The regional indexes:
k ⳱ 1—Far East economic region;
k ⳱ 2—Ural.
The indexes of the scenarios of the policy:
j ⳱ 1—labor-saving scenario of version of the regional scientific
and technological policy;
j ⳱ 2—fund-saving scenario of the regional scientific and
technological policy.
The indexes of strategies of the given policy:
i ⳱ 1—the growth of power of equipment per unit;
i ⳱ 2—the automatization and robotization of production;
i ⳱ 3—increasing the energetic equipment of labor;
i ⳱ 4—improving working conditions.
The indexes of tactic:
s ⳱ 1—the growth of power of metallurgy equipment per unit;
s ⳱ 2—the growth of power of press equipment per unit;
s ⳱ 3—the robotization of underground mining works;
s ⳱ 4—the robotization of production in the processing industry;
s ⳱ x—. . .
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Then Zks31i2j1—the tactic of the robotization of underground mining
works with the condition of accepting the automatization and robotization productive strategy while conducting the labor-saving scenario of the scientific and technological policy in the Far East
economic region. That is how the development of the optimal tactic
model is prepared.
The concrete strategy and regional scientific and technological
policy, in general, are modeled analogically.
After choosing the strategy and tactic of the regional scientific
and technological policy, its organizing and economic mechanism of
implementation is defined. This is the least developed block of the
system in the given policy. It falls behind the corresponding mechanisms of the scientific and technological policy of the district and
common state policy in the sphere of scientific and technological
progress, with regard to the level of development.
In our opinion, the regional administrations do not fully utilize
such means of governing scientific and technological development
as taxes, amortization, price control, investment in new technologies, and standardization. The implementation of the elements of
planned and programmed government of scientific and technological progress in the region is far from sufficient. However, the experience of a number of regions in the country shows the high
effectiveness and opportunities of utilizing these organizational and
economic means of governing by regional administrations.
In the economic literature, there are suggestions for differentiating the amortization norms in the regions of Russia (at first, areas
with high wages and unfavorable climate conditions are being emphasized). However, in our opinion, we should now approach changing the amortization norms in the regions considering not only
indicated conditions, but also their impact on the rate of the scientific and technological development of the regional economy and
regional social and economic tasks.
The territorial branches of the State bank should play their role in
conducting the regional scientific and technological policy as well. It
is expedient for them to offer credit on privileged terms upon acquiring or producing new equipment, the absence of which holds back
the social and economic development of the region.
If the region is interested in attracting to its territory the powers
of a manufacturing enterprise, the region can accept the obligations
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of training and retraining of the necessary workers and of investment
for creating the social and even productive infrastructure.
In our opinion, it is expedient to develop special funds within the
regional budget in order to finance the accelerated scientific and
technological development of the productive force in the region. The
facilities of the fund may be spent to create the regional scientific
and technological centers (for collective use of equipment and laboratory facilities) and to conduct for the region the most important
projects and research aimed at developing the regional complex, protecting the environment, securing the ecology of the regional human
population, etc.
Regions where the top-priority development of the industry is effective may be granted the right of decreased (or full permanent or
temporary removal of) fund fees.
Now, in all republics and regions, in many cities and districts,
there are territorial branches of the State Committee of the USSR
for standardization. These branches conduct the common state scientific and technological policy in the regions. The territorial systems of quality control, which are usually created with the
participation of the branches, embrace activities of the largest number of enterprises in the region. The organizing and technological
basis of these systems is the standards of the enterprises. At the same
time, the regional standards, which are developed on the basis of
the state standardization system and on the basis of considering the
domestic ecological, social and economic, and natural and climate
conditions, should have served this purpose.
The technological basis of the regional scientific and technological
policy should be the territorial computing chains of inter-district or
directly regional administrations. Such territorial chains are functioning in the system of inter-district administrations in all republics
and in a number of regions in the country. For example, in Armenia,
the inter-district information and computation system was created,
embracing more than 30% of computing centers and stations in the
republic. In Armenia, 70% of enterprises and organizations in the
different branches of the economy are using the services offered by
the system. In 1981, on a contractual basis alone, the computation
center and stations in Armenia served 1,419 enterprises, ministries,
and administrations in the republic. Such level of development of
the territorial computation chains is characteristic of most republics.
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In the regions, these chains are less developed, and in some of the
regions, they are absent. Orientation of practically all territorial computation systems toward solving problems of the regional scientific
and technological development of the regional economy is an important reserve for increasing the effectiveness of the regional policy.
One of the most effective means of governing scientific and technological progress in the region is organizing socialist competition.
During the years of the 11th 5-year period, a positive experience
in this sphere was accumulated. The competition between adjacent
scientific and productive teams participating in the same project,
contracts for creative interaction in developing and implementing
the regional programs for scientific and technological progress, etc.,
became the most effective forms of competition. Creative interaction is successfully unfolding among the participants in implementing the scientific and technological programs on the republic,
regional, and district scale and in developing large-scale objects of
new equipment. This type of competition may be called an engineering version of ‘‘Working Relay Race.’’ On the whole, forms and
methods of public influence on governing scientific and technological progress in the region necessarily have to be united in the single
system of the organizational and economic mechanism of the regional scientific and technological policy.
As was noted, the shared state scientific and technological policy
should integrate and define the scientific and technological policy of
the economic branches and regions of the country as well. Therefore,
the practical success of the policy depends in large part on the place
that will be occupied by the complex regional programs of scientific
and technological progress and other methods of governing scientific
and technological progress within the economic system of planning
and governing.

UNIFIED SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL POLICY:
WHAT AND WHY
The main aim of the scientific and technical policy is to select the
most promising directions and priorities in developing science and
technology and apply their achievements to production, both on a
large scale and effectively, so as to secure its accelerated progress in
order to reach our social goals as soon as possible.
These goals are no secret; they are to satisfy to the greatest extent
the Soviet people’s material and cultural requirements and achieve
the harmonious development of the individual personality.
However, it is much easier to state in general the task facing the
scientific and technical policy than to work out its content, structure,
and the means of shaping and carrying it out.
What Is the Complexity?
Experience shows that tackling these problems means consolidating
the efforts and combining the research of economists, sociologists,
process engineers, political scientists, lawyers, and other specialists.
Underestimating, until recently, the importance of this work has
left the theoretical basis of scientific and technical policy less developed than that of economic and social policy.
Related to both the economic basis of society and its superstructure, scientific and technical policy is determined, first and foremost,
by the level and forms of the development of productive forces and,
at the same time, by the goals and principles of the organization of
social production and ways of managing it.
Scientific and technical policy is also part and parcel of society’s
scientific management, because managing society in a scientific way
means drafting and implementing a correct, flexible, and realistic
policy expressing objective requirements of social development.
Moscow News, No. 45 (1983), 12.
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In the USSR the validity of scientific and technical policy is a
prerequisite for building an advanced material-technical base.
The state scientific-technical policy, as the accepted economic
trend, is of a directive nature. It presupposes that the determination
of its principal aims and the means for attaining them should be
subordinated, at all territorial and departmental stages, to the tasks
of developing the country’s economy as a whole, while preserving the
initiative of each and every element in social production.

A Must
The capability, built up by Soviet labor, is truly immense.
• The USSR today produces a fifth of the world’s industrial output.
• The value of fixed assets has topped 1.7 trillion rubles.
• Our country has one-quarter of all the research workers in the
world—more than 3,500.
• Soviet scientists have been awarded honorary titles and degrees
from academies, research societies, universities, and institutes in 59
states.
• State budget and other spending on science totals almost 22 billion
rubles annually.
• Some 90,000 items, produced in this country, have the State Quality Sign, i.e., are on par with the best international standards.
• On average, some 4,000 types of machines, equipment, devices, and
instruments are developed in the USSR every year. And the manufacture of more than 1,500 obsolete items is discontinued.
• The contribution of electric power-engineering, machine-building,
metal-working, chemical, and petrochemical industries to gross industrial output and industrial fixed assets is increasing all the time
and now equals 50%.

Granted such a scope, a further increase in economic and social effectiveness of the country’s production is possible only with a broadscale application of the most advanced processes and the more important scientific and engineering achievements.
The idea is to combine the advantages of socialism with the possibilities opened up by the scientific and technological revolution.
This goal is unattainable without a unified scientific and technical
policy.
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The Main Directions
Our scientific and technical policy is drafted and implemented
under socialist ownership of the means of production. This provides
the opportunity, when dealing with the new tasks that emerge at
the sharp turns in social, economic and political development, for
implementing large-scale maneuvers and reorienting all or part of
the state’s scientific-technical capability, rather than simply that of
separate firms or monopolies, which is a feature of the capitalist
world.
During the cold war unleashed by militarists, the USSR, concentrating the necessary forces, secured the quick development of
atomic and then thermonuclear weapons. The USSR became, not by
chance but strategically, the first power to use nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. The Obninskaya and Sibirskaya atomic power
plants, with 500- and 600- megawatt capacity respectively, generated
the first commercial electricity nearly 30 years ago. The nuclear-powered icebreaker Lenin was launched in 1959. A new era was opened
in power engineering and in civil shipbuilding. We have quite a few
social, economic, scientific, and engineering achievements.
At the same time, our economy has a number of specific problems.
First of all, our territory comprises, in effect, a sixth of the total
land-surface of the earth and offers a broad spectrum of naturalgeographic conditions. Of all the climatic zones that exist in the
world, the USSR lacks, probably, only the tropics. In Yakutia, where
the Northern Hemisphere’s Pole of Cold is, machinery must stand
up to extreme sub-zero temperatures. In Western Siberia machines
must operate on bogland, and in the Caucasus, in the mountains.
We do not as yet have the capability to equip ourselves completely
with machinery best adapted to these or other conditions. Both in
the north and in the south we have to use standard models. The
losses from this are estimated at five billion rubles annually. Estimates indicate that each additional ruble spent on developing regionally adapted machines would save about seven rubles on
maintenance.
In the 1980s the situation in the Soviet economy has become considerably more complicated. Its fuel, energy, and raw materials bases
are moving to remote, practically deserted areas in Siberia with its
harsh climate. And in addition to the developing of new territories,
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the already developed industrial areas in the European part of the
USSR need to be rebuilt. The country has a scarcity of manpower,
and greater effort and resources must be devoted to coping with
ecological problems.
A unified scientific and technical policy can and must be decisive
in overcoming all these difficulties.
The Comprehensive Program for Scientific and Engineering Progress in the USSR is being drafted for the third time, now until 2005.
In the next, the 12th Five Year-Plan (1986–1990), similar projects
will be drafted for the country’s various regions and industries at
practically all levels. And the main assignment in the programs for
developing science and technology is included in current and longterm economic plans.
As we have already indicated, priority is given to the most promising trends. Today they include, in particular, economizing waste-producing technological processes, flexible systems of comprehensive
automation, and the mechanization of production, industrial robots,
laser instrument production, and biotechnology.
Siberia Remains the Pioneer
The Soviet economy is relying more and more on Siberia, in spite of
the fact that the greater part of the population still lives in the European part of the USSR, and 70% of industrial output is concentrated
there. That is how Russia’s economy has taken shape historically.
Nature, however, thought differently. Nearly three-quarters of the
mineral, fuel, and energy resources and more than half the hydroresources, an impressive part of ores of nonferrous metals, a fifth of
the agricultural land, and about half of all timber resources are located east of the Urals. This is truly a tremendous wealth, and we
started tapping it half a century ago. This work was done most energetically in the postwar years.
The scope of Siberia’s present-day development and the varied
nature of the challenge the work poses demands a fundamentally
new approach to the elaboration of the scientific-technical policy.
Nearly all researchers in the region have pooled their efforts to formulate the ‘‘Siberia’’ superprogram. The program is divided into 26
sections dealing either with problems common to the entire region
or with more local problems: ‘‘Timber resources,’’ ‘‘Oil and gas,’’
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‘‘Kuzbas coal,’’ ‘‘Norilsk mining-metallurgical complex,’’ etc. There
are also special chapters on ‘‘The population’s health’’ and ‘‘Baikal’s
ecology.’’ There is also a chapter on ‘‘Synnyrtis’’—the mining and
processing of the unique potassium-alumina material that can yield,
when used in recycling, dozens of items that today are scarce in the
chemical industry—and nonferrous metallurgy, agriculture, construction work, etc.
Answering the West’s Technological Challenge
The USSR could, in principle, develop its economy without maintaining foreign scientific and technological relations. But the USSR
is developing much quicker cooperation with other, above all, socialist states.
The USSR is confronting the technological challenge of the West,
which is trying to distort mutually advantageous relations, with an
agreed-upon strategy of dealing with long-term and current socioeconomic problems. For example, the pooling together of the scientific
and engineering capabilities of the CMEA countries in computer
making (300 firms and 350,000 experts) has made it possible to carry
out, in the course of five or six years, work equal to that done over
the preceding 25 years.
Scientific and engineering cooperation is being implemented between socialist states, with an agreed-upon scientific and engineering
policy, taking into account their common national interests, the industrial patterns that have taken shape in each of them, and accumulated research and professional know-how. In Czechoslovakia, for
example, a country with a mild Central European climate and superb roads, Tatra Works, which had traditionally specialized in making large-capacity trucks, now produces serially cross-country
vehicles adapted for the Arctic, deserts, and tropics. According to
experts there, Tatra trucks are second to none in the world.
It has now been suggested that the CMEA countries work out
a comprehensive, long-term program for scientific and engineering
progress based on the Soviet experience. Its implementation along
the line ‘‘research technology-production-exploitation’’ promises an
impressive economic benefit.
As we know, pooling our labor internationally, which embraces all
these stages, enables each country to cut both its costs and research
and development time by half, as compared with doing it all alone.
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Many concerns in the industrialized capitalist states are turning
cooperation with the Soviet economy into a sort of proving ground
to test their latest ideas in production. This is characteristic, for example, of Finland, which delivers equipment to the USSR for deep
processing of wood and various types of icebreakers and icebreakertype ships. Magirus Deutz, a West German firm, considerably
strengthened its reputation after many of its trucks were used in
Siberia. In its turn, the Soviet Belarus tractors are working very well
in countries with different climatic and natural conditions.
Developing the international division of labor and improving scientific and engineering relations continue throughout the world, despite the complexity of the international situation. The shaping of
regional and worldwide scientific and technical policies is very much
up-to-date and should account far more for the specific natural, economic, and social conditions of separate countries and regions of the
world.
Here is a simple example. Western firms deliver to the developing
countries costly energy-consuming technology calculated to save
manpower. But their partners in many countries in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America need exactly the opposite; due to a lack of money and
energy resources, they have today a great excess of manpower.
The up-to-dateness of building a worldwide scientific and technical policy is related to a number of global problems now facing mankind. They include: the comprehensive use of resources of the
world’s oceans, the use of space, and the development of general
health programs. Scientific and technical programs, which may be
regarded as a serious contribution to worldwide scientific and engineering progress, are already being implemented in the USSR today.
In particular, the systems approach has been made the basis for
developing the productive forces of the Pacific coast and tapping the
resources of its continental shelf in our country. The ‘‘Arktika’’ project is now being prepared; it is immense in scope and difficulties: it
is the drawing of the northern Eurasian areas into the economic
turnover based on year-round navigation in the Soviet sector of the
Arctic Ocean.
Regional health programs have been drafted for the various climatic zones in the USSR. They are aimed at giving each person
scientific recommendations on the natural conditions of his work,
rest, and diet and at making the region’s environment healthier.

TO ACCURATELY DETERMINE A
COURSE OF ACTION: AN
ECONOMIST ANALYZES THE
RESULTS OF KRASNOYARSK’S
PAST DECADE
An extrapolation method that is popular among economists requires
taking several steps backward in order to have a better perspective.
For example, if you want to understand trends for the next 20 years,
analyze the past 20 years first.
By the 1970s, the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the largest in the USSR
(covering one-fifth of the earth), had lived through sharp and dramatic changes. The new policy of the Soviet leadership, which was
aimed at the accelerated development of the country’s East, made
us realize that until now we have been quite shy in mastering our
vast resources. It is not easy to admit that. Our habit of admiring
blindly whatever was done to the east of the Urals has been too
strong.
No doubt, we have indeed had something real to admire. By 1970,
the major indicators of economic development in Krasnoyarsk Territory were comparable to the indicators for central regions of the
USSR. In terms of manufacturing output and cargo turnover per
capita, the figures were 1.5 times higher than the central regions. In
capital construction, the figures were 1.7 times higher. Profit per
employee exceeds the average figure for Russia by 9% to 10%.
Thus, in terms not only of production volume but also of production costs Krasnoyarsk Territory was not behind. As for individual
industries, such as nonferrous metallurgy, for example, profit was
much higher than the average for the USSR as a whole.
The Yenisei River has generated considerable power: six aggregates
of the Krasnoyarskaya hydroelectric power plant are rotated by this
Za Nauku v Sibiry [For Science in Siberia], Novosibirsk, 35 (September 11, 1980),
4–5.
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powerful river. That power transformed Kiya-Shaltydskiye nephelines into aluminum. Sorsky molybdenum, Chernogorsky clothes,
and Abaza and Teya ore were also supplied by Khakassiya.
Railroads connecting Abakan and Taishet, Achinsk and Abalakovo,
were built through wild woods (taiga).
Since 1960, within 10 years, the gross industrial output produced
in Krasnoyarsk Territory increased by 276.9%, which is higher than
the average for the USSR. This figure means that 6 times more
power was produced in the area, 8 times more pulp, 11 times more
paper, and 3 times more reinforced concrete were manufactured in
our region than in the USSR at large.
Examples discussed during this period were often introduced with
the words ‘‘the largest,’’ which occurred by hundreds in the printed
media of those years. However, there were other figures, too, which
were less often mentioned in the press but talked of and thought of.
Krasnoyarsk Territory has substantial natural resources: 40% of the
nation’s reserves of brown coal, 13% of hydro resources, 18% of high
quality wood pulp. All this wealth is located within easy access. It
seems as if nature herself was telling people to use her resources.
Figures for the period demonstrate that this wealth was used in
the same way as taking only cream and throwing away the milk. Krasnoyarsk Territory was far behind in terms of the average economic
indicators for the USSR. The more natural resources there were, the
more difficult it was to master all of them. Krasnoyarsk Territory was
trailing the Urals economic region, though it is very similar to it.
Then, for the first time, the idea arose of a long-term program for
the production and development of this promising region. Was that
indeed the first time?
Since 1925, the State Planning Committee (GOSPLAN) had been
developing the project ‘‘Angaro-Yeniseistroj.’’ The project involved
the Angaro-Yenisei cascade of hydroelectric power plants, the largest
in the world, and the formation on their basis of heavy industry in
Siberia. The project was led by such prominent Soviet researchers as
I. Alexandrov, N. Kolossovsky, and V. Malyshev.
The project was approved at the First Conference for Studies of
Industry in Eastern Siberia.
Prior to that, there was another project, a general plan for the
economic development of Siberia, which to many at that time
seemed too daring. Its authors were making plans for the next 10 to
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16 years to develop promising regions in Siberia. They thought that
all future economic projects would face the underexploration of natural resources. They created a comprehensive program for exploring
Siberia, which was accomplished in pre-war (World War II) years.
Today, we can only be amazed by the authors of these daring projects
and admire the courage of the pioneers who explored the Siberian
wilderness. The fact that we have a comparatively clear vision of the
scope of the natural resources to be developed is an achievement in
itself.
That was the beginning of a new stage in the development of
Krasnoyarsk Territory, the stage of forming its economy on a scientific basis.
1960s—The USSR was experiencing a turbulent stage in its scientific and technical revolution. Not only were new production lines
evolving but also new industries. At that time a disproportion became evident: the main industrial potential was concentrated in the
European part of the USSR, but the main source of raw materials,
fuel, and power was located in Siberia and the Far East.
Then, once again, the idea of a complex long-term program for
the development of industry in Krasnoyarsk Territory was raised. At
that time, there were numerous discussions related to another idea,
the concept of economic geography, its subject matter and methods
of research. From today’s perspective, we can say that it was the
beginning of a new science—regional economics.
The new science was the result of the urgent problem of mastering
the vast territories in Siberia. Having generated this science, the
same project immediately demanded answers to thousands of questions. A full member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Abel Aganbegian, wrote at that time: ‘‘Krasnoyarsk Territory is one of the most
characteristic areas of Siberia, with all types of climatic and economic zones. It should be considered as very important in terms of
research, as a proving ground for scientific and technical innovations.
This is particularly true for those scientific programs aimed at creating possibilities for high productivity and favorable living conditions
in this area.’’
The Krasnoyarsk 10-year plan became a new field for such research. An important contribution to the development of the plan’s
concept was a set of recommendations for a scientific conference on
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industry in Siberia, which was organized by the USSR Academy of
Sciences in Novosibirsk in 1969.
The Krasnoyarsk 10-year plan was part of the general plan for the
economic development of the USSR and the Russian Federation in
particular. The 10-year plan included programs and concepts elaborated by more than 30 organizations and R & D institutes.
Along with local Krasnoyarsk scholars and economists, research
fellows of the Institute of Economics and Organization of Industrial
Production, which is affiliated with the Siberian division of the
USSR Academy of Sciences, and experts from GOSPLAN and the
Central economic R&D institute participated.
By 1971, a strategic plan of an unprecedented 10-year scope was
prepared for Krasnoyarsk Territory. Today, we can say that the plan
has been accomplished. Krasnoyarsk Territory had never seen such
purposeful and intensive economic use of its region.
The following are some economic indicators of the period. Industrial output doubled. The production of nonferrous metals also doubled. Ferrous metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and light
industries increased their output by 150%. New industries have
evolved such as electrical engineering, machine tool manufacture,
and automobiles.
This is the result of a precisely set strategic goal, that goal being
the accelerated mastery of natural resources in the region and the
development of priority industries on that base. Also, the intricate
interweaving of factors, both industrial and territorial, had to be
achieved.
The complex development of production forces brought to life
new modern cities: Lesosibirsk, Divnogorsk, Sayanogorsk, Sosnovoborsk, and Svetlogorsk. Old cities like Krasnoyarsk have renewed
their faces, too.
About 350,000 families moved to new dwellings, including onefifth of them in rural areas. The important strategic direction of the
10-year plan reached a high level of productivity of labor by introducing achievements of scientific and technical progress.
The accelerated development of industries related to mining and
mineral-resources processing requires the enlargement of the raw
materials base. Of course, geological exploration in various remote
areas demands serious financing. This requires the extensive use of
space research related to the exploration of natural resources. Pic-
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tures taken from outer space provide data that are very helpful for
geological and other purposes.
Introducing the latest achievements of domestic and world science and technology, the automation and mechanization of laborintensive processes resulted in a 170% increase in labor productivity.
Two-thirds of the growth in the gross product was generated by this
factor.
However, a question naturally arises. What if the current program
had not been adopted 10 years ago? Would the labor techniques
have improved anyway and would labor productivity have grown and
new industries evolved? Of course, all these processes would have
taken place, but not so quickly. However, it is not only a matter of
pace. First and foremost, the structure of the regional economy has
improved. Krasnoyarsk Territory began to obtain more products
needed for its own development and for the country as a whole.
There are also some results and achievements of the Krasnoyarsk
10-year plan which are not easily expressed in numbers and figures.
Consider the social and cultural development of the region. Without
it, the economic program would not be realized. For example, today
the number of people who move to Krasnoyarsk Territory exceeds
the number of those who leave it. Ten years ago the picture was
reversed.
This new trend has been integrated into plans for social and economic development by 1,440 organizations. Krasnoyarsk Territory
became the first area in the country to have each of its towns and
counties create its own plan for social development. If under the 9th
6-year plan there were 253 such plans, then under 10-year plan that
number increased 6-fold. That 10-year plan made everyone like planning. This is one of its invisible but essential achievements.
The 10-year plan removed the ‘‘blinders’’ from hundreds of offices
of top executives of the region. At one time, many of them did not
care about their neighboring enterprises, but now they have learned
to think in terms of the interests of the entire region.
This was the first time that a country considered in its economic
plan the figures of a regional program. The sophistication of the
organizational and economic mechanism of management has risen
beyond regional borders. Local authorities were given the opportunity to influence the formation and development of all enterprises
of their region. The goals to achieve were set not for the whole of
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East Siberia but for one of its specific regions—Krasnoyarsk Territory. Another important result of the 10-year plan is that the leadership of Krasnoyarsk Territory gained valuable experience in the issues
of complex planning. The hope was born that right there, in Krasnoyarsk Territory, cooperation between local authorities and central
agencies could result in the development of plans for their region’s
future.
This is true not only of officials but also of the general population,
ordinary people. For example, Victor Nadezhdin, a worker from ‘‘Sibtjazhmash,’’ said that ‘‘the 10-year plan taught us to think of a shop,
a plant, and a region.’’
This is how the sense of being ‘‘the boss’’ has evolved. This is
another achievement of the 10-year plan.
Under the 10-year plan Krasnoyarsk Territory became a region of
territorial and production complexes (TPK). TPK is strengthened by
the ties between the enterprises that constitute it. Those ties were
becoming stronger all over the region: between TPK, industrial centers, and individual enterprises. That has multiplied the economic
feedback, increasing the productivity of the region. Transportation
expenses have been substantially reduced because products of one
enterprise are becoming the raw materials for neighboring enterprises.
This way, the share of the final product began to increase in the
region. If, before, the region was mostly just a supplier of raw materials for the European part of the country, now 40,000 combines, flatcars for carrying containers, light aluminum modules, high-voltage
vacuum switches, trailers and other machines, and industrial equipment are sent to the East.
For its part, cooperation between the region’s enterprises and a
better industrial structure overall strengthen its ability to effectively
use natural resources.
This complex approach applied to everything everywhere—that is
probably the main lesson of the Krasnoyarsk 10-year plan. Its success
is being taken into account in a new 10-year plan for 1980–1990 that
is now under consideration.
The new 10-year program stipulates for Krasnoyarsk Territory the
further development of existing TPKs, the improvement of their
structure, and the intensive mastery of new areas, primarily in Priangariye. According to the new plan, two new cities and several hy-
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droelectric power plants are to be erected there. In Krasnoyarsk a
plant for heavy excavators will be built. Its ‘‘walking’’ and rotary excavators will help to mine coal in KATEK and other coal basins in the
USSR.
While preparing this new program, its authors took into account
that in the past not enough attention was given to regional policy in
science and technology. Today, a special complex program for this
field has been worked out. It stipulates the accelerated introduction
of automatic device engineering, the mechanization of loading
works, and the use of equipment adjusted to the northern climate.
These factors will help to reduce the labor shortage in the region.
Krasnoyarsk Territory takes off in 1990. It looks further, to the next
century, even to the next millennium.

THE INTERMEDIARY ROLE OF
SCIENTIFIC/TECHNOLOGICAL
COMPANIES: FROM THE
EXPERIENCE OF
‘‘SIBTSVETMETAVTOMATIKA’’
The intensive development of new regions in Siberia, with its mineral wealth, forest, water, and power resources, calls for the largescale introduction of technology adapted to the conditions of the
region, a constant quest for forms and methods that will enhance
the connections between science and industry. Among the more progressive forms of this kind are scientific-production associations
(SPA).
Having first appeared only a short time ago there are now some
150 SPAs operating in all the branches of the national economy. Like
any other organizational form, these associations are going through
a development period. Work is still in progress on specific reports
regulating their work, defining organizational patterns, determining
their place in the country’s system of industrial management, and
developing their economic mechanism.
How are these problems solved in the conditions in Siberia?

From the Blueprint to Services
Among the country’s first scientific-production complexes was the
inter-district scientific-technological enterprise ‘‘Kraspromavtomatika,’’ set up in 1957 in Krasnoyarsk. In 1965 it was transferred under
the authority of the USSR Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy, and
in 1977 was reorganized as SPA ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika.’’
It is not by chance that the scientific-technological base of SPA is
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta [The economic newspaper] (Moscow), no. 38 (1978), p.
16.

the experience of ‘‘sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’

595

located in Krasnoyarsk Territory. This is the site of the giant of heavy
industry the Norilsk mining-metallurgical combine, the Krasnoyarsk
aluminum plant, and several other industrial facilities. However, the
area of SPA activity is not confined to this territory. Its branches have
mushroomed in Yakutia, Kuzbass, Buryatia, Kazakstan, the Urals, the
Far East, and the republics of Central Asia.
Today, SPA is an organization with a complete scientific-technological cycle. A special design bureau—the head structural unit of
the association—is concerned with project research and design; a
parts division supplies SPA with all the necessary mass-produced elements for projected automation systems, and an experimental plant
responsible for their production transmits them to assembly boards
and divisions of SPAs for assembly work and adjustment of the systems. The association’s training center provides advanced training
for workers and engineers who will be operating the envisaged projected systems. Besides, SPA does its own repair jobs, and provides
maintenance service to several systems.
Virtually the entire volume of work at ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ is
accomplished on the basis of direct economic contracts. How is the
effectiveness of SPA’s work and the quality of its services maintained?

As Applied to Specifics
SPAs began to set up their own permanently operating local
branches/boards and sectors that are now functioning virtually in all
associations and combines of nonferrous metallurgy in Siberia, the
Far East, Urals, and Central Asia.
In these conditions the central SPA apparatus is oriented to the
development of new technical systems and their stock production
and the training of personnel for future operating staffs.
The conditions in Siberia have a specific effect on logistics. Siberian enterprises, as a rule, have a variety of structural and production
units, each one in need of complete sets of plans for the introduction
of new technologies.
According to the logistics, the funding for material and technological supplies, including the development of automation, is in the
hands of the client. It turns out that although the Ministry is pro-
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vided with the required amount of plant sets, the latter are actually
delivered to warehouses of the different enterprises, which prolongs
the introduction of automation. In this respect SPAs have acquired
extensive positive experience.
During the development of an automation system for dredges
(‘‘Draga-1’’), the funds for the required sets of equipment were allocated to our association. Now the plants for this system were delivered to the central SPA warehouse and then distributed to
experimental plants and units in strict conformity with the plan and
order of priority for their demand. The result: it has been possible to
reduce twice the time needed for introducing the system, and the
technological level of ‘‘Draga-1’’ has long received the high approval
of clients, along with an award of the Exhibition of Economic
Achievements.
Due to the specific conditions of Siberia, especially its lack of
proper roads, it is often possible to deliver the new equipment to
most of the dredges only during the winter. Moreover, assembly work
is out of the question during the flushing season. It is typical that
the equipment is delivered to the client at the wrong time and because of the lack of proper storage at remote factories and mines, it
is left to rust and deteriorate out in the open.
At present, the automatic systems (‘‘Draga-1’’) are stored in wellequipped premises provided by the association, and the bank provides SPAs with loans for the timely stocking of new equipment.
Thus, consideration is given in the interests of both parties.
Our experience will undoubtedly be of use to other scientific-technological associations located in Siberia or delivering its products to
the region.

Zone of Attraction
Scientific-technological associations and organizations always specialize in a certain aspect of scientific and technological progress.
This, like a magnet, attracts many enterprises regardless of their Departmental jurisdiction. There is actually no possibility of placing
several Departments in every SPA industrial center. Consequently,
in addition to managing their own branch, SPA is compelled through
different boards and social bodies to guide the work of regional auto-
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mation, promoting its scientific-technological level at enterprises
under other Ministries and Departments.
For example, in Krasnoyarsk, the SPA ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’
plays the part of a base organization in the technology and economics board under the Territory’s Party Committee, which lends support to the board’s sector concerned with scientific and technological
progress. The sector coordinates the efforts of all industrial enterprises in the area aimed at introducing new technology and promotes
the shaping and implementing of technological policies.
The Territorial Party Committee is engaged in extensive work on
popularizing and introducing robotics into industries in the area.
Development has begun on an automated line for ingot casting at
the Krasnoyarsk aluminum plant. The association makes wide use
of technology developed at the Krasnoyarsk Television Plant in the
production of electronic appliances. Several SPA developments have
been applied not only in nonferrous metallurgy but in other industries as well. Among these are devices for geophysical prospecting
(DEMP-3 and AEMM-3) used in prospecting construction work.
Recently, proposals have come in on setting up ‘‘go-between organizations’’ to reduce the time needed to bring the development to
the consumer. It is surmised that with the experience of ‘‘Sibtsvetmetavtomatika’’ the functions of such a go-between catalyst could
well be performed by the scientific-production associations themselves, though this will certainly require a higher level of comprehensiveness in the system of services to the enterprises/clients.
Such organizations should accept the function of taking charge
along regional lines of the respective industrial aspects. There are
barriers to overcome, but, on a regional scale, the effect is worthwhile
both for the SPA and the industry it represents.

PREPARATION FOR
PRODUCTION: A KEY STAGE
IN IMPLEMENTING
TECHNOLOGICAL POLICY
The Significance of Preparing for Production in the
Acceleration of Scientific and Technological Progress
‘‘Preparation for production’’ (PP) comprises a system of measures
aimed at applying the latest scientific and technical research to industry. It is the final stage of technical development and incorporates
a number of diverse operations calling for systematization, general
purposeful management, and planning. Having created new possibilities for the practical implementation of scientific discoveries which
earlier lacked technical solutions, scientific and technological research has set the technology departments of companies the task
either of applying new equipment and new, more economical and
more effective technological processes, or of automating the systems
already in operation. This way companies will be able to bring down
costs, improve quality, and increase the volume of production.
The process of preparing for the production of new goods, or introducing new machines and technology, whether automation or mechanization systems, may require the renovation of production shops,
changes in the organization of production, and the like.
‘‘Preparing for production’’ is a link in the ‘‘idea–production’’
cycle. Specifically, it is this link that straddles the border between
science and production, and determines in large part the success of
the scientific-industrial cycle.
Determining the content of the basic direction of improvement
and the role of the preparatory stage in carrying out the technical
policy is a key condition both for the intensification of industrial
output and for its increased effectiveness.
Excerpt from The Increase in the Technical Development of Industry (Moscow:
Znanie [Knowledge] Publishing House, 1976).
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Throughout Russian economic history, much attention has been
focused on the preparation-for-production stage. Before the mid1930s, PP was conducted on an individual basis and in some cases
was purely of a cottage-industry nature, dealing with the specifics of
individual products and the conditions of production at each company. By the end of the 1930s, however, the first theoretical works
on the subject appeared which scientifically substantiated the need
for standardization and unification of technology.
Since the early 1940s, perfecting PP has been the subject of research on the part of many Soviet scientists. During the 5th and
6th five-year plans, industrial enterprises accumulated experience in
perfecting PP (for example, Leningrad metallurgical plant, etc.),
which then developed into a system of accelerated preparation for
production (for example, Yaroslav motor plant, ‘‘Severny Press’’
plant in Leningrad, etc.).
The increasing attention given to PP showed workers in management and technology the importance of speeding up the introduction of know-how into new production processes and mastering the
specific technology and equipment. At the same time it revealed the
complex nature of managing this process, which involved a significant number of participants: research institutes, design and construction bureaus, and company technology and economic
departments. With their static interrelation scheme, the line graphs
that were in used at the time in planning and preparation work failed
to reflect fully the dynamic character of the jobs and ensure timely
control and management.
The search for better planning methods of PP led, in the early
1960s, to the development and implementation abroad, and later in
the Soviet Union, of methods of network planning and management
(NPM), making it possible to coordinate and determine the organized functioning of large numbers of participants in a project, and
define the critical line of development, thus ensuring a speedy and
timely fulfillment of the job. Even at that stage of PP, network methods made it possible to reduce production time by 20% to 30% and
to lower production costs.
In the Soviet Union, the organizational structure of management
had become an obstacle to further improving PP work. It was insufficiently adjusted to the target management of the complex scien-
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tific and technological programs that had superseded developments
using individual machines and technological processes.
Matrix structures of management organization, which made the
most effective use of NPM possible, were a step forward. However,
matrix structures put certain restrictions on the potential of network
graphs. Though allowing the coordination and organization of the
work of a large number of developers dealing with complex technological systems and distributing the available resources, these structures failed to ensure control (in the process of development) of the
product’s technological parameters and its progressive development.
Combining the latest organizational forms of management—
matrix structures and network methods of management—became
the preparatory stage in introducing radically new functions in the
process of PP (showing both the need for them and the potential for
their realization): an industrial-economic (functional-cost) analysis
and configuration management, allowing analysis from the consumer’s position at each stage of the preparatory work of the specific
product. There emerges the possibility of making alternative decisions: to go on with the development, to stop at the achieved technological level of the designated product, or to take it off the
production line.
At present, based on the wealth of actual and theoretical material,
it has become possible to undertake a comprehensive standardization of the elements needed for the preparatory stage, to develop a
single interbranch system of technological preparation for production (ISTPP).
In this period of rapid development of scientific and technological
progress, the volume and importance of the preparatory stage are
steadily on the rise.
First, with the acceleration of scientific and technological progress, the manufactured product is replaced more quickly, its batch
production and production time are reduced, and the time needed
for PP either equals or exceeds the actual production time. For instance, the process of renewing the manufactured systems and automation circuits for the mining and metallurgical industries has
accelerated five to ten times in the last decade. Characteristic of the
increasing share of PP work is the growing number of workers involved in the process.
Second, the intensification and expansion of automation in pro-
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duction, and the introduction of fully automated processes, not only
relieve man of taking a direct part in production but to a certain
extent free him from the functions of control and regulation of production. Equipment, transducers, software for automatic devices,
etc., handle all of this, allowing man more time for PP work. As a
result, organizational improvements in this type of production offer
greater potential for manpower savings.
Third, constant improvement in the quality of new machinery
goes hand in hand with its growing complexity and relative increase
in the amount of large technological projects (automation systems
among them) in total volume. This leads to the growth of research,
construction, technological, pilot, and other types of work, labor
input, and the cost and time of preparing for production.
Fourth, the improvement in PP, which reduces the time from scientific conception to its practical realization, significantly decreases
the process of depreciation of products designated for production,
and of the equipment and technologies developed for introduction
into the production process. Delays in the PP phase of new products
not only lead to excess direct outlays of both financial and labor
resources and the waste of machines, mechanisms, and technical
equipment, but also result in a product that, having been manufactured with outdated technology, turns out to be technologically obsolete.
A non-comprehensive approach to PP at industrial enterprises
may lead to situations in which some equipment is ready to be implemented while other elements of the new technology are only in
the preparatory stage. The result: the introduced equipment becomes dated, for although it is ready for operation, it is in disuse;
left unattended, it is negatively affected by the environment.
A reduction in depreciation and deterioration ensures economy of
materialized labor. However, at the PP stage, economies can be
achieved by employing, as much as possible, elements of earlier constructions, as well as technological apparatus and equipment in the
development of new constructions and technological processes.
Fifth, while ensuring continuity in determining the types of new
products and their manufacturing technologies at the PP stage, a
choice is made in favor of more progressive constructions, technologies, and parameters for achieving their optimization, from the best
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of all possible methods of production organization which support
the output of high quality produce.

Elements and Methods of Organizing Preparatory Work for
Production
Determining the role and place of PP in the overall effort to increase
productivity allows the formulation of its basic tasks:
• the choice of the best economic-management and technological solutions;
• the acceleration of development and learning to handle new products, and progressive technology; reduction in duration of the
‘‘idea–production’’ cycle;
• the reduction of all costs associated with PP.

These tasks can be solved only on the basis of a multi-component
and flexible system. The complexity of the PP system is due to the
interaction of elements and the number of links between functions,
that is, the multi-aspect character of its structure.
Scientific literature gives several definitions of PP. Most often, PP
is subdivided into construction, technology, etc. Other publications
view PP by its duration in time, place of realization, etc. A scientifically grounded definition of PP would be a uniform system conducive to carrying out all the aspects of technological policies of
enterprises. This classification, while stating the concept of this process, can be well realized by using methods of analysis and modeling.
Analysis of the PP system can be based on a variety of principles.
Here separate elements have been singled out on the basis of the
vertical principle, with consideration for the following peculiarities:
time-target, sphere of action, object, and stage of realization. Having
broken down this process, one way or another, into elements (to
facilitate its survival and management), it is necessary to reduce as
much as possible the time span between these elements, to augment
their interaction, etc.
Analysis of the single PP process makes it possible to systematize
and constantly improve this process. All PP classifications have to be
based on, and its realization has to envisage, a certain complexity of
the basic PP functions: research, technical, organizational-economic,
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social-psychological, and material. The more intense the specialization of the elements of the PP system, the more complex the methods of management of the overall system. This approach allows the
carrying out of the required decomposition in order to bring out the
system’s diverse elements for analysis, the optimal methods and
forms of their functioning and management, and at the same time
present PP as a single complex system.
An expression of this approach is the conceptual model of the PP
system which, first, shows how the system is formed, second, gives
its structural-functional description, and, third, shows the system’s
dynamics in time. The description of the given model should reflect,
above all, the origins and the formation order of the basic PP functions.
The next PP stage—the technical preparation for production—is
carried out with the close cooperation of the client and producer. For
instance, if a company is engaged in construction and technological
preparatory work for an automated system, the construction-technological work has to be carried out by the client-center to prepare the
unit that is to be automated. Here, owing to the changes made in
the technological process, the automation system, new product, etc.,
one can expect new technological results.
At this stage, the finishing touches are added by the construction
division, sets of new technological equipment are selected, and
norms of material and labor outlays are determined. This stage, in
regard to the character of the work, is broken down into two large
divisions—construction and technological preparation.
Learning to handle the new production mechanism and introducing new technology, automation, and the modernization of technology call for forecasting the effect that can be achieved at the given
company through the implementation of the aforementioned measures and the effectiveness of the new product during its utilization
at other companies and in export–import operations. The execution
of this work will be part of the stage of organizational-economical
preparation of production.
At this stage, production receives its organizational and economic
backup; that is, necessary changes are undertaken in organizing the
technological process and other production elements, and costs are
analyzed on the basis of the company’s estimates to determine the
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cost of the new product (or to bring down its cost with the use of
new technology).
The handling of new technologies calls for training and retraining
at the enterprise. Prior to installing the system, the client needs to
send its future operators for training. It is obvious that the profile of
the classes has to be expanded to train employees for all the systems
developed by the trust.
That the work force often meets the introduction of radically new
technology with some skepticism calls for certain psychological and
social training for workers engaged in the new production process.
To ensure normal functioning, the production process should be
furnished with raw materials, the required basic and auxiliary materials, machines, and operational capital. Organizing reserves and determining their norms for different production aspects constitute the
material preparation for production, which completes the PP cycle.
With regard to their organization, these PP stages should by no
means be viewed as strictly consecutive. Although each stage lays
the foundation for the one that follows, some of the jobs can be
conducted simultaneously. Moreover, in practice their diffusion
should be maximally supported.
It is surmised that with regard to the structural-functional characteristic of the PP system it is necessary to determine two aspects:
first, singling out the elements that constitute the PP system; and
second, explaining their relationship, method, and nature of contacts.
As already noted, the formation of the PP system is essential in
selection of all implementation methods. These can be classified
into six aspects of production preparation, each aspect forming the
basic structural unit in the system. To be implemented industrially,
each of the selected aspects may demand the execution of some or
all of the mentioned PP functions. These functions can be realized
within the systems of internal or outside training, depending on the
complexity of its character and the length of PP demanded by the
project.
The designing of the PP system would be incomplete if the emerging model did not reflect its dynamics. More often than not, the
realization of PP requires a considerable period of time.
Preparing for production as an element of technological policy
may entail long spans of time needed for planning and organization
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to utilize the achievements of technological progress in industry. For
instance, while introducing into the long-term plan of an enterprise
the targets for switching over to new technology, one should simultaneously envisage the carrying out of research in the production organization, retooling of production, and the costs incurred by the
customers, etc. While current PP is aimed at perfecting technologies
and machines in operation by introducing changes and modernization, medium-term PP is aimed at utilizing the results of research
for the partial improvement of the production process, and longterm PP is set on preparing for the introduction and exploitation of
radically new technologies and organizational solutions. Hence, the
specific tasks of each PP stage.
The singling out of PP types according to their time-target aspect
is evidence of the PP system’s dynamic character; it also shows that
by extensive, continuous purposeful work PP is not a one-time campaign. Analysis of the composition of PP makes it possible to:
A. Single out the following elements of the PP system and their
classification:
1. According to the time-target aspect: long-term; medium-term;
current.
2. According to the sphere of realization: inter-plant; extra-plant.
3. According to the object of preparatory work: preparing for the
output of new products; installation of new equipment; introducing
new technology, new types of power and materials; introducing automation and mechanization into production processes; management
measures; reconstruction of production.
4. According to types of work (stages of realization): research, technical (construction, technological); organizational-economic; socialpsychological; material.
B. Express the prevalent idea of the PP system in the form of its
conceptual model. The offered model can be the basis for coordinating preparatory work for introducing scientific and technological
achievements and carrying out a single technological policy.
More than ever before there is a need for specialization of PP work.
However, in the current conditions, differentiation and specialization of this work would be constantly augmented by their integration, single uniform planning, and management. Besides, along with
specialization and diffusion (for a more profound study) of PP elements, it is necessary to promote coordination and integration of
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hands-on work in implementing scientific and technological achievements. This approach has certain advantages over the ‘‘traditional’’
one.
First, it ensures the comprehensive realization at companies of a
uniform technology policy, as the model embraces all the areas of its
application: machinery, technology, and the final product.
Second, it becomes possible to incorporate in a single comprehensive plan all the preparatory work for implementing technological
achievements and carrying out organizational-economic measures.
Such a comprehensive plan, uniting the available plans for science
and technology and the plan for organization, has been regularly
drawn up at enterprises of the association AERO (CzSSR) since
1973. This has made it possible to adjust more precisely the measures for scientific and technological development of the enterprise
and to incorporate more intensively new technology.
Third, it becomes possible to systematize all the work conducted
at industrial enterprises in preparation for improvement of production and management, and to establish cooperation and proper functioning for parties involved in PP.
Fourth, it is possible to solve to a certain extent a major, extremely
complex methodological problem—the development of methods to
classify measures for the introduction of new machinery and technology, and improve organization of production and labor.
Conceptual Model of System for Preparing for Production
(1) System to prepare for production—system for management
of development
(2) Preparation for output of new product
(3) Preparation for output of new machinery
(4) Preparation for introduction of new technology, new types
of power and materials
(5) Preparation for introduction of automation and
mechanization systems
(6) Preparation for management changes
(7) Preparation for reconstruction of production
(8) Research preparation
(9) Technical preparation
(10) Organizational-economic preparation
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(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
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Social-psychological preparation
Material preparation
Construction preparation
Technological preparation
Development of technological documentation
Development of technological processes
Development of technological equipment
Control
Incentive
Regulation
Coordination
Organization
Planning
Current preparation
Medium-term preparation
Long-term preparation
Management functions
Time

Generalization and incorporation of all PP elements into a single
system allows the use of standard-type forms and methods in their
organization. To achieve the tasks facing an industrial enterprise calls
for a precise and clear-cut organization of management of the PP
process. In developing an organization structure for managing PP,
special research must be carried out to study the technologies and
standard production methods for the new product, coordination and
control of PP, etc.
Organization of research and implementation at the PP stage is
determined by the nature of the tasks (complexity and volume), the
structure of the unit of the company responsible for introduction of
new technology, and the methods used, which in itself depends on
what is to be solved—single-aspect tasks or a diversity of tasks at one
and the same time.
Analysis of the existing PP systems at several industrial enterprises
shows that considerable losses of diverse resources at this stage of
production are due to organizational flaws in PP management.
Of late there has been a trend in industrial development to go over
to the production of more complicated products and machinery, to
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develop more complicated technological systems. The entire company is drawn into preparation work for the production of these systems. This is due to the ever more complex character of machinery
and the ongoing industrial specialization and concentration. These
trends necessitate the perfection of organization structures for production management, forming services that make it possible, in
keeping with the new requirements, to coordinate all the participants in the project (individual workers, services, teams) and its huge
technological systems.
In the field the organization structure of an enterprise and its divisions usually turns out to be much less dynamic, less changeable,
than the object of their efforts and the product. This results in a
certain contradiction between the latest technological systems developed and implemented in industrial production and the dated organizational structures. Hence, the need to search for ways of
improving the organizational aspect of PP. Centralization, for instance, may bring positive results either at enterprises with batch
production or in conditions where PP is handled by dealing with its
separate elements in different functional services without a single
management system.
Yet, even in this case, centralization, with its positive results, will
have a certain dampening effect: lengthening of time needed for PP
due to despecialization of workers recruited to the PP division from
different functional services (Head Constructor, Head Metallurgist,
Technologist, etc.).
On the other hand, enterprises involved in rapid switching of
products, small serial production, and simultaneous preparation
work for several types of products or large-scale technological systems require a different, more flexible organizational structure. It
must envisage the organization of management for the entire preparatory cycle of work for each item designated for production. This
method of management, however, can diminish the responsibility
for the development of the product on the part of the heads of functional services, thereby immediately affecting the rates of incorporating PP. Hence, it is necessary to see that management of PP on the
part of the person responsible for the overall process goes hand in
hand with management on the part of heads of functional divisions.
The leader responsible for preparatory work in regard to a product
(group of items, technological system) stands in charge over special-

preparation for production

609

ists engaged in developing the product while retaining them in their
respective functional divisions. This gives rise to matrix organizational structure, where management of PP is conducted along two
lines: ‘‘vertically,’’ with each PP stage being the responsibility of the
head of the respective functional subdivision; and ‘‘horizontally,’’
with the PP of an item or its development becoming fused into an
integrated process by the head in charge of preparing or developing
the technological scheme as a whole.
In hands-on preparatory work a specialist (or group) in the functional division is singled out for individual tasks. He works immediately under the division head, but is ultimately responsible to the
project director. The organization works well when the spheres of
work are precisely defined and there is good teamwork.
The head of the project determines ‘‘what’’ has to be done and
‘‘when,’’ while the heads of functional divisions make decisions in
regard to ‘‘how’’ and ‘‘who.’’
Naturally, conflict is possible between the divisions in the projects
and between the heads of divisions in regard to the spheres of activity and the costs and quality involved in different solutions. Nevertheless, this organizational structure of PP management has several
advantages over current structures. It provides for a swifter resolution of said conflict in functional divisions, and by performing specifically designated work on a permanent basis, workers are able to
acquire excellent professional skills. Moreover, the fact that an individual worker is responsible only for the given project (preparing the
designated item for production) helps expedite the introduction of
the item into production.
The experience of using matrix structures shows that they promote the observance of a stable production discipline and are conducive to individual incentive and teamwork, and expedite the
transition from research stage to production process 3–4 fold.
A study made of organization of PP work and work to introduce
automated systems in nonferrous metallurgy shows that matrix
structures of two types can be used: (a) in the process of developing
and designing automated systems by joint effort of several organizations—in this case it would be expedient to develop a detailed coordinating and planning body either under the head contracting
organization or under the leadership of the customer-organization;
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and (b) inside separate organizations incorporating the efforts of numerous divisions and subdivisions.
The matrix structure allows the use of more developed methods
of controlling the technological level of the designated product
(technological system) and, consequently, promotes the fulfillment
of one of the basic PP requirements—the choice of the best technological solutions. These methods should be targeted, above all, to
achieve the fullest conformity between the characteristics of the
product, the requirements for and conditions of its utilization, and
raising the quality of individual elements of technology from the
point of the final product. They must also bring down production
costs by constantly reducing all expenses related to the production
of new products and the handling of new technology. The significance of this for raising the effectiveness of production can hardly
be overestimated.
The growing volume of work to put new types of products and
new technology into production underscores the need to rationalize
and develop ways to lower PP costs. This envisages improvement in
forecasting methods and long-term planning of development expenditures, thereby making it possible to foresee their volume and work
out measures to determine both the optimal level of costs and the
time needed to put the product into production. The basic task is to
turn planning and forecasting of outlays for development into a
means of managing technological progress.
The planning of investment for the development of a new product
and its incorporation into production is performed in two ways: by
the direct calculations method, using norms and ratios of expenditure of production resources for each type of product, or by the estimation-analytical method, which takes into account the experience
of producing similar items. Quicker innovation of products and
sharp quality distinctions between their consecutive types (models)
accounting for their original and inimitable character make these
methods non-effective and even unacceptable for the preliminary
estimation of costs of the newly developed systems. In this case, the
methods cannot be applied, because they are built along the lines
of extrapolating previous experience on the new production process
without taking into account the quality distinctions in similar yet
technologically different types of product.
The high level of cooperation in present-day production, and the
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complex character of technology and machinery, make it hard to
do away with non-productive excess outlays during the production
process, given the limited possibility of changing the operating technology or modifying existing construction. The greater complexity
of machinery leaves many things unspecified, leading to the need for
more changes later, and this too can hardly be taken into account in
the preliminary estimates. The result: planned outlays are consistently overestimated.
The quality of the future product and its volume of production
are largely dependent on the preparatory stage. According to a number of specialists, 70% of the volume of costs involved in the production of an item is determined at this stage. It is therefore necessary
to use methods that would enable one to avoid the unnecessary expenses, forecast future outlays, and, consequently, control production
expenses.
Control of production expenses should go hand in hand with raising the quality of work, analyzing the technological properties and
the functional and consumer properties for the future item. Combining control of production costs with control of its quality from the
position of the final product is a dual task that practical experience
sets before researchers and organizers of the PP system in industry.
By generalizing all that has been said, it is possible to formulate
the following principles—it is on these principles that the methods
for the solution of the set task should be predicated:
• not simply fixing outlays, but containing and forecasting them;
• including within the sphere of control of outlays not only production expenses but also the costs of exploiting the respective product;
• combining control of expenditure with control of product quality;
• controlling outlays and quality of product with regard to consumer
requirements as well as the functional task of the product during its
utilization.

Product control at all stages of production envisions control of
quality from the earliest stages of development. Such a method can
be based on the recently developed configuration control aimed at
organizing, with the help of identification and systematization, control over the base configuration of the product following the introduction of changes into its construction proper and the respective
documentation. Each change, as a rule, involves changes in related
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details, etc. The authors of Russia’s first publications on configuration control underline that, to many engineers and technologists,
the term still has a mysterious implication. Actually, it defines what
remains their regular practical work (even though it is not always
organized along the required professional lines). Configuration control, which allows maintaining and controlling the interaction of
change, shows at every moment of the PP period the extent to which
the product conforms to the required technological norms.
In the event that the product is determined to be non-profitable
(at the moment), its PP stage can be checked until technical, technological, or organizational ways are found to bring down its cost.
The provisions of configuration control should be extended to the
technology developed for the designed projects, item or circuit, and
its operation. The experience of several foreign firms demonstrate
the successful and highly effective application of this system. For
instance, IBM (USA), which specializes in the production of electronic automated circuits and electronic computers, has extensive
experience in using configuration control. IBM not only markets the
circuits but also handles the assembly and adjustment work and puts
them into operation, and provides consultations and technical support. Hence, the proposal to introduce the system in the trust to
similar organizations is quite justified.
Configuration control is applied at the stage when the basic elements accounting for the quality of the product are introduced into
the technical and technological aspects of its production process.
The realization of subsequent measures of quality control have to
adhere to the general stages of development (technical target, draft
design, etc.).
The complex and systematic character of the methods of industrial-economic analysis, organizing the interaction of all services employing this method in the process of PP, make it imperative to
single out a body that would bear responsibility for the entire work.
This function could be vested in a group (bureau) for the planning
and coordination of PP work.
Costs are what determine the expediency of organizing the production of any item. It is the task of the industrial-economic analysis
service that is part of the aforesaid bureau to assess and provide
precise information on costs and check their size by analyzing the
pertinent information before the production stage. The work of this
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service should be characterized not only by the number of exposed
miscalculations but also by the sum of forestalled expenses, resulting
in a permanent improvement of the work of the enterprise.
Methods of network planning and management (NPM) should
be employed to optimize the development of new equipment and
technology in regard to time and resources, coordinate the work of
all PP participants, and ensure the consecutive character of all the
operations. The USSR has had extensive experience in the application of NPM methods.
All the described methods of organization and management of PP
are sufficiently effective. There is already some experience of their
application. However, their analysis shows that under current conditions they should not be used independently but integrated into the
work of the enterprise.
Planned work of an enterprise is based on the observance of certain standard requirements. Their scientific justification, high level
of authenticity, quality, and near-term introductions are a prime
condition for making optimal planned estimates. Most of the standard requirements are established at the PP stage. Hence, the period
needed for the handling of a new product stems from the laborconsuming character and time required in developing summary documents for technological procedures.
A single system of technological PP envisages extensive use of
computers with centralization of the entire standardization process.
Besides, the centralized recording and storage of standardized information on disk makes it possible to use computers for subsequent
calculations of industrial-economic planning, accounting, material
and technical supplying, etc.
As production becomes more effective, there is an increasing need
for the further automation of production processes and their control.
Today, planning, dispatching, and control are hardly possible without
the use of computers and complex automation means.
General indices reflecting the technological preparation for PP includes: time of development and the labor-consuming character of
the new product and its material-consuming properties, cost, reliability, durability, etc. Due to the irregular character of the technological PP (TPP) level, analysis of these and other indices will define
the main restructuring needs of production. On the other hand, the
growing role of incentive-prompting material factors for bringing
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down costs and improving the quality indices of the PP period will
improve the general indices for industrial production.
It is already obvious that the development and introduction of
USTPP is only the starting point of extensive work along new lines
of raising the effectiveness of social production.
First, the use of USTPP standards in the work of an enterprise
may expose certain inaccuracies—it will be necessary to develop a
number of new standards and change the existing ones. On the other
hand, it would be wrong to assume that improvement of production
starts with the direct introduction of USTPP. This process should be
preceded by extensive organization and inculcation work that would
draw the attention of managers and engineers to PP problems. This
would make it possible to use ‘‘easily accessible’’ reserves and examine the promising trends of perfecting production.
A preliminary analysis of PP systems carried out at separate enterprises has showed the availability of substantial reserves. However, in
its present form USTPP fails to embrace all industries and is confined to instrument making and engineering. Besides, from the point
of PP it still lacks a comprehensive approach.
At present, questions dealing with PP and its management are
applied chiefly to engineering, instrument-making, and metal-processing industries. At these enterprises sufficient attention is devoted
to PP, and especially to technological PP, during planning, organization, and execution of the production process. The achievements of
technological PP and the attained level of technological standardization in these industries show the need for a systemic approach in
developing USTPP.
However, the principles underlying USTPP make it acceptable to
other industries—among them, mining and metallurgical enterprises
where PP organization is the more complex process.
In perfecting but one stage, that of technological PP (minus design), the single system of technological preparation for production
serves as a fine prerequisite for developing a single engineering PP,
calling for a single system of construction PP and providing it with a
reliable base. This approach to perfecting the engineering PP allows
one to draw a conclusion on the formation of a single enterprisewide engineering policy whose direct execution starts at the stage of
engineering PP.
The task of working out a single inter-branch system for compre-
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hensive PP has not been set. But the work that is being carried out
along these different lines—the introduction of USTPP, the development of problems dealing with economic preparation, the working
out of principles and methods of organizational preparation, and the
improvement of personnel training and material preparation—
demonstrates that in the near future solutions to these and similar
tasks will be achieved.
Analysis of USTPP leads to the conclusion that the development
of a comprehensive system of measures for improving even a single
PP stage will allow for the full and consistent use of progressive
methods of organization and implementation, thereby raising the
quality of work, expediting its completion, reducing costs for TPP,
and increasing production effectiveness.

UNIFORM SYSTEM FOR THE
TECHNICAL PREPARATION OF
PRODUCTION
Standardization is key to the acceleration of scientific and technological progress. Today, the objects of standardization are not only
quality of production, documentation, and terms, but also the designing of systems and the organization and management of production. This calls for complex standardization, that is, the purposeful
and planned defining and implementation of a system of interlocked
requirements, with the objective of comprehensive standardization
as a whole and of its basic elements with the aim of providing for
the optimal solution of a specific problem. This approach to standardization calls for the implementation of large-scale statewide systems of standardization.
The government decree, ‘‘On Raising the Role of Standards in
Improving the Quality of Output,’’ sets the task of elaborating and
approving a complex of standards for the Uniform System of Technological Preparation for Industrial Output (USTPIO) of products in
the engineering, instrument engineering, and automation industries.
The task was assigned to the State Committee for Standards and to
several of the ministries for engineering and instrument engineering.
The goal of the Uniform System of Technological Preparation for
Industrial Output is to raise the level of typification of technological
processes for preparation of production and standardize the design,
technological documentation, and equipment needed to reduce the
time for designing, preparing, and introducing new products into
production while bringing down manpower, material, and financial
resources.
The basis for the USTPIO is:
• the Uniform System of Technological Documentation (USTD);
• typification and standardization of technological processes;
From The Handbook of the Economics of Industrial Enterprise (Moscow: Ekonomika [Economics] Publishing House, 1974), pp. 267–275.
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• standardization and unification of building-block designing of technological equipment and tooling;
• inter-district system of readjusted tooling;
• standardization of the means and methods of automation and
mechanization of engineering operations for the technological preparation of production, etc.

The setting up of USTPIO presupposes the practical implementation at industrial enterprises of the previously developed Uniform
System of Design Documentation (USDD).
The Uniform System of Design Documentation defines uniform
stages for developing, storing, registering, and circulating of draft,
maintenance, and repair documentation.
The Uniform System of Documentation (USTD) envisages the typification, mechanization, and automation of developing technological processes as well as the processes themselves; it provides for their
stability and control, microfilming of technological documentation,
and the large-scale introduction of computer technology into managing the technological preparation of production.
USTD makes it possible to rework manufactured goods with regard to their technical properties during the process of their designing; it establishes a single system of stages, thoroughness in
developing the respective documentation, and a uniform order for
its presentation and circulation.
USTPIO is intended to increase the processing time of information more than tenfold and, at the same time, cut in half the nomenclature of technical documentation. The introduction of USTPIO
will substantially increase the role of information and the uniform
system of its indices. This task is being solved in the USTD.
Although USDD and USTD are independent uniform statewide
systems they are subsystems of USTPIO and to a great extent define
its development and implementation.
An integral part of USTPIO is type design and standardization of
technological processes on the basis of previously developed type sizes
and parameters for the production of specific items within definite
classification groups without any additional technological developments.
With the introduction of USTPIO 50%–60% of all work performed in this cycle will consist of type-designed processes; at present their share stands at 12%–14%.
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The classification of processed items and the introduction of typedesigned technologies are based on the implementation of state
technological classification of parts for the engineering and instrument engineering industries.
The time for preparing and enhancing production mobility is reduced through the standardization and unification of operations for
technological preparation of equipment and tooling, by introducing
devices capable of being retooled, joint processing of type-designed
items, and other adjusting fixtures. Each element of the listed adjustments is independent in terms of design and can be quickly removed.
At present, a considerable amount of effort that goes into the
technological preparation work falls to designing and constructing
special technological tooling. These outlays are being considerably
reduced through the development and introduction of an inter-district system of readjustable and reusable tooling based on principles
of long-term usage, universal properties, and reversibility, and consisting of subsystems, sets, and different type sizes including standardized parts. In developing an inter-district system of adjustable
tooling, consideration should be given to the continuity between the
tooling in use and the tooling that is developed, the possibility of
using existing instruments and equipment, and maximum reduction
of the cost of developing and implementing the system.
An important aspect of USTPIO is standardization of the means
and methods of automation and mechanization of engineering work
for the technological preparation of production.
An automated USTPIO (ASTPIO) can include subsystems dealing with: information, control of technological preparation (TPP),
norms and technical data, and the design of both technological tooling and TPP processes.
USTPIO contains documents defining the consecutiveness of
work dealing with automation and mechanization of TPP, setting up
ASTPIO, methods of computerizing TPP, a nationwide reserve of
type-designed algorithms, and programs for the preparation of production.
ASTPIO, like other automated systems, requires a technical and
economic basis for its implementation.
The base for the informational support for ASTPIO consists of
technical and economic classifiers of information, including the na-
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tionwide classifier of industrial and agricultural output, technological classifier of parts for the engineering and instrument engineering
industries, classifier of operations, etc.
The standard information-forecasting model USTPIO, with the
highest level of automated processing of information, serves as the
basis of an information-model TPP operating at a specific company.
It ensures an optimal level of automation for that company on the
basis of which further work is performed on the TPP. The information carriers are chosen for their storing convenience and for the
reliability and correctness of the information. In the process of creating the information model, the composition and structure of information are determined and a chart is drawn up of its movement
with account for the timely and optimal loading of all the means of
automation.
The software should reduce as much as possible the labor-intensive programming by creating and choosing problem-oriented algorithm languages and employing a unified method for solving
standardized problems.
The task of reducing the time for the technological preparation of
production is effectively solved by computerizing TPP designing.
The design process down to receiving technological documentation
is automated.
USTPIO is a highly convenient base for developing and designing
the automated system for control of technological preparation of
production (ASCTPP) as a subsystem of ASCP. The need for designing this subsystem arises out of the increased level of production
automation in general and the insufficient automation of control
over technological preparation and of the process itself.
The effect of introducing USTPIO is determined for all companies intending to implement the system and for the consumers of
their products.
The effect on enterprises (E) is calculated by using the formula
E ⳱ (O2P2 ⳮ O1P1) ⳮ (O2C2 ⳮ O1C1) ⳮ Ef (K2 ⳮ K1).
where
O ⳱ output of product (program);
P ⳱ price of unit of product;
C ⳱ cost of unit of product;
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K ⳱ production assets of enterprise (capital investments and
current assets);
Ef ⳱ share of allocation to the State budget for production assets
(usually 0.06);
index 1 and index 2 ⳱ indices, respectively, before and after
introduction of USTPIO.
The economic effect is determined in the second year after introduction of USTPIO with account for the volume of output and the
respective outlays.
An important prerequisite for calculating the effect of introducing
USTPIO is its comprehensive character—selecting initial data embracing indices of the developed objects, labor expenditure, costs,
length and characteristics of technological processes, their organization and employed tooling; determining standard technological processes, production operations, control and testing of product.
Effect of standardizing technology is made up of:
(a) reducing cost of developing technology determined by the formula
E1 ⳱ B (Z1 Ⳮ Za) ⳱ 0.2 Z2
where
B ⳱ average number of processes developed yearly;
Z1 ⳱ average cost of developing a single process;
Za ⳱ cost of additional work to adjust the standard technological
process to specific part (item);
Z2 ⳱ cost of developing standard technological process;
0.2 ⳱ factor of reducing costs for the development of standard
technological process;
(b) reduction of number of readjustments and time required:
E2 ⳱ n (Pw Ⳮ

Zy
) • (␣1 Tr1 ⳮ ␣2 Tr2),
F

where
n ⳱ average number of sets of identical parts produced yearly;
Pw ⳱ wages per time unit of worker engaged in readjustment with
account of additional wages and allocations for social insurance;
Zy ⳱ yearly sum of conditionally permanent costs;
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␣ ⳱ number of operations assigned to equipment and requiring
readjustment;
Tr ⳱ time for readjustment;
here and further index 1 and index 2 ⳱ indices, respectively, before and after standardization of technology;
(c) reduction of time for preparation of production depending on
effectiveness of equipment earmarked for production:
E3 ⳱ N Et (Tp1 ⳮ Tp2),
where
N ⳱ norm factor of economic effect of capital investments (0.12);
Et ⳱ effect from output of new machinery for financial
production year;
Tp ⳱ time of preparation for production;
(d) increase of labor productivity:
E4 ⳱ B2

冘 (T P
m
1

r1

w1

ⳮ Tr2Pw2) Ⳮ (To1Xo1 ⳮ To2Xo2) Ⳮ
ⳮ

N XlTo1
(
F Kl1

X2To2
),
Kl2

where
m ⳱ number of operations per unit of output;
Tr ⳱ time rate for one operation;
Pw ⳱ wages per time unit of work with account for additional
wages and allocations for social insurance;
To ⳱ time of machine load for one operation (distinct from Tr in
multi-machine and team servicing, periodical use of
equipment);
Xo ⳱ cost of one minute or one hour of machine operation;
Xl ⳱ cost of equipment;
kl ⳱ factor of equipment load;
(d) reduction of the cycle of production activity due to less laborconsuming control and testing, reducing interruptions and changing
the form of production movement:
E5 ⳱
where

NB2C (1 Ⳮ y) • (Tc1 Ⳮ Tc2)
,
2F
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y ⳱ specific gravity of materials and purchased items in cost of
production;
C ⳱ cost of unit of output;
Tc ⳱ length of production cycle;
(e) raising quantity production:
E6 ⳱

C1 (100 ⳮ nc)
,
100

where
C1 ⳱ cost of operation (excluding cost of materials and blanks)
before type-designing of technology;
nc ⳱ cost of operations after type-designing in percentage.
Effect of unification of technological tooling and its elements is
made up of:
(a) reducing designing costs:
E7 ⳱ Bo (Zp1 ⳮ Za) ⳮ 0.2 Zp2,
where
Bo ⳱ average number of tooling projects for replacement of given
unified construction developed in the course of one year;
Zp1 ⳱ average cost of designing tooling;
Za ⳱ average cost of additional work for designing separate parts
or separate changes in unified tooling, if they are needed for its
specific application;
Zp2 ⳱ cost of development of unified construction;
(b) standardization (unification of adjustments:
C
C
E8 ⳱ B ( a1 ⳮ a2),
Kp1
Kp2
where Ca ⳱ cost of adjustment;
Kp ⳱ number of processed items until wear-out of adjustments;
index 1 and index 2 ⳱ indices, respectively before and after
unification of tooling.
Effect of reduction of nomenclature of operated equipment is
achieved by:
(a) reducing the units of equipment:
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a
E9 ⳱ (
Ⳮ N) • (Xl1 ⳮ Xl2),
100
where
a ⳱ percentage of amortization;
Xl1 and Xl2 ⳱ cost of equipment before and after reduction of
nomenclature of operated equipment;
(b) reducing repair work:
E10 ⳱ Tr Pw (R1 ⳮ

R2
),
K

where
Tr ⳱ labor input into repairs per group of repairs complexity;
Pw ⳱ average wages of repairman per time unit with account for
additional wages and allocations for social insurance;
R ⳱ number of groups of repairs complexity;
k ⳱ factor of nomenclature of equipment, i.e., the ratio of
number of equipment trademarks before and after unification;
(c) reduction of specifications of turnover capital
E11 ⳱ N (Zz1—Zz2),
where
Zz1 and Zz2 ⳱ cost of spare parts of equipment, excluded from
nomenclature or newly introduced.
Effect of type designing of means and methods of control and testing
is achieved by:
(a) reduction in the volume of testing and reducing its costs:
E12 ⳱

b Pw
T b
T b
ⳮ ( t1 1 ⳮ t2 2),
100
kc1
kc2

where
Pw ⳱ wages per time unit of tester (controller) with account for
additional wages and allocations for social insurance;
Tt ⳱ testing time;
b ⳱ percentage of selectivity of parts for testing;
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kc ⳱ number of testing stands (apparatus) serviced by one tester;
here and further index 1 and index 2 ⳱ indices, relatively before
and after type-designing of means and methods of control;
(b) reduction of missed spoilage (if loss from use of spoiled units
is known):
E13 ⳱ BY

b • by
,
100

where
by ⳱ percentage of cases when use of spoiled units brings losses;
Y ⳱ losses from use of spoiled item;
(c) reduction of output discarded as spoilage:
E14 ⳱

B • bg (C ⳮ Ys)
,
100

where
bg ⳱ percentage of reduction of cases when good output turns up
at spoilage;
Ys ⳱ cost of spoiled unit discarded as waste;
Effect of using USTD in the process of technological preparation of
production is determined by the formula
E15 ⳱ KFw Pw (1 ⳮ

100
),
100 Ⳮ p

where
K ⳱ number of workers;
Fw ⳱ yearly time fund of worker;
p ⳱ percentage of raising labor productivity.
Effect of using USTD instead of documentation in force is achieved
by:
(a) accelerating training of workers;
E16 ⳱
where

Kp
⌬ T Pw,
Tc
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Kp ⳱ number of workers in given category;
Tc ⳱ average number of years of continuous work;
T ⳱ reduction of time for training with use of USTD;
(b) mechanization of filling in technological documentation:
E17 ⳱ [G Tg Ⳮ Gm (Tg ⳮ Tgm)] Pwt ⳮ (N Ⳮ

a
) Km,
100

where
G ⳱ number of excluded columns in documentation;
Gm ⳱ number of columns transferred to mechanical filling in;
Tg ⳱ average time for filling in a single column by hand;
Tgm ⳱ average time for mechanized filling in of one column;
Pwt ⳱ wages of industrial engineer per time unit;
Km ⳱ capital investments into copying machinery;
Effect from improvement of work organization due to introduction
of USTPIO is determined by the formula
E18 ⳱

冘冘B T

m1 n1
1

1

u

p1

Pw ,

where
m1 ⳱ number of types of jobs;
n1 ⳱ number of types of operations in performing jobs, including
inspection jobs;
Bu ⳱ yearly number of job units;
Tp1 ⳱ labor input into a unit of work.
Effect of measures included in USTPIO to raise effectiveness of production as compared with the elaboration of similar individual plans
at enterprise equals
E19 ⳱ N (Zt1 ⳮ Zt),
where
Zt1 and Zt2 ⳱ expenses for transition to USTPIO, respectively,
without and with using the typical list of measures to raise the
effectiveness of production.
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The choice of means is determined by:
(a) expenses for their acquisition for one year:
Zc ⳱ (N Ⳮ

a
) Zl,
100

where
Zl ⳱ cost of equipment;
(b) expenses for exploitation (per unit of output):
Zk ⳱ Te P3 Ⳮ Ze Ⳮ

Z3
,
noc

where
Te ⳱ time for treating unit of production;
Ze ⳱ cost of electricity or other power and technological fuel per
unit of output;
Ze ⳱ cost of tooling;
noc ⳱ cost of tooling in units of output;
(c) scale of production:
Zg ⳱ Zk B Ⳮ Zc,
where
Zg ⳱ total expenses for one year’s production.
The more general average indices of effectiveness of work on technological preparation of production are: time of developing and labor
capacity of new output, its material capacity, cost, reliability, durability, etc. Analysis of these and other indices will expose TPP sections calling for utmost improvement.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Vladimir Kvint is a world-renowned scholar, economist, and
strategist. An award-winning author or co-author of 21 books and
550 articles and a highly sought-after expert, he is widely regarded
as having an extraordinary understanding of the dynamics of global
emerging markets. His activities in academia, achievements in economics, and hands-on managerial and strategic experience with large
and small businesses have all earned him the respect and esteem of
global leaders. While his analyses and forecasts of events are not
infrequently outspoken, controversial, and at times even criticized as
outlandish or impossible, in hindsight, they have been remarkably
accurate and insightful. Indeed, it becomes evident that his forecasts
are soundly grounded in detailed analysis of fact, coupled with a
unique perspective and the wisdom gained of a long and unique
career.
For 30 years, Vladimir Kvint’s research and study has focused on
the creation of theories of economic development in emerging market countries and regions. His work shows a passionate attention
to the challenges faced by and in emerging markets as well as the
development of attainable solutions to these problems. And while
‘‘emerging markets’’ may have become a popular buzzword and an
area where many would like to believe they are experts, Dr. Kvint’s
works evince an unparalleled depth of knowledge. Included in the
body of work he has created are the theory of regionalization of scientific-technical progress as a gobal trend, an evaluation of the role
of scientific-technical progress in regional development, the development of the methodology of regional programs, a theory of Global
Emerging Markets, a system of optimization models of emerging
market business strategies, and the development of economic solutions to poverty and unemployment. This work has won him the
highest awards and accolades from governments, academic institutions, and other organizations.
Dr. Vladimir Kvint has been a Professor of Management Systems
and International Business at the Graduate School of Business at
Fordham University since 1990 and has also served as Adjunct Professor of International Business at the Leonard N. Stern School of
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Business at New York University. In 1991, he was a Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Economics at Babson College in Massachusetts
and from 1988 to 1990 was a Professor at Austria’s Vienna Economic
University. He has a Doctor of Science in Economics, a Ph.D. in
Managerial Economics, an M.S. in Mining Electrical Engineering,
and an Honorary Doctorate from the University of Bridgeport. He
has served as the mentor for several Ph.D. dissertations in economics
and management and for two Doctorates of Science in Economics
dissertations.
I have had the honor of knowing and working with Vladimir Kvint
since 1992. I was his student and Graduate Assistant at Fordham
University’s Graduate School of Business, and worked under his
leadership at Arthur Andersen, LLP in New York. This work afforded
me the opportunity to study, research, analyze, strategize, write, and
consult with him. It is with great pleasure that I write a few words
about him for this book.
All of the points in his above biography paint a picture of a brilliant and accomplished man. But they do not convey the heart of
the man, or his love of teaching and ability to make his students
think in new ways. They do not illustrate his humor (although many
of his writings do), the sparkle in his eyes, his exuberance and energy,
his curiosity, his love of poetry and music, and his enormous kindness and charity. These are attested to in the letters and evaluations
of his students, in the laughter during an evening spent with his wife
and daughters in a home where someone is always singing (preferably his lovely wife with the even more beautiful voice), in the laughter that sneaks out of his office (even in the most dour of
atmospheres), in the many letters of appreciation from philanthropic
organizations, or in the buzz of activity that always seems to surround him. He has great courage, and has the wonderful gift of
seeing what is special in a person, and in encouraging them to be
their best, and then better. and he has a great sense of balance. I
recall having made an error while working with him. I don’t recall
what the error was but I do recall being afraid that it would bring
him significant difficulty. With considerable trepidation, I sat down
in his office, laid before him my error and the possible outcomes and
waited. I suppose I expected his disappointment, anger, or, at least,
anxiety. His reply? ‘‘Jacqueline,’’ he said in his heavy Russian accent,
‘‘what can they do to me, send me to Siberia?’’ I’d made a mistake,
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we fixed what we could, and dealt with what we couldn’t. But his
faith in me, and his acceptance of this as an error from which I would
surely learn, gave me inspiration and encouragement.
Given the nature of his work and my small part in it, the encouragement was necessary. He is a visionary. The forecasts that he
makes often seem outlandish and the brainchildren of an eccentric,
but turn out to be quite prescient. From his statements that the
Soviet Union would crumble (including the timing of its demise), to
his certainty that Boris Yeltsin would not stand for re-election as
president of Russia, to a multitude of other predictions, his work has
raised reactions of doubt, criticism, suspicion, and even jealousy or
anger. Understandably, many readers, even those who are supposed
experts on the subjects or on related subjects, simply lack the deeper
knowledge of the situations on which his analysis is based, or if they
understand the situation, they may not have the analytical skills, or
the historical perspective, or perhaps even the imagination to extrapolate from the past or present to the future. Some may simply lack
the imagination required to reach the same conclusion.
I remember when I saw his first Forbes cover story in 1990. I had
started to research opportunities in the Eastern bloc, and was astonished when I read his prediction. I don’t recall believing it, but I
certainly remembered it. I’d decided mid-way through my first class
at Fordham with Professor Kvint that I wanted to work with him. I
admired how he engaged students, had them questioning their ingrained suppositions, their biases, and the way he had them questioning situations with new perspective, even in the first class. At the
end of the class I learned that he was the author of the story I’d read
almost three years prior, and determined to find some way to work
with him. How fortunate I am to have been given the opportunity.
And yet, even I would question his statements when we were writing
an article together, and would ask him to explain (which he did with
enormous patience.)
Coherently describing the progression of his career is challenging,
for while he devotes intense attention to one project, program, study,
or client, it is also his second nature or talent to maintain a much
broader outlook. Whether he is like the musician who composes in
his head, hears and follows the music on the radio to the point he
could notate it, and has a conversation all at the same time, or be it
because his brain works sequentially but never shuts down, I’m not
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sure. I do recall that when I began to work with him, I had to specifically prohibit him from calling me at 11 p.m. with some idea or task
I needed to do the next day. I hardly have a weak work ethic, but I
certainly needed down time, even if he didn’t. Whatever resources
he draws upon for his work, the result is that he manages to concurrently drive several areas in his life and studies to uncommon levels
of achievement. In the period of a few short years, he studied law,
economics, metals, engineering, and sports—all with notable, and
well-noted, success. All this plus working a mile below the earth in a
mine gave him a most unique point of view. But because he commonly has parallel and overlapping activities, describing them in a
comprehensible chronological order is challenging. Thus, I hope the
reader will follow my feeble attempts to do so.
On February 21, 1949, Vladimir Kvint was born in Krasnoyarsk, a
city in the industrial center of Siberia. Fresh fruits and vegetables
were very difficult to procure in the winter, so his mother found a
position that enabled her to more readily obtain these foods for her
children. She became the captain of a ship on the Krasnoyarsk River,
a remarkable accomplishment for a woman. Perhaps this resolve and
spirit is part of what inspired his own rise to the top echelon of the
economics world.
His exhausitve knowledge of the metals industry had an early
foundation; he began to work as a metalworker and turner at the age
of 15 while enrolled in a middle school with a special railroad worker
program. After graduating, he moved to the northernmost city in the
world, Norilsk, situated above the Arctic Circle. One might suspect
the quality of education in such an outpost would provide an inadequate foundation for advanced study in the most prestigious institutions, but in fact, Vladimir was offered a strong education there, for
his teachers had been professors in prestigious universities before
they were sentenced by Stalin’s regime to live above the Arctic Circle. He finished high school, with honors, in 1966, while at the same
time becoming an award-winning athlete.
In 1966 Vladimir was accepted into the very competitive Krasnoyarsk Graduate Institute of Nonferrous Metals, which had recently
located from Moscow to Krasnoyarsk. While gaining entrance to this
school is a considerable achievement in itself, during his first years
at the Krasnoyarsk Graduate Institute Vladimir was also accepted
by and became a student at the Krasnoyarsk Political Marx–Engels
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University, where he studied constitutional law and international relations. In 1967, at age 18, Vlaimir had his work published for the
first time, in an article entitled ‘‘Economy of Krasnoyarsk Territory
in 1920,’’ based on his own research. In 1970, he graduated with
honors from Krasnoyarsk Political Marx–Engels University and continued his education at the Krasnoyarsk Graduate Institute of Nonferrous Metals.
During the last two years at the Graduate Institute, he prepared
an independent student research paper in economics. In 1972, this
paper was formally recognized as one of the best in the Soviet Union.
In the same year, Vladimir Kvint garduated from the Institute with
honors and received a Masters of Science in Mining/Electrical Engineering, with a thesis entitled, ‘‘Electrification of the Underground
Mine Zapolyarniy of the Norilsk Mining–Metallurgical Concern.’’
One week after graduation, Vladimir was appointed as an Assistant
Professor of Political Economy at the Krasnoyarsk Graduate Institute
of Nonferrous Metals. Later in 1972, at least partly due to the attention and respect his research paper had received, he was accepted as
a full-time Ph.D. candidate in one of the most prestigious schools in
the Soviet Union, the Plekhanov Graduate Institute of the National
Economy in Moscow. During the preparation of his Ph.D. dissertation, Vladimir also worked as a junior researcher in the electro-technical industry at the Central Laboratory of Economics. His first book
was published in Krasnoyarsk in 1974, entitled Improvement of Preparation of New Production. He was 25. In 1974, he also co-authored a
sourcebook for Russian economists. In 1975, he received unanimous
approval for his dissertation entitled ‘‘The Organization and Stages
of the Management of Industrial-Technological Development’’ (e.g.,
the automation of nonferrous metallurgy) and was awarded the title
of Ph.D. in Economics (Managerial Economics). He became one of
the youngest Ph.D.s in Russia.
Despite an invitation to work as an associate professor in Moscow,
Vladimir Kvint returned north to Norilsk. Between 1975 and 1976,
he continued his work in the metals industry; he founded and was
Chief of the Department of Organizational Management at the Norilsk Mining–Metallurgical Concern, which was the largest Russian
enterprise (150,000 employees) and largest producer worldwide of
nickel, cobalt, platinum, palladium, and osmium. He combined his
understanding of the metals industry and of management, and pre-
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pared the company’s first General Organizational Structure, covering
all of its plants and departments. Concurrently, he was a part-time
Associate Professor of Management at the Industrial Graduate Institute. His first solo publication in Moscow was in 1976, The Acceleration of the Industrial Technical Development. The book received the
USSR Annual Award as the ‘‘Best Popular Scholarly Book of the
Year.’’
In 1976, Dr. Kvint was promoted to the position of Deputy Director General and Deputy Chairman of ‘‘Sib Tsvemet Automatica,’’ a
scientific-technological company, which automated the nonferrous
metals industry throughout the former USSR. He was responsible
for economic policy, business planning, the organization of compensation systems, and the financial and accounting departments in this
company of 5,000 employees. In addition, he was Chief of Sib Tsvemet’s Economics Laboratory, and prepared the company’s strategies and forecasts for the nonferrous and precious metals and
diamond industries.
Dr. Kvint was able to bring the benefit of his knowledge and studies to the government as an adviser when he was made, at this point,
an economic adviser to the Krasnoyarsk regional government. Under
his supervision, the USSR’s first Regional Scientific-Technical Program was developed. This program was documented by Dr. Kvint
and two co-authors in the book Scientific-Technical Progress and the
Economy of the Krasnoyarsk Territory. The work resulted in Dr.
Kvint’s 1981 nomination for Russia’s highest award for young
scholars.
But even before this, he was winning additional acclaim for his
work. In 1978, he was invited to join the Soviet Union Academy of
Sciences and was elected as a Chief of the Department of Regional
Problems of Scientific-Technical Progress at the Institute of Economy and Industrial Organization of the Siberian branch of the USSR
Academy of Sciences. He developed methods of studying economic
situations, natural resources, and strategic business opportunities
through the organization of Complex Economic Expeditions, and in
1979 the Chairman of the Siberian branch appointed him to head
these expeditions. Several were unprecedented, major economic expeditions. For example, in 1980 the academicians ventured across
the entire eight seas of the Arctic Seaway by ship, helicopter, and
jeep. Another economic expedition traveled through three seas along
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the entire Pacific Coast of Russia to evaluate the area’s natural resources and productive forces.
In 1982, the men who were to become the leaders of the country
promoted Dr. Kvint to work as an adviser to the government. This
brought him from Siberia to Moscow, where he worked until 1989 at
the Institute of Economy of the USSR Academy of Sciences. His
title was initially Senior Researcher in the Department of Economic
Problems of the Scientific-Technological Revolution, then Chief of
the Departmen of Theoretical Problems for the Organization of the
Management of the National Economy, and later, he became a leading research fellow in the Department of Methodology of the Political Economy.
Over several years, he organized and managed more major economic missions, studying the regional economies in Uzbekistan
(1983), the Donetsk region of Ukraine (1984), the Daghestan Republic (1985), Estonia (1986), Georgia (1986), Mongolia (1987), Belarus (1988) and Latvia (1988). Between 1978 and 1986, Dr. Kvint
developed the concept of Economic Mechanism of Organization for
the Strategic Management of Scientific-Technical Development, and
led a team that first developed ‘‘The Methods of Preparing Complex
Regional Programs of Scientific-Technical Progress’’ (1980). Based
on this study, Dr. Kvint wrote over thirty articles. This concept is
the discovery of two new trends of scientific-technological progress:
regionalization and technologization, and the influences of these
trends on the world economy. He determined to uncover the nature
and form of the correlation between scientific-technological progress
and regional complexes. He defined the category of regional scientific-technological policy, the main goal of which was to promote the
health of the people and the ecological system of the region. He also
studied the role of this policy in the human development of the
economy. Using optimization models based on Boole’s algebra, Pareto’s Law, and other rules, he developed a system for developing companies’ strategies in new regional and national emerging markets.
The study prompted several innovations in the theory of regional
and emerging markets and their economy and management. In 1986,
he wrote a report on the Organization of Strategic Development of
the Scientific-Technical Progress, which he presented to the USSR
Council of Ministers, explaining that without the activation of these
factors the Soviet Union would have no economic future.
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In 1988, Vladimir Kvint prepared a new dissertation on the ‘‘Regional Management of the Scientific-Technological Development of
the National Economy.’’ He presented this dissertation to the Research Council of the Institute of Economy of the USSR Academy
of Sciences in Moscow and received the degree of Doctor of Sciences
in Economics. In 1989, he received the life-title Professor of Political
Economy—the highest state academic title in the former USSR and
now in all countries of the former Soviet bloc.
From 1980 to 1988, Dr. Kvint prepared reports on the methodology of the development of Regional Programs of Scientific-Technical
Progress and supervised this program, or parts of it, for the Krasnoyarsk Territory, Siberia, Daghestan, Donbas, Ukraine, and Mongolia.
For these reports, Dr. Kvint was awarded with a Silver Medal for
Achievements in the National Economy by the USSR Main National
Exhibitions Committee (1986) and with the Artem Award in
Ukraine (1986). At the request of the government, between 1986
and 1987 Dr. Kvint prepared a strategy for the development of the
transportation of oil products through the entire USSR territory. For
this work, he was awarded the Commendation of the Presidium of
the USSR Academy of Sciences (1988), and awards from several
other academic institutions.
In recognition of his scholarly achievements, Dr. Kvint was elected
as Deputy Chairman of the Research Council for Regional Economy
of the USSR Academy of Sciences; member of the Research Council
for International and Inter-Ethnic Relationships with the Presidium
of the USSR Academy of Sciences; member of the USSR (Russia)
Philosophical Society; member of the Research Council of Plekhanov Moscow Institute of National Economy; board member of the
USSR Exporters Association and member of the editorial board of
the most popular Russian business magazine, ECO, which had, at
that time, a circulation of 200,000.
From 1981 to 1987, Dr. Kvint was an economic columnist of the
Moscow News, a major voice of perestroka in Russia. In 1984 he was
named for the second time as author of the Best Popular Scholarly
Book of the Year (this time with his co-author, Dr. Nikolai Sengur).
Their book, The Polar Star Above Us, was based on the results of a
study of the regional economy in the Arctic area and the lives of
nomadic people, information and observations which Dr. Kvint and
Dr. Sengur collected during their 1980 Arctic economic expedition.
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In February of 1987, Dr. Kvint was elected as a member of the Russian Union of Journalists, where he is still an active member. From
1986 to 1990 and from 2001 to the present, he has been an economic
observer for the magazine New Times, a major political weekly in
Russia. For articles published in 1988 the editorial board of New
Times awarded Dr. Kvint, together with several other prominent authors such as U.S. Secretary of State George P. Schultz and U.S.
Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, with the Annual Commendation.
Between 1985 and 1989, Dr. Kvint was an adviser to the USSR
leadership, government, and parliament. However, much of his work
had been very controversial. For many years, he was prohibited by
the Soviet government from traveling outside of the USSR, and
when he was permitted to travel abroad, his family was not allowed
to accompany him. Finally, at the invitation of the Vienna Economic
University, he was allowed to visit Austria with his family and in
1989 he was elected Visiting Professor at the Vienna Economic University. In 1988 and 1989, he prepared a political and economic analysis of the situation in the USSR and forecast that the Soviet Union
would cease to exist by the end of 1991 or in 1992. Of course, the
Soviet Union did, in fact, disappear in December of 1991. His forecast was published in Austria (a cover story in Wochenpresse), the
United Kingdom, the U.S. (a cover story in Forbes and an op-ed
article in The New York Times) and, in part, in Russia. After the
Soviet Union disintegrated and the role of regional governments
grew, Dr. Kvint’s recommendations found practical implementation
in Russia and other former Soviet republics.
Between 1988 and 1990 he was a creator and the deputy chairman
of the board of several first joint ventures in the USSR with partners
from Western countries. From 1989 to 1994, Dr. Kvint conducted
studies in the fields of metallurgy and mining, telecommunications,
and other high-tech businesses, and on international cooperation in
high-tech systems to control production. During these years, he developed a theory of the Global Emerging Market and strategies for
businesses to enter emerging markets. He studied problems related
to the creation and operation of international joint ventures in
emerging markets with partners from several countries and the operational processes of special industrial zones, sea ports, trade and free
economic zones in Belgium, China, Russia, and the United States.
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Since 1989, he has had a consulting practice; his clients have included leading industrial and financial companies and banks from
several European countries, the U.S., Russia, Ukraine, and Latin
America. He consulted to General Electric from 1989 to 1994, to
Timex Corp., TOSCO Corp., Baker & McKenzie (the largest law
firm in the world), Engelhard, Trans-America Leasing (U.S.),
Cable & Wireless (U.K.), PLD Telecom (U.S., U.K.), Scandinavian
Trading Company (Sweden), State Investment Corporation of Russia, Fairchild Corporation (U.S.), and the U.S. agency OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation), among others. He also is a
consultant to the government of several European countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine, as well as to several U.S. senators. From 1992 until December 1997, Dr. Kvint worked with Arthur
Andersen L.L.P. (at that time the largest professional services firm
in the world) as a senior consultant. He was then promoted to Director and Managing Director of Emerging Markets, worldwide. His responsibilities included analyzing economies and the development of
commercial environments in emerging markets worldwide, including
Latin America, Southeast Asia, North Africa, and the former Soviet
bloc. He developed comprehensive strategies for these markets along
with practical steps for management and implementation for a wide
variety of industrial, consumer, and financial services firms. He conducted market studies and feasibility studies for the creation and
operation of leading global companies in emerging markets, performed economic forecasts, and consulted on the establishment of
privatization programs and capital market institutions. Some of the
studies he conducted during that period included: Influence of
Emerging Markets on Global Risk Management Systems; Political,
Economic, and Business Approaches to the Evaluation of Emerging
Markets; Top Six European Emerging Markets; Economic Analysis
of MERCOSUR; Situational Analysis of the Current Telecom Industry and Forecasts in the Russian Federation; Reserves, Production,
and Utilization of Nickel in Russia; and Privatization of Telebras,
Brazil. He was Chairman of the World Economic Development Congress’ Summit for Institutional Investors (Washington, D.C., 1995);
the World Economic Development Congress’ Global Risk Management Summit (Washington, D.C., 1996); and the International
Banking Congress: US–CIS and Baltics (New York City, 1997).
Dr. Kvint has lectured at universities in Austria, Belarus, Belgium,
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Canada, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Latvia, Poland, Russia,
and the United States, including the Russian Research Center at
Harvard University, Kellogg Business School at Northwestern University, Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, the New Jersey
Institute of Technology, Whittier College, Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, Muhlenberg College, University of Bridgeport, Kent State University, University of Southern
California, UCLA, and Baruch College of the City University of New
York. In 1992, Dr. Kvint received a two-year scholarship from the
Wexner Heritage Foundation in New York and in 1993 he received a
Faculty Scholarship Award from the University of Southern California.
From 1993 to the present, he has been a member of the Research
Council for Regional Economy and Inter-Republic Relationships of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, and from 1993 to 1998 he was a
member of the International Committee of Muhlenberg College in
Pennsylvania. Since 1993, Dr. Kvint has been a member of the Bretton Woods Committee (Washington, D.C.), which monitors the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. He is a member
and senior advisor of the Business Council for International Understanding (BCIU) in New York, an organization created by an initiative of the White House in 1959.
After previously being a corresponding member, in 1994 Dr. Kvint
was elected to be a full member for life (Academician) of the Russian
Academy of Natural Sciences, one of the most prestigious think
tanks in Russia. In 1998, he was elected an Honorary Member of the
U.N. International Informatization Academy.
From 1997 to 1999, he was a member of the board of directors of
the Newscorp subsidiary PLD Telecom (the only telecommunications company listed on NASDAQ and the Toronto Stock Exchange
whose business focus was exclusively on Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
and other Soviet Bloc countries). He consulted on the company’s
NASDAQ listing and advised on the development of corporate strategies for expanding and managing business in the former Soviet
Union on entry into new regions and on appropriate joint venture
partners. In 1999, when PLD Telecom merged with Metromedia, Dr.
Kvint was appointed Director for Governmental Affairs of Metromedia International Telecommunications, Inc.
In 1997, he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate (honoris causa)
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by the University of Bridgeport, Connecticut, for his studies on
Emerging Markets, and also received the title of Honorary Fellow of
the New England Center for International and Regional Studies. In
the same year, he was invited to be an economic adviser to the President of the United Nations’ General Assembly.
In 2001, by the decision of the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board and the U.S. Department of State, Dr. Kvint became a
Fulbright Scholar Award recipient and was sent to conduct a study
and provide consultation to the governmet of Albania. In 2002, he
received a special recognition certificate from the U.S. Department
of State for these activities. Also in 2002, Fordham University honored Professor Kvint with its annual G.L.O.B.E. Appreciation Award
‘‘in recognition of the significant role he has played in the support
and advancement . . . of [the] university and the greater community
in and around Fordham.’’
Dr. Kvint, in parallel with his professorship and academic studies,
continues his consulting activity in emerging market countries. He
is the Chairman of the Economic Expert Council of the State Committee for Sport and Physical Culture of the Russian Federation and
the Chairman of the board of directors of NEP Bank. In 2002 he
was elected as co-Chairman of the International Council of Russian
Compatriots, an organization that unites 35 million Russians living
abroad, and was elected as an Honorary Member of the Russian
Economists’ Club and a member of the Russian Attorneys’ Academy. In 2003, he was awarded the Gold Medal as an ‘‘Honorary Advocate of Russia.’’
Between 1996 and 2001, Kr. Kvint was an economic adviser to the
King of Bulgaria, Simeon II. In 2001, the king returned to Bulgaria
and was elected Prime Minister. In 2002, Dr. Kvint, together with
Steve Forbes, was awarded the Golden Crest by the Renaissance Society of Bulgaria for the internationalization of Bulgarian business.
In the same year, he was elected a full lifetime member of the International Academy of Regional Development.
As a result of his studies, Dr. Kvint has published numerous books
in Russia, Ukraine, Poland, and the U.S., and hundreds of articles,
which have appeared in various periodicals, magazines, and newspapers in several countries, including the U.S. (Forbes, Harvard Business Review, Institutional Investor, Journal of Accountancy,
International Executive, The New York Times). Some of his books
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are: Acceleration of Technical Industrial Development (Moscow, 1976;
received National Award); The Introduction and Use of Automation
Systems (Moscow, 1981); Krasnoyarsk Experiment (Moscow, 1982);
Regional Scientific-Technological Complexes (with co-authors; Donetzk, Ukraine, 1983); The Polar Star Above Us (Moscow, 1985; received National Award); Management of Scientific-Technical Progress:
Regional Aspect (Moscow, 1986); Enterprise-Industry-Region: The
Economic and Scientific-Technial Information (with co-authors; Moscow, 1987); and Scientific Technological Development of the Economy
of Daghestan Republic (Mahachkala, 1988; received Daghestan National Award). His cover story in Forbes, ‘‘Russia Should Quit the
Soviet Union’’ (February 1990), was included in a list of best business stories in the United States. In the U.S., he authored several
books, including The Barefoot Shoemaker: Capitalizing on the New
Russia (New York, 1993); Creating and Managing International Joint
Ventures (with co-authors; Westport, Connecticut, 1996); Emerging
Market of Russia (title editor and co-author; New York, 1998); International M&A Joint Ventures & Beyond (New York, 1998, 2nd Edition in 2002). In 1999, the first edition of The Global Emerging
Market in Transition was the subject of a special conference held at
the U.N. headquarters. In 2003, Bloomberg Press published a book
titled Investing Under Fire: Winning Strategies for Bulls, Bears, and
the Bewildered. In this book, Professor Kvint wrote about calculating
the risk of foreign direct investment in emerging market countries.
This book is written by outstanding co-authors including General
Wesley K. Clark, Ambassador Dennis Ross, and the Vice Chairman
of Goldman Sachs International, Robert D. Hormats.
Dr. Kvint is listed in Who’s Who in America, Who’s Who in the
World, Who’s Who in Science and Engineering, Who’s Who in Finance
and Industry, Who’s Who in American Education, Who’s Who Among
American Teachers, the International Who’s Who of Intellectuals
(Great Britain), the Contemporary Who’s Who of the American Biographical Institute, and Harvard Business School’s International Directory of Business and Management Scholars and Research.
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